G-VIIO Las Vegas

[Father Dick Byrne]

Originally Posted by suninmyeyes

I do not know if Father Dick Byrne is a troll or whether he just has a very poor grasp of flight deck procedures, air traffic procedures and what actually happened on that day...

You have no idea how far wrong you are, in those words and the rest of your post.

Because this has gone from professional to personal, I’ll take no further part.

[tdracer]

Originally Posted by Banana4321

I would have thought that it is both possible and useful for a single "EVAC" button to perform the required cutoffs and fire extinguishers and therefore eliminate the need for (most of) the Evacuation Checklist (or a significant part thereof). We live in an age of technology. Non?

Are you seriously advocating a single button that would shutdown all the engines? You don't see a problem with that?

[Capn Bloggs]

Originally Posted by AVR4000

It is almost painful to hear the lack of fire communication from ATC in this case, it is like crew were "expected" to figure everything out on their own. It is pretty clear that ATC saw what's happened since they started to issue go-around commands and closed the runway but not a single word about the fire being serious.

I agree. I'm sitting there trying to work out what is going on. What do you guys want, everybody to be polite and stay quiet until I ask? The aeroplane's majorly on fire, FFS ATC should keep calling me until I respond! "BA, there's a large fire underneath your centre fuselage!". "Tell ATC to be quiet, I'm busy", while I continue to "Diagnose?". I don't think so.

Originally Posted by tdracer

Are you seriously advocating a single button that would shutdown all the engines? You don't see a problem with that?

Put it on a squat switch. What could possibly go wrong?

Originally Posted by NTSB

The relief pilot told a cabin crewmember to get ready to evacuate and, after returning to the flight deck, stated (at 1615:50), "doesn't look good to me." Also at that time, the CVR recorded a sound similar to the interphone (a call from the cabin to the flight deck), which was not answered.

Methinks that should be 1613:50.

Video again, for a refresh...

You Tube

[RatherBeFlying]

The flight crew seems to be the last to know there's a raging fire

The cabin crew and passengers were very much aware, but it took a long time for the flight crew to receive the information.

The announcement "Remain seated" while a fire is obviously increasing by leaps and bounds only communicates that the flight crew is unaware of the fire. Had they been aware, the announcement would have been "Evacuate".

[pax britanica]

Isnt it about time that airliners were fitted with video cams that focussed on key areas of the aircraft . Aviation seems to prefer indicators over reality as this technology ha been around for a few years, I know that anything fitted to an airliner cost 20 times as muchas the same thing fitted toa car and understand why but in the circumstances and many others where there is airframe damage out of sight from the flight deck is it too much to spend ratehr than relying on EGT indications and fire 'sensors'

if you spent $!00m plus ona building you would surely have some cctv in there but not it seems on a plane.

As to this incident , from a pax POV then I think the crew did pretty well, they functioned as a crew for a start despite the captain fast tracking a checklist item and as has been often said its all very well having procedures and following them but when the sh-t really hits the fan right in front of you then you may decide to act ina slightly different but still logical way and the key thing is the aircraft stopped quickly and safely , fuel was contained-not ideally but contained and the everyone got out quickly and safely. It struck me in the Sully film how much time the feds spent trying to prove that eh could have landed , well maybe he could if he had headed for Teterboro the same second the first goose struck -ignoring shut down and restart processes of course and . A lot of Monday morning quarterbacking on these issues -whats next VAR for the flight deck LoL

[mickjoebill]

At the pull and twist of a handle, the worlds most tested computers can’t be trusted to “make safe” an aircraft for evacuation, once it’s come to a stop?

mjb

[AVR4000]

The lack of ATC information can be summarized using a couple of screenshots from the airport security camera and should make it pretty evident why they should have updated the crew.



This is the point of engine failure and the beginning of the event.



The fuel ignites a few seconds later, take-off is now aborted and the aircraft starts to slow down.


The fire is now more intense and things start to get serious. No ATC calls has been made yet since it is just a few seconds after the initial event.



This is the situation when the crew transmit "Speedbird 2276, stopping". This is the first time where an ATC reply would be expected AND to those who make the argument about "ATC shouldn't disturb the crew" - this is when the latter *is* contacting them reporting that they abort take-off. The situation is pretty evidently bad AND the lack of any more comment from the pilot such as "Speedbird 2276, stopping... (pause) we have an engine fire" is a clear indication that they are unaware of the serious fire.

ATC should have replied "there's a lot of smoke and visible flames on the left side of your aircraft" at this time and it is pretty evident just by looking at the picture.


This is the situation when the crew transmit "Speedbird 2276, mayday, mayday, request fire services". This is the second occasion when ATC should have told them that they have a serious fire on their left side and a lot of smoke.


This picture is from the point in time when ATC reply "fire services on their way" and that they didn't add any information about the fire and smoke is pretty baffling indeed.

An appropriate ATC exchange between Speedbird 2276 and themselves would have been something along the lines:

BA2276: "Speedbird 2276, stopping."
ATC: "Roger, Speedbird 2276, there's smoke and flames on the left side of your aircraft."
BA2276: "OK, standby" (from Speedbird 2276)
BA2276: "Speedbird 2276, mayday, mayday, request fire services!"
ATC: "Fire services are on their way, there's still a lot of smoke and fire on your left side."

The other version would be:

BA2276: "Speedbird 2276, stopping."
BA 2276: "Speedbird 2276, mayday, mayday, request fire services!"
ATC: "Roger, Speedbird 2276, fire services are on their way, there's a lot of smoke and flames on the left side of your aircraft, they are on their way now."
BA2276: "OK, standby"

We can compare it with the 1985 accident in Manchester and the ATC exchange. This image says it all:


This is British Airtours flight 28M during their abandoned take-off and the picture was taken at approximately the same time as their information exchange with ATC:

KT28M: "28 Mike, we're abandoning take-off.... (pause, fire warning comes on) it looks as though we've got a fire on the number one."
ATC: "Right, there's a lot of fire, they are on their way now."

This information enabled the captain to tell the cabin "Evacuate on the right side please" and also placed him and his F/O in the appropriate mindset regarding shutting down the remaining engine and get going with evacuation immediately after stopping.

So yes, ATC should convey information to a burning aircraft when the crew contact them. Kindly notice this - "when the crew contact them". It is appropriate to report visible smoke and flames when the aborted take-off is reported (it means that the crew is in the "communicate" stage of aviate, navigate, communicate) so replying with information about the situation is appropriate.

I am pretty sure that the situation in Manchester would have been even worse than it became *if* ATC hadn't told the crew about the fire. It is probable that they would have stopped with the number 2 still running, trying to assess the situation before finally ordering evacuation (or that the cabin crew had initiated it before the engine had been shut down due to the rapidly deteriorating conditions in the cabin).

So a combination of improved possibilities for the crew to assess the situation (cameras) and relevant ATC information during the "communicate" stage is the best course of action.

[AVR4000]

Originally Posted by mickjoebill

At the pull and twist of a handle, the worlds most tested computers can’t be trusted to “make safe” an aircraft for evacuation, once it’s come to a stop?

mjb

It doesn't work that way since such a system would have to perform a couple of things:

1. Set parking brake.
2. Shut down the remaining engine(s).
3. Close the fuel supply to the engines.
4. Operate the fire suppression system if needed (such as when fire warning is still on after the first shot have been fired into the engine).
5. Depressurize the cabin.

The next question is when this system should kick into action? Is it when an engine failure is detected (a failure would be defined as sudden rpm drop, loss of thrust, reduced burner pressure, overheating, fire indication etc)? It must be able to distinguish between an "engine failure" and a "catastrophic fuel-fed fire" since the need to evacuate arise in the latter case but not the former.

The question is how the system can determine a fuel leak and a fire caused by it unless a sophisticated set of sensors paired with a computer system can figure out that "X amount of fuel is flowing but the engine is shut down" or "the amount of fuel pumped out of the tank is higher than the amount of fuel received on the engine end". I.e. the fuel is flowing at a normal rate from the tank but the engine failure caused the line to separate so it is flowing out on the tarmac rather than into the right place.

An over-automated aircraft relying on artificial intelligence (i.e. the decision-making is now transferred to the machine itself and different systems operate in specific ways on different events) would be less safe since the automation would require very exact, reliable input from multiple sources in order to make appropriate decisions such as shutting down engines immediately when the speed hits 0 after an abandoned take-off.

Even a manual "evacuation switch" that shuts down the engines, close the fuel-supply, depressurizes the cabin and everything would require pretty complex co-operation across different systems without adding any particular benefit but rather increase risks if something doesn't work in the process.

The normal evacuation checklists are OK, the thing is to convey information to the crew so they can make a quick, informed decision whether an evacuation is necessary or not.

[BAengineer]

Originally Posted by mickjoebill

At the pull and twist of a handle, the worlds most tested computers can’t be trusted to “make safe” an aircraft for evacuation, once it’s come to a stop?

mjb

Well the only real thing you have to make safe is to stop both engines - on the 777 that is a matter of flicking 2 switches. I dont see that adding yet another way of shutting down is really needed.

[tdracer]

Originally Posted by mickjoebill

At the pull and twist of a handle, the worlds most tested computers can’t be trusted to “make safe” an aircraft for evacuation, once it’s come to a stop?

mjb

Any switch that has the capability to shut down both (or all) engines has a failure mode that will do exactly that when it shouldn't. As I wrote before, do you really thinks its a good idea to design in a failure mode that will cause the loss of all engines?
It would also violate a several FAR/CSs...
Heck, even with the action of two, independent switches required to shut down both engines, there have been at least two cases when the pilots shut down both engines in-flight when they meant to do something else...

[back to Boeing]

Originally Posted by tdracer

Any switch that has the capability to shut down both (or all) engines has a failure mode that will do exactly that when it shouldn't. As I wrote before, do you really thinks its a good idea to design in a failure mode that will cause the loss of all engines?
It would also violate a several FAR/CSs...
Heck, even with the action of two, independent switches required to shut down both engines, there have been at least two cases when the pilots shut down both engines in-flight when they meant to do something else...

adding to that. One of the basic tenants of aviation safety is redundancy. Where is the redundancy in one switch killing off everything

[Cloudtopper]

Where are the initial posters , back in 2015 , saying this was well handled .....

[ROKNA]

The ATC tape clearly show both ATC and 777 getting stepped on while trying to each tell the other there was a problem

The tower was getting a Delta to go around having seen the smoke from the 777, the Delta really dragged out the RT

Plenty of youtube clips capture it

You Tube

[Yaw String]

Lots of discussion on whether the crew received information on the true nature of their dilemma.
I think one of the most difficult decisions can often be,"do we need to evacuate",however...once the decision has been made,it is a " read and do" procedure. I believe this to be the case in most airlines in the World.
The boss didn't "read and do"..
shouldn't this be the crux of the discussion!
Maybe he didn't have quick access to the Evacuation Checklist ...either electronic or paper...

[wiggy]

Originally Posted by Yaw String

..once the decision has been made,it is a " read and do" procedure. I believe this to be the case in most airlines in the World.
The boss didn't "read and do"..
shouldn't this be the crux of the discussion!
Maybe he didn't have quick access to the Evacuation Checklist ...either electronic or paper...

FYI and for obvious reasons procedures have changed but as vaguely recall it at the time of the accident at BA the evacuation checklist was not a mandatory “read and do”, it was done from memory but it was available on the back cover of the QRH and on the yoke clip (though that version did not contain the warning about Fuel Control switch operation).

The Electronic Checklist occults once the Fire Switches are pulled so is not used for that checklist.

[sudden twang]

Wiggy,
i think the read and do came in way before this event. The checklist was amended at some point to make the yoke checklist non SOP. I agree with everything else’s that you’ve said. 👍
And as for the CRUX of the matter surely it’s why the capt had to reject the take off in the first place. It was a latent system failure that made it necessary to initiate the evacuation
Whichever way you look at it everyone got off safely. Good maybe, good enough definitely.
Gone are the days when an evacuation was as easy as ABCDE. A aircraft stop B brakes set C cut off fuel to engines and APU D depressurise E evacuate.
Its likely that had the crew gone against SOPs and moved the fuel control switch to cut off during the deceleration then this event would have had a better outcome. However I very much doubt any airline would advise this for v g reasons.

[wiggy]

Sudden Twang

i think the read and do came in way before this event. The checklist was amended at some point to make the yoke checklist non SOP.

Fair enough... for a long time it was supposedly a checklist done from memory and then if possible the actions checked using the paper QRH...I’ll admit I thought we formally transitioned to “read and do” very shortly after this accident, but that was umpteen iterations of QRH and IPad etc ago so if I haven’t got the timing of the change of procedure correct blame my fading memory.

Yaw String

Wiggy, I agree that the initial crux of the matter was why the event occured.
However,after the final report has been released,I think it is reasonable to be discussing how to,or not to,evacuate successfully.

?? TBH you lost me with that comment, I’m not aware I’m on record as saying we shouldn’t be discussing the evacuation....

[sudden twang]

Originally Posted by Yaw String

Nobody was injured in the Singapore inferno,therefore a successful outcome,However,would you have reacted the way they did!

An interesting comparison. Whilst both crews were in the wrong place at the wrong time and the failures were not down to them, nothing the BA Flt crew did exacerbated the fire. The same cannot be said of the SIN crew. Both incidents resulted in all occupants surviving so again good enough.
Train in the Sim to be as perfect as possible then when there is real shock, surprise, Adrenalin etc humans won’t Perform as well but will hopefully be good enough to allow to all to survive.

[42go]

To me, all this kerfuffle about whether ATC told the crew about the fire, how long it took to call an evac, etc etc, are ALL overshadowed by the fact that the Captain initiated the evac without doing the most important action - shutting down the running engine. It was lucky no-one got sucked into the motor. That should be the focus of any criticism here.

[sewushr]

Am I the only one that thinks it odd that BA no longer insist on 'window blinds open' as part of their pre-departure and pre-landing safety announcement (unless they have re-instated it very recently).

It isn't mandatory to include this as part of the briefing, but it is considered by most Safety Regulators to be good practice, and most other airlines I've flown on recently still include it, and are quite insistent that all window blinds are fully open for take off and landing. As an airline that has had more than one incident involving a cabin evacuation with a fire outside the aircraft, I'd have thought it would be prudent to re-instate it.

Apologies if they have done so. I haven't flown with BA for quite a few months, but took several flights with them after the Las Vegas incident and was struck by the fact that it no longer formed part of the safety briefing.