A319 FO windshield blowout
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Part of the government sponsored propoganda, I should think. shimin released all this info and now perhaps, the only ATC audio tape ever to come out of China. Unfortunately, it does not appear that the accident reports that I requested will appear any time soon. Only carefully cultivated positive info.
Not to take away from the crew. Congrats for getting the aircraft safely down.
Not to take away from the crew. Congrats for getting the aircraft safely down.
I agree that the performance of the flight and cabin crew after the blowout was amazing and I have the deepest respect for their performance. I truly hope the F/O regains his hearing.
However, having fussed with transport windshields for many years and ridden on jump seats staring out them, it is inconceivable to me that a windshield could fail in this manner. The loss of the BAC 1-11 Captain's windshield was a failure of the retention frame of the aircraft holding the windshield due to improper installation. This one was a transparency failure. Was there any indication of windshield overheat? Even that should not fail it. They are designed to resist fairly large bird strikes. Truly a puzzle.
The Airbus A320 series has a long history so it can't be a design failure. It would have shown up years ago. Anyone have any ideas?
However, having fussed with transport windshields for many years and ridden on jump seats staring out them, it is inconceivable to me that a windshield could fail in this manner. The loss of the BAC 1-11 Captain's windshield was a failure of the retention frame of the aircraft holding the windshield due to improper installation. This one was a transparency failure. Was there any indication of windshield overheat? Even that should not fail it. They are designed to resist fairly large bird strikes. Truly a puzzle.
The Airbus A320 series has a long history so it can't be a design failure. It would have shown up years ago. Anyone have any ideas?
Is there a chance a windshield could be ‘bogus parts’?
The outfit I was with in the mid nineties had trouble with bogus parts, they came complete with paperwork etc.
The outfit I was with in the mid nineties had trouble with bogus parts, they came complete with paperwork etc.
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The possibility of a bogus part had occurred to me but a windshield would be a tough part to duplicate. I noticed, on re-reading previous posts that I had missed that the windshield had cracked with a very loud noise prior to its total failure. Years back I was overseeing an installation of a new F/O windshield on an L-1011. The mechanic was engaged in torqueing the retainer screws when he slipped a bit and lost his grip on the torque wrench. The pointy drive bit hit the very edge of the glass scratch shield that overlays the entire outer face. It is a very thin, tempered glass sheet that actually is bent and glued down to the curved windshield. It chipped the edge. That thin panel went into bits of glass with a noise that was a loud as a pistol shot. That glass layer played no part in the strength of the windshield. Its only function was to prevent erosions or scratching of the softer (relatively) layer under it.
I have seen cracked laminations in windshields but none of them failed catastrophically. I have seen the results when the internal heating layer failed and left burns an delamination inside but again, no blow-outs. This is a very puzzling failure and I am sure that certain companies are losing some sleep over it.
I have seen cracked laminations in windshields but none of them failed catastrophically. I have seen the results when the internal heating layer failed and left burns an delamination inside but again, no blow-outs. This is a very puzzling failure and I am sure that certain companies are losing some sleep over it.
Looks like China rewards it's pilots when they do a great job under difficult circumstances. Captain Liu Chuanjian was just awarded $777,000 for his actions.
Pilot who landed plane after co-pilot was 'sucked halfway' out cockpit window awarded $777G | Fox News
Pilot who landed plane after co-pilot was 'sucked halfway' out cockpit window awarded $777G | Fox News
The loss of the BAC 1-11 Captain's windshield was a failure of the retention frame of the aircraft holding the windshield due to improper installation.
6 bolts were the correct diameter but 0.1 inch too short, while 84 bolts were of the wrong diameter (0.026 undersize).
Kaylock floating anchor nuts are attached to the airframe and are elliptical in shape prior to insertion of the bolt. The nut shape permitted sufficient grip for the reduced diameter bolts to be torqued to the correct value, but insufficient grip to retain the bolts against pressurisation forces.
Kaylock floating anchor nuts are attached to the airframe and are elliptical in shape prior to insertion of the bolt. The nut shape permitted sufficient grip for the reduced diameter bolts to be torqued to the correct value, but insufficient grip to retain the bolts against pressurisation forces.
Have heard that the final report is out, but sadly for me, don't speak Chinese.
Anyone seen it?
Anyone seen it?
Taken from ASN
https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=211013
The report mostly in chinese ...
At least there are pictures and some limited english text to go by.
jr
Yes, the Windshield anti ice was the cause.
Apparently the curtains in business class exited the front windscreen. And DC 1 and 2 failure mixed in.
MSA was rather high - I seem to remember it started with a 2...
A bad day at the office very well handled.
edit. They didn’t put in the pic of remnants the FOs tie, but the pic of the shirt makes up for it! (P26).
there are some good diagrams and graphs that tell a lot that are labelled in English.
Apparently the curtains in business class exited the front windscreen. And DC 1 and 2 failure mixed in.
MSA was rather high - I seem to remember it started with a 2...
A bad day at the office very well handled.
edit. They didn’t put in the pic of remnants the FOs tie, but the pic of the shirt makes up for it! (P26).
there are some good diagrams and graphs that tell a lot that are labelled in English.
Last edited by compressor stall; 10th Jun 2020 at 09:25.
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One of my personal interests is that when most people think that high altitude hypoxia will be fatal, Liu's experience is opposite to that. My personal understanding is that the high-speed impact air greatly enhances the air density of the cockpit, of course, including the increase of oxygen. This is a particularly interesting discovery to me. I will work with my colleagues, aeronautical medics and flight control experts to study these interesting topics with accident data collected. We expect that we will find something, and then prove something, for our safer air travel.
I had just been wondering if the ram air entering the cockpit had increased the cabin pressure enabling the pilot to continue without supplemental oxygen for longer.
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Interesting to note there are no bolt holes (a-la BAC1-11) and the window seems to fit from the outside i.e not plug, so its just bonded with pressure working against it!?
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Courtesy of google translate.
1. Facts
1.1 Flight past [1]
On May 14, 2018, Sichuan Airlines Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Sichuan Airlines) Airbus A319-133/B-6419 performed Chongqing-Lhasa flight 3U8633. There are 3 flight crew members (responsible captain, second captain, first officer), 5 crew members, 1 safety officer and 119 passengers.
At 06:27:18 (Beijing time, the same below), the plane took off from Chongqing Jiangbei Airport. The left captain Liu XX served as the PF, the right seat co-pilot Xu XX served as the PM, and the second captain Liang X sat in the observer position. Entering the cruise stage, the second captain Liang X is the third member in the cabin 1F seat.
At 06:56:46, the plane rose to a cruising altitude of 9800m (32100ft) and held it. At 07:06:47, it flew over MIKOS on route B213, with a cabin height of 6272ft. 07:07:05, flew to 2.2km west of MIKOS on the B213 route, cockpit
At a height of 6272ft, there was a muffled noise in the CVR. The crew found a radial mesh crack on the right windshield. The crew described it as "very broken, very flowery, all cracked" afterwards.
At 07:07:06, the co-pilot said "the windshield was cracked".
At 07:07:06, the message “ANTI ICE R WINDSHIELD” appears in ECAM. 07:07:07, the right windshield heating function is disabled (the right windshield is triggered in DAR
Of the logical value).
07:07:10, the second "Bang" sound appeared in the CVR. 07:07:11, the captain said "I operate". 07:07:19, the crew sent to the Chengdu Regional Control Center (hereinafter referred to as "regional management")
Report aircraft failure, apply for lower altitude, maintain 8400m under the command of district management, the crew follows
After applying for a return flight, it was reported that the windshield was cracked and it was decided to alternate to Chengdu. 07:07:42, the cabin pressure difference is 7.688psi.
[2]
07:07:45, the cockpit height is 6256ft. A muffled "boom" sound appeared in the CVR, followed by continuous noise in the CVR, which continued until the aircraft landed. The DC bus bar DC BUS 1/DC BUS 2 is powered off, the load of the No. 2 engine generator becomes 0 (07:30:38 recovery), the left windshield and the left and right side window heating failure, the automatic brake system fails, and the flight guide 2 is broken On, SEC2 and SEC3 are faulty, and the spoilers No.1, No.2 and No.5 are faulty.
07:07:46, the cabin pressure difference is 7.688psi [3]. Autopilot (AP) is disconnected. The captain manually operated the aircraft and began to descend. The plane turned right and then left.
07:07:48, the automatic thrust is disconnected.
07:07:50, the standard pressure for flight altitude is 31864ft, the cockpit height is 24320ft, and the cabin pressure difference is 0.922psi. ECAM's cockpit altitude warning appears for the first time (until 07:29:39). The ECAM electrical system page pops up and the ELAC1 roll channel is faulty (continues until the end of the flight).
07:08:09, flight altitude standard pressure 31664ft, cockpit height 24362ft, maximum gradient (left) 51.7°.
At 07:08:14, the standard pressure of the flight altitude is 31512ft; the cockpit height is 26368ft. At this time, the cockpit height reaches the highest in the whole journey, and then it gradually decreases. The cockpit pressure differential is 0.578 psi. ELAC2 The pitch and roll channels are invalid, and the pitch control enters the standby rule.
From 07:08:17 to 07:17:08, the district manager continuously called the crew through various means, but no response was received.
07:08:46, the flight altitude standard pressure is 30876ft.From 07:08:46 to 07:09:15, 07:09:18 to 07:09:41, DAR records that there are inputs on both the left and right side bars (intermittently triggers double operation warnings). 07:09:26, the maximum descent rate is 10279ft/min; 07:09:47, the maximum table speed is 349 knots.
At 07:09:57, the aircraft altitude was 24072ft, and the descent rate was less than 100ft/min for the first time. Until 07:16:39, the aircraft altitude remained above 23600ft.
At 07:10:39, the ATC radar showed that the aircraft transponder code was set to 7700.
At 07:10:57, for the first time in the CVR, the breathing sound of the crew (first officer) wearing an oxygen mask [4].
After entering the cockpit, the second captain used his EFB [5] to query information such as aeronautical charts. At 07:14:25, the MCDU flight plan was changed to direct flight to Chongzhou (CZH). At 07:16:40, the flight altitude began to fall below 23600ft and continued to decline. At 07:17:09, the district manager continuously called the crew, but no response was received.
Blindly send the crew “contact approach 124.85 if heard”.
At 07:19:25 and 07:19:32, the crew announced MAYDAY twice in the district management frequency. District management responded, but CVR and ATC recordings were not recognized
The crew's acceptance of the control instructions.
07:19:56, the aircraft is located on the west side of CZH at 8.9NM, and the altitude is starting to fall below the standard
The altitude of air pressure is 6000m[6].
At 07:20:17, the crew reported a cabin pressure loss. 07:20:26, the crew reported again: "The cabin is depressurized, and it is now flying towards Chongzhou
4200m".
At 07:20:44, the district management command fell to 3600m to maintain, the crew did not respond. At 07:22:36, the aircraft was located 2.7NM west of CZH, and the altitude began to fall below
4800m[7].
At 07:24:20, the crew was in the Chengdu terminal control room (hereinafter referred to as the "approach" frequency report Mayday), and is now hovering below Chongzhou altitude.
At 07:24:32, the approach replied: "Yes, the current position continues to circle right down to the height, down to the corrected sea pressure of 2700m, and the corrected sea pressure of 1004".
At 07:27:39, the cockpit height began to fall below 10000ft. 07:28:33, the flap handle is set to 1. 07:28:48, the landing gear handle is set in the down position. 07:29:20, the flap handle is set to 2.
07:29:39, the cockpit height is 8928ft, and the cockpit height warning disappears. 07:30:14, approach call "3U8633, now using the runway... available
02...".
At 07:30:17, the crew blindly issued "turn left 02R[8] to land". 07:34:42, the APU main switch is turned on (the APU is unavailable due to power failure). 07:35:46, the flap handle is set to 3 positions. 07:37:32, the approach command "can land on runway 02R, wind direction 250, 2m/s,
RVR is greater than 2000m".
07:37:45, the crew reported "Tower, 8633 02R landed, occupied runway" (ATC
Not heard in the recording).
07:41:05, 3U8633 uses flaps 3 to land on runway 02R of Chengdu Shuangliu Airport
Ground.
At 07:43:07, the plane finally stopped at the junction of E8 and 02R. 07:44:06, 3U8633 established contact with the tower, the crew reported that they could not autonomously slide
Yes, the crew and flight attendants were injured.
1. Facts
1.1 Flight past [1]
On May 14, 2018, Sichuan Airlines Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Sichuan Airlines) Airbus A319-133/B-6419 performed Chongqing-Lhasa flight 3U8633. There are 3 flight crew members (responsible captain, second captain, first officer), 5 crew members, 1 safety officer and 119 passengers.
At 06:27:18 (Beijing time, the same below), the plane took off from Chongqing Jiangbei Airport. The left captain Liu XX served as the PF, the right seat co-pilot Xu XX served as the PM, and the second captain Liang X sat in the observer position. Entering the cruise stage, the second captain Liang X is the third member in the cabin 1F seat.
At 06:56:46, the plane rose to a cruising altitude of 9800m (32100ft) and held it. At 07:06:47, it flew over MIKOS on route B213, with a cabin height of 6272ft. 07:07:05, flew to 2.2km west of MIKOS on the B213 route, cockpit
At a height of 6272ft, there was a muffled noise in the CVR. The crew found a radial mesh crack on the right windshield. The crew described it as "very broken, very flowery, all cracked" afterwards.
At 07:07:06, the co-pilot said "the windshield was cracked".
At 07:07:06, the message “ANTI ICE R WINDSHIELD” appears in ECAM. 07:07:07, the right windshield heating function is disabled (the right windshield is triggered in DAR
Of the logical value).
07:07:10, the second "Bang" sound appeared in the CVR. 07:07:11, the captain said "I operate". 07:07:19, the crew sent to the Chengdu Regional Control Center (hereinafter referred to as "regional management")
Report aircraft failure, apply for lower altitude, maintain 8400m under the command of district management, the crew follows
After applying for a return flight, it was reported that the windshield was cracked and it was decided to alternate to Chengdu. 07:07:42, the cabin pressure difference is 7.688psi.
[2]
07:07:45, the cockpit height is 6256ft. A muffled "boom" sound appeared in the CVR, followed by continuous noise in the CVR, which continued until the aircraft landed. The DC bus bar DC BUS 1/DC BUS 2 is powered off, the load of the No. 2 engine generator becomes 0 (07:30:38 recovery), the left windshield and the left and right side window heating failure, the automatic brake system fails, and the flight guide 2 is broken On, SEC2 and SEC3 are faulty, and the spoilers No.1, No.2 and No.5 are faulty.
07:07:46, the cabin pressure difference is 7.688psi [3]. Autopilot (AP) is disconnected. The captain manually operated the aircraft and began to descend. The plane turned right and then left.
07:07:48, the automatic thrust is disconnected.
07:07:50, the standard pressure for flight altitude is 31864ft, the cockpit height is 24320ft, and the cabin pressure difference is 0.922psi. ECAM's cockpit altitude warning appears for the first time (until 07:29:39). The ECAM electrical system page pops up and the ELAC1 roll channel is faulty (continues until the end of the flight).
07:08:09, flight altitude standard pressure 31664ft, cockpit height 24362ft, maximum gradient (left) 51.7°.
At 07:08:14, the standard pressure of the flight altitude is 31512ft; the cockpit height is 26368ft. At this time, the cockpit height reaches the highest in the whole journey, and then it gradually decreases. The cockpit pressure differential is 0.578 psi. ELAC2 The pitch and roll channels are invalid, and the pitch control enters the standby rule.
From 07:08:17 to 07:17:08, the district manager continuously called the crew through various means, but no response was received.
07:08:46, the flight altitude standard pressure is 30876ft.From 07:08:46 to 07:09:15, 07:09:18 to 07:09:41, DAR records that there are inputs on both the left and right side bars (intermittently triggers double operation warnings). 07:09:26, the maximum descent rate is 10279ft/min; 07:09:47, the maximum table speed is 349 knots.
At 07:09:57, the aircraft altitude was 24072ft, and the descent rate was less than 100ft/min for the first time. Until 07:16:39, the aircraft altitude remained above 23600ft.
At 07:10:39, the ATC radar showed that the aircraft transponder code was set to 7700.
At 07:10:57, for the first time in the CVR, the breathing sound of the crew (first officer) wearing an oxygen mask [4].
After entering the cockpit, the second captain used his EFB [5] to query information such as aeronautical charts. At 07:14:25, the MCDU flight plan was changed to direct flight to Chongzhou (CZH). At 07:16:40, the flight altitude began to fall below 23600ft and continued to decline. At 07:17:09, the district manager continuously called the crew, but no response was received.
Blindly send the crew “contact approach 124.85 if heard”.
At 07:19:25 and 07:19:32, the crew announced MAYDAY twice in the district management frequency. District management responded, but CVR and ATC recordings were not recognized
The crew's acceptance of the control instructions.
07:19:56, the aircraft is located on the west side of CZH at 8.9NM, and the altitude is starting to fall below the standard
The altitude of air pressure is 6000m[6].
At 07:20:17, the crew reported a cabin pressure loss. 07:20:26, the crew reported again: "The cabin is depressurized, and it is now flying towards Chongzhou
4200m".
At 07:20:44, the district management command fell to 3600m to maintain, the crew did not respond. At 07:22:36, the aircraft was located 2.7NM west of CZH, and the altitude began to fall below
4800m[7].
At 07:24:20, the crew was in the Chengdu terminal control room (hereinafter referred to as the "approach" frequency report Mayday), and is now hovering below Chongzhou altitude.
At 07:24:32, the approach replied: "Yes, the current position continues to circle right down to the height, down to the corrected sea pressure of 2700m, and the corrected sea pressure of 1004".
At 07:27:39, the cockpit height began to fall below 10000ft. 07:28:33, the flap handle is set to 1. 07:28:48, the landing gear handle is set in the down position. 07:29:20, the flap handle is set to 2.
07:29:39, the cockpit height is 8928ft, and the cockpit height warning disappears. 07:30:14, approach call "3U8633, now using the runway... available
02...".
At 07:30:17, the crew blindly issued "turn left 02R[8] to land". 07:34:42, the APU main switch is turned on (the APU is unavailable due to power failure). 07:35:46, the flap handle is set to 3 positions. 07:37:32, the approach command "can land on runway 02R, wind direction 250, 2m/s,
RVR is greater than 2000m".
07:37:45, the crew reported "Tower, 8633 02R landed, occupied runway" (ATC
Not heard in the recording).
07:41:05, 3U8633 uses flaps 3 to land on runway 02R of Chengdu Shuangliu Airport
Ground.
At 07:43:07, the plane finally stopped at the junction of E8 and 02R. 07:44:06, 3U8633 established contact with the tower, the crew reported that they could not autonomously slide
Yes, the crew and flight attendants were injured.
1.9.1 Personal injury situation After the windshield fell off, there was an explosive cabin pressure loss.
After the leakage air is taken away from the seat, it returns to the cockpit seat by its own power. During this period, the first officer's body was bruised or scratched by hard objects such as cockpit instruments and windshield frames, and the body was pulled by the seat belt. After diagnosis, the first officer's right eye contusion, left upper arm skin contusion, right calf back scratch, bilateral groin contusion, was discharged on May 21, 2018
At the time of the incident, flight attendant No. 5 was serving a meal at the 22nd row, and was thrown up due to the drastic change in the aircraft's attitude, causing a waist injury. After being diagnosed, the flight attendant suffered from multiple traumas throughout the body and a L1 compression fracture of the lumbar spine. He was discharged on May 28, 2018.
After the leakage air is taken away from the seat, it returns to the cockpit seat by its own power. During this period, the first officer's body was bruised or scratched by hard objects such as cockpit instruments and windshield frames, and the body was pulled by the seat belt. After diagnosis, the first officer's right eye contusion, left upper arm skin contusion, right calf back scratch, bilateral groin contusion, was discharged on May 21, 2018
At the time of the incident, flight attendant No. 5 was serving a meal at the 22nd row, and was thrown up due to the drastic change in the aircraft's attitude, causing a waist injury. After being diagnosed, the flight attendant suffered from multiple traumas throughout the body and a L1 compression fracture of the lumbar spine. He was discharged on May 28, 2018.
There's a bunch of stuff in there on CFD computer modelling post windscreen loss if you want to copy and paste it into google translate.
Only half a speed-brake
In addition to the official and factual report of events: ....
https://www.imdb.com/title/tt10218664/
Viewer beware, Chinese pilots facepalm when asked their opinion.
https://www.imdb.com/title/tt10218664/
Viewer beware, Chinese pilots facepalm when asked their opinion.
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In addition to the official and factual report of events: ....
https://www.imdb.com/title/tt10218664/
Viewer beware, Chinese pilots facepalm when asked their opinion.
https://www.imdb.com/title/tt10218664/
Viewer beware, Chinese pilots facepalm when asked their opinion.
Couldn't be any worse that the US 2012 film 'Flight', could it?
I have read the complete thread including the dispersions that may have been cast on Shimin's role in assisting the Chinese propaganda machine. I have no knowledge of Chinese civil aviation operations so couldn't comment but if the Chinese wanted to offset a perception of ineptitude that some might harbour, then they couldn't have picked a better event to hold up as a candle. Regardless of what is and what is not propaganda, I think it can be reasonably accepted without question that the FO's window completely departed the airframe, partially sucking him out and that despite the ensuing decompression, damage to systems, untrustworthy information, no comms, high terrain, intense noise, cold and buffeting wind pressure on the body, the Captain hand flew the airplane and with some navigation (and O2) assistance from the second Captain, brought the flight to a safe landing. Well done the Captain and crew as a whole.
Just an observation that there must have been a hell of lot of visual and aural warnings going off but I suppose none of them could be heard in the cacophony. That might have been a blessing in disguise!
This was effective seat of the pants flying. We discuss in so many threads about automation, Children of Magenta, experience necessary to land as a single pilot in a pilot incapacitation scenario etc, etc. But the reality is that this guy had a piece of broken aluminium strapped to him with a bunch of warm furry bodies clinging to it down back, and was served up a dogs bollocks for breakfast that morning. He had one job. Fly the damned POS airplane, no matter what condition it is in, no matter what else is happening around him, and no matter what all his senses are trying to tell him, no matter what SOP's said. He didn't go for the QRH. Probably got sucked out the window anyway!! . He is the only person in the world who with a bit of luck (good wx, daylight ops, and the aircraft not breaking up or departing the flight regime due to possible unknown flap system damage) could make this a successful outcome and used all his piloting skills to do it.
No two events are the same, no matter how similar they may seem but I guess we don't have to look too far to find perfectly serviceable aircraft lost with all lives on board when all that was needed was this guy or someone like him in any one of of those two seats up front. How do we get back to that position?