SWA1380 - diversion to KPHL after engine event

[Cloudtopper]

More to meet the eye here..

Considering the gravity of this situation , 2 serious failures and memory actions accordingly plus a flap non normal checklist - landing with flap 5.

Theres no doubt about it , they managed the situation quiet well looking at the outset.

The ATC commucation was a little amateur in places . Perhaps a bit more force - personally i would of starting with a MAYDAY . Get the point across .

Did ATC speak a little too much - Much Slang?

The non normal checklist calls for a descent to 10000 during a rapid descent - why would they accept 11000 as per audio .

The rate of descent from 10K to circuit alt - how high ROD .

I also saw a bank angle of close to 45 recorded. This would imply the aircraft was close to an upset condition or very close to approaching one

Lastly . Regarding the earlier career of the captain flying for the US navy , should this imply that a non navy trained airline pilot is unable to carry out the above manoeuvres in a safe fashion - The media unfortunately appear to snowball this and quite often refer to this accident as a single pilot ops .

Significant investigative effort should also be placed on examining the
procedures and why the airline has had a similar occurrence 2 years back .

Out .

[pax britanica]

Captain certainly was extremely calm but then her years in the cockpit of an F18 doing stuff like night carrier landings would mean that while this was not exactly a walk in the park it probably wasnt the most frightning experience of her career.

The ATC tapes certainly show a very calm professional teamwork between ground and flight deck with a lot of quick thinking by ATC to give her a non standard visual approach into Philidelphia.

Humans 2 Automated FD and ATC Nil on this one, yes?

[Herod]

Flymesome.

We didn't have the option of choosing between Flaps 15 and any other Flap setting on our QRH in the One Engine Inoperative Landing Checklist. Does planning a Flaps 5 landing raise the question of legality in terms of crew training?

As I recall. you are right. 15 flap on one engine. However, there are times when a command decision calls for operation outside SOPs. That decision was made here, and I would suggest it was the right one. Successful outcome.

[PEI_3721]

Flymesome, you should always have options. QRH/SOPs are guidance; it’s up to you to select the most appropriate option for the situation, which may not be covered by documentation.
Forget the legalities; if you choose a justifiable option then there is a defensible case - for events at that time, and not based on evaluation after event or with hindsight.
In this instance, with wing leading edge/ slat damage, a ‘good’ option is to leave configuration as it - the aircraft is flying and still controllable. cf MD 80 tail trim accident.

[deadheader]

ICAO recommends the use of standard "PANPAN" and "MAYDAY" calls instead of "declaring an emergency" as failing to use non-standard phraseology has previously resulted in confusion and aircraft handling errors:

https://www.hkatc.gov.hk/HK_AIP/aic/AIC21-12.pdf

https://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/115.pdf

[megan]

Sure, I listen to the brief.

[bizdev]

Pax window

For info - although a bit of thread drift - one of the very many cowling release incidents happened to an A320 Airtours aircraft out of LGW. The departing cowl took out an outer pax window but in this instance did not cause a depressurisation as the inner pane remained intact. Only reason for mentioning this is that it may not have been the exiting fan blade that hit the window (albeit that this was not the same aircraft type)

[RAT 5]

F5 with LED's at EXT was an understandable choice. When the Qantas A380 blew one, I also believe they did some handling checks. I presume that included some flap selections, but I can't remember all the ACI program details.
I wonder if a F5 election at 10,000 would be a good idea to confirm, before finals, that it was not going to cause control problems.
I'll be interested to hear how soon after the engine fire indication, i.e. the first 'attention- getting startle item', that the depressurisation warning pinged. The engine shutdown = immediate descent from FL32.5 anyway and the memory items being taken care of as the descent is being set up: then ping goes the pressurisation. Wow, that is a can of worms that not even the nastiest TRE would dream up in an RST sim. I'm glad there was more than a few years experience up front to deal with this. It would have been a real team effort as they bounced around checklists from Recall and had to include ATC.
I would have expected the broken window to create an explosive decompression, but it is a small opening. That will also be interesting hear about. Thus was it a MMo descent or same speed? I wonder how suction changes with IAS.

[infrequentflyer789]

another ntsb briefing

Latest from the NTSB is now on youtube:

You Tube

Some interesting info on the window - they have found no trace of window material inside the aircraft. He didn't conclude anything from this, but I would suspect it points away from window being shattered by high energy impact (ie. the blade) and towards the window or frame being cracked by blunt impact from other debris and then blown out. From the photos we have the frame looks to me to be pretty intact though.

[M.Mouse]

In the video the speaker says the cabin altitude warning goes off at around 13,500'? Is that correct. My experience of Boeings is that the warning sounds at a cabin altitude of 10,000' and the masks will drop automatically at 13,500'. Is the B737 different?

[MarkerInbound]

Originally Posted by flymesome

2) We didn't have the option of choosing between Flaps 15 and any other Flap setting on our QRH in the One Engine Inoperative Landing Checklist. Does planning a Flaps 5 landing raise the question of legality in terms of crew training?

I'm just curious.

FAR 91.3, 121.557 and 559, 125.319 and 135.19 all state something similar to "In an emergency situation that requires immediate decision and action the pilot in command may take any action that he considers necessary under the circumstances. In such a case he may deviate from prescribed operations procedures and methods, weather minimums, and this chapter, to the extent required in the interests of safety."

So no matter what rules you are operating under, if you are around to talk about it what you did is ok.

[FiveGirlKit]

EASA airworthiness directive issued 2 weeks ago, FAA not

EASA issued AD 2018-0071 on 26 March 2018 following the first incident of loss of fan blade. It says:

Reason:
An occurrence was reported of fan blade failure on a CFM56-7B engine. The released fan blade was initially contained by the engine case, but there was subsequent uncontained forward release of debris and separation of the inlet cowl. Preliminary investigation determined that the fracture in the blade initiated from the fan blade dovetail.
This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to fan blade failure, possibly resulting in uncontained forward release of debris, with consequent damage to the engine and the aeroplane.
To address this potential unsafe condition, CFM International issued CFM56-7B SB No. 72-1019, later revised, and CFM56-7B SB No. 72-1024, providing inspection instructions.
For the reason described above, this AD requires a one-time inspection of certain fan blades, and, depending on findings, accomplishment of applicable corrective action(s).
This AD is considered an interim action and further AD action may follow.

It is interesting that the FAA have not yet issued an AD on the same subject, despite a Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) being issued covering the same issue on 25 August 2017.

Maybe they are now speeding up the AD process, as stated here

[Highway1]

Originally Posted by M.Mouse

In the video the speaker says the cabin altitude warning goes off at around 13,500'? Is that correct. My experience of Boeings is that the warning sounds at a cabin altitude of 10,000' and the masks will drop automatically at 13,500'. Is the B737 different?

737 cabin altitude warning is triggered at 10,000ft (+/- 1000).

The altitude pressure switch releases the passenger oxygen mask automatically when cabin altitude is at or above 14000 feet.

[CONSO]

Originally Posted by pax britanica

Captain certainly was extremely calm but then her years in the cockpit of an F18 doing stuff like night carrier landings would mean that while this was not exactly a walk in the park it probably wasnt the most frightning experience of her career.

She may NOT have been carrier qualified which would infer combat ready- and at that time women were not allowed in combat roles. She WAS and instructor AND " agressor" pilot for training . .

[PukinDog]

Originally Posted by ExSp33db1rd

And what's all this cr*p about misuse of oxygen masks by the passengers ? Maybe they didn't follow the precise design features for designed use, but they were more in danger from not opening their individual release valves by not giving the line a good tug, but does it matter how they breathed sufficient oxygen, did anyone die through lack of oxygen ?

Exactly, cr*p. IF they donned them over mouths only, the brain is automatically going to have them sucking it in through their mouths because thats where it knows the O2 they put the mask on to get is. I really doubt anyone with it over their mouths only was breathing through their nose only.

No, nobody died. Nobody incapacitated either by any account. In fact, the 2 male pax who pulled the lady stuck halfway out the window and the female, ex-nurse pax who began attending to her once back inside doing CPR etc, plus whatever cabin crew were there on the injury scene did all they did do with no masks.

Those throwing spitballs about yellow-cup mask use as if it mattered just reckon they'd diligently follow every instruction to the letter under stress so they act as if those in the aircraft were wearing them on top of their heads like party hats, or something.

[CONSO]

Structurally-speaking, I wonder what kinds of tests Boeing will need to do around that window and fuselage area?

EVER since the days of the British Comet disasters, there has been major attention to the structure around windows- There is a relatively ' massive' forging along and around the windows- window line. So much so that a few inches diff the part(s) would not have penetrated. No doubt that area will be NDT for any cracks or hidden damage.

[tscell7]

Originally Posted by hikoushi

In the USA we "declare an emergency". However if lack of use of the word "MAYDAY" is the only criticism we can throw at this American domestic crew operating in American domestic airspace, let's just shut up and say good job.

I would concur. There was no confusion between pilot and controller. I listened to the audio and from the moment the pilot announced they were descending, the controller inferred the emergency and began vectoring them towards a landing.

My only quibble with the approach controller were the multiple queries about the nature of the emergency ("is the engine still on fire?" etc.) which were probably redundant in a situation where the pilots' hands were full.

I also found it interesting that the pilot chided ATC about too many frequency changes -- those were edited out of the audio clip I listened to.

[Herod]

IIRC, the use of "Pan" and "Mayday" in UK is also to cover against any claims by third parties. I once had a medical emergency on board and requested a priority landing. The controller advised that he couldn't give me that. "Pan, pan, pan"...."You are cleared direct three-mile final". That way, if anyone, e.g. people under a non-standard flight path, complain, the controller and the airport authority are covered. Different from America, and perhaps American pilots operating into UK should know about it. Thread drift; sorry.

[costalpilot]

Originally Posted by tscell7

I would concur. There was no confusion between pilot and controller. I listened to the audio and from the moment the pilot announced they were descending, the controller inferred the emergency and began vectoring them towards a landing.

My only quibble with the approach controller were the multiple queries about the nature of the emergency ("is the engine still on fire?" etc.) which were probably redundant in a situation where the pilots' hands were full.

I also found it interesting that the pilot chided ATC about too many frequency changes -- those were edited out of the audio clip I listened to.

quite right...imo, the emergency should have been given directed a discrete frequency. there were way too many distracting transmissions, so much so that at one point atc had to clarify to the emergency flight who they were talking to. .

Also. ATC ended up having to tell the emergency flight that some of ITS questions: 'it doesn't matter." Indeed, it didn't matter.

Approach control even instructed the emergency flight to avoid "the city" while giving her the mda.

I understand much of it (tension), but the frequency congestion was avoidable, had they just given her a discrete frequency. How hard could that be?

[Airbubba]

For some reason, I don't think Southwest pilots have to worry too much about ICAO R/T procedures.