Turkish (private) jet down in Iran

[Jet Jockey A4]

More incompetence in a cockpit.

[spoon84]

Very sad and incredible. I think that blaming the pilots., which are not here anymore, doesn't help. I think that many accidents are nowadays related to unreliable instruments reading and bad manual flying skills related to bad problem solving. That's scary.

Looking at the future and with shortage of pilots, we need to be able to elevate the quality of training and give the pilots all the tools to become proficient and confortable to solve all problems in complex cockpit situations.

[Jetstream67]

I wish training still included flying somewhere in the course ...

[macdo]

That is exactly what is scary about the scenario in 20 years time. By then, most pilots sitting in both seats will have come come through an approved school and accelerated themselves into a flying computer which has eroded what basic flying skills they ever had. All the old guys from the military or GA will have retired. If you can't revert to Power+Attitude=Perf. when deprived of your flight instruments, what hope is there that aircraft can be saved if the instruments fail?

[lucille]

But don’t you just love it when they say Capt. XYZ has 19,000 hours and is very experienced. How so? I ask, when 18,800 of those has been sitting staring out of the window with the AP engaged. Its no more useful experience than sitting in First Class, sipping Champagne and logging the time.

The odd chap I know who dares to hand fly an approach will never do so with the A/T disengaged. It’s no wonder no one can fly.

[atakacs]

Originally Posted by macdo

That is exactly what is scary about the scenario in 20 years time.

Well by then it is far from certain that anyone would be sitting in those chairs.

As for this accident it seems that yes, the pilots are to blame.

[BizJetJock]

the pilots are to blame

Really? The training system in general, a company that probably went out of its way to find the cheapest training that was legal or the regulators that made those rules - none of these are any factor? I hope you are never judged by those standards, for your sake.

[BluSdUp]

Atakacs.
Dear Sir, I bet my boat that in 20 years there is still a pilot in any transport category aircraft and the oars that there is still two!!
Specially the 100 000 plus produced from ca 1970 to ca 2038.
Most of them piloted by qualified crew, as basic training and recurrent training has to get better.

Murphy and Darwin is hard at work weeding out the weak and incompetent on line, as the schools, CAAs and Flight-training Departments are not capable of stopping them. Being run by money, not safety.
The exception looks to be the USA , and every day that goes, I get greater respect for the FAA system.
The European system so loved by insiders and outsiders alike, are severely flawed. Incompetent pilots get command every day.
Rising two levels above competency level is endemic , I am afraid!

Regards
Cpt B

[J.O.]

Originally Posted by atakacs

As for this accident it seems that yes, the pilots are to blame.

Sure thing, remove pilots and no more accidents will occur.

/sarcasm.

I have to wonder if the cockpit gradient was a factor here. Interrupting the FO's attempts to complete a checklist that might have helped address the situation smells suspiciously like a captain with CRM issues.

[filejw]

Originally Posted by spoon84

Very sad and incredible. I think that blaming the pilots., which are not here anymore, doesn't help. I think that many accidents are nowadays related to unreliable instruments reading and bad manual flying skills related to bad problem solving. That's scary.

Looking at the future and with shortage of pilots, we need to be able to elevate the quality of training and give the pilots all the tools to become proficient and confortable to solve all problems in complex cockpit situations.

So who would you blame ? I always thought I had a personal responsibility to to keep my skill level and systems knowledge up to a certain standard whether an issue was covered in recurrent training or not. I had unreliable airspeed abnormal two or three times in my career and the last time just before retirement last year the A/P disconnected at the same time. Make sure you can fly the A/C in all situations folks .

[Vessbot]

Originally Posted by J.O.

Sure thing, remove pilots and no more accidents will occur.

/sarcasm.

I have to wonder of the cockpit gradient was a factor here. Interrupting the FO's attempts to complete a checklist that might have helped address the situation smells suspiciously like a captain with CRM issues.

I don't think so. It's very normal that when getting conflicting indications and losing control, to get hyper focused on the immediate task (that "fly the airplane first" thing) and shed nonessentials until it's under control. But it's a catch-22 that the nonessential being shed might help regain control...

[macdo]

I think it is difficult not to blame the pilots of being at fault for crashing the aircraft. The fact that they clearly were not capable of dealing with the situation was most likely the fault of their training. As for CRM, I imagine the confusion and lack of a disciplined response to the emergency was again, a fault of their training and ability to perceive the problem and work as a team to solve.

[hans brinker]

Originally Posted by mjv

https://aviation-safety.net/database...?id=20180311-0

Ouch. Sounds like the FO was trying to do the right thing while the Captain didn't react correctly. While it could have been possible to get an overspeed during the climb as there were reports of turbulence while over mountainous terrain, the combination of overspeed on one side in combination with reports of icing conditions make wrong airspeed indication due to pitot icing more likely. Pulling engines to idle while continuing to climb would not be the right reaction even if there was an overspeed. Subsequently ignoring stall warnings and stick pushers while at least some of the airspeed indications seemed to be correct (Comperator warning) until the engines flamed out is just not excusable. Much more realistic training is required to prevent these things from happening.

[Intrance]

Power and pitch, know your plane. I'm no top gun, but I know roughly the power settings and pitch my CRJ will do in the different phases of flight. Who in their right mind will pull thrust to idle in a climb and then sit and stare for a minute watching airspeed still climb, without thinking something is not quite right? I hope that is just a mistake in the description on ASN.

EFIS COMP MON is not a very hard caution message to deal with. It should normally combine with an indication on the PFD to tell you which comparison has failed (pitch/roll/alt/ias/hdg etc). The QRH steps for it combined with IAS indication are literally to cross check the instruments, determine which one is likely correct and switch to that side data source. If no indication for IAS seems correct, go to unreliable airspeed and fly according to pitch/power tables.

[Loose rivets]

Way back, I issued a met warning in Palma one night when our BAC 1-11 showed nothing on one ASI and over 350 on the other. We'd just lifted off. The aircraft was thrown over some hangers to the left of the runway. We climbed away and everything was normal after that except that Barcelona became very busy that night.

The relevant point here is that with those conditions, accelerative side forces in those conditions may just have caused a momentary difference in the pitot/static pressures that triggered the difference warning. Not long, but an age if the wrong conclusions are arrived at.

[megan]

get hyper focused on the immediate task (that "fly the airplane first" thing) and shed nonessentials until it's under control

Vessbot, couldn't agree more. Was once in a situation where I was so focussed on getting us out of our predicament that I never knew until it was over that the PM had put out a mayday, nor conscious of the bells and whistles in the cockpit blaring. Hearing is the first thing you lose when under stress.

[Dan_Brown]

I blame the modern system. Geared to automatics. Why isn't this scenario trained for and practised???. Which of the 3 has the most potential to be unreliable?? Attitude? Power indication? or A/S that has been through some sort of ADC? 20/20 hindsight is a wonderful thing but all the crew had to do was fly an attitude and a power setting. If you have forgotten the power setting, then it should be in the QRH, should it not?.Flying skills are well down the list of priorities for most outfits of today. These sort of failures and how to deal with them, should be practised in training. from ab initio onwards. A known power setting plus attitude will give a know A/S, whether it be IAS or TAS. Even some sense would be drawn from a G/S read out, corrected for wind.. So fly an attitude for level flight and a known power setting. That would have kept them flying under control and this must be a memory item or reflex action. If the auto pilot plays up, we fly manually, and don't use it. right? If the airspeeds are showing ambiguity, don't use them.

Anyone have any ideas why this training is not in place??? We are moving away from the basics and have been for a long time. Yes, if the computers keep playing up, we are going to see more of this. Pilots now are becoming over reliant on automation.

[The Deec]

Originally Posted by lucille

But don’t you just love it when they say Capt. XYZ has 19,000 hours and is very experienced. How so? I ask, when 18,800 of those has been sitting staring out of the window with the AP engaged. Its no more useful experience than sitting in First Class, sipping Champagne and logging the time.

The odd chap I know who dares to hand fly an approach will never do so with the A/T disengaged. It’s no wonder no one can fly.

Very true but unfortunately computers are better at flying planes than us weakest link humans are... they are much quicker at identifying tech /inst problems before our small brains can get our heads around a very complicated problem... Add into the mix short rest periods, fatigue, high alt ,flying long sectors through different time zones and you've got a recipe for disaster. There really is no real need for pilots any more when you think about it .

[flash8]

50​​​ page interim here in English (scroll down to entry 8):

https://www.cao.ir/web/english/inves...teLayout=false

​​​​​​

[suninmyeyes]

But don’t you just love it when they say Capt. XYZ has 19,000 hours and is very experienced. How so? I ask, when 18,800 of those has been sitting staring out of the window with the AP engaged. Its no more useful experience than sitting in First Class, sipping Champagne and logging the time.

The odd chap I know who dares to hand fly an approach will never do so with the A/T disengaged. It’s no wonder no one can fly.

Except in the early days of those 19,000 hours he may have flown some heavy piston engined planes or turbo props, or early generations of jets, when autopilots were not reliable and better basic skills were required. He probably flew well before GPS or INS was used and so was used to tracking VOR and ADF needles and flying instrument approaches manually. He has probably experienced a couple of engine failures and shutdowns in his 28 year career. Admittedly he probably had better knowledge of pitch and power settings in the earlier days than he has now but after all those hours at the controls he probably has a better feel for when something is going wrong and what feels right. He probably has a better interpretation of a weather radar image and what is safe and what is not safe because he flew before red, amber, and green weather radar presentations and not only interpreted the old green picture but tilted it down to the ground and used it to assess his drift. He does less hand flying now than he used to but can still hand fly when needed. His copilot might think his reactions are a little slow but the truth is this grizzled veteran is evaluating for just that little bit longer before he makes a decision over a diagnosis that can have deadly results if got wrong.

In those 19,000 hours he has probably had about 5 days as a professional airline pilot where he really frightened himself. These occasions might have been unforecast bad weather or technical problems or near mid air collisions or swiss cheese holes lining up on him. He will have done many more simulator checks than an inexperienced pilot and will have seen unreliable airspeed numerous times and had he been faced with the conditions that caused this terrible accident above he might just have paused when the Mach overspeed clacker sounded. He (or she) might have looked at the copilot's ASI, felt that something was wrong and then realised the situation rather than closing the thrust levers on the basis of a faulty indication. So don't knock the 19,000 hour pilot, it is true 18,000 hours of time may have been spent on autopilot but his years of experience may have given him the skills needed to cope with the unexpected, unbriefed situation that might just avoid an event becoming an accident.