Turkish (private) jet down in Iran
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Ten of the victims remains have been returned and been buried in Turkey. The captain`s remain are still in Iran for forensic examination.
https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2018/gundem...liyor-2289103/
https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2018/gundem...liyor-2289103/
International newspapers says nothing...
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That`s rather curious. My understanding from the various press reports I have come across, is that forensic identification was required for ID of victims and further examinations were being conducted on the remains of the captain. In addition for DNA ID matching would be required. This would suggest, whilst DNA samples have been matched for the other victims, none yet may have been matched for the captain.
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https://www.google.it/amp/s/www.wash...6bc_story.html
The bodies were all found as the black boxes. Usually for the CVR it doesnt take so long to read it...
The bodies were all found as the black boxes. Usually for the CVR it doesnt take so long to read it...
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Here the named last picture. As I understand Captain Beril Gebes(ch), Copilot Melike Kuvvet, Stewardess Eda Uslu. (May they rest in peace)
https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2018/gundem...liyor-2289103/
But the next article contains interesting details.
https://www.ntv.com.tr/galeri/turkiy...7kGCXriPV2Owbg
I think that is inside the airplane. The red balloons are filled with helium?
The next foto a red balloon partial visible as well. They took it to the flight?
Isn't it the same like dry ice....hidden DG?
https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2018/gundem...liyor-2289103/
But the next article contains interesting details.
https://www.ntv.com.tr/galeri/turkiy...7kGCXriPV2Owbg
I think that is inside the airplane. The red balloons are filled with helium?
The next foto a red balloon partial visible as well. They took it to the flight?
Isn't it the same like dry ice....hidden DG?
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An all too familiar mishap following an instrument disagreement on a transport jet.
Narrative from the link above:
Narrative from the link above:
Narrative:
A Turkish Challenger 604 corporate jet impacted a mountain near Shahr-e Kurd in Iran, killing all 11 on board.
The aircraft departed Sharjah, UAE at 13:11 UTC on a flight to Istanbul, Turkey. The aircraft entered Tehran FIR fifteen minutes later and the Tehran ACC controller cleared the flight to climb to FL360 according to its flight plan. About 14:32, the pilot requested FL380, which was approved. Before reaching that altitude, the left and right airspeeds began to diverge by more than 10 knots. The left (captain's) airspeed indicator showed an increase while the right hand (copilot's) airspeed indicator showed a decrease.
A caution aural alert notified the flight crew of the difference. Remarks by the flight crew suggested that an 'EFIS COMP MON' caution message appeared on the EICAS.
As the aircraft was climbing, the crew reduced thrust to idle. Approximately 63 seconds later, while approaching FL380, the overspeed aural warning (clacker) began to sound, indicating that the indicated Mach had exceeded M 0.85. Based on the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) of the aircraft, the pilot flying should validate the IAS based on the aircraft flight manual and define the reliable Air Data Computer (ADC) and select the reliable Air Data source. The pilot did not follow this procedure and directly reduced engine power to decrease the IAS after hearing the clacker. The actual airspeed thus reached a stall condition.
The copilot tried to begin reading of the 'EFIS COMP MON' abnormal procedure for three times but due to pilot interruption, she could not complete it. Due to decreasing speed, the stall aural warning began to sound, in addition to stick shaker and stick pusher activating repeatedly. The crew then should have referred to another emergency procedure to recover from the stall condition.
While the stick pusher acted to pitch down the aircraft to prevent a stall condition, the captain was mistakenly assumed an overspeed situation due to the previous erroneous overspeed warning and pulled on the control column. The aircraft entered a series of pitch and roll oscillations.
The autopilot was disengaged by the crew before stall warning, which ended the oscillations. Engine power began to decrease on both sides until both engines flamed out in a stall condition.
From that point on FDR data was lost because the electric bus did not continue to receive power from the engine generators. The CVR recording continued for a further approximately 1 minute and 20 seconds on emergency battery power. Stall warnings, stick shaker and stick pusher activations continued until the end of the recording.
The aircraft then impacted mountainous terrain.
A Turkish Challenger 604 corporate jet impacted a mountain near Shahr-e Kurd in Iran, killing all 11 on board.
The aircraft departed Sharjah, UAE at 13:11 UTC on a flight to Istanbul, Turkey. The aircraft entered Tehran FIR fifteen minutes later and the Tehran ACC controller cleared the flight to climb to FL360 according to its flight plan. About 14:32, the pilot requested FL380, which was approved. Before reaching that altitude, the left and right airspeeds began to diverge by more than 10 knots. The left (captain's) airspeed indicator showed an increase while the right hand (copilot's) airspeed indicator showed a decrease.
A caution aural alert notified the flight crew of the difference. Remarks by the flight crew suggested that an 'EFIS COMP MON' caution message appeared on the EICAS.
As the aircraft was climbing, the crew reduced thrust to idle. Approximately 63 seconds later, while approaching FL380, the overspeed aural warning (clacker) began to sound, indicating that the indicated Mach had exceeded M 0.85. Based on the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) of the aircraft, the pilot flying should validate the IAS based on the aircraft flight manual and define the reliable Air Data Computer (ADC) and select the reliable Air Data source. The pilot did not follow this procedure and directly reduced engine power to decrease the IAS after hearing the clacker. The actual airspeed thus reached a stall condition.
The copilot tried to begin reading of the 'EFIS COMP MON' abnormal procedure for three times but due to pilot interruption, she could not complete it. Due to decreasing speed, the stall aural warning began to sound, in addition to stick shaker and stick pusher activating repeatedly. The crew then should have referred to another emergency procedure to recover from the stall condition.
While the stick pusher acted to pitch down the aircraft to prevent a stall condition, the captain was mistakenly assumed an overspeed situation due to the previous erroneous overspeed warning and pulled on the control column. The aircraft entered a series of pitch and roll oscillations.
The autopilot was disengaged by the crew before stall warning, which ended the oscillations. Engine power began to decrease on both sides until both engines flamed out in a stall condition.
From that point on FDR data was lost because the electric bus did not continue to receive power from the engine generators. The CVR recording continued for a further approximately 1 minute and 20 seconds on emergency battery power. Stall warnings, stick shaker and stick pusher activations continued until the end of the recording.
The aircraft then impacted mountainous terrain.
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Pretty bad ! the Air France A330 accident isn’t a good comparaison in term of design philosophy. The 604/605 share pretty much the same stall warning system of the 601. It’s bullet proof and old technology. Barely relies on the ADCs, it uses an ALT input to fine tune the trigger point of the shaker and pusher. but other than that, it soley relies on stand alone analog AOA vanes and a proven analog stall computer. The 604/605 might not be a hot rod in the high thirties but it’s a proven aircraft, built like a tank, and has been trusted by major corporations like BOEING to transport their management for the last 20 years.
