UA1175 emergency landing Honolulu
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Based on the information available to us at the moment, we can conclusively state that what caused the occurrence was that something went wrong.
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Aircraft is registered as N780UA, it went to China, Hong Kong to do 'C check' maintenance and modifications like all United aircraft. Not sure if the maintenance was done properly.
This mishap is B-777.
?? Didn't TBC & FAA change the certification testing
----> cost $aving
-- prior to the B-777 cert' ??
Earlier FLIGHT TEST program, B-767, ~ 1982:
One of the most spectacular flight tests
aboard VA3 [aka B-767 JT9D-7R4G ? N602UA]
was the intentional shedding of ice,
a cowl-ring & Bullet-dome full of natural ice
into the LHS Engine -- then drive back to BFI
with that damaged engine still operating
(lots of damage, & shaking)
That video -- fixed camera (as flight test instrumentation)
was perhaps the most impressive test result.
Difference : planned DAMAGE inflight to test aircraft-engine,
and flight back-to-base
proving that engine would hold together.
.
?? Didn't TBC & FAA change the certification testing
----> cost $aving
-- prior to the B-777 cert' ??
Earlier FLIGHT TEST program, B-767, ~ 1982:
One of the most spectacular flight tests
aboard VA3 [aka B-767 JT9D-7R4G ? N602UA]
was the intentional shedding of ice,
a cowl-ring & Bullet-dome full of natural ice
into the LHS Engine -- then drive back to BFI
with that damaged engine still operating
(lots of damage, & shaking)
That video -- fixed camera (as flight test instrumentation)
was perhaps the most impressive test result.
Difference : planned DAMAGE inflight to test aircraft-engine,
and flight back-to-base
proving that engine would hold together.
.
I don't recall any specific issues when they did the fan blade out testing on the PW4084 during the 777 certification. The GE90 was a different issue - the blade was contained, but the inlet and a lot of the engine accessories broke loose due to the massive vibrations. They had to beef up the inlet and accessory attachments as a result of the test (and the FAA updated their requirements for fan blade out pass/fail to address the failures on the GE90). Once the inlet is gone, it's not surprising the aero loads combined with the continued vibrations caused more of the nacelle to depart. Obviously no first hand experience, but apparently the aircraft vibrations after a fan blade out are horrendous (even after the engine has run down) - stories of flight crew nearly unable to read the gauges/displays things were shaking so bad, and the FAA updated the regulations a while back to require various parts of the aircraft (especially the remaining engine(s) ) can withstand several hours of the extreme FBO vibrations.
Damage to engine cowling expected and confined to the affected engine.
Well, it's really an engineer's idea. As engineers have improved the power and reliability of engines, airlines have been able to take advantage of that.
Which would you rather be on? A 777 with two modern, computer controlled and remote monitored engines or a 707 with four smokey turbojets with only 15% of the thrust and controlled by a hydromechanical unit using ten times the moving parts and serviced at whatever intervals?
Which would you rather be on? A 777 with two modern, computer controlled and remote monitored engines or a 707 with four smokey turbojets with only 15% of the thrust and controlled by a hydromechanical unit using ten times the moving parts and serviced at whatever intervals?
A 707 without a doubt, it can fly a lot further
after losing two engines
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I WOULD RATHER BE IN ANY 4 ENGINE JET ANYDAY WAY OUT OVER THE PACIFIC...... If they were 180 minutes ETOPS they would ALL be dead today... Fact
Only a matter of time until a big twin is in the water way out in the middle of nowhere...
Only a matter of time until a big twin is in the water way out in the middle of nowhere...
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Age 23, 4th built , N773UA, part of test program.
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Well you're right, Aterpster, it shouldn't. The year of manufacture was interesting to me, being so close to roll out, and of course the engines are going to be newer than the airframe as it is.
This is not the first time United has been on the ETOPS merry go round, with one not so long ago over the Pacific. As we know, statistics are what run this particular show and theoretically backs up what "we were sold".
Seems like we were sold "way back when" that all the extra care done for an ETOPS operation would keep this kind of stuff from happening. This wasn't just a loss of oil pressure.
I would rather be on a modern aircraft with four modern, computer controlled and remote monitored engines, and luckily for me they exist and I have that choice available, at least on long over-water sectors, so that when one of the modern, computer controlled and remote monitored engines decides to pack up or, as in this case. shed most of its front end, there are 3 more instead of just the one.
One of my problems with ETOPS, apart from the imminent prospect of approval for 420 minutes s/e diversion time (ie 7 long hours over the freezing Southen Ocean hoping the remaining engine won't suffer a failure and that the aircraft's remaining ETOPS significant systems** will continue to perform in accordance with a set of statistical assumptions), is the way that ETOPS maintenance procedures are designed to make an ETOPS aircraft safer than one that's not ETOPS certified. By and large, I would rather that the extra care is applied to every aircraft used on commercial air transport. The regulations essentially acknowledge - admit - that this is not the case.
** On that subject, has anyone ever tested the assumption that the ability to maintain 3% halon concentration in the cargo hold for 7 hours continuously (in the worst case) will suppress a fire that would otherwise spread to other areas including the cabin? As a layman, I don't get it. What is "suppress" supposed to mean in this context? It isn't "extinguish"; if it were they would say "extinguish", wouldn't they? What happens, exactly, when you "suppress" a fire for 420 minutes? Fires consume fuel, if they don't go out they spread.
Last edited by old,not bold; 15th Feb 2018 at 15:24.
Psychophysiological entity
When I went all probability-philosophical back there, I didn't even introduce the added burden on the remaining engine. The concept of hundreds of people being over non-survivable ocean for hours on one engine is something dreamed up by people that are sitting in a warm room - but drowning financially.
That Alitalia executive's heart was in the right place, but then, things were not always as rosy as we'd like to believe.
The 727 drift-down comes to mind, with its subsequent hosing in of fuel.
That Alitalia executive's heart was in the right place, but then, things were not always as rosy as we'd like to believe.
The 727 drift-down comes to mind, with its subsequent hosing in of fuel.
How do you call this fact. The aircraft would have flown just fine for 180 minutes. Would have flown fine for decades statistically on 1 engine.
But that isn't the choice, is it? I think that my last flight on a smokey 707 must have been in 1971, but I'm not sure.
I would rather be on a modern aircraft with four modern, computer controlled and remote monitored engines, and luckily for me they exist and I have that choice available, at least on long over-water sectors, so that when one of the modern, computer controlled and remote monitored engines decides to pack up or, as in this case. shed most of its front end, there are 3 more instead of just the one.
One of my problems with ETOPS, apart from the imminent prospect of approval for 420 minutes s/e diversion time (ie 7 long hours over the freezing Southen Ocean hoping the remaining engine won't suffer a failure and that the aircraft's remaining significant systems will continue to perform in accordance with a set of statistical assumptions), is the way that maintenance procedures are designed to make the aircraft safer than one that's not ETOPS certified. By and large, I would rather that the extra care is applied to every aircraft used on commercial air transport. The regulations essentially acknowledge - admit - that this is not the case.
I would rather be on a modern aircraft with four modern, computer controlled and remote monitored engines, and luckily for me they exist and I have that choice available, at least on long over-water sectors, so that when one of the modern, computer controlled and remote monitored engines decides to pack up or, as in this case. shed most of its front end, there are 3 more instead of just the one.
One of my problems with ETOPS, apart from the imminent prospect of approval for 420 minutes s/e diversion time (ie 7 long hours over the freezing Southen Ocean hoping the remaining engine won't suffer a failure and that the aircraft's remaining significant systems will continue to perform in accordance with a set of statistical assumptions), is the way that maintenance procedures are designed to make the aircraft safer than one that's not ETOPS certified. By and large, I would rather that the extra care is applied to every aircraft used on commercial air transport. The regulations essentially acknowledge - admit - that this is not the case.