An-148 missing after takeoff from Moscow
Pegase Driver
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Lots of people here are referring to eventual lack of basic flying skills to explain that one. If we were talking about an operator using MPLs with 150h on the right seat or accepting shady licences , perhaps, that would be relevant, but in Russia ? Flying in Russia was (still) includes some of the most regulated professions there and basic flying training was far above some western standards. I do not think things have changed much since my time there. But wait to be corrected.
I was told once that Antonov Russian build aircraft were fitted with ( old) Russian avionics and automation , unlike the Ukrainians built ones , which are fitted with standard Western avionics. Can someone in the know confirm this ?
I was told once that Antonov Russian build aircraft were fitted with ( old) Russian avionics and automation , unlike the Ukrainians built ones , which are fitted with standard Western avionics. Can someone in the know confirm this ?
Bring back manual flying first - Automation after. I'd happily pay XXX more per seat I flew on and know I'd have a crew that were on top form and knew how to manually fly an aircraft. Truth be told, I think 90% of people would.
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The 45-year old FO of this flight was a former steward, who got his license in June 2017 after 10-month courses. All his 812h are on AN-148, no other experience.
The Captain was an ex-military, with a total of more than 2000h on AN-148, but (not officially confirmed yet) only 58h as Capt.
The Captain was an ex-military, with a total of more than 2000h on AN-148, but (not officially confirmed yet) only 58h as Capt.
Hand flying imc
My first two flag carriers did and probably still do hand flying on a nice day.
My last did It when the weather was cr*p especially sensible because of intrusion of unmonitored general Aviation in our airspace on nice days.
When things go wrong it’s often on those dirty days when you are tired...anyone can fly and trouble shoot on a sunny morning.
After the frogs got it wrong there was a similar incident out east..the crew said they only just managed and if it hadn’t been in relatively good weather at the start of their day it would have probably turned into another accident.
My last did It when the weather was cr*p especially sensible because of intrusion of unmonitored general Aviation in our airspace on nice days.
When things go wrong it’s often on those dirty days when you are tired...anyone can fly and trouble shoot on a sunny morning.
After the frogs got it wrong there was a similar incident out east..the crew said they only just managed and if it hadn’t been in relatively good weather at the start of their day it would have probably turned into another accident.
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To a certain extent I can understand forgetting to turn on the pitot heat (who didn't miss an item in his career?), but a plane like this doesn't it have a clearly visible lighted annunciation of that situation? No "all indicator lights out before T/O" philosophy?
But let's face it, we have been taught, trained to the limit, brainwashed, programmed to always trust Your instruments. Now suddenly You AND Yr mate, amidst solid IMC, need to step back and use other sources/procedures to guide Yr plane.
Of course I also flew through sim sessions in which You knew this event was going to be "played". Easy stuff. But I was happy that I never had to tackle a situation as happened here, even if it was because of their own (?) omission.
Unlike an explosive engine failure, this one slowly creeps upon You, which makes is even more deadlier.
But let's face it, we have been taught, trained to the limit, brainwashed, programmed to always trust Your instruments. Now suddenly You AND Yr mate, amidst solid IMC, need to step back and use other sources/procedures to guide Yr plane.
Of course I also flew through sim sessions in which You knew this event was going to be "played". Easy stuff. But I was happy that I never had to tackle a situation as happened here, even if it was because of their own (?) omission.
Unlike an explosive engine failure, this one slowly creeps upon You, which makes is even more deadlier.
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It does actually.. pictures on the Russian forums are floating around with very prominent yellow warning messages displayed on ECAM should the heating be off or failed
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As a humble turboprop pilot I rarely venture into these lofty realms - however, many moons ago as a F/O on a venerable Convair 580 turboprop freighter operating downunder, I had the misfortune to experience a complete failure of the pitot static system on takeoff at night into a low overcast and driving rain.
The usual pitch attitude did not (apparently) give the expected performance, so I reduced the pitch angle from (the usual) 7deg nose up to 5 deg. Speed and ROC continued to (apparently) decrease. I was about to reduce the pitch further when (mental) alarm bells started ringing. I was well below 1000 a.g.l at night, both engines were running and yet the instruments wanted me to pitch forward.
I announced to the Captain that there was a serious issue with the pitot-static instruments and I was reverting to power and attitude only. Won't bore you with the rest of the details; I will only say that the urge to pitch forward to "regain airspeed" was almost overpowering. Watching the ASI decrease towards (and eventually below) stall speed was terrifying, knowing that I was betting our lives on my assessment. The ol 580 didn't have checklists for these situations.
All ended well but it remains the single most terrifying few minutes (and also my proudest) of my career to date.
I can only imagine what this crew was thinking and trying to understand and my heart goes out to them, having some tiny inkling of the confusion they must have felt.
The usual pitch attitude did not (apparently) give the expected performance, so I reduced the pitch angle from (the usual) 7deg nose up to 5 deg. Speed and ROC continued to (apparently) decrease. I was about to reduce the pitch further when (mental) alarm bells started ringing. I was well below 1000 a.g.l at night, both engines were running and yet the instruments wanted me to pitch forward.
I announced to the Captain that there was a serious issue with the pitot-static instruments and I was reverting to power and attitude only. Won't bore you with the rest of the details; I will only say that the urge to pitch forward to "regain airspeed" was almost overpowering. Watching the ASI decrease towards (and eventually below) stall speed was terrifying, knowing that I was betting our lives on my assessment. The ol 580 didn't have checklists for these situations.
All ended well but it remains the single most terrifying few minutes (and also my proudest) of my career to date.
I can only imagine what this crew was thinking and trying to understand and my heart goes out to them, having some tiny inkling of the confusion they must have felt.
Shaggy Sheep Driver:
Really? What is the source of your (mis)information?
SSD:
Probably because there wasn't a massive pitch-up indication. Again, what is the source of your information? Exactly what pitch up attitude are you calling "massive"?
Confusing pitch attitude and angle of attack is a very basic error, especially for a pilot claiming as much experience as yourself.
Many might believe that any of the pilots on AF447 could and should have assessed what was going on from the combination of instrument indications, however your confusion perfectly illustrates some of the issues about assumptions, training, experience etc. They were dealing with it in the air, under pressure, for real, as it happened. You are relaying 'facts' (read assumptions) from the ground, not under pressure, with the benefit of hindsight and years to review the reported facts.
They had all the AIs showing pitch attitude massively high....
Ample time to do an instrument scan and note the excessive nose-up pitch attitude.
Ample time to do an instrument scan and note the excessive nose-up pitch attitude.
SSD:
When the captain came back onto the flight deck to a scene of chaos and panic, but in plenty of time to recover the situation, why did he miss that massive pitch-up indication?
Confusing pitch attitude and angle of attack is a very basic error, especially for a pilot claiming as much experience as yourself.
Many might believe that any of the pilots on AF447 could and should have assessed what was going on from the combination of instrument indications, however your confusion perfectly illustrates some of the issues about assumptions, training, experience etc. They were dealing with it in the air, under pressure, for real, as it happened. You are relaying 'facts' (read assumptions) from the ground, not under pressure, with the benefit of hindsight and years to review the reported facts.
Fortybelow :
That's a belter of an account, and all credit to you for how you handled it. How did the story continue back to landing ?
Given that GPS will also provide quite reasonable approximate values for these items, is there not scope nowadays for it providing a backup display.
That's a belter of an account, and all credit to you for how you handled it. How did the story continue back to landing ?
Given that GPS will also provide quite reasonable approximate values for these items, is there not scope nowadays for it providing a backup display.
I can second what fortybelow wrote. Lost all ASIs on a Citation X in a stormy day, the urge to pitch down to recover the ever reducing indicated speed was definitely there.
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WHBM
gps is always ground speed. so no gps is not the solution.
you may lookup the airbus backup speed scale.
what may be feasible but still highly unreliable was a good wind data base in combination with gps.
gps is always ground speed. so no gps is not the solution.
you may lookup the airbus backup speed scale.
what may be feasible but still highly unreliable was a good wind data base in combination with gps.
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When you look at normalized statistics of crashes (aka the reality), you can clearly see who has better training standards. Just saying
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SAF703 AN-148 Black Box Data Tells of Chaos Before Plane Crash Near Moscow
Well here is the first real answers from the Flight Recorders
It appears they either ignored or glossed over their check lists and missed the Pitot Heat.
Black Box Data Tells of Chaos Before Plane Crash Near Moscow
Black box data recovered from the ill-fated airliner that crashed outside Moscow last week suggests that the plane’s pilots had received different speed measurements preceding the crash, leading to chaos and hampering attempts to stave the tragedy.
Saratov Airlines Flight 703 plummeted in the Moscow region four minutes after departing from Domodedovo Airport on Sunday, claiming 71 lives.
The pilots' "inarticulate cries" can be heard on the flight recorder immediately before the crash, the Kommersant business daily reported on Thursday.
Citing an unnamed source familiar with the black box data, the outlet said that it showed “the pilots didn’t understand why distorted speed readings showed up on the displays,” hampering efforts to bring the critical situation under control.
According to the data, the pilots had failed to turn on the heating of the An-148 aircraft’s pressure measurement equipment before takeoff, despite the procedure being listed on a preflight checklist.
The pilots reportedly got into an argument about the data while trying to solve the problem, increasing the speed and tilting the plane to the ground preceding the crash.
Earlier, Russia’s Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC) said that the pilots had failed to turn on the heating unit for the plane’s pressure measurement equipment, which displayed incorrect speed readings in cold weather.
Russia’s Investigative Committee said Thursday that it would consider the black box data in its criminal investigation of the crash.
https://themoscowtimes.com/news/blac...r-moscow-60528
The Sorry State of Russian Aviation Safety
“If we don’t urgently deal with this problem, these tragedies will simply continue to happen”
The plane was in the air only five minutes before its steep fall began. Left dead were six crew members and 65 passengers, including three children and a Swiss national.
Flight 703 only made it 80 kilometers southeast of the capital after departing Domodedovo Airport on Sunday afternoon. Operated by Saratov Airlines, a regional carrier, the An-148 aircraft was headed for Orsk, a city in southern Russia between the country’s border with Kazakhstan and the southern tip of the Ural Mountains.
Sunday’s scenes were all too familiar for Russians: It was the third major civil airliner disaster in recent years.
Even though 2017 was reportedly the safest year yet in commercial passenger jet travel worldwide, the spate of crashes in Russia, experts say, will continue unless the country's civil aviation agencies are overhauled.
What caused the latest tragedy is only in the early stages of being pieced together.
Investigators said that they are exploring a wide range of possibilities, including poor plane maintenance, inclement weather and human error — though terrorism was ruled out quickly, with the Investigative Committee saying that the plane was intact before the crash.
https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/...n-safety-60475
Russia: Plane crash caused by pilots’ error on speed data
MOSCOW (AP) — Investigators say the crash of a Russian passenger plane that killed all 71 people on board may have been caused by the pilots’ failure to activate heating for pressure measurement equipment, resulting in flawed speed data.
The Interstate Aviation Committee said Tuesday, after studying the plane’s flight data recorder, that Sunday’s crash occurred after the pilots saw varying data on the plane’s two air speed indicators.
The flawed indication came because the pilots failed to turn on the heating unit for the plane’s pressure measurement equipment prior to takeoff.
The pilots put the An-148 on autopilot after taking off from Moscow’s Domodedovo Airport but took manual controls back when they saw clashing speed data.
The plane plummeted into a snowy field six minutes after takeoff, killing all 65 passengers and six crew.
https://apnews.com/ce5fca8731de4c09a7679378195ce080
It appears they either ignored or glossed over their check lists and missed the Pitot Heat.
Black Box Data Tells of Chaos Before Plane Crash Near Moscow
Black box data recovered from the ill-fated airliner that crashed outside Moscow last week suggests that the plane’s pilots had received different speed measurements preceding the crash, leading to chaos and hampering attempts to stave the tragedy.
Saratov Airlines Flight 703 plummeted in the Moscow region four minutes after departing from Domodedovo Airport on Sunday, claiming 71 lives.
The pilots' "inarticulate cries" can be heard on the flight recorder immediately before the crash, the Kommersant business daily reported on Thursday.
Citing an unnamed source familiar with the black box data, the outlet said that it showed “the pilots didn’t understand why distorted speed readings showed up on the displays,” hampering efforts to bring the critical situation under control.
According to the data, the pilots had failed to turn on the heating of the An-148 aircraft’s pressure measurement equipment before takeoff, despite the procedure being listed on a preflight checklist.
The pilots reportedly got into an argument about the data while trying to solve the problem, increasing the speed and tilting the plane to the ground preceding the crash.
Earlier, Russia’s Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC) said that the pilots had failed to turn on the heating unit for the plane’s pressure measurement equipment, which displayed incorrect speed readings in cold weather.
Russia’s Investigative Committee said Thursday that it would consider the black box data in its criminal investigation of the crash.
https://themoscowtimes.com/news/blac...r-moscow-60528
The Sorry State of Russian Aviation Safety
“If we don’t urgently deal with this problem, these tragedies will simply continue to happen”
The plane was in the air only five minutes before its steep fall began. Left dead were six crew members and 65 passengers, including three children and a Swiss national.
Flight 703 only made it 80 kilometers southeast of the capital after departing Domodedovo Airport on Sunday afternoon. Operated by Saratov Airlines, a regional carrier, the An-148 aircraft was headed for Orsk, a city in southern Russia between the country’s border with Kazakhstan and the southern tip of the Ural Mountains.
Sunday’s scenes were all too familiar for Russians: It was the third major civil airliner disaster in recent years.
Even though 2017 was reportedly the safest year yet in commercial passenger jet travel worldwide, the spate of crashes in Russia, experts say, will continue unless the country's civil aviation agencies are overhauled.
What caused the latest tragedy is only in the early stages of being pieced together.
Investigators said that they are exploring a wide range of possibilities, including poor plane maintenance, inclement weather and human error — though terrorism was ruled out quickly, with the Investigative Committee saying that the plane was intact before the crash.
https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/...n-safety-60475
Russia: Plane crash caused by pilots’ error on speed data
MOSCOW (AP) — Investigators say the crash of a Russian passenger plane that killed all 71 people on board may have been caused by the pilots’ failure to activate heating for pressure measurement equipment, resulting in flawed speed data.
The Interstate Aviation Committee said Tuesday, after studying the plane’s flight data recorder, that Sunday’s crash occurred after the pilots saw varying data on the plane’s two air speed indicators.
The flawed indication came because the pilots failed to turn on the heating unit for the plane’s pressure measurement equipment prior to takeoff.
The pilots put the An-148 on autopilot after taking off from Moscow’s Domodedovo Airport but took manual controls back when they saw clashing speed data.
The plane plummeted into a snowy field six minutes after takeoff, killing all 65 passengers and six crew.
https://apnews.com/ce5fca8731de4c09a7679378195ce080
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Flying in Russia this time of the year without the pitot tube heaters on, yeap, that will do it. And from just 6000 feet and maybe even a cloudy day, no way for a recovery. On top, not too many hours on type. Not a chance.
Cheers,
Cheers,
Assuming that the Russian certification requirements are similar to EASA/FAA, which from my experience they are, then one area for accident investigation would be on the pitot heat alerting system.
Was an alert given;
no; then why not, given the requirements below? (if...then this failure must be indicated).
yes; then why was it not observed / acted on? (is there a condition where a pitot heat failure is masked by a collective icing alert relating to another failure or MEL item).
Re AAKEE, is the AoA heating part of the pitot heating system?
Extracts from EASA CS 25
CS 25.1326 Flight instrument external probes heating systems alert
If a flight instrument external probe heating system is installed, an alert must be provided to the flight crew when the flight instrument external probe heating system is not operating or not functioning normally. The alert must comply with the following requirements:
The alert provided must conform to the Caution alert indications.
The alert provided must be triggered if either of the following conditions exists:
The flight instrument external probe heating system is switched ‘off’
The flight instrument external probe heating system is switched ‘on’ and is not functioning normally.
AMC 25.1326 Flight instrument external probes heating systems alert
CS 25.1326 requires that if a flight instrument external probe heating system is installed, an alert must be provided to the flight crew when the flight instrument external probes heating system is not operating or not functioning normally.
It is expected that probe heating system failures are indicated to the flight crew if such failures have an impact on the performance of the heating system to the extent of having an “effect on operational capability or safety”.
... a Caution category of alert is required ... for immediate crew awareness and subsequent crew action. It should be assumed that icing conditions exist during the failure event. The decision to provide heating system failure indication should not be based on the numerical probability of the failure event. If the failure could potentially have hazardous or catastrophic consequences, then this failure must be indicated.
The reliability of the system performing the probe heating system failure detection and alerting should be consistent with the safety effect induced by the failure. Refer to AMC 25.1309, ... for more detailed guidance.
Was an alert given;
no; then why not, given the requirements below? (if...then this failure must be indicated).
yes; then why was it not observed / acted on? (is there a condition where a pitot heat failure is masked by a collective icing alert relating to another failure or MEL item).
Re AAKEE, is the AoA heating part of the pitot heating system?
Extracts from EASA CS 25
CS 25.1326 Flight instrument external probes heating systems alert
If a flight instrument external probe heating system is installed, an alert must be provided to the flight crew when the flight instrument external probe heating system is not operating or not functioning normally. The alert must comply with the following requirements:
The alert provided must conform to the Caution alert indications.
The alert provided must be triggered if either of the following conditions exists:
The flight instrument external probe heating system is switched ‘off’
The flight instrument external probe heating system is switched ‘on’ and is not functioning normally.
AMC 25.1326 Flight instrument external probes heating systems alert
CS 25.1326 requires that if a flight instrument external probe heating system is installed, an alert must be provided to the flight crew when the flight instrument external probes heating system is not operating or not functioning normally.
It is expected that probe heating system failures are indicated to the flight crew if such failures have an impact on the performance of the heating system to the extent of having an “effect on operational capability or safety”.
... a Caution category of alert is required ... for immediate crew awareness and subsequent crew action. It should be assumed that icing conditions exist during the failure event. The decision to provide heating system failure indication should not be based on the numerical probability of the failure event. If the failure could potentially have hazardous or catastrophic consequences, then this failure must be indicated.
The reliability of the system performing the probe heating system failure detection and alerting should be consistent with the safety effect induced by the failure. Refer to AMC 25.1309, ... for more detailed guidance.
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Black Box Data Tells of Chaos Before Plane Crash Near Moscow
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Next time you are in a simulator ask the instructor to give you a blocked static vent before take off roll starts. First hint there is a problem is after lift off when both the altimeter and VSI fail to register. A few seconds later the ASI needle stops increasing as the aircraft climbs and then goes backwards. That may trigger a false windshear warning. Eventually the reducing IAS sets off a false stick shaker.
if in IMC and if you have not seen this event in the simulator before, some pilots will react by lowering the pitch attitude to gain lost airspeed. Others will confirm correct climb power is set and correct nose attitude for climb and disregard the erroneous airspeed and altimeter readings.
This exercise in the simulator you will never forget
if in IMC and if you have not seen this event in the simulator before, some pilots will react by lowering the pitch attitude to gain lost airspeed. Others will confirm correct climb power is set and correct nose attitude for climb and disregard the erroneous airspeed and altimeter readings.
This exercise in the simulator you will never forget