Pegasus Airlines Boeing 737-800 TC-CPF overrun runway at Trabzon. All pax okay
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Sonicbum
Calling me an astronaut made my day.
To all of you apparently feeling emotionally attached to wether this is or is not a common mistake. I'm truthfully sorry. I didn't mean to attack anybody's feeling or anything like that. I simply say that I have never seen anybody do this mistake. And well yes, I'm not in training. I however still have a very fair amount of experience on the 737, classic as ng.
Calling me an astronaut made my day.
To all of you apparently feeling emotionally attached to wether this is or is not a common mistake. I'm truthfully sorry. I didn't mean to attack anybody's feeling or anything like that. I simply say that I have never seen anybody do this mistake. And well yes, I'm not in training. I however still have a very fair amount of experience on the 737, classic as ng.
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I have to admit being surprised by this error. I've never seen it, but there were numerous memos to the trainers to insist on correct hand position because of it. I always trained correct hand position, but for proper TL control reasons, not inadvertent TOGA. If your hand is in the correct Boeing position the thumb is over the AT disconnect switch, true, your 1st & 2nd fingers are also hovering over the TOGA switches. i.e. the correct position gives instance access to both without any hand movement. Therefore the brain has to send the signals to the correct digits depending on what you want to happen. Thus I've never understood how the correct hand position prevents wrong selection.
The incorrect hand position I observed frequently, was guys flying with their hands flat on top of the TL's & TR's and squeezing the whole fitment; either pushing the TL's forward with their palms, and sliding them back with fingers on the TR's. Not good. The TOGA switches were hidden under their hands and inaccessible without lifting the complete hand off the TL's and replacing them. The AT disconnect switches were not covered at all.
This technique of controlling TL's on finals with sweaty palms or gusty conditions was very imprecise, inaccurate & not positive control. Their hands were moving up & back to reposition depending on wanting more or less thrust.
I still fail to understand how it could cause erroneous selection of TOGA, but evidently something did. I'm just not sure this was the reason.
The incorrect hand position I observed frequently, was guys flying with their hands flat on top of the TL's & TR's and squeezing the whole fitment; either pushing the TL's forward with their palms, and sliding them back with fingers on the TR's. Not good. The TOGA switches were hidden under their hands and inaccessible without lifting the complete hand off the TL's and replacing them. The AT disconnect switches were not covered at all.
This technique of controlling TL's on finals with sweaty palms or gusty conditions was very imprecise, inaccurate & not positive control. Their hands were moving up & back to reposition depending on wanting more or less thrust.
I still fail to understand how it could cause erroneous selection of TOGA, but evidently something did. I'm just not sure this was the reason.
either consciously or sub consciously has finger poised to hit TOGA
This reduces the chances of inadvertently selecting an incorrect mode while fiddling with the TOGA buttons while at the same time giving a moderately high enough thrust setting enabling a safe initial climb away gradient.
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A more prudent technique is to manually advance the thrust levers towards go-around thrust while pitching up as part of the GA procedure.
That would suggest you are the type of long disappearing pilot who likes to control the a/c rather than be a follower: but I don't want to open up that long running never ending debate.
That would suggest you are the type of long disappearing pilot who likes to control the a/c rather than be a follower: but I don't want to open up that long running never ending debate.
It surprises me greatly that nobody here mentioned that the safest way is easy: there was no reason for the captain to take over controls, the go-around should have continued even if started accidently. Safest option. Safest solution. Trying to recover from a started go-around is asking for problems, especially on a 737 with a hard power-pitch effect. Go-arounds are non-events, not really what you can say here...
We pilots make mistakes, live with it, stay safe.
Last edited by BraceBrace; 20th Jan 2018 at 21:49.
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It surprises me greatly that nobody here mentioned that the safest way is easy: there was no reason for the captain to take over controls, the go-around should have continued even if started accidently. Safest option. Safest solution. Trying to recover from a started go-around is asking for problems, especially on a 737 with a hard power-pitch effect. Go-arounds are non-events, not really what you can say here...
If, and I stress if it turns out to be the case, then it would appear to be quite similar to QF1 in 1999 and the EK DXB 777 accidents.
QF1 was also a case of a "rejected go-around", that in hindsight, I'm sure the LHS if he had his time again would just have let the process of a missed approach to happen just as per procedure. QF1 Accident report.
Originally Posted by RAT5
I have to admit being surprised by this error [inadvertent TOGA]. I've never seen it, but there were numerous memos to the trainers to insist on correct hand position because of it.
Close to the ground, confusion is to be avoided at all costs, SOP and only SOP will keep you safe 99.999% of the time. For all those times with a minuscule probability, you just have to make it up & hope your brain can perceive things clearly & quickly enough to resolve the scenario safely. In the case of the EK DXB777, the FO followed SOP to the letter, but failed to notice the mistake of TOGA being pushed after main gear weight-on-wheels thereby that it disabling it.
As I said, there is almost no work done on this state of mind & decision making. It is worth examining your own mental processes at work, to determine just how much of the time that you end up in this state, and how long it takes to resolve. You have to be honest about it to yourself.
The opposite state also occurs, where you are in a state of "flow".
In positive psychology, flow, also known as the zone, is the mental state of operation in which a person performing an activity is fully immersed in a feeling of energized focus, full involvement, and enjoyment in the process of the activity. In essence, flow is characterized by complete absorption in what one does, and a resulting loss in one's sense of space and time.
Recently in this state of flow, I observed a highly experienced fellow crew member make a MCP error. He was totally confused (arming APP early, capturing GS before LOC capture, then immediately setting missed approach heading resulting in us turning away from the LLZ intercept). I could actually observe his surprise & confusion at what was happening, and his inability to resolve the solution (simply turning the heading back to original intercept). All I had to do was prompt him to set the heading and his confusion was immediately eliminated. In this instance, I could slowly and methodically observe each and every one of his touches of the MCP panel, and actually anticipate the error, and solution with ease.
I felt totally "in-tune" with both the aircraft, and other pilot making the mistake, that is a state of flow. My mental state of flow just happened to coincide with his error in this particular instance. This isn't always the case & I only tell the anecdote as an example of how our minds work sometimes, not self aggrandizement. I'm nothing special when it comes to aviation.
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The reason nobody mentioned anything yet is probably due to the fact that we are basing everything on assumptions as there are (obviously) no preliminary reports out yet. What the crew "should have done" in a total lack of event details is totally useless.
I could actually observe his surprise & confusion at what was happening, and his inability to resolve the solution (simply turning the heading back to original intercept).
And that is "CLICK CLICK" disengage the autopilot and if appropriate the autothrottle, and without delay manually recover the situation to get back to the desired heading/course/whatever. Whatever actions take place after that depends on pilot discretion.
Click Click
Centaurus, gearlever, I disagree.
It is the ‘click click’ mentality which more often contributes to mistakes.
First just because crews have been shown a film it does not mean that they will change behaviour as required. Why should individual pilots, training, or management think that way; ‘video training complacency’.
Second, ‘click click’ training does not explain when to disengage autos; the critical aspects of judgement based adequate awareness of the situation. Many problems in this category arise from SOPs, - when to use autos or not, and the underlying philosophy of safety benefits. Why use A/T independently from the A/P - few people would consider the opposite arrangement.
Third, is the method of disconnecting fully explained, which includes the means of confirming the selection and appropriate cross checking. How many incidents originate from less than adequate PNF duties when Captains are in that role?
It is the ‘click click’ mentality which more often contributes to mistakes.
First just because crews have been shown a film it does not mean that they will change behaviour as required. Why should individual pilots, training, or management think that way; ‘video training complacency’.
Second, ‘click click’ training does not explain when to disengage autos; the critical aspects of judgement based adequate awareness of the situation. Many problems in this category arise from SOPs, - when to use autos or not, and the underlying philosophy of safety benefits. Why use A/T independently from the A/P - few people would consider the opposite arrangement.
Third, is the method of disconnecting fully explained, which includes the means of confirming the selection and appropriate cross checking. How many incidents originate from less than adequate PNF duties when Captains are in that role?
It's not about a "video", it's about a philosophy.
"If you don't like what you see, or don't understand.. click, click."
This incorporates manual flight = manual thrust.
PEGASUS, as many other accidents may not have happened with "click, click".
"If you don't like what you see, or don't understand.. click, click."
This incorporates manual flight = manual thrust.
PEGASUS, as many other accidents may not have happened with "click, click".
Last edited by gearlever; 21st Jan 2018 at 15:36.
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.I guess that makes me retarded as I was qualified and was not having a seizure.
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Well yeah it did but he click clicked the wrong button.
If you click click the autothrottle on every flight, you will not make a mistake so quickly by inadvertently pressing toga instead.
It all boils down to:
1. Are you allowed by sops?
2 are you comfortable to do so because of your training?
3. Are you encouraged to manually fly the beast by the airline/crew mates/culture?
It all boils down to:
1. Are you allowed by sops?
2 are you comfortable to do so because of your training?
3. Are you encouraged to manually fly the beast by the airline/crew mates/culture?
Not really, for anything that creates an "unstable approach" you will have to go-around, a rule implemented by pretty much every sane company. Unstable is from 1000/500 AGL... and below. Children of the magenta is fantastic and tries to solve problems, below a certain height trying to solve problems is not the preferred method, staying safe is.
But I completely 100% agree that as far as this flight is concerned, it is all speculation. I'm only referring to proposed reactions in case of certain failures - in general -.
But I completely 100% agree that as far as this flight is concerned, it is all speculation. I'm only referring to proposed reactions in case of certain failures - in general -.
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According to news on Turkish media the plane is a write off.
Pistten ç?kan uça??n ak?beti belli oldu - Cumhuriyet Türkiye Haberleri
Pistten ç?kan uça??n ak?beti belli oldu - Cumhuriyet Türkiye Haberleri