Pax sue Boeing in DBX crash
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Firesysok
I agree the approach, flare and touch down on the 777 should be done with one hand on the thrust lever and one on the control column. The nose is only raised 2 degrees or so in the flare.
However a goaround is normally performed with 2 hands on the control column after the TOGA switch has been pushed as the nose needs to be raised 15 degrees or so. I would like to bet that on the Emirates that there was a quick push of the TOGA followed by a 2 handed rotation. Good airmanship would dictate that the non handling pilot should follow through on the thrust levers to make sure they go forward as was done by a flight engineer in the old days.
Unfortunately if ATC shout a command at the second the goaround is initiated and the co-pilot is looking for a positive climb (which he saw) and FMA indications of Thrust TOGA TOGA and raising the gear in response to the call of gear up and trying to acknowledge the ATC instruction he may not have had his eyes where they should have been. This is understandable when people are taught Pavlovian responses to FMAs rather than monitoring the basics, ie a goaround or rejected landing needs 2 key ingredients, pitch and power. The latter was omitted by both pilots until shortly before ground impact.
I agree the approach, flare and touch down on the 777 should be done with one hand on the thrust lever and one on the control column. The nose is only raised 2 degrees or so in the flare.
However a goaround is normally performed with 2 hands on the control column after the TOGA switch has been pushed as the nose needs to be raised 15 degrees or so. I would like to bet that on the Emirates that there was a quick push of the TOGA followed by a 2 handed rotation. Good airmanship would dictate that the non handling pilot should follow through on the thrust levers to make sure they go forward as was done by a flight engineer in the old days.
Unfortunately if ATC shout a command at the second the goaround is initiated and the co-pilot is looking for a positive climb (which he saw) and FMA indications of Thrust TOGA TOGA and raising the gear in response to the call of gear up and trying to acknowledge the ATC instruction he may not have had his eyes where they should have been. This is understandable when people are taught Pavlovian responses to FMAs rather than monitoring the basics, ie a goaround or rejected landing needs 2 key ingredients, pitch and power. The latter was omitted by both pilots until shortly before ground impact.
A good point t.d. #179, however perhaps a legal interpretation might judge otherwise.
My company’s policy required an understanding of all commercially rated add-ons, this was recorded and the technical and operational judgements were shared with operators and regulators. This provided a basis for a defence, with a fall back of proving that the change was not known of.
In the ‘Executive’ market where there were many more enhancing ‘gismos’, the policy was even more ridged.
The add-on had to be formally approved to the standards of part 25 - technical equivalence, usually requiring a company evaluation / fight test; or if not, then the modification centre / operator were informed of the reasons why a device would not be approved or the outstanding risk which they held; i.e. preventing part 23 or lesser quality ‘STCs’.
Many of today's ‘add-ons’ apply to a wide range of aircraft types and operations. System vendors often cover this with let-outs; ‘not for primary use’, or ‘advisory only’ (how can enhancing awareness be advisory - having to ignore something already known).
This leaves a safety gap to be closed by regulators, yet even they duck the issue with ‘the operator must show, etc.’
Another complication is that the originating aircraft type certificate (country) is often transferred to another county's regulatory system without amendment or knowledge of what responsibilities that carries - i.e. questioning add-ons. Similarly with operational approvals, usually based on vendor material (insufficient thought about the ‘get outs’), or again transferring the judgement to the operator.
The primary manufacturer exports a design /operational culture - the aircraft and training, the system vendor similarly, but not necessarily identical technical or operational cultures.
A third party applies his version of these cultural aspects in operations; any disparity enabling opportunity for error.
Not an A vs B point, but compare cultural views amongst designs, operations, training and support.
The crux of your point is who approved the system interface and operating procedures, but I suspect that will not be the key issue in law.
My company’s policy required an understanding of all commercially rated add-ons, this was recorded and the technical and operational judgements were shared with operators and regulators. This provided a basis for a defence, with a fall back of proving that the change was not known of.
In the ‘Executive’ market where there were many more enhancing ‘gismos’, the policy was even more ridged.
The add-on had to be formally approved to the standards of part 25 - technical equivalence, usually requiring a company evaluation / fight test; or if not, then the modification centre / operator were informed of the reasons why a device would not be approved or the outstanding risk which they held; i.e. preventing part 23 or lesser quality ‘STCs’.
Many of today's ‘add-ons’ apply to a wide range of aircraft types and operations. System vendors often cover this with let-outs; ‘not for primary use’, or ‘advisory only’ (how can enhancing awareness be advisory - having to ignore something already known).
This leaves a safety gap to be closed by regulators, yet even they duck the issue with ‘the operator must show, etc.’
Another complication is that the originating aircraft type certificate (country) is often transferred to another county's regulatory system without amendment or knowledge of what responsibilities that carries - i.e. questioning add-ons. Similarly with operational approvals, usually based on vendor material (insufficient thought about the ‘get outs’), or again transferring the judgement to the operator.
The primary manufacturer exports a design /operational culture - the aircraft and training, the system vendor similarly, but not necessarily identical technical or operational cultures.
A third party applies his version of these cultural aspects in operations; any disparity enabling opportunity for error.
Not an A vs B point, but compare cultural views amongst designs, operations, training and support.
The crux of your point is who approved the system interface and operating procedures, but I suspect that will not be the key issue in law.
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However a goaround is normally performed with 2 hands on the control column after the TOGA switch has been pushed as the nose needs to be raised 15 degrees or so. I would like to bet that on the Emirates that there was a quick push of the TOGA followed by a 2 handed rotation.
I have flight tested procedures with some of the best of the best drivers the manufacturers, and airlines have...I have NEVER seen anyone of these drivers use 2 hands for a GA, balked, EO approach/missed or any other flight validation exercise.
Who needs 2 hands to pull back, and someone else to work the thrust?!?!?! If you are EO approach, especially on a twin, you need to be workin it.
We were in so much turbulence in a 738, could not read the numbers, teeth rattling, including about the max crosswind, ( the rwy lined up with the right seat side window) and the driver had 2 fingers (not two hands) on the yoke, the other working the crab with both thrust levers...
Granted, we are always pushing the system with all of the possible scenarios, but still...why leave all of the the thrust possiblities/combinations out of the equation and assume pressing TOGA and pulling back with 2 hands will save you?
Bounce the ac, press TOGA and pulls back with both hands....see where that gets you.
In the grand scheme of things, looking back, there is clearly not enough attention (or criteria) placed on balked landings and the myriad of if/then parameters.
Last edited by underfire; 28th Aug 2017 at 19:24.
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In some of the airlines in my portfolio I was always disturbed by how the GA was 'stressed' to be a rapid actioned manoeuvre. Why? It will be at a lower weight than a Takeoff; OK more drag initially with flap, but nothing needs to be rushed. Some of the rote SOP mouth music caused this rush atmosphere. All so unnecessary. Wow, I've changed my mind, let's throw the one away, let aviate away from terra firma smoothly: Let's do the A bit. Now we are climbing away, power's good, flaps have been selected, let's raise the gear, let's select a NAV mode. Now relax, the crucial part has been achieved. OK, what's next? Let's clean up the flaps. Later, when clean let's do the N bit. So now we know where we are and we are safe let's do the C bit and make a plan. What's the rush?
There are some guys who emphasise that flaps need raising at 400'. Why? At takeoff it's at 1000'; what's the rush? It all increases the risk of mistakes.
There are some guys who emphasise that flaps need raising at 400'. Why? At takeoff it's at 1000'; what's the rush? It all increases the risk of mistakes.
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Rat, very good post.
The GA has been vilified as some sort of failure, but yes, it should be like missing an exit on the freeway...not set up. go around to the next exit.
Stress about it, hit the brakes, change lanes, disengage the cruise control, speed up/slow down....you increase the stress and crash potential.
In reality, the issue is capacity, hence the stress to land. Not to mention that in a few airports, you really have to land, as the missed is well, damn.
In the aviation world, missing the exit doesnt mean a 5 minute delay, going through the clover leaf, a simple circle and getting back on the right exit...all good.
it means the COST of driving 400 miles to the next one, missing the slot, missing the gate, and missing the dep slot...with the associated ramifications to the driver, airline, and passengers.
As an example, an A388 GA at DXB cost $400K as it had to be routed to AUH because of crew issues, while even the casual GA cost $100K.
Cant imagine any pressure or stigma on GA....
The GA has been vilified as some sort of failure, but yes, it should be like missing an exit on the freeway...not set up. go around to the next exit.
Stress about it, hit the brakes, change lanes, disengage the cruise control, speed up/slow down....you increase the stress and crash potential.
In reality, the issue is capacity, hence the stress to land. Not to mention that in a few airports, you really have to land, as the missed is well, damn.
In the aviation world, missing the exit doesnt mean a 5 minute delay, going through the clover leaf, a simple circle and getting back on the right exit...all good.
it means the COST of driving 400 miles to the next one, missing the slot, missing the gate, and missing the dep slot...with the associated ramifications to the driver, airline, and passengers.
As an example, an A388 GA at DXB cost $400K as it had to be routed to AUH because of crew issues, while even the casual GA cost $100K.
Cant imagine any pressure or stigma on GA....
Last edited by underfire; 28th Aug 2017 at 21:20.
RAT, galaxy, http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/5...ml#post9872445 (#145).
How quickly the industry forgets why some thing was done, and if it still required or even if new suggestions will conflict with existing practices; leaving the pilot to manage the resultant complexity.
How quickly the industry forgets why some thing was done, and if it still required or even if new suggestions will conflict with existing practices; leaving the pilot to manage the resultant complexity.
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underfire,
Go take a check in Canada where balked landing is a checking item--even OEI at 50'RA. I got them every sim recurrent.
Go take a check in Canada where balked landing is a checking item--even OEI at 50'RA. I got them every sim recurrent.
Per my post, we test balked touch and go....you mention 50'...not touch down and GA.
As there is no criteria for balked, would like to see the requirements, especially on each aircraft variant.
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The crew never commanded thrust. They used a mode disabled for the phase of flight they were in. In the 777 if you want trust you push the throttles forward. Anytime you use the GA trust or other automatic mode you follow the throttle movement and assist if neccesary. Failing in that basic item of airmanship they could have considered all the other cues of a lack of thrust.
I never claimed the crew didn't fail. The crew failed. Did I mention that the crew failed?
For the avoidance of doubt, the crew failed. Is three times enough?
I take issue with ascribing zero blame to the automatics.
The automation silently refused a command for thrust with airspeed above 125 knots without weight on all the wheels.
Instead of describing why the crew effed up (they did, that's four times), can anyone describe why the automatics were perfectly correct?
Last edited by pilot9249; 28th Aug 2017 at 23:30.
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In some cultures a missed approach is somehow considered as a loss of face. e.g. the perfectly good Gulf Air A320 flight crashing into the water years ago while orbiting on final rather than completing a missed approach, Asiana at SFO and many more. Feeling forced to avoid a missed approach, regardless of all the circumstances, is something I have frequently observed in others. A written report and meeting with fleet chief actually confirms misconceived attitudes to missed approach.
The sooner all cultures accept a missed approach as a normal manoeuvre the sooner aviation safety will improve.
Missed approaches are practiced in the sim, often EO, unusual config or other emergency conditions. We need to look more at the all engine, no emergency missed approach in the sim, with brief/debrief emphasising that it is as normal as a take-off or landing. Just not performed as often.
How much grief will be avoided if this message bears fruit.
The sooner all cultures accept a missed approach as a normal manoeuvre the sooner aviation safety will improve.
Missed approaches are practiced in the sim, often EO, unusual config or other emergency conditions. We need to look more at the all engine, no emergency missed approach in the sim, with brief/debrief emphasising that it is as normal as a take-off or landing. Just not performed as often.
How much grief will be avoided if this message bears fruit.
sptraveler,
Because the automatics aren't "right" of "wrong"; they just are. They are inanimate objects that do as commanded. Garbage in, garbage out. The crew, for reasons not yet explained, didn't know they were doing the "garbage in" part; their training should have ensured that they added power manually when the throttles didn't move.
And, as has been stated, "fixing" the automatics may well ontroduce others risks.
GF
Because the automatics aren't "right" of "wrong"; they just are. They are inanimate objects that do as commanded. Garbage in, garbage out. The crew, for reasons not yet explained, didn't know they were doing the "garbage in" part; their training should have ensured that they added power manually when the throttles didn't move.
And, as has been stated, "fixing" the automatics may well ontroduce others risks.
GF
Originally Posted by Underfire
Bounce the ac, press TOGA and pulls back with both hands....see where that gets you.
The reason, I suspect, that some pilots (not your "best drivers from the manufacturers") use two hands during a GA is because that is what is done during takeoff. The captain's right hand goes off the throttles at V1 onto the control column so there is no/less temptation to reject after V1. Isn't that what you do?
Secondly, I find that I can fly the thing more accurately with two hands (especially if major roll inputs are required after a failure on a turning SID) but as quickly as I can, get back to one hand because it forces me to get the thing in trim.
TDRacer, ask your mates down the road at Long Beach about GAs on the ground. While you're there, get them to give you a brief on "Lo Speed Protection".
Originally Posted by Galaxy flyer
What's a "startle touch and go"? Touch and goes are planned maneuvers, I thought. The crew was apparently doing a go around. Should the T7 or any plane have a A/T touch and go mode. They were trained in go arounds, presumably, and both pilots messed it up, full stop. Are we now saying pilots are startled by a go around?
BTW, the EK SOP on "long landing" is a system error. They employ pilots to make landings which require judgement inherent in being a pilot.
SPTraveller, I wholeheartedly agree with your posts.
I didn't say that the automatics couldn't be better, just the pilots must understand them and not blame an inanimate object for their own failures. The pilots in thus case didn't accomplish the most basic task of ensuring thrust was there.
I agree with your opening sentence post 194, just that you can't blame the automatics, especially on such a proven design, for pilots' failure to comply with training and SOPs, training and SOP designed to back up the automatics.
Bloggs, WRT to pilots exercising their judgement, then disciplined for doing so repulsive, but then again I never have, nor will, fly in such an operation. FOQA wasn't intended to be a discipline tool, but rather a tool to refine the operation, identify training problems, uncover systemic failings. having done literally thousands of touch and goes, I never thought them as "unplanned". Intend, both Civil and military flying shouldn't involve unplanned or intrajned maneuvers by line pilots. A go around is trained and checked at each session. A heavy jet likely will touch in a balked landing from very low heights, this shouldn't be a problem.
BTW, I was one of "not your best drivers from the manufacturers". I was with a manufacturer and "not your best driver, too.
GF
I agree with your opening sentence post 194, just that you can't blame the automatics, especially on such a proven design, for pilots' failure to comply with training and SOPs, training and SOP designed to back up the automatics.
Bloggs, WRT to pilots exercising their judgement, then disciplined for doing so repulsive, but then again I never have, nor will, fly in such an operation. FOQA wasn't intended to be a discipline tool, but rather a tool to refine the operation, identify training problems, uncover systemic failings. having done literally thousands of touch and goes, I never thought them as "unplanned". Intend, both Civil and military flying shouldn't involve unplanned or intrajned maneuvers by line pilots. A go around is trained and checked at each session. A heavy jet likely will touch in a balked landing from very low heights, this shouldn't be a problem.
BTW, I was one of "not your best drivers from the manufacturers". I was with a manufacturer and "not your best driver, too.
GF
Last edited by galaxy flyer; 29th Aug 2017 at 01:22.
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I think we're arguing the wrong point. Whether the crew or aeroplane failed is moot. The real question should be: why did they go around in the first place?
I'll start digging my foxhole and put my helmet on.
I'll start digging my foxhole and put my helmet on.
Last edited by Oldaircrew; 29th Aug 2017 at 02:36. Reason: Add more content
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Are you suggesting that the EK captain uses his judgement and ignores the RAAS and then gets sanctioned? This is the real world, you know...
The real question should be: why did they go around in the first place?
Indeed. It has been suggested the A/T in TOGA mode worked as designed and educated. The A/T is a tool to help work load under design conditions; as are most automatics add-ons. It has also been said that RAAS was designed as an advisory tool. EK decided it should be a command not an advice, with punishment for disobedience. Is that correct?
From the inside what has been EK reaction?
1. train all crew more diligently in an RAAS GA manoeuvre including bounced recoveries and GA's.
2. rewrite the RAAS SOP to be advisory.
3. Fire the crew and ignore it ever happened.
The real question should be: why did they go around in the first place?
Indeed. It has been suggested the A/T in TOGA mode worked as designed and educated. The A/T is a tool to help work load under design conditions; as are most automatics add-ons. It has also been said that RAAS was designed as an advisory tool. EK decided it should be a command not an advice, with punishment for disobedience. Is that correct?
From the inside what has been EK reaction?
1. train all crew more diligently in an RAAS GA manoeuvre including bounced recoveries and GA's.
2. rewrite the RAAS SOP to be advisory.
3. Fire the crew and ignore it ever happened.
IMHO the question should not be "why did they go around"? Go-around is a proper option, to be encouraged, if an approach doesn't look good or even if a touchdown doesn't look good – as others more qualified than me have said here, go-around is an option until thrust reverse is selected. Airlines who penalize crew for go-around are (IMHO again) completely misguided.
The real question should be: why did they screw up the go-around?
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I'll take the bait ... According to the preliminary report (linked at post #11 in this thread) they went around because wind conditions changed, they were landing long, and they sensibly thought "let's get out of here and do it again" or words to that effect.
IMHO the question should not be "why did they go around"? Go-around is a proper option, to be encouraged, if an approach doesn't look good or even if a touchdown doesn't look good – as others more qualified than me have said here, go-around is an option until thrust reverse is selected. Airlines who penalize crew for go-around are (IMHO again) completely misguided
The real question should be: why did they screw up the go-around?
IMHO the question should not be "why did they go around"? Go-around is a proper option, to be encouraged, if an approach doesn't look good or even if a touchdown doesn't look good – as others more qualified than me have said here, go-around is an option until thrust reverse is selected. Airlines who penalize crew for go-around are (IMHO again) completely misguided
The real question should be: why did they screw up the go-around?