UPS contract plane off runway - KCRW
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In my view, approaches like this VOR-A should be "ceiling required" for everyone. That used to be an option in TERPs (though never used). It was removed in the latest version of TERPs.
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The flight inbound to SDF from CRW was SNC 1259, it sounded to me like the captain was operating the radio for a visual approach to 35R.
The FAA says he had a second class medical and no prior incidents or accidents:
Pilot in deadly plane crash had no prior safety issues
The FAA says he had a second class medical and no prior incidents or accidents:
CHARLESTON, W.Va. (WSAZ) - The pilot involved in the cargo plane crash Friday that killed both himself and the co-pilot had no prior incidents related to safety, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) said.
Jonathan Pablo Alvarado, 47, of Stamford, Texas, never had a prior accident or incident, according to the FAA.
Alvarado, along with Anh K. Ho, 31, of Cross Lanes, West Virginia, died when the Short 330 aircraft crashed while attempting to land Friday morning at Yeager Airport. Both were pilots for Air Cargo Carriers, which is contracted by UPS.
As far as medical classification, the FAA reports that Alvarado was classified second class and Ho was first class. The FAA says second class still allows pilots to operate commercial planes.
Jonathan Pablo Alvarado, 47, of Stamford, Texas, never had a prior accident or incident, according to the FAA.
Alvarado, along with Anh K. Ho, 31, of Cross Lanes, West Virginia, died when the Short 330 aircraft crashed while attempting to land Friday morning at Yeager Airport. Both were pilots for Air Cargo Carriers, which is contracted by UPS.
As far as medical classification, the FAA reports that Alvarado was classified second class and Ho was first class. The FAA says second class still allows pilots to operate commercial planes.
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At the risk of being shot down for speculating too soon, I am going to jump in and say what I think from footage of the accident aircraft. I am always open to criticism if I am wrong.
1. No post crash fire.
2. The aircraft was in a left hand bank when it crashed.
3. The right wing aileron is in the up position suggesting the that PF was trying to correct the left hand bank
4, The elevator is is an up position suggesting that PF was trying to pull up.
5. The rudder looks to be fairly center.
6. Unfortunately, we can't see the propellers, but I don't see any gouge marks anywhere on the runway or near it which might have been caused by a spinning propeller.
The evidence that I have cited above suggests to me that they ran out of fuel some time during the approach and they stalled.
Of course, I may be completely wrong.
Edit: Another thing I failed to mention: What looks like full flaps and gear down would have caused a stall very quickly.
1. No post crash fire.
2. The aircraft was in a left hand bank when it crashed.
3. The right wing aileron is in the up position suggesting the that PF was trying to correct the left hand bank
4, The elevator is is an up position suggesting that PF was trying to pull up.
5. The rudder looks to be fairly center.
6. Unfortunately, we can't see the propellers, but I don't see any gouge marks anywhere on the runway or near it which might have been caused by a spinning propeller.
The evidence that I have cited above suggests to me that they ran out of fuel some time during the approach and they stalled.
Of course, I may be completely wrong.
Edit: Another thing I failed to mention: What looks like full flaps and gear down would have caused a stall very quickly.
Last edited by PPL Hobbyist; 9th May 2017 at 16:32.
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I think you're fooling yourself if you think that the position of the control surfaces after the plane broke apart and rolled down a hill has anything to do with he position of the control surfaces immediately prior to impact.
1. No post crash fire.
So unless the top of the fuselage was breached, there would not necessarily be much fuel released. Losing a wing might only release a relative dribble.
The only picture of the fuselage available so far is a tight crop that is a little difficult to interpret, but it appears the fuselage ended up on its left side, with the tail twisted the other way. The fuel tanks may well be intact.
Additionally, even if the tanks were breached in the tumble down the hillside, the ending position is down in a foggy, damp woods (from that same picture - drooping leaves heavy with moisture, plus NTSB mention that that site was "muddy" and "slippery"). There may have been no source of ignition remaining by the time any significant fuel spilled from the tanks.
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The plane took off from Louisville with 310 gallons of fuel, more than enough to reach Yeager. There was no explosion at impact. The fuel tanks for the Short 330 are on top of the fuselage. Some of the fuel did leak a the site. The state DEP and West Virginia American Water Company were contacted about the possibility of the spill reaching the Elk River. The spill was contained and didn’t reach the river, officials confirmed Friday afternoon.
From the LiveATC.net link I posted above the plane did not appear to do any holding on arrival at CRW prior to vectors for the VOR-A approach.
Gear down and at least partial flaps would be a normal configuration to cross the final approach fix for a circling approach in most planes, I would guess that is the case for the SD-330. It is indeed a high drag configuration with little altitude for recovery if you do stall. But, you are in that situation every time you land a plane, right?
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The evidence that I have cited above suggests to me that they ran out of fuel some time during the approach and they stalled.
Yeager crash site monitored to check for possible fuel leakage in Elk tributary | WCHS
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IMG_4597 by National Transportation Safety Board, on Flickr
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NTSB Docket opened here:
https://t.co/SgpKlf8rO4
A sign of the times, text messages, some sent while flying without an autopilot:
https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/61000-61...194/615487.pdf
The FO was scared by the captain's IMC maneuvering down low near the airport hills in an earlier incident.
Some technical details of damage to and data recovery from the personal electronic devices:
https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/61000-61...194/615510.pdf
Data was even harvested from the captain's CPAP machine:
https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/61000-61...194/615506.pdf
https://t.co/SgpKlf8rO4
A sign of the times, text messages, some sent while flying without an autopilot:
https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/61000-61...194/615487.pdf
The FO was scared by the captain's IMC maneuvering down low near the airport hills in an earlier incident.
Some technical details of damage to and data recovery from the personal electronic devices:
https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/61000-61...194/615510.pdf
Data was even harvested from the captain's CPAP machine:
https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/61000-61...194/615506.pdf
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FO had something like 300 hours on her application, and had picked up another 330 hours on the job.
The key here is figure 5: https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/d...194&mkey=95115
Combine that with the captain's alleged difficulties in IMC, particularly when banking, and it would look like he tracked 085 to 095 at MDA to half a mile from the threshhold, then chopped and dropped 600 feet, all the while trying to line up. Or that was his idea, and he just lost it.
The key here is figure 5: https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/d...194&mkey=95115
Combine that with the captain's alleged difficulties in IMC, particularly when banking, and it would look like he tracked 085 to 095 at MDA to half a mile from the threshhold, then chopped and dropped 600 feet, all the while trying to line up. Or that was his idea, and he just lost it.
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Gear down and at least partial flaps would be a normal configuration to cross the final approach fix for a circling approach in most planes, I would guess that is the case for the SD-330. It is indeed a high drag configuration with little altitude for recovery if you do stall. But, you are in that situation every time you land a plane, right?
FlightGlobal have published an article with a security video compilation. If the playback speeds are correct, the aircraft appears to me to to be going like the clappers in a diving spiral. It looks similar to the FO's text descriptions of how the PI handled the aircraft when they had the undercarriage problem: steep bank and dive.
FlightGlobal have published an article with a security video compilation. If the playback speeds are correct, the aircraft appears to me to to be going like the clappers in a diving spiral. It looks similar to the FO's text descriptions of how the PI handled the aircraft when they had the undercarriage problem: steep bank and dive.
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Sounds like the cargo outfit was full of 'cowboys' including some who did slip the Shorts. From one of the interview summaries, page 14:
https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/61000-61...194/615478.pdf
Of course, it can be argued that any crosswind landing involves a slip.
Mack had flown with a handful of pilots at ACC who flew “way” outside of the standard operating procedures (SOP). When he first started at ACC, his captain was hard on him and he came to appreciate that. He discovered that at ACC there was a compromise between flying to standards and managing the cockpit work environment. He described his choices; fly with good pilot who was hard on him, versus a poor pilot who was a nice guy. He would choose the good pilot as “the lesser of two evils.” He thought Anh would have made a good captain and would have been one that stayed within the SOPs.
When asked what kind of behavior he had seen outside of SOPs, he stated that some pilots wouldn’t be standardized and fly the set profile for the Shorts with airspeed, gear, and flap settings at specific locations on approach. He had flown with one guy who was always in a hurry and gave the example of another pilot flying inbound to the airport at 3000 feet and fast, then diving to the airport at the last minute. This other pilot would also be programming the GPS for the return leg even though they hadn’t landed on the outbound leg yet. He had also seen pilots pull the fuel levers to ground to get the aircraft to descend faster. He witnessed pilots side slip the aircraft, which he didn’t believe was safe to do in the Shorts. He said most of what he had seen from other pilots in terms of not following SOPs was related to poor planning. He clarified that these were specific individual pilots at the operator and not a reflection of the overall culture of the airline. He wasn’t sure how Jonathan had stayed that long at ACC has he had failed a few check rides. He had also seen certain pilots not use checklists. He felt that these problems typically came from pilots who had flown somewhere else and had brought bad habits to ACC. He believes that that is what happened with Jonathan during this accident.
When asked what kind of behavior he had seen outside of SOPs, he stated that some pilots wouldn’t be standardized and fly the set profile for the Shorts with airspeed, gear, and flap settings at specific locations on approach. He had flown with one guy who was always in a hurry and gave the example of another pilot flying inbound to the airport at 3000 feet and fast, then diving to the airport at the last minute. This other pilot would also be programming the GPS for the return leg even though they hadn’t landed on the outbound leg yet. He had also seen pilots pull the fuel levers to ground to get the aircraft to descend faster. He witnessed pilots side slip the aircraft, which he didn’t believe was safe to do in the Shorts. He said most of what he had seen from other pilots in terms of not following SOPs was related to poor planning. He clarified that these were specific individual pilots at the operator and not a reflection of the overall culture of the airline. He wasn’t sure how Jonathan had stayed that long at ACC has he had failed a few check rides. He had also seen certain pilots not use checklists. He felt that these problems typically came from pilots who had flown somewhere else and had brought bad habits to ACC. He believes that that is what happened with Jonathan during this accident.
Of course, it can be argued that any crosswind landing involves a slip.
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Thanks for that
I certainly think he was wise to prefer a good pilot who was tough on him and stuck to SOP.
Really feel for the FO who did seem reluctant to call out the risk-taking Cap. And from all accounts seemed eager to learn and perhaps had a future as a strong left seat.
What a shame all around.
Really feel for the FO who did seem reluctant to call out the risk-taking Cap. And from all accounts seemed eager to learn and perhaps had a future as a strong left seat.
What a shame all around.
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It is nice to see that phone SMS is now part of NTSBs tools, what is next, my old post cards and love letters.
I do appreciate that in this case without CVR and FDR and a crew that was a ultra incompetent in a company run like a 1970s bush operation , the NTSB would turn every stone.
But go into the WatsApp group for some bases and I suspect You find a few lies and subjective slander of other crew members.
I do feel sorry for the FO , very much so. But she was not 21 and blond, so she should have sorted out the Cpt at one point. I specifically remember two occasions were I told the Cpt to NEVER repeat the stunt he pulled. It is a FOs job.
Anyway , What shocks me is here use of the mobile phone in flight. That tells me one thing,Not fit for flight!
The Captain, 49 with less then 2 years as PIC multi and scared off IFR, at night!
Lastly I would like to mention that the focus on phones and iPad messages before flight , taxi out , just after touchdown and on turnarounds are going to end in tears.
As a matter of fact it already did for me, my nr4 cabin crew started crying and refused to tell us why on a turnaround , we had to dispatch with him "incapacitated" as we had less then 150 pax.
Never mind, back to thread.
Airing concerns on SMS to buddys , not constructive. Face the other part,Cpt in this case, then CP.
Reading this report was a bit back to old stomping grounds for me and not so relevant, UNTIL I saw the video of the approach, then two things occurred to me: Incompetent Cowboys are still out there AND they are trying to get into airplanes with hundreds of PAX.
What a terrible, unnecessary way to go. But it is Darwin , Newton and Bernoulli that rules in here. One must at all time try to respect them!
I do appreciate that in this case without CVR and FDR and a crew that was a ultra incompetent in a company run like a 1970s bush operation , the NTSB would turn every stone.
But go into the WatsApp group for some bases and I suspect You find a few lies and subjective slander of other crew members.
I do feel sorry for the FO , very much so. But she was not 21 and blond, so she should have sorted out the Cpt at one point. I specifically remember two occasions were I told the Cpt to NEVER repeat the stunt he pulled. It is a FOs job.
Anyway , What shocks me is here use of the mobile phone in flight. That tells me one thing,Not fit for flight!
The Captain, 49 with less then 2 years as PIC multi and scared off IFR, at night!
Lastly I would like to mention that the focus on phones and iPad messages before flight , taxi out , just after touchdown and on turnarounds are going to end in tears.
As a matter of fact it already did for me, my nr4 cabin crew started crying and refused to tell us why on a turnaround , we had to dispatch with him "incapacitated" as we had less then 150 pax.
Never mind, back to thread.
Airing concerns on SMS to buddys , not constructive. Face the other part,Cpt in this case, then CP.
Reading this report was a bit back to old stomping grounds for me and not so relevant, UNTIL I saw the video of the approach, then two things occurred to me: Incompetent Cowboys are still out there AND they are trying to get into airplanes with hundreds of PAX.
What a terrible, unnecessary way to go. But it is Darwin , Newton and Bernoulli that rules in here. One must at all time try to respect them!
