AAIB investigation to Hawker Hunter T7 G-BXFI 22 August 2015
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OK. Fine. I'll leave you to yours
Lemain
Let's try go put this radar issue to bed. The AAIB used the radar data along with video evidence to produce a track of the aircraft. The radar helped confirm the positioning of the Hunter from the few returns used. Furthermore, the report clearly states the limitations in using the radar data to 'track' a dynamic display (page 72-73) and the associated mode C info. Does anyone need to know (say) that the radar return on the run in was 20m further west? No, not relevant.
The bent loop was clearly depicted on several videos from various locations. There was no dispute about where the aircraft tracked. Again, does an error in the radar data have any impact on anything! No.
The radar data was used by the AAIB as a tool. The limitations in using the data was clearly shown.
The ASI & altimeter were accurately bench tested. Do we need to know the accuracy of the pressure test set used? What about the 115vac 400Hz supply they used, could that have had an effect on the bench testing? What about the post accident engine strip data from Rolls; do they need to include all the caveats with the methods they used to produce that data?
I'm not trying to beat you into submission, but can assure you that any errors on the radar data used by the AAIB have absolutely no bearing any possible conclusion to the accident.
Let's try go put this radar issue to bed. The AAIB used the radar data along with video evidence to produce a track of the aircraft. The radar helped confirm the positioning of the Hunter from the few returns used. Furthermore, the report clearly states the limitations in using the radar data to 'track' a dynamic display (page 72-73) and the associated mode C info. Does anyone need to know (say) that the radar return on the run in was 20m further west? No, not relevant.
The bent loop was clearly depicted on several videos from various locations. There was no dispute about where the aircraft tracked. Again, does an error in the radar data have any impact on anything! No.
The radar data was used by the AAIB as a tool. The limitations in using the data was clearly shown.
The ASI & altimeter were accurately bench tested. Do we need to know the accuracy of the pressure test set used? What about the 115vac 400Hz supply they used, could that have had an effect on the bench testing? What about the post accident engine strip data from Rolls; do they need to include all the caveats with the methods they used to produce that data?
I'm not trying to beat you into submission, but can assure you that any errors on the radar data used by the AAIB have absolutely no bearing any possible conclusion to the accident.
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Amnesia.
I have not put forward that as a defence against charges. I have suggested it as reason for not being able to stand and be tried for the offence(s). What does amnesia mean. It may well represent a mask, a symptom of much more serious underlying psychological disturbance/ condition resultant from the accident whereby a reasonable defence cannot be mounted against the charges. Just try and imagine what AH may actually seen out of the wind shield of his aircraft in the last few seconds before the crash. Could he have not seen a crowd of people and vehicles in the path of his doomed aircraft. Could he have been oblivious to his own imminent death and of all those standing transfixed with faces up turned to the sky, moments before their lives were extinguished in front of him on the ground. When did the mercy of unconsciousness remove the horror of such an image from his mind. But what was it replaced with. I cannot conceive any normal human being not being affected by such a tragedy, particularly the person who has the capacity to feel any sense of responsibility for being an instrument for its cause. The question therefore is the nature and extent of the injury or trauma that such a person may have suffered. If such a person has by reason of such trauma, be reduced to such a pathetic state as a blabbering idiot or a catatonic moron, then would any court stand him up and try him. Perhaps a court in some demonic regime might do just that, but I doubt any over in our neck of the world would. So perhaps it is over to the shrinks and the lawyers to decide what next, with the police somewhere in between the two to decide what next.
I have not put forward that as a defence against charges. I have suggested it as reason for not being able to stand and be tried for the offence(s). What does amnesia mean. It may well represent a mask, a symptom of much more serious underlying psychological disturbance/ condition resultant from the accident whereby a reasonable defence cannot be mounted against the charges. Just try and imagine what AH may actually seen out of the wind shield of his aircraft in the last few seconds before the crash. Could he have not seen a crowd of people and vehicles in the path of his doomed aircraft. Could he have been oblivious to his own imminent death and of all those standing transfixed with faces up turned to the sky, moments before their lives were extinguished in front of him on the ground. When did the mercy of unconsciousness remove the horror of such an image from his mind. But what was it replaced with. I cannot conceive any normal human being not being affected by such a tragedy, particularly the person who has the capacity to feel any sense of responsibility for being an instrument for its cause. The question therefore is the nature and extent of the injury or trauma that such a person may have suffered. If such a person has by reason of such trauma, be reduced to such a pathetic state as a blabbering idiot or a catatonic moron, then would any court stand him up and try him. Perhaps a court in some demonic regime might do just that, but I doubt any over in our neck of the world would. So perhaps it is over to the shrinks and the lawyers to decide what next, with the police somewhere in between the two to decide what next.
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Lemain
As I've said before, AAIB reports do not contain a comprehensive description of every test, data validation process, theory or idea that was used/investigated and deemed "in their expert opinion" to be omissable from the final report. If they did report everything thereport would probably be the size of Lord of the Rings! It's really easy for Armchair experts like us, with no real understanding of the AAIBs internal processes and rigour, to pick holes in the end result of what must be a ridiculously complex process.
As I've said before, AAIB reports do not contain a comprehensive description of every test, data validation process, theory or idea that was used/investigated and deemed "in their expert opinion" to be omissable from the final report. If they did report everything thereport would probably be the size of Lord of the Rings! It's really easy for Armchair experts like us, with no real understanding of the AAIBs internal processes and rigour, to pick holes in the end result of what must be a ridiculously complex process.
Last edited by n305fa; 21st Mar 2017 at 21:46.
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It seems a strange argument that because a person cannot or more importantly "claims" they cannot remember anything we can not put them on trial.
It seems to lead to an open door on everyone claiming amnesia!
For example a lorry driver who wipes out yet another family on the A34 in Oxfordshire (which is becoming a regular occurrence now) simply claims amnesia of the event and we all say that fine you can go, no trial is necessary as we cannot try them.
What happens if he claims amnesia - but actually there is cab-cam (which in all the recent fatals there has been) which records him piling into the rear of the said family of 4? Does the availability of other evidence now render the alleged amnesia in this example irrelevant and we can put the person on trial.
It also leads to the strange situation where a person can escape justice by virtue of his brain makeup being susceptible to suffering from amnesia while say another person who does is not susceptible in such a way can be put on trial.
You may recall that Ernest Saunders managed to pull something similar off in his finance related trial...and succeeded in being released early as part of the appeal process due to supposedly having Alzheimers whereupon post release a miraculous recovery ensured.
It seems to lead to an open door on everyone claiming amnesia!
For example a lorry driver who wipes out yet another family on the A34 in Oxfordshire (which is becoming a regular occurrence now) simply claims amnesia of the event and we all say that fine you can go, no trial is necessary as we cannot try them.
What happens if he claims amnesia - but actually there is cab-cam (which in all the recent fatals there has been) which records him piling into the rear of the said family of 4? Does the availability of other evidence now render the alleged amnesia in this example irrelevant and we can put the person on trial.
It also leads to the strange situation where a person can escape justice by virtue of his brain makeup being susceptible to suffering from amnesia while say another person who does is not susceptible in such a way can be put on trial.
You may recall that Ernest Saunders managed to pull something similar off in his finance related trial...and succeeded in being released early as part of the appeal process due to supposedly having Alzheimers whereupon post release a miraculous recovery ensured.
Last edited by dsc810; 21st Mar 2017 at 22:13.
For example a lorry driver who wipes out yet another family on the A34 in Oxfordshire (which is becoming a regular occurrence now) simply claims amnesia of the event and we all say that fine you can go, no trial is necessary as we cannot try them.
What happens if he claims amnesia - but actually there is cab-cam (which in all the recent fatals there has been) which records him piling into the rear of the said family of 4? Does the availability of other evidence now render the alleged amnesia in this example irrelevant and we can put the person on trial.
What happens if he claims amnesia - but actually there is cab-cam (which in all the recent fatals there has been) which records him piling into the rear of the said family of 4? Does the availability of other evidence now render the alleged amnesia in this example irrelevant and we can put the person on trial.
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The emotiveness of an incident or claimed amnesia has no bearing on whether someone can be sent for trial. It is for the trial judge and/or jury to decide if a defendant is guilty of an offence. If a guilty verdict is delivered, then the judge may take into consideration all these factors before handing down a sentence. The law is rather dispassionate when it comes to dispensing justice for good reason.
Chronus suggests a horrific scenario that is so traumatic that few if any people could endure the consequences without blotting the incident from their brain. I would alternatively suggest that at 15° nose up and 225 knots, you will have no view of anything out the front except sky. Prior to that, you are too high and too far away to make out those sorts of details.
The AAIB report deals with the facts of the accident. The courts will deal with the facts of the accident. Any emotive issues will be considered only as they are relevant to the probable cause of the accident. So it is pointless speculating how, why, or if a case of amnesia might somehow absolve the pilot from the consequences of his actions that day. They won't as far as the law is concerned.
Chronus suggests a horrific scenario that is so traumatic that few if any people could endure the consequences without blotting the incident from their brain. I would alternatively suggest that at 15° nose up and 225 knots, you will have no view of anything out the front except sky. Prior to that, you are too high and too far away to make out those sorts of details.
The AAIB report deals with the facts of the accident. The courts will deal with the facts of the accident. Any emotive issues will be considered only as they are relevant to the probable cause of the accident. So it is pointless speculating how, why, or if a case of amnesia might somehow absolve the pilot from the consequences of his actions that day. They won't as far as the law is concerned.
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Given some posts here, there are a few here who would applaud him too....
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I started this thread to discuss the report, not the crash.
I am concerned that the report makes so little of the failings of those tasked with regulation of the "airshow circus" and airworthiness in general.
I am concerned that the report makes so little of the failings of those tasked with regulation of the "airshow circus" and airworthiness in general.
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Hunter Escape Manoeuvre
IIRC from my Hunter flying back in the day, coarse aileron input at slow speed would cause departure from controlled flight. The resulting spin was quite unstable and thus dangerous outside of the test environment. We ensured pilots were aware of this trap and, if anybody would care to post it, is detailed as a warning in the pilots' notes. So I am not surprised this pilot was neither taught nor had practised recovery from slow speed inverted at the top of a loop (nb this wasn't a loop or even a 'bent loop' BTW). It would have been quite a leap of faith to do so when training in the Hunter. Once this pilot had found himself significantly below his gate (assuming he even was alert to the situation), he had little option. It is possible he could have avoided the ground if he'd flown optimum AOA - light buffet - but with the ground rushing up to him, the natural human reaction would be to pull harder.
I read the AAIB Hunter test report. The evaluated type was a single seat Hunter with an Avon 200. Whilst similar, it is quite a different beast to the 2-seat Avon 100 trainer. It doesn't matter how much you fudge it, it is not going to be representative and cannot be compared. The very capable TP should have known this and ensured a Hunter T7, in the same fit, weight and balance, was used to evaluate. So, I am afraid it is like apples and pears. The fact that the TP safely flew an 'escape manoeuvre' is down to his experience, ability - lots of Hunter time spent spinning, I am told - and pre-flight spin prevention planning on this distinctly different variant.
I read the AAIB Hunter test report. The evaluated type was a single seat Hunter with an Avon 200. Whilst similar, it is quite a different beast to the 2-seat Avon 100 trainer. It doesn't matter how much you fudge it, it is not going to be representative and cannot be compared. The very capable TP should have known this and ensured a Hunter T7, in the same fit, weight and balance, was used to evaluate. So, I am afraid it is like apples and pears. The fact that the TP safely flew an 'escape manoeuvre' is down to his experience, ability - lots of Hunter time spent spinning, I am told - and pre-flight spin prevention planning on this distinctly different variant.
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Personally I think the 30 recommendations to the regulator regarding airworthiness and airshow regulation say quite a lot about the state of the air display regulation. The final recommendation to the DfT, for an independent review also says a lot
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But no real castigating of those who failed in their duty to protect the public?
I'm thinking of the pre-existing requirements that have not been observed. Why are we not reading of a "blame" for want of a better word, being laid at the door of those who thought it acceptable to not authenticate the adherence to rules?
I'm thinking of the pre-existing requirements that have not been observed. Why are we not reading of a "blame" for want of a better word, being laid at the door of those who thought it acceptable to not authenticate the adherence to rules?
airpolice,
Look at the AAIB website and understand their remit; they do not apportion blame in any report about any aspect of an accident. Therefore, the Shoreham report is totally within their remit.
Look at the AAIB website and understand their remit; they do not apportion blame in any report about any aspect of an accident. Therefore, the Shoreham report is totally within their remit.
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Airpolice says he started this thread so that we discuss the report and not the crash. So I read the report again, for the umpteenth time. All I can make out is that it seems to be all about the crash. Am I missing something.
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But no real castigating of those who failed in their duty to protect the public?
I'm thinking of the pre-existing requirements that have not been observed. Why are we not reading of a "blame" for want of a better word, being laid at the door of those who thought it acceptable to not authenticate the adherence to rules?
I'm thinking of the pre-existing requirements that have not been observed. Why are we not reading of a "blame" for want of a better word, being laid at the door of those who thought it acceptable to not authenticate the adherence to rules?
The Civil Aviation (Investigation of Air Accidents and Incidents) Regulations 1996 states
"Purpose of the investigation of accidents and incidents
4. The sole objective of the investigation of an accident or incident under these Regulations shall be the prevention of accidents and incidents. It shall not be the purpose of such an investigation to apportion blame or liability."
REGULATION (EU) No 996/2010 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 20 October 2010 also states
(4) The sole objective of safety investigations should be the prevention of future accidents and incidents without apportioning blame or liability.
If you want blame and liability you've got the wrong organisation.
Last edited by n305fa; 22nd Mar 2017 at 19:50.
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It's rather difficult to separate the two, and PPrune must be delighted that the thread is generating so much interest. It's a pity that so much of it is uninformed rubbish which will neither change the AAIB report nor persuade the CPS one way or the other. However at least Andy H now has a beauty parade of "experts" to help his defence.
I realise this thread has wandered from time to time into what I’d view as odd areas, which I’d rather not get into.
Can I bring up something which seems to me might be fairly central in all this?
Something which has puzzled me is that it is said that AH had not rehearsed the escape manoeuvre mentioned, to act as a get out if things look wrong partway through a ~looping manoeuvre. That seemed unusual, for an experienced aerobatic pilot originally from a military background, carrying out low level aerobatics in a fast jet.
Then I started to think about his ‘normal’ every day flying environment and at the associated psychology/mindset. Back in his RAF days, I presume AH would have been used to rehearsing and practicing manoeuvres many times, including all sorts of emergency situations. Quite normal military practice, since after all most of their flying is very realistic ‘practice’ against the possibility of a real threat situation.
However, for more than twenty years most of AH’s flying had been commercial flying I believe. In general in that environment, emergencies are only practiced in the simulator during scheduled refreshers and re-validation exercises. The routine day to day operation is oriented towards completion of the flight. Emergencies are briefed on and ‘rehearsed’ verbally or internally, they are not routinely flown, quite understandably.
Could this then have produced an inadvertent but entirely understandable mindset in which the routine expectation was to complete the planned exercises, with emergencies being discussed or internally reviewed only? Hence it would not have seemed necessary to actually trial that manoeuvre, which would make it much less likely to be used.
It seems quite possible to me – this is not to criticise, simply to try to understand. I can think of a few times in my life when I realised in hindsight I was applying inappropriate criteria to a judgment call, because I’d not got the correct mindset running, so to speak.
Could this be an area where more detailed oversight and formal pre-briefing etc. could help encourage detail rehearsal and possibly avert an incident?
I’d very much like to know what some of the experienced folk on here think.
Can I bring up something which seems to me might be fairly central in all this?
Something which has puzzled me is that it is said that AH had not rehearsed the escape manoeuvre mentioned, to act as a get out if things look wrong partway through a ~looping manoeuvre. That seemed unusual, for an experienced aerobatic pilot originally from a military background, carrying out low level aerobatics in a fast jet.
Then I started to think about his ‘normal’ every day flying environment and at the associated psychology/mindset. Back in his RAF days, I presume AH would have been used to rehearsing and practicing manoeuvres many times, including all sorts of emergency situations. Quite normal military practice, since after all most of their flying is very realistic ‘practice’ against the possibility of a real threat situation.
However, for more than twenty years most of AH’s flying had been commercial flying I believe. In general in that environment, emergencies are only practiced in the simulator during scheduled refreshers and re-validation exercises. The routine day to day operation is oriented towards completion of the flight. Emergencies are briefed on and ‘rehearsed’ verbally or internally, they are not routinely flown, quite understandably.
Could this then have produced an inadvertent but entirely understandable mindset in which the routine expectation was to complete the planned exercises, with emergencies being discussed or internally reviewed only? Hence it would not have seemed necessary to actually trial that manoeuvre, which would make it much less likely to be used.
It seems quite possible to me – this is not to criticise, simply to try to understand. I can think of a few times in my life when I realised in hindsight I was applying inappropriate criteria to a judgment call, because I’d not got the correct mindset running, so to speak.
Could this be an area where more detailed oversight and formal pre-briefing etc. could help encourage detail rehearsal and possibly avert an incident?
I’d very much like to know what some of the experienced folk on here think.
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Biscuit74, I too have wondered about the escape move, and not having flown a Hunter I can't say that I have any real knowledge of how to do it, but I would expect that practice of that move would also involve reading the Pilot's Notes for the aircraft, and taking into account the situation at the apex, low, slow and out of energy... not a good time to roll the aircraft without being really sure of what's happening with the energy.
The aircraft is very spin resistant and is most reluctant to enter a spin unless coarse use is made of the rudder or ailerons during manoeuvres close to the stall, particularly in heavy buffet. Under these conditions, an erect spin is more likely to occur than an inverted spin, but the latter may result from coarse use of aileron, caused by, for example, a poorly executed loop, a stall turn type of manoeuvre or when full aileron rolling manoeuvres are performed and the control column is moved appreciably aft. It is recommended that theses pro spin conditions be avoided.
The aircraft is very spin resistant and is most reluctant to enter a spin unless coarse use is made of the rudder or ailerons during manoeuvres close to the stall, particularly in heavy buffet. Under these conditions, an erect spin is more likely to occur than an inverted spin, but the latter may result from coarse use of aileron, caused by, for example, a poorly executed loop, a stall turn type of manoeuvre or when full aileron rolling manoeuvres are performed and the control column is moved appreciably aft. It is recommended that theses pro spin conditions be avoided.