AAIB investigation to Hawker Hunter T7 G-BXFI 22 August 2015

[Pozidrive]

Have you flown 9 types concurrently?

[Bravo Alpha One]

Courtney Mil
Thank you for that. Having read your blog I am familiar with your extensive experience.
In view of your opinion, it makes me worry even more about Transient Ischemic Attack [TIA] as a possible, and unfortunately un-provable, cause of the strange "errors" occurring just prior to, and during the "bent loop" [including no attempt to escape] as I eluded to earlier [as did "hum"] - round about # 165or6 ~ # 168. Such events can happen to just about anyone resulting in varying degrees of confusion, lasting from a handful of seconds to over half-an-hour, for instance. I do hope proper medical opinion will be obtained in due course.

[Davef68]

A thought occured when reading the report that if it wasn't for the tragic deaths on the ground, the main talking point about the accident would be the fact that AH survived

[Nomennudum]

Following from pot #265 (quoting failed)

And a tilt table test. Assuming a high g test is unavailable. Speaking as a "funny turn" expert but not a pilot. Don't know if this would be part of the medical before doing aerobatics, but it could be a new problem the person might well not have had any symptoms of.

[John R81]

Interesting article published March 3.

[Lemain]

John R81 -- Very interesting, thank you. This puzzles me:

A Hunter test pilot confirmed that from the apex the pilot could have escaped by rolling the aircraft upright and had 4 seconds from the inverted apex to do this and avoid ground impact.

"The pilot was aware of escape manoeuvres for other military aircraft but had not practiced and had not been assessed on escape manoeuvres in the Hunter aircraft. This is extremely concerning - if he had practised this in the Hunter, it would have been fresh in his memory and he could have prevented this tragedy."

There doesn't seem to have been any attempt at an escape manoeuvre. Not even a botched one. If the pilot had been concerned and wished to escape even if he couldn't recall the procedure, with his experience he'd have given it his best shot.

[ciderman]

H Peacock, thank you. Biscuit74, Yes, it does.

Getting back to the possibility of confusion between types (Hunter and Jet Provost), would 112 kt be an appropriate take-off speed for the Jet Provost? Could the pilot's mindset have been that he was flying a JP display even at this point?


If he didn't know what type of aircraft he was in he is not fit to fly never mind display. I remember from my JP and Hunter days that to get a straight pull up for a loop it was always best to pull up on the AI. Especially with the Hunter with the swept wings. I am at a total loss to explain this accident and until/unless AH comes out with more information even the AAIB is speculating to a degree.

[Capt Scribble]

Just a grunt
DaveReid at #238 makes a suggestion re the ANO.

[wiggy]

would 112 kt be an appropriate take-off speed for the Jet Provost?

Have to look at the books but that sounds way way way too high, it's going back a long time since I was on the machine, ready to be corrected, but I don't think on the JP there was a strict "rotate to get airborne" speed or specific "take off" speed in the way that there is on some civvie types, you just made sure the the nose came up to/selected a takeoff attitude at a sensible speed in the take-off roll and at some point hopefully soon after that the aircraft would simply fly off when it was good and ready.

If the Hunter is similar (and TBH don't know) then I think nitpicking the initial takeoff speed on the day is a bit moot, though I am aware it is commented on in the report.

I'll see if I've still got any JP notes lurking.......

[H Peacock]

Getting back to the possibility of confusion between types (Hunter and Jet Provost), would 112 kt be an appropriate take-off speed for the Jet Provost? Could the pilot's mindset have been that he was flying a JP display even at this point?

The JP take-off was quite a bit slower than the Hunter. For the JPMk3 the nose was raised at 75kts before the aircraft was flown off at 85kts, or 80kts if the Tips were empty. For the JPMk5A the nosewheel was raised at 85kts before the aircraft was flown off at 95kts.

[wiggy]

Thank you HP, I suspect like my memory my notes have long gone....

[hum]

Inappropriate Manoeuvre

Whatever was intended, the actual manoeuvre flown was in effect a half barrel roll followed by a half loop. The first half barrel roll was both totally inappropriate (irrespective of aircraft type) and completely unprecedented. The second, tragic 'half loop' was equally inappropriate. In my opinion, the inappropriate manoeuvres, especially combined with the bizzare and inappropriate throttle movements scream cognitive impairement from before the pull-up.

For me there are some obvious similarities to another tragic accident where sadly the pilot died, but fortunately no-one else was injured.
With the benefit of an ADR the Board of Inquiry were able to declare that "Pilot incapacitation ....was a possible cause.."..

A brief excerpt from that report is thought-provoking:

[Kitty Hawk 1]

I was never a FJ display pilot so can't and unlike others here, will not, comment on 'displaying' different types consecutively. Most of us have been rated on two types of the same aircraft and flown them concurrently. I have certainly had to concentrate hard at critical stages of flight to remember which aircraft I was flying. A Hunter (never rated) is obviously completely different to a JP (rated). Can't see how you could get mixed up. I frequently flew four completely different types, single piston, twin turbine (two types) and heavy four jet. This is however a different case all together you don't get mixed up between a single piston and a heavy four jet, no one to serve lunch for starters.

No one will ever know what AH was thinking when he performed that manoeuvre. Including him.

[Legalapproach]

Just a Grunt

Reckless or negligent endangerment of an aircraft under the Air Navigation Order 2016 Article 240.

Although the accident would have been covered by the 2009 ANO article 238 the wording is the same

Gross negligence Manslaughter

Recklessness requires there to be a foreseeable risk of injury or serious damage and the defendant nevertheless goes on to take that risk
Negligence is simply falling below the standard that would be expected of the reasonably prudent and competent individual (so pilot)

Gross negligence exists where there is:
a) the existence of a duty of care to the deceased;
b) a breach of that duty of care which;
c) causes (or significantly contributes) to the death of the victim; and
d) the breach should be characterised as gross negligence, and therefore a crime.

It is for a jury to determine whether the negligence should be categorised as "gross"

[seniortrooper]

The aircraft AMOC was not authorised.
Defects and exceedences for the aircraft had not been reported to the maintenance org.
Mandatory requests of the AAN were not met.
The engine hadn't been preserved properly during long periods of inactivity.
P to F not valid (ergo).
Entering @ 185' Vs 500'.
Speed 105kts Vs 350Kts.
Top of manouevre too low.
No escape option either implemented or trained for.

All of the above are facts - not conjecture. FACTS.

To suggest that the pilot had a "lapse" (which humans have occasionally) is disingenuous to say the least. This lapse (listed above) started months ago and continued right up until the aircraft hit the ground.
Not the sort of thing one could attribute to a sleight of memory during a difficult manouevre under duress, I would suggest.
To err is human - too plan to err, is.................................

[Tay Cough]

Whatever was intended, the actual manoeuvre flown was in effect a half barrel roll followed by a half loop. The first half barrel roll was both totally inappropriate (irrespective of aircraft type) and completely unprecedented. The second, tragic 'half loop' was equally inappropriate. In my opinion, the inappropriate manoeuvres, especially combined with the bizzare and inappropriate throttle movements scream cognitive impairement from before the pull-up.

For me there are some obvious similarities to another tragic accident where sadly the pilot died, but fortunately no-one else was injured.
With the benefit of an ADR the Board of Inquiry were able to declare that "Pilot incapacitation ....was a possible cause.."..

A brief excerpt from that report is thought-provoking:

Having read the XX179 report in the past (I had worked with the accident pilot's father), it's interesting to note that the structure of the MAA report findings is very methodical as to whether it deems a particular aspect - such as pilot distraction or disorientation - as "not a factor" or "possible cause", hence generating the "Why". In fact, the methodology used is discussed in the report itself - often using a process of elimination.

By comparison, the Shoreham AAIB report although giving both causal and contributory factors, does not touch on a "Why" and their methodology isn't entirely clear. If such a methodical approach was used by the AAIB - and there is no evidence one way or the other to determine this - I wonder why they weren't more explicit in ruling specific aspects in or out?

[DaveReidUK]

Originally Posted by seniortrooper

Speed 105kts Vs 350Kts.

All of the above are facts - not conjecture. FACTS.

Er, no.

105 KIAS was the actual speed at the apex of the loop; 350 KIAS was the target speed at the entry to the loop (actual was 310 ± 15 KIAS).

[funfly]

Is there any (photographic) record of the same pilot performing the same procedure previously, this in order to ascertain if he had previously always operated within the correct parameters i.e. heights and speeds.

[Brian W May]

So apart from not being at the right speed, the right height and the right power setting it was perfect.

That's the essence of page 2 of the Accident Report summary.

[Lemain]

Dave Reid -- you said:

105 KIAS was the actual speed at the apex of the loop; 350 KIAS was the target speed at the entry to the loop (actual was 310 ± 15 KIAS).

How do we know what the IAS was? Was there a flight recorder or a cockpit camera? A problem with the pitot or static vent? A mechanical problem (e.g. stiction) due to the a/c being flown infrequently? As the pilot has no recollection (perfectly normal and understandable) how do we know what was 'indicated'?