AAIB investigation to Hawker Hunter T7 G-BXFI 22 August 2015
Another common theme here is the entry heigh for the Manoeuvre. The report touches on this, but does not give it the "importance" that some here tend to attribute to it. We discussed this a few months ago, but let me reiterate.
AH was cleared to 100 feet for flypasts, etc. It is perfectly legal to enter an earobatic manoeuvre from that altitude as long as the manoeuvre itself isn't performed at that altitude. It is also legal to let down to that altitude at the nd of the manoeuvre once the (e.g.) 500 foot base height has been assured.
The entry height in this case is, therefore, not relevant. For further explanation please refer to our earlier discussion on this forum.
AH was cleared to 100 feet for flypasts, etc. It is perfectly legal to enter an earobatic manoeuvre from that altitude as long as the manoeuvre itself isn't performed at that altitude. It is also legal to let down to that altitude at the nd of the manoeuvre once the (e.g.) 500 foot base height has been assured.
The entry height in this case is, therefore, not relevant. For further explanation please refer to our earlier discussion on this forum.
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Courtney Mil --
One would imagine that any "manoeuvre" is defined, in a legal and aviation sense, to commence at the instant it is "entered"? For example, "landing" is not just the instant the wheels touch the ground. "Landing" commences at some earlier stage -- somewhere between finals and coming to a standstill. Obviously you cannot be said to be in the "manoeuvre" of landing if you are descending vertically in a spiral dive three metres above the runway, at 190kts. "Landing" is a manoeuvre that requires a sequence of events. I'd suggest that "manoeuvre" includes preparation for entry, entry, and then successful completion. In this case the completion was not successful.
It is perfectly legal to enter an earobatic manoeuvre from that altitude as long as the manoeuvre itself isn't performed at that altitude.
The aircarft could have still hit the ground if the manoeuvre had been started from 500ft but mishandled, but I would acknowledge that this was a contributory factor. The engine power, or lack of, is also not a cause as a check of the apex gate parameters would have showed whether it was safe to continue the loop. In my view the cause was pulling through with insufficient height to complete the manoeuvre, what led to that error will probably never be known.
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Going back a'piece... mention of the 'vapour trail' prior to this 'manoeuvre' may have been an FCU vent tank, start vent tank, or the cyclonic oil breather from the engines oil labyrinth sealing system...?
Perchance??
Perchance??
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Raikum
Thank you for your interesting post.
This is also my understanding...hence why I wanted to challenge CM on the point but he seems to have clammed up.
Either someone gave him information in confidence (bad judgment it seems) which was blurted out onto the internet, or as your post suggests to me no such information was given to him yet he pretended for some reason that he had some external source to this information only to be called out because medically PTSD is not consistent with total memory loss.
CM
You've been rumbled mate. Not that you're my mate....but let's try to keep the BS off the thread.
Note to journos....you'd better not print the inaccurate PTSD stuff. It was at best ex FJ BS.
Thank you for your interesting post.
This is also my understanding...hence why I wanted to challenge CM on the point but he seems to have clammed up.
Either someone gave him information in confidence (bad judgment it seems) which was blurted out onto the internet, or as your post suggests to me no such information was given to him yet he pretended for some reason that he had some external source to this information only to be called out because medically PTSD is not consistent with total memory loss.
CM
You've been rumbled mate. Not that you're my mate....but let's try to keep the BS off the thread.
Note to journos....you'd better not print the inaccurate PTSD stuff. It was at best ex FJ BS.
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I'm just glad the pilot lived.
He alone has to wake up every day knowing he has killed several people. The vocation that was his life is gone, he can never be part of a respected professional group again, either at work or as his hobby.
His home life will never be the same again; neighbours will judge, friends will doubt. For him, every curtain twitches.
If he could remember the events surrounding the event, perhaps cause could be found. Only blame will remain; his forever.
Remember these pilots, less fortunate than this pilot, perhaps more fortunate:
Glen Stuart
James Thain
Kevin Hunt
- from whom we all learned lessons that have enhanced aviation safety to this day. None of them lived happy and rewarding lives after their event, they all paid their price for their mistakes, whilst those behind the scenes who also made mistakes remained at their desks free of all guilt and collected their pensions.
For the Shoreham Hunter pilot, 2017 is the first year of a the rest of his life he would never have wanted to live.
He alone has to wake up every day knowing he has killed several people. The vocation that was his life is gone, he can never be part of a respected professional group again, either at work or as his hobby.
His home life will never be the same again; neighbours will judge, friends will doubt. For him, every curtain twitches.
If he could remember the events surrounding the event, perhaps cause could be found. Only blame will remain; his forever.
Remember these pilots, less fortunate than this pilot, perhaps more fortunate:
Glen Stuart
James Thain
Kevin Hunt
- from whom we all learned lessons that have enhanced aviation safety to this day. None of them lived happy and rewarding lives after their event, they all paid their price for their mistakes, whilst those behind the scenes who also made mistakes remained at their desks free of all guilt and collected their pensions.
For the Shoreham Hunter pilot, 2017 is the first year of a the rest of his life he would never have wanted to live.
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Cobol. Being a bit pedantic here, but Capt. Thain didn't make a mistake. It was a lack of knowledge by all concerned about how slush degrades acceleration. He was eventually absolved of all mistakes, if I remember correctly.
By pure coincidence, I met him at his home a few years before he died, when my farmer friend collected some equipment from another farm. I didn't know who he was until my friend was making out his cheque. Another coincidence, I dated Capt Rayment's niece for six months . He lost his life in that accident.
By pure coincidence, I met him at his home a few years before he died, when my farmer friend collected some equipment from another farm. I didn't know who he was until my friend was making out his cheque. Another coincidence, I dated Capt Rayment's niece for six months . He lost his life in that accident.
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While I understand the discussions regarding the completion of the final manoeuvre and the performance of the pilot I would politely suggest that this the final stage in a chain of failings which includes the airworthiness of the aircraft, management of risk, training requirements, proactive regulatory oversight etc. It's incredibly easy to focus on the final event, for perfectly understandable reasons, but I feel that the root cause of this tragic accident lies much deeper than the completion of the final manoeuvre.
I would also suggest to those that are criticising the AAIB report that they have spent considerable time examining a greater volume of evidence and expertise outside the AAIB than we could every have access to. I'm not suggesting that they are infallible, I'm just saying that they have probables considered most of the issues mentioned on these pages and, for good evidential reasons, found them to be irrelevant. I think that if the AAIB included everything that was considered and dismissed during their investigation the report would be considerabley larger that it is.
I expect many of you may disagree with me and I respect that, I just felt that I would throw out my thoughts for consideration.
I would also suggest to those that are criticising the AAIB report that they have spent considerable time examining a greater volume of evidence and expertise outside the AAIB than we could every have access to. I'm not suggesting that they are infallible, I'm just saying that they have probables considered most of the issues mentioned on these pages and, for good evidential reasons, found them to be irrelevant. I think that if the AAIB included everything that was considered and dismissed during their investigation the report would be considerabley larger that it is.
I expect many of you may disagree with me and I respect that, I just felt that I would throw out my thoughts for consideration.
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The Captain of the Pan Am B707 which landed at Northolt instead of Heathrow was (allegedly) asked by ATC for his intentions. "I guess I'll take up Chicken Farming" was the reply.
H Peacock
Other way around.
That's why aircraft tend to take off into wind.
Other way around.
That's why aircraft tend to take off into wind.
Tailwind takeoff = same IAS, higher GS. Therefore more runway.
While I understand the discussions regarding the completion of the final manoeuvre and the performance of the pilot I would politely suggest that this the final stage in a chain of failings which includes the airworthiness of the aircraft, management of risk, training requirements, proactive regulatory oversight etc. It's incredibly easy to focus on the final event, for perfectly understandable reasons, but I feel that the root cause of this tragic accident lies much deeper than the completion of the final manoeuvre
I wonder what the discussion would be if it had been this Typhoon?It's not an uncommon event.
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You are right of course JEM60.
My post implies otherwise; what I was getting at was he was blamed, vilified by many I'm sure due to his high profile PAX. From what one can learn from an internet search; he was sacked, it took 10 years for him to clear his name, he never flew again, and he didn't live to a ripe old age. Probably not the life he would have chosen given a choice.
He took the blame for years, but the reason was found elsewhere, later. Today, from what the industry learned at his expense, we are safer now.
My post implies otherwise; what I was getting at was he was blamed, vilified by many I'm sure due to his high profile PAX. From what one can learn from an internet search; he was sacked, it took 10 years for him to clear his name, he never flew again, and he didn't live to a ripe old age. Probably not the life he would have chosen given a choice.
He took the blame for years, but the reason was found elsewhere, later. Today, from what the industry learned at his expense, we are safer now.
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Having worked my way through the factual part of the report, I think the following observations might be pertinent.
The aircraft was maintained to as high a standard as could reasonably be expected for an ex military aircraft of that age. There were a few minor niggles and oversights, but nothing that materially affected its overall airworthiness.
The failure to set or achieve the full engine power setting may have been a distraction that initiated the events that followed. Although the g forces involved in the loop shouldn't have been physically debilitating, they certainly don't help the mental processes when things are starting to unravel.
The observations regarding the bent loop all contain caveat error bars as to speeds and heights. If you consider the worst possible readings from all the error bars and total them together, there is no way that this maneouvre could have been completed without ploughing into the ground. The median readings still result in an accident. Even the most optimistic estimates would have resulted in a most serious breach of display flying limits.
Even without specific training, a pilot who becomes aware that the apex height of the loop is too low, has two proven escape routes. Roll the aircraft upright coming down off the apex, potentially risking a stall and spin, or rolling the aircraft upright into a dive before reaching 45° nose down. The second option may result in excessive g forces on the airframe, but better than trying to pull it around the rest of the loop with not enough height.
By my estimates, the aircraft was perhaps only actually at 2,700 feet agl rather than 3,700 feet at the apex of the loop. The under reading altimeter that the pilot seems to have used as a reference may have been showing even less height than that! Surely a glance outside the cockpit would reveal that something was very wrong for an experienced display pilot? That sort of height difference from what you expect to see should be obvious even without looking at the altimeter - which is telling you the situation is even worse than you thought.
Given those circumstances, I would imagine the shock of seeing something so different occuring from the normal display profile could cause a person to freeze up at the controls or try desperately to continue to haul it round in an effort to tighten the loop. Reason tends to go for a walk when panic sets in, so you just keeping pulling back on the stick and hope for the best.
Despite all the other contributory aspects of this incident that are considered in extreme detail in the report, it really does come down primarily to pilot error. Initiating a maneouvre at too low an altitude, with too low an airspeed, and too little power on the way up, then a failure to abandon the display program when it became obvious that something had gone very wrong.
Of course the AAIB report is not about establishing blame but to identify the cause of an accident, so no matter what opinions are formed from reading the report, it remains for others far more qualified to establish if there is an element of blame to be attached to anyone or any organisation. It may well be that the ultimate decision is that this was just a tragic accident caused by a momentary error of judgement and thus unavoidable.
The aircraft was maintained to as high a standard as could reasonably be expected for an ex military aircraft of that age. There were a few minor niggles and oversights, but nothing that materially affected its overall airworthiness.
The failure to set or achieve the full engine power setting may have been a distraction that initiated the events that followed. Although the g forces involved in the loop shouldn't have been physically debilitating, they certainly don't help the mental processes when things are starting to unravel.
The observations regarding the bent loop all contain caveat error bars as to speeds and heights. If you consider the worst possible readings from all the error bars and total them together, there is no way that this maneouvre could have been completed without ploughing into the ground. The median readings still result in an accident. Even the most optimistic estimates would have resulted in a most serious breach of display flying limits.
Even without specific training, a pilot who becomes aware that the apex height of the loop is too low, has two proven escape routes. Roll the aircraft upright coming down off the apex, potentially risking a stall and spin, or rolling the aircraft upright into a dive before reaching 45° nose down. The second option may result in excessive g forces on the airframe, but better than trying to pull it around the rest of the loop with not enough height.
By my estimates, the aircraft was perhaps only actually at 2,700 feet agl rather than 3,700 feet at the apex of the loop. The under reading altimeter that the pilot seems to have used as a reference may have been showing even less height than that! Surely a glance outside the cockpit would reveal that something was very wrong for an experienced display pilot? That sort of height difference from what you expect to see should be obvious even without looking at the altimeter - which is telling you the situation is even worse than you thought.
Given those circumstances, I would imagine the shock of seeing something so different occuring from the normal display profile could cause a person to freeze up at the controls or try desperately to continue to haul it round in an effort to tighten the loop. Reason tends to go for a walk when panic sets in, so you just keeping pulling back on the stick and hope for the best.
Despite all the other contributory aspects of this incident that are considered in extreme detail in the report, it really does come down primarily to pilot error. Initiating a maneouvre at too low an altitude, with too low an airspeed, and too little power on the way up, then a failure to abandon the display program when it became obvious that something had gone very wrong.
Of course the AAIB report is not about establishing blame but to identify the cause of an accident, so no matter what opinions are formed from reading the report, it remains for others far more qualified to establish if there is an element of blame to be attached to anyone or any organisation. It may well be that the ultimate decision is that this was just a tragic accident caused by a momentary error of judgement and thus unavoidable.
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Airbubba. Yes it was a chicken farm that we visited.
Cobol. Thanks for that. He was not a well man when I met him. Sad in so many ways. Regards, John.
Cobol. Thanks for that. He was not a well man when I met him. Sad in so many ways. Regards, John.