Canada Rouge at Montego Bay
While not defending this crew for missing the ILS NOTAM.
I too and the crews I work with have often said that NOTAMs often require a lot of digging to find the real important stuff. ( yes I agree it is all important )
Perhaps a new and improved presentation would be nice.
What really scared me in Africa was some of the stuff that was not NOTAMed.
example : on first contact: "Airport closed because the President is arriving/departing..you go someplace else!"
Why wasn't it NOTAMed? ....security..president's movements are secret.
Happened more than once.
I too and the crews I work with have often said that NOTAMs often require a lot of digging to find the real important stuff. ( yes I agree it is all important )
Perhaps a new and improved presentation would be nice.
What really scared me in Africa was some of the stuff that was not NOTAMed.
example : on first contact: "Airport closed because the President is arriving/departing..you go someplace else!"
Why wasn't it NOTAMed? ....security..president's movements are secret.
Happened more than once.
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A thorough TEM briefing for a normal visual landing, hand flown, with manual thrust? Arrggghhh. We're doomed. It should be a standard procedure that everyone is fully aware of, comfortable with, and doing it is part of the SOP's. Instead it's viewed by some as a six headed monster. What's next, a crew briefing on how to tie one's shoe while airborne?
Think of this - these reports are about guys trying to land a fully functioning airplane and their inability to use simple manual procedures leads to near accidents. How many reports and studies have we read about the negative impact on raw flying skills? When SOP's promote the loss of skills, or pilots accept the loss of skills out of fear of company retribution or their own lack of skills, trying to use raw flying skills when it's absolutely necessary due to emergencies or unusual events because a very high risk event.
AF 447 only lost total airspeed indication for less than a minute and it rapidly became a tragedy. The sad reality is that loss of control has been repeated in training by crews that were expected to do better. They didn't.
"Automation is your friend, until it isn't." I tell new guys that and how they need to understand when ramping up, or down, the automation level is something that they NEED to understand.
The topic of appropriate automation level came up last month after last than desirable automation requests were made by the PF. The requests that were just poor I complied with and the inappropriate ones I didn't comply with. He was new on the aircraft and new to that level of automation with less than 100 hrs after checkout. The PF brought it up over beers realizing that his requests were not the way to operate the aircraft. High time guy, low experience in type. We've all been there, to some degree, throughout our careers.
An example where automation confusion can set in is approaching a level off restriction, due to terrain, while cleared for an ILS and above glideslope. It can rapidly become a floundering event if altitude capture is triggered prior to glide slope intercept. This is similar to what happened to this crew when the descent mode changes to a level off or climb mode.
Think of this - these reports are about guys trying to land a fully functioning airplane and their inability to use simple manual procedures leads to near accidents. How many reports and studies have we read about the negative impact on raw flying skills? When SOP's promote the loss of skills, or pilots accept the loss of skills out of fear of company retribution or their own lack of skills, trying to use raw flying skills when it's absolutely necessary due to emergencies or unusual events because a very high risk event.
AF 447 only lost total airspeed indication for less than a minute and it rapidly became a tragedy. The sad reality is that loss of control has been repeated in training by crews that were expected to do better. They didn't.
"Automation is your friend, until it isn't." I tell new guys that and how they need to understand when ramping up, or down, the automation level is something that they NEED to understand.
The topic of appropriate automation level came up last month after last than desirable automation requests were made by the PF. The requests that were just poor I complied with and the inappropriate ones I didn't comply with. He was new on the aircraft and new to that level of automation with less than 100 hrs after checkout. The PF brought it up over beers realizing that his requests were not the way to operate the aircraft. High time guy, low experience in type. We've all been there, to some degree, throughout our careers.
An example where automation confusion can set in is approaching a level off restriction, due to terrain, while cleared for an ILS and above glideslope. It can rapidly become a floundering event if altitude capture is triggered prior to glide slope intercept. This is similar to what happened to this crew when the descent mode changes to a level off or climb mode.
Last edited by misd-agin; 24th Aug 2019 at 13:33.
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Misd.
Interesting about fully manual Flt in an AB. Take manual thrust for an example thrust idle to max is about 5 inches of movement, so adjusting thrust has to be done with finess. You can't just give the thrust levers an inch like you can on a Boeing. As AB will tell you the side stick ergonomics mean full movement is very easy to do. Most pilots hit the stops on a gusty approach. Again this is NOT an airbus boeing thing. They are different beasts each has its benefits. I was told in the early 90's that the FBW AB was not really designed to be hand flown only for short periods whilst you got the appropriate modes engaged.
Just to say my career was t/props, Boeing, AB, Boeing & back to AB. All a pleasure to hand fly but the AB needed modified skills, which a lot of pilots do not have. There is some UT videos showing some low level flights in Europe. Just look at the pilot (stirring the porrage) So reverting to manual flt as this crew did can on occasion not solve the problems that they had set themselves.
Interesting about fully manual Flt in an AB. Take manual thrust for an example thrust idle to max is about 5 inches of movement, so adjusting thrust has to be done with finess. You can't just give the thrust levers an inch like you can on a Boeing. As AB will tell you the side stick ergonomics mean full movement is very easy to do. Most pilots hit the stops on a gusty approach. Again this is NOT an airbus boeing thing. They are different beasts each has its benefits. I was told in the early 90's that the FBW AB was not really designed to be hand flown only for short periods whilst you got the appropriate modes engaged.
Just to say my career was t/props, Boeing, AB, Boeing & back to AB. All a pleasure to hand fly but the AB needed modified skills, which a lot of pilots do not have. There is some UT videos showing some low level flights in Europe. Just look at the pilot (stirring the porrage) So reverting to manual flt as this crew did can on occasion not solve the problems that they had set themselves.
Kerosine
My apologies, cannot blame the wine as I don't drink But i had discovered I had shifted my keyboard off centre by accident and not checking what a I thought I typed-apologies again.
I would also blame the decline in manual keyboard skills since automation (spell check and predicative text) became the norm
My apologies, cannot blame the wine as I don't drink But i had discovered I had shifted my keyboard off centre by accident and not checking what a I thought I typed-apologies again.
I would also blame the decline in manual keyboard skills since automation (spell check and predicative text) became the norm
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After reading this thread, I'm left wondering if every large passenger aircraft should not have a large (10cm diam.) knob at the centre top of the panel labelled "I Have Control!".
Pushing it in would de-activate all the automatics, except those needed to enable the pilot to fly the aircraft manually, ie stick 'n rudder, throttle and flaps, to somewhat over-simplify it.
I have sat in the Concorde jumpseat during an approach and landing with the FO flying it manually using just those controls. (The trips round regional airports were mostly to give crews the minimum handling they needed.)
I was there when, still sitting in the flight deck at Muharraq , the Captain of a B707-338C, operating as QF739 on February 21, 1969 explained how he regained control after the aircraft went out of control over the Arabian Gulf on route to Bahrain at FL350 and M 0.81, dived inverted, rolled, probably went supersonic momentarily (not recorded accurately due to compressibility issues at the pitots) ) recorded +4.57G and - 0.63 G, and lost 19,000 ft.
"I realised that we had finally entered a spin", he said, "so I recovered it like I would a Tiger Moth. No big deal." And off he went with the crew for a stiff drink in the Gulf Hotel. We found soap stuck to the ceilings in the toilets.
Crews would be trained to recognise a situation where they have lost effective control of their aircraft because they do not understand what the automatics are up to, and/or when something is obviously seriously wrong and getting worse, and to use the button to recover, stabilise, whatever, using their basic flying skills, if they have any.
Pushing it in would de-activate all the automatics, except those needed to enable the pilot to fly the aircraft manually, ie stick 'n rudder, throttle and flaps, to somewhat over-simplify it.
I have sat in the Concorde jumpseat during an approach and landing with the FO flying it manually using just those controls. (The trips round regional airports were mostly to give crews the minimum handling they needed.)
I was there when, still sitting in the flight deck at Muharraq , the Captain of a B707-338C, operating as QF739 on February 21, 1969 explained how he regained control after the aircraft went out of control over the Arabian Gulf on route to Bahrain at FL350 and M 0.81, dived inverted, rolled, probably went supersonic momentarily (not recorded accurately due to compressibility issues at the pitots) ) recorded +4.57G and - 0.63 G, and lost 19,000 ft.
"I realised that we had finally entered a spin", he said, "so I recovered it like I would a Tiger Moth. No big deal." And off he went with the crew for a stiff drink in the Gulf Hotel. We found soap stuck to the ceilings in the toilets.
Crews would be trained to recognise a situation where they have lost effective control of their aircraft because they do not understand what the automatics are up to, and/or when something is obviously seriously wrong and getting worse, and to use the button to recover, stabilise, whatever, using their basic flying skills, if they have any.
To paraphrase an old saying:
"Better to do a go-around and have a few ignorant folks think you can't fly, than prang your aircraft and remove all doubt in everyone."
"Better to do a go-around and have a few ignorant folks think you can't fly, than prang your aircraft and remove all doubt in everyone."
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This is a very interesting discussion with many great points. Whilst I have been flying Airbus aircraft for 20 years (save the 18 months I had on the B744), there is no doubt in my mind that my skills are not like they were back then. Now, I fly the 330 from point to point/ILS to ILS on long-haul fights. For those sectors I am operating, after a 13+ hour day, frankly hand bombing it is is not generally the first thing on my mind. I would pick my days based on how I felt and who I was with. With my new gig however, it is just to painful to tell my crew that I will fly a visual approach to landing. The fear/concern they have for such a simple task is palpable - so I just don't bother. This is another reality out there and one that is not likely going to change for me anytime soon.
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@IcePack
There's actually some thought going on on the certification/design side of the world to address the issue of GA with the high thrust levels (and other issues) on modern aircraft. Restricting the T/W achieved on a GA is one concept (like the Boeing two-press TOGA idea)
There's actually some thought going on on the certification/design side of the world to address the issue of GA with the high thrust levels (and other issues) on modern aircraft. Restricting the T/W achieved on a GA is one concept (like the Boeing two-press TOGA idea)
Talk is cheap. What will it take to actually get someone other than Boeing to implement this, as an option that is retrofittable to in-service types?
And in A320/330/340ies selecting TOGA, then going back to CLB as soon as the engines spool up works fine.
I flew every dual engine G/A on them like that... and I've done a few 🙄
I flew every dual engine G/A on them like that... and I've done a few 🙄
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Icepack - I've flown the 320 family. Yes, the throttle travel is less than the Boeings but if you only flew Airbus it would be no change.
Even with the more sensitive throttles you can make N1 adjustments in 1% increments. You just have to look, like on any aircraft, at what result you got from your input.
It's brutal watching guys stir the pot, vigorously, while hand flying. If they let go, especially on an AB, the ride almost always settles out. On departure, on gusty day, you can feel slight lurching as the stick inputs are made. As soon as the side stick inputs stop, either by releasing the stick or turning the a/p on, the small lurches go away. The 777 does the same if you make large or rapid inputs. With regards to stirring the pot it's like watching an old Hollywood movie with the fake driving, the steering wheel is constantly moving. In reality steering wheel inputs should be minor and steady, just like flying.
Even with the more sensitive throttles you can make N1 adjustments in 1% increments. You just have to look, like on any aircraft, at what result you got from your input.
It's brutal watching guys stir the pot, vigorously, while hand flying. If they let go, especially on an AB, the ride almost always settles out. On departure, on gusty day, you can feel slight lurching as the stick inputs are made. As soon as the side stick inputs stop, either by releasing the stick or turning the a/p on, the small lurches go away. The 777 does the same if you make large or rapid inputs. With regards to stirring the pot it's like watching an old Hollywood movie with the fake driving, the steering wheel is constantly moving. In reality steering wheel inputs should be minor and steady, just like flying.
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Most modern aircraft CAN be a handful on a go-around. Can't find it at mom but in the early days of the A320 at LTN one went around & if I remember got to 13000 ft before the crew got it under control. (G/A alt = 3000ft). I had one almost get to the stall (into VLS) on an automatic go-around. (I disconnected & flew it before anything serious happened). This is not a AB Boeing thing as Boeing have had their fair share.
So I believe a lot of pilots subconsciously resist go arounds. The crew in question had already "lost it" so going around probably didn't enter their conscious thought.
So I believe a lot of pilots subconsciously resist go arounds. The crew in question had already "lost it" so going around probably didn't enter their conscious thought.
Last edited by Sky Slug; 13th Jan 2017 at 06:07.
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Misd& sky I agree with both your points. Personnaly I had no problems with any of the types I flew probably due to so much hand flying in my early days.
However looking at all the incidents occurring at present it is QED that it is a problem. For what it's worth I believe some of the problem is the denial that modern ergonomics & power management are the problem. "Just a pilot problem"
(As a side note got de-briefed on a line check which as it happened ended in a go around,due aircraft missing his turn off, for coming back to climb detent as soon as gear was up. Not SOPA don'you know! I just looked at the check airman sideways. Think he got my point.
However looking at all the incidents occurring at present it is QED that it is a problem. For what it's worth I believe some of the problem is the denial that modern ergonomics & power management are the problem. "Just a pilot problem"
(As a side note got de-briefed on a line check which as it happened ended in a go around,due aircraft missing his turn off, for coming back to climb detent as soon as gear was up. Not SOPA don'you know! I just looked at the check airman sideways. Think he got my point.
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@pfvspnf
I believe this aircraft, C-FZUG msn 697, was originally an Air Canada mainline A319 ordered without GPS, and the RNAV approach cannot be flown using DME/DME positioning. With the ILS OTS the VOR/DME approach was their only option.
I believe this aircraft, C-FZUG msn 697, was originally an Air Canada mainline A319 ordered without GPS, and the RNAV approach cannot be flown using DME/DME positioning. With the ILS OTS the VOR/DME approach was their only option.
