Jet goes down on its way to Medellin, Colombia
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I really don't care if lives could have been saved by declaring mayday 3 minutes earlier or if the plane was still able to make it to the airport when it became a glider. (Or if he would have made it if the other planes weren't there)
What we should be really interested in is how it became possible that this captain thought he could get away with what he did (including all contributing factors leading to that state of mind)
What we should be really interested in is how it became possible that this captain thought he could get away with what he did (including all contributing factors leading to that state of mind)
What I initially said was the cause seems to be an irrefutable fact now. I don't hold out much hope for any enquiry/investigation. As with lots of things in that neck of the woods, the enquiry will exonerate the one with the deepest pockets and some poor individual will end up in jail. Or am I just being cynical again?
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Originally Posted by zero/zero
I do care if it the aircraft could have been saved by declaring a mayday 3 minutes earlier as we can use that knowledge to improve training. Same for the gliding - if the aircraft could have made it, then should we training more for such eventualities in the sim?
Practising an all engine failure glide to land once in a while might be useful (and fun) but if the investigators would recommend more of such training in their final report because of this crash, they would be making fools of themselves.
Talking about this event in a CRM course might be useful. You're not going to need a sim for this one.
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The question needs to be asked why the football club didn't charter a longer range aircraft to fly them directly from Chapeco airport (which has a 2475m runway) to Medellin rather than flying commercial via Sao Paulo to Santa Cruz and then booking what should have been a two leg charter. That would be 4 sectors in total which probably isn't ideal preparation for a cup final. It wasn't that the charter was cheap. From what's been published it would appear that the price of the charter was way in excess of what would be reasonable presumably due to various backhanders from the airline to officials in the football world.
It would appear that either the club were in on the scam or the Brazilian FA or CONMEBOL instructed them to use LaMia however inconvenient it was.
It would appear that either the club were in on the scam or the Brazilian FA or CONMEBOL instructed them to use LaMia however inconvenient it was.
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Oh my! There is an emergency ahead of me and I'm out of fuel. Enter a holding pattern ?
Hell no !
Land in front of them and get rear ended ? Save lives perhaps.
Land behind them and rear end them ? Save lives perhaps.
Land parallel in the grass? Save lives perhaps.
But run out of fuel ?
You declare an emergency and all the rules are off! You don't go into a holding pattern and use up your lifeblood.
Hell no !
Land in front of them and get rear ended ? Save lives perhaps.
Land behind them and rear end them ? Save lives perhaps.
Land parallel in the grass? Save lives perhaps.
But run out of fuel ?
You declare an emergency and all the rules are off! You don't go into a holding pattern and use up your lifeblood.
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And there I was hoping that Erwin might be sitting in the flight deck and be privy to the fuel discussions and shed some valuable light on the chain of events. APU's tend to be faulty if they have no fuel to start up with. Does he think the APU could have replaced the engines?
Acc to Tumiri's latest newspaper interview ( surprised he's still not been interviewed by the investigating team) , he says he flew with LaMia only 3 times previously, first flight with them being in August. He qualified in 2015 and "I belong to a mechanics company in Cochabamba called Bacams."
Also he qualified as a private pilot in 2016.
(Maybe FA Suarez is not speaking to the press because she's more astute, Tumiri keeps changing his account, so best taken with a pinch of salt. )
some bad translations from the links:
About the fatal accident, Tumiri reiterated his responsibility in this event, is as a crew member, he considers that they lacked leadership. "That leader should coordinate with all team members. That should be the responsibility of the pilot. I was commissioned to write down details, like what time we are taking off, landing, if there was hydraulic, water flow, if there was gasoline, those details ".
He said that he filled up to the max with fuel and that it should make a stop at Cobija to re-fuel, but at the time of departing the pilot said we'd go straight to Medellin. "If the problem had been fuel, was due to the fact that we charge in Cobija, I did check the gas to Cobija, but from when I said they would go straight to Medellin," he recalled.
However, Tumiri does not believe the accident was due to lack of gasoline or an electrical problem, but rather a failure, "a generator that goes in the back of the plane, called the APU, which already not enter gasoline and did not generate more electricity. On the other hand, he said the pilot only mentioned that the crew prepare for landing and it was not until the stewardess told him something was wrong, he was concerned. "The pilot only mentioned that we prepare for landing, we were not alarmed because the decline we did was the type of movement to land. There was no panic or anything. The only detail was that the stewardess told me to fasten well, then something happened."
He said that he filled up to the max with fuel and that it should make a stop at Cobija to re-fuel, but at the time of departing the pilot said we'd go straight to Medellin. "If the problem had been fuel, was due to the fact that we charge in Cobija, I did check the gas to Cobija, but from when I said they would go straight to Medellin," he recalled.
However, Tumiri does not believe the accident was due to lack of gasoline or an electrical problem, but rather a failure, "a generator that goes in the back of the plane, called the APU, which already not enter gasoline and did not generate more electricity. On the other hand, he said the pilot only mentioned that the crew prepare for landing and it was not until the stewardess told him something was wrong, he was concerned. "The pilot only mentioned that we prepare for landing, we were not alarmed because the decline we did was the type of movement to land. There was no panic or anything. The only detail was that the stewardess told me to fasten well, then something happened."
The journalist's questions in italics, also at that link is the later description of the crash and moments leading up to it.
What was your role?
Check that the aircraft is well, it is all quiet, everything is airworthy. That's my job, refuelling, checking the oil, under the rules we have and the plane's manual.
According to the flight plan too?
The flight plan is separate from that, the dispatcher is responsible.
Was it the first time that fuel may have been lacking?
I'm not so sure it's the fuel. I could tell you yes, but we must still wait investigations . Now it is said to be fuel issue and could also say that, but I'm not so sure.
You, as a mechanic, you know how much fuel the plane was carrying?
I did know.
In this case, for the flight to Medellin?
I filled all fuel to full, well overdone.
That was enough to get to the destination?
I coordinate that with the dispatcher. If the dispatcher tells me x many liters, or full, I do it. In this case I said it's 'fulee' and I did. Then I told YPFB (Bolivian Fiscal Oilfields) to make an invoice to Cobija. But during the flight, Angel flight engineer, told me the plane will no longer go to Cobija, but up to Medellin.
The invoice was to resupply at Cobija?
Yes. But it was night and all that, they knew that the Cobija airport does not work at night.
Were you surprised that no refuelling is done in Cobija? Did not it generate an alert?
Yes, but they are responsible for their own administration, their own money. Part from the head of them coming orders. I have to fulfill. My role is to check that the plane is in good condition and is filled with everything that has to be filled: lubricants, oils, fuels.
Check that the aircraft is well, it is all quiet, everything is airworthy. That's my job, refuelling, checking the oil, under the rules we have and the plane's manual.
According to the flight plan too?
The flight plan is separate from that, the dispatcher is responsible.
Was it the first time that fuel may have been lacking?
I'm not so sure it's the fuel. I could tell you yes, but we must still wait investigations . Now it is said to be fuel issue and could also say that, but I'm not so sure.
You, as a mechanic, you know how much fuel the plane was carrying?
I did know.
In this case, for the flight to Medellin?
I filled all fuel to full, well overdone.
That was enough to get to the destination?
I coordinate that with the dispatcher. If the dispatcher tells me x many liters, or full, I do it. In this case I said it's 'fulee' and I did. Then I told YPFB (Bolivian Fiscal Oilfields) to make an invoice to Cobija. But during the flight, Angel flight engineer, told me the plane will no longer go to Cobija, but up to Medellin.
The invoice was to resupply at Cobija?
Yes. But it was night and all that, they knew that the Cobija airport does not work at night.
Were you surprised that no refuelling is done in Cobija? Did not it generate an alert?
Yes, but they are responsible for their own administration, their own money. Part from the head of them coming orders. I have to fulfill. My role is to check that the plane is in good condition and is filled with everything that has to be filled: lubricants, oils, fuels.
Tumiri hace nuevas revelaciones y funcionaria busca asilo: LaMia | Diario Correo del Sur: Noticias de Sucre, Bolivia y el Mundo
?Cuando se prendieron las luces de emergencia Ximena presintió que algo pasaba? | Noticias de Bolivia y el Mundo - EL DEBER
On engineer Angel Lugo who died - he'd worked for LaMia for 2 years. "Lugo had already spent 5 years in the area Avionics Engineer and Technical experience encompassed maintenance planning and Engineering Technical Support."
Habla el primo de Ángel Lugo, el técnico aeronáutico venezolano que murió en la tragedia de Chapecoense
Last edited by jess15; 7th Dec 2016 at 15:15. Reason: typo
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The question needs to be asked why the football club didn't charter a longer range aircraft to fly them directly from Chapeco airport (which has a 2475m runway) to Medellin rather than flying commercial via Sao Paulo to Santa Cruz and then booking what should have been a two leg charter. That would be 4 sectors in total which probably isn't ideal preparation for a cup final. It wasn't that the charter was cheap. From what's been published it would appear that the price of the charter was way in excess of what would be reasonable presumably due to various backhanders from the airline to officials in the football world.
It would appear that either the club were in on the scam or the Brazilian FA or CONMEBOL instructed them to use LaMia however inconvenient it was.
It would appear that either the club were in on the scam or the Brazilian FA or CONMEBOL instructed them to use LaMia however inconvenient it was.
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They were already in Sao Paulo having played against Palmeiras on the Sunday evening. The played on Sunday and stayed in Sao Paulo until the Monday. This lack of research which leads to assumptions is really quite incredible.
As I am not familiar with standard routes in South America: are there scheduled flights daily from Sao Paulo to Medellin? Is there a reason that a Brazilian team would not take a Brazilian charter to Colombia from Sao Paulo? (Asking out of sheer ignorance due to lack of familiarity).
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None, other than that there appears to be a cosy relationship between the South American football confederation and this particular operator. A relationship that is surely about to be scrutinised in minute detail. Maybe.
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As I am not familiar with standard routes in South America: are there scheduled flights daily from Sao Paulo to Medellin? Is there a reason that a Brazilian team would not take a Brazilian charter to Colombia from Sao Paulo? (Asking out of sheer ignorance due to lack of familiarity).
I've also seen reports (unconfirmed) that GOL was willing to run the charter for a price very similar to what was reportedly paid to Lamia.
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As staggering an assumption you're ever likely to find! The investigation can conclude now...just let us know when you have almost certainly concluded the final report.
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I was merely trying to paint a picture of the sort of 'burócrata' she is likely to be and the gross unfairness of attaching blame to her.
Anyone who has lived/worked in Latin America and had dealings with government departments will be familiar with such people. And yes, that is how many/most of them get a job. I am not being judgemental, that is the system.
It may be an assumption, but a fair one.
Anyone who has lived/worked in Latin America and had dealings with government departments will be familiar with such people. And yes, that is how many/most of them get a job. I am not being judgemental, that is the system.
It may be an assumption, but a fair one.
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What I initially said was the cause seems to be an irrefutable fact now. I don't hold out much hope for any enquiry/investigation. As with lots of things in that neck of the woods, the enquiry will exonerate the one with the deepest pockets and some poor individual will end up in jail. Or am I just being cynical again?
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https://panampost.com/karina-martin/...a-plane-crash/
"Vargas Villegas served as Director of the Aeronautics Registry for DGAC and was therefore responsible for giving out flying licenses to companies like LaMia, and would have given one to his son."
"Vargas Villegas served as Director of the Aeronautics Registry for DGAC and was therefore responsible for giving out flying licenses to companies like LaMia, and would have given one to his son."
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Nothing quite like waiting to see what happens next, is there? Perhaps we shall get an honest report out of all this mess. Who knows for certain?
Let's wait and see, shall we?
Let's wait and see, shall we?
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Thanks for your attention and comments to my posting on this accident. I have added a fair amount of additional material over the last few days to answer some lingering questions. Let me know if something is wrong or missing. Of course, with real flight data a more conclusive analysis would be possible, plus awareness of the actions onboard.
Having dug as deep as I can with the limited information at hand:
1) The flight plan from SLVR to SKRG with 77 aboard is beyond the legal range of this airplane, even with auxiliary tanks. The same plane had flown the same city pair in reverse on Nov 4, with with even a longer stage length of over 4:33. The investigation will have to conclude on this point as it appears the flight planning was reckless.
2) FEED LO LEVEL warning would have been raised at least 150 km from SKRG. Each feed tank has a dedicated gage for constant monitoring. There can be no doubt the flight crew knew they had a little more than 20 minutes of fuel left, at that point, and counting.
3)There appears to have been sufficient fuel for a straight-in approach, and after one circuit around the holding pattern. The decision to turn outbound on the second circuit left fuel exhaustion inevitable.
4) ADS-B position data appears to be driven from an IRS source, not GNSS. The departure position was offset by 2 km. Evaluating a few other flights of similar duration suggests another 2 km drift could be expected, or for this flight the position uncertainty is about 4 km (2 nm). The northern arrival suggest an easterly offset of less than 1 nm.
5) LMI2933 entered and held over RNG VOR/DME. The reported position was offset about 10 nm south of the VOR. While IRS error might account for 2 nm of the error, the remaining 8 nm offset is puzzling. The final resting place and the actions through the last few minutes are most consistent with the airplane operating 8-10 nm south of RNG. This issue should be resolved in the investigation.
6) The necessary glide ratio while holding at 21,000 feet peaked at about 11:1 on the backside of the pattern (to SKRG runway 01).
7) The necessary glide ratio from the last reported position had increased to 13:1 (due to there relatively steep descent).
8) The RJ85 operates with no fuel (windmilling engines, no APU, no standby generator) by using a battery to power one comm/nav set, standby instruments, and hydraulic power for landing gear extension and braking. The pitch and roll controls are mechanical. The rudder control is possible only if the windmilling on Eng 3 is sufficient and only if the crew isolates the standby generator. Flap, spoilers, air brake: are not powered. Plan on flaps up landing.
9) RJ85 predicted glide ratio is 15:1 flaps up at best glide speed.
10) Normally should only extend gear when landing is assured, as glide ratio drops to 6:1 with gear extended.
11) LMI2933 descended from 21,000 feet presumably under power, with flameout approximately at 15,000.
12) In the descent the airplane was slowed to what appears to be flaps/gear down approach configuration.
13) The estimated glide ratio from the last reported position to the crash site is about 5.7:1 (matching predicted gear down glide ratio of 6:1).
14) LMI2933 appears to have been capable to glide to SKRG runway 01 until the point that the flight crew (apparently) pre-maturely extended flaps and gear.
I have extracted info from a copy of the RJ85 FCOM vol 1. It would help if someone could send me vol 2 and vol 3.
Satcom Guru: LMI2933 LAMIA AVRO RJ85 Medellín Deadstick
Having dug as deep as I can with the limited information at hand:
1) The flight plan from SLVR to SKRG with 77 aboard is beyond the legal range of this airplane, even with auxiliary tanks. The same plane had flown the same city pair in reverse on Nov 4, with with even a longer stage length of over 4:33. The investigation will have to conclude on this point as it appears the flight planning was reckless.
2) FEED LO LEVEL warning would have been raised at least 150 km from SKRG. Each feed tank has a dedicated gage for constant monitoring. There can be no doubt the flight crew knew they had a little more than 20 minutes of fuel left, at that point, and counting.
3)There appears to have been sufficient fuel for a straight-in approach, and after one circuit around the holding pattern. The decision to turn outbound on the second circuit left fuel exhaustion inevitable.
4) ADS-B position data appears to be driven from an IRS source, not GNSS. The departure position was offset by 2 km. Evaluating a few other flights of similar duration suggests another 2 km drift could be expected, or for this flight the position uncertainty is about 4 km (2 nm). The northern arrival suggest an easterly offset of less than 1 nm.
5) LMI2933 entered and held over RNG VOR/DME. The reported position was offset about 10 nm south of the VOR. While IRS error might account for 2 nm of the error, the remaining 8 nm offset is puzzling. The final resting place and the actions through the last few minutes are most consistent with the airplane operating 8-10 nm south of RNG. This issue should be resolved in the investigation.
6) The necessary glide ratio while holding at 21,000 feet peaked at about 11:1 on the backside of the pattern (to SKRG runway 01).
7) The necessary glide ratio from the last reported position had increased to 13:1 (due to there relatively steep descent).
8) The RJ85 operates with no fuel (windmilling engines, no APU, no standby generator) by using a battery to power one comm/nav set, standby instruments, and hydraulic power for landing gear extension and braking. The pitch and roll controls are mechanical. The rudder control is possible only if the windmilling on Eng 3 is sufficient and only if the crew isolates the standby generator. Flap, spoilers, air brake: are not powered. Plan on flaps up landing.
9) RJ85 predicted glide ratio is 15:1 flaps up at best glide speed.
10) Normally should only extend gear when landing is assured, as glide ratio drops to 6:1 with gear extended.
11) LMI2933 descended from 21,000 feet presumably under power, with flameout approximately at 15,000.
12) In the descent the airplane was slowed to what appears to be flaps/gear down approach configuration.
13) The estimated glide ratio from the last reported position to the crash site is about 5.7:1 (matching predicted gear down glide ratio of 6:1).
14) LMI2933 appears to have been capable to glide to SKRG runway 01 until the point that the flight crew (apparently) pre-maturely extended flaps and gear.
I have extracted info from a copy of the RJ85 FCOM vol 1. It would help if someone could send me vol 2 and vol 3.
Satcom Guru: LMI2933 LAMIA AVRO RJ85 Medellín Deadstick
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The cockpit voice recorder and the flight data recorder operate on ESS AC power. The flight data acquisition unit operates on ESS DC power.
With all engines off and no APU, the only source of power is battery to EMERG DC/AC.
The recorders would not be operating on battery power, and would not record the information from the point power was lost (flameout).
Satcom Guru: LMI2933 LAMIA AVRO RJ85 Medellín Deadstick
With all engines off and no APU, the only source of power is battery to EMERG DC/AC.
The recorders would not be operating on battery power, and would not record the information from the point power was lost (flameout).
Satcom Guru: LMI2933 LAMIA AVRO RJ85 Medellín Deadstick
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The Importance of the MAYDAY
Quote from the individual controller at La Guardia working - "Sully" Hudson Splash 1549 in 2011.
"When a pilot says Mayday or declares an emergency, you go from a focused state to a hyper-focused state. You focus in on the emergency and figure out the solution to the problem".
How sad there was no MAYDAY at Medellin, (better) early or (worse) late.
"When a pilot says Mayday or declares an emergency, you go from a focused state to a hyper-focused state. You focus in on the emergency and figure out the solution to the problem".
How sad there was no MAYDAY at Medellin, (better) early or (worse) late.
No, but your comment is the first definitive statement about what services the crew would still have that I've seen here. Given that the aircraft uses engines 1 & 4 for primary generators, and a (engine driven) hydraulic system for the standby generator, and has an APU, I didn't expect to see much on the battery. There's not much in the public domain to confirm what's left.....
I think all going well they could have at least crashed on the runway. Of course, all going well they would've stopped for fuel along the way.