Jet goes down on its way to Medellin, Colombia
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Live: Aerocivil press conference with investigation update of the LaMia crash near Medellin #Chapecoense :
https://t.co/m6tOIjOfMB
https://t.co/m6tOIjOfMB
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Bolivia closed its official investigation last week, issuing a final report last Tuesday and naming the pilot and company as directly responsible for the crash. Functionaries of AASANA and DGAC plus the flight dispatcher now in Brazil also received criticism and blame. There have been no public findings into the role of the highest authorities in Bolivian aviation (e.g. at ministerial level), in terms of how LaMia was allowed to continue to operate in light of information which has emerged since the date of the accident. In effect, the Bolivian government has sought to distance itself from any potential malpractice on its own part and close down the story. The ruling party (MAS) are currently under pressure over mismanagement of water resources and infrastructure which has led to water rationing here in La Paz. MAS is at the same time seeking to overturn the result of a February referendum which prevents incumbent President Evo Morales from standing for an (unconstitutional) fourth term. (This is the same President who claimed not to be aware of LaMia the airline, until footage emerged showing him recently posing for pictures onboard the incident aircraft in Rurrenabaque.) Opposition figures have conversely sought to establish and publicise links between LaMia and the Morales administration. Against this political backdrop, it should be of no surprise that the Bolivian government would rather that this story disappear.
The swift release of Bolivia's official final report led to criticism from Colombia's Director of Civil Aviation, who has stated that Bolivia has neither the faculty ("facultad", which can be translated as either authority or ability) nor competence to come up with such investigation findings. This in turn led to a statement from Bolivia's Vice President at a press breakfast on Christmas Eve that the Bolivian investigation report would serve as a contribution to the overall Colombian investigation, and that the final word regarding any immediate and underlying causes of the accident remains with Colombia.
Chapecoense de Brasil - Bolivia: Investigación a Lamia es "contribución" a Colombia | Latinoamérica | Mundo | El Comercio Peru
Chapecoense de Brasil: "Lamia y piloto son responsables de la tragedia" | Latinoamérica | Mundo | El Comercio Peru
Colombia tiene la última palabra sobre el accidente - Diario Pagina Siete
The swift release of Bolivia's official final report led to criticism from Colombia's Director of Civil Aviation, who has stated that Bolivia has neither the faculty ("facultad", which can be translated as either authority or ability) nor competence to come up with such investigation findings. This in turn led to a statement from Bolivia's Vice President at a press breakfast on Christmas Eve that the Bolivian investigation report would serve as a contribution to the overall Colombian investigation, and that the final word regarding any immediate and underlying causes of the accident remains with Colombia.
Chapecoense de Brasil - Bolivia: Investigación a Lamia es "contribución" a Colombia | Latinoamérica | Mundo | El Comercio Peru
Chapecoense de Brasil: "Lamia y piloto son responsables de la tragedia" | Latinoamérica | Mundo | El Comercio Peru
Colombia tiene la última palabra sobre el accidente - Diario Pagina Siete
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G1 have a brief rundown on the press conference given today by the Colombian authorities.
Avião da Chapecoense viajou com pouco combustível e excesso de peso, dizem investigadores | Mundo | G1
Overweight, crew were aware of the fuel situation, discussed two refuelling stops, and didn't advise ATC even with two engines out.
Avião da Chapecoense viajou com pouco combustível e excesso de peso, dizem investigadores | Mundo | G1
Overweight, crew were aware of the fuel situation, discussed two refuelling stops, and didn't advise ATC even with two engines out.
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This article was published in the Brazilian press an hour ago:
Colômbia responsabiliza órgão do governo boliviano por autorização irregular a voo da LaMia
Key points include:
- Colombia's Secretary of Air Safety, Colonel Fredy Bonilla, holds AASANA (noted to be a Bolivian government body) responsible for the crash due to irregular authorisation of the flight plan.
- LaMia did not hold proper authorisation to carry passengers nor market national or international flights.
- Colombian civil aviation authorities have stated that according to the Chicago Convention they have sole responsibility for investigating the accident. This may be in response to the Bolivian "final report" already released.
- The flight was over permitted weight, in addition to Medellin being at the limit of its fuel.
- CVR evidence reveals that the pilots discussed making a refuelling stop in Leticia or Bogota. Colonel Bonilla states that the pilots were aware that fuel on board was neither adequate nor sufficient.
A comment on the article notes that alternative refuelling stops were also available in Brazil in Rio Branco and Tabatinga (the latter being right next to Leticia - the two are effectively one town with an international border down the middle).
Colômbia responsabiliza órgão do governo boliviano por autorização irregular a voo da LaMia
Key points include:
- Colombia's Secretary of Air Safety, Colonel Fredy Bonilla, holds AASANA (noted to be a Bolivian government body) responsible for the crash due to irregular authorisation of the flight plan.
- LaMia did not hold proper authorisation to carry passengers nor market national or international flights.
- Colombian civil aviation authorities have stated that according to the Chicago Convention they have sole responsibility for investigating the accident. This may be in response to the Bolivian "final report" already released.
- The flight was over permitted weight, in addition to Medellin being at the limit of its fuel.
- CVR evidence reveals that the pilots discussed making a refuelling stop in Leticia or Bogota. Colonel Bonilla states that the pilots were aware that fuel on board was neither adequate nor sufficient.
A comment on the article notes that alternative refuelling stops were also available in Brazil in Rio Branco and Tabatinga (the latter being right next to Leticia - the two are effectively one town with an international border down the middle).
That is not considered a primary factor ("fator prioritário") affecting the outcome, though the previously posted RJ85 payload-range curve suggests that would have knocked about 20 nm off the range, so who knows ...
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Hey whats all this talk of whitewash? Thats the stuff of Politics, Governments, Enquiries etc, dedicated to finding someone, anyone, on whom to pin the blame. I dont ever recall hearing that said of an ICAO-mandated accident report only dedicated to digging out the facts and causes and coming to meaningful conclusions from which something can be learned. I am expecting Colombia's reports to be the usual high standard.
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The report and a reconstruction of flight and accident including ATC exchanges ( all in Spanish ) :
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9GXr8zQN6fY
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9GXr8zQN6fY
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The madness started well before that when they decided not to stop, when they knew fuel was a problem. The rest of the journey was conducted in a state of pure denial, their primary thought probably being "how will we cover this up?"
The report and a reconstruction of flight and accident including ATC exchanges ( all in Spanish ) :
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9GXr8zQN6fY
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9GXr8zQN6fY
a couple of screenshots from near the end of the preso
stills and aerial views of crash site starts here: https://youtu.be/9GXr8zQN6fY?t=23m32s
stills and aerial views of crash site starts here: https://youtu.be/9GXr8zQN6fY?t=23m32s
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Very true atatacs. Madness indeed. Just a lowly PPL myself but I do some legal consulting in my profession of Anesthesiology as an expert witness in malpractice. Hubris can be a real problem in Medicine as well as Aviation. IMHO these "cowboys" illustrated classic normalization of deviance: they got away with skeletal flight planning by being careless/reckless with fuel margins many times in the past on similar routing. The added "prestige" of taking this team and perhaps extra weight made for an even greater recklessness on their part. Utter madness and completely preventable.
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Quote from the Aviation Herald with link:
Crash: LAMIA Bolivia RJ85 near Medellin on Nov 28th 2016, electrical problems, no fuel, impact with terrain
On Dec 26th 2016 Colombia's Aerocivil introduced their preliminary report in a press conference (the preliminary report itsself was not released) stating, that the aircraft did not show any technical fault, there was no sabotage or suicide attempt. The evidence revealed the aircraft suffered fuel exhaustion. The crew was aware of their fuel status and considered fuel stops in Leticia (Bolivia) and Bogota (Colombia), however did not decide to perform such stops. The aircraft was operated at a takeoff weight of 42,148 kg, maximum takeoff weight permitted 41,800 kg, this takeoff weight was not a factor into the accident however. According to cockpit voice recordings the first officer and observer repeatedly calculated the fuel and considered a fuel stop in Leticia but did not follow up as they did not know whether the airport was open. The aircraft features a system that activates an alarm if the fuel remaining was no longer sufficient for more than 20 minutes of flight, however, this system did not activate. 10 minutes prior to impact the crew requested priority for landing and selected the first stage of flaps. The aircraft began to turn and descend without ATC clearance causing separation problem with the other aircraft in the hold. 6 minutes prior to impact engine #3 is the first to flame out, 5 minutes prior to impact the crew selected the next stage of flaps and selected the landing gear down, the crew advised ATC ground services were not needed. Engine #2 fails. 3:45 minutes prior to impact all engines had flamed out, the aircraft was without power, the APU also failed due to lack of fuel. 2 minutes prior to impact the crew declared emergency reporting total power failure. The aircraft impacted Cerro Gordo at a speed of 230km/h below 9000 feet when they needed to be above 10,000 feet to safely cross the mountain.
Seems like Lemme have been pretty spot on with his "investigation". Crew selected both flaps and gear down before the last engine flamed out. The last engine flamed out 3:45 min before impact.
Crash: LAMIA Bolivia RJ85 near Medellin on Nov 28th 2016, electrical problems, no fuel, impact with terrain
On Dec 26th 2016 Colombia's Aerocivil introduced their preliminary report in a press conference (the preliminary report itsself was not released) stating, that the aircraft did not show any technical fault, there was no sabotage or suicide attempt. The evidence revealed the aircraft suffered fuel exhaustion. The crew was aware of their fuel status and considered fuel stops in Leticia (Bolivia) and Bogota (Colombia), however did not decide to perform such stops. The aircraft was operated at a takeoff weight of 42,148 kg, maximum takeoff weight permitted 41,800 kg, this takeoff weight was not a factor into the accident however. According to cockpit voice recordings the first officer and observer repeatedly calculated the fuel and considered a fuel stop in Leticia but did not follow up as they did not know whether the airport was open. The aircraft features a system that activates an alarm if the fuel remaining was no longer sufficient for more than 20 minutes of flight, however, this system did not activate. 10 minutes prior to impact the crew requested priority for landing and selected the first stage of flaps. The aircraft began to turn and descend without ATC clearance causing separation problem with the other aircraft in the hold. 6 minutes prior to impact engine #3 is the first to flame out, 5 minutes prior to impact the crew selected the next stage of flaps and selected the landing gear down, the crew advised ATC ground services were not needed. Engine #2 fails. 3:45 minutes prior to impact all engines had flamed out, the aircraft was without power, the APU also failed due to lack of fuel. 2 minutes prior to impact the crew declared emergency reporting total power failure. The aircraft impacted Cerro Gordo at a speed of 230km/h below 9000 feet when they needed to be above 10,000 feet to safely cross the mountain.
Seems like Lemme have been pretty spot on with his "investigation". Crew selected both flaps and gear down before the last engine flamed out. The last engine flamed out 3:45 min before impact.
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Admittedly I haven't read this entire thread and all links herefrom, but the idea that Celia in Bolivia could have prevented this tragedy is ridiculous. Had she not accepted the laughable flight plan, they would have dismissed her and found someone else. That's just the way it is.
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Had she not accepted the laughable flight plan, they would have dismissed her and found someone else. That's just the way it is. Quote.
Yes, but she is an easy one to blame.
Yes, but she is an easy one to blame.
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Celia would not now be hiding in Brazil if it wasnt for that endurance figure on the flight plan. We will never know why it appeared like that or even who actually wrote it in. It must be certain that it was not the captain so was it another crew member trying to send a signal? Having heard of Celia's efforts to get the fpl changed but to no avail,I cant believe that she would not have brought that to the attention of the duty Atco, probably only a room or so above her. If she did the Atco is just as much if not more to blame than Celia, even if he/she also failed to stop the flight ( for reasons already discussed), according to the Bolivians' logic.
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Portmanteau :
Already discussed at length before , None of the 2 had authority to prevent a/c from departing. Easy scapegoats,for people that do not know how really the system works and want to pass the buck to lower echelons.That's all.
On a side note on the PLN : what is interesting in the report is the fact that they filed W in the PLN while the aircraft was not RVSM certified , and really flew at FL300.. also disregard of safety and implications for other aircraft .. Did not spot that one .
But one more thing in a long list ..
Lemme :Your speculations turned out to be quite correct , I have to say. . of course the engines did quit at different times as expected, , and a few bits we did not know before the report , but overall , not bad at all .Credits when it is due.
But do not take this as proof that it will always work like this in the future. I still maintain that to make such detailed speculations bring nothing , and if you are wrong , or if your calculations differ from the official report , it will cause more far more harm than good.
I already see in the EVA/LAX thread comments like " ADS-B ( e.g FR24) is better than radar " or " US controllers do not have to monitor and correct readbacks " etc.. statements posted as " facts" , and those arguments being used by others to call the EVA pilots and the controller various names and of course blaming / accusing . Dangerous games. Especially if there are victims and some of those victims family members look for immediate justice/ vengeance.
If she did the Atco is just as much if not more to blame than Celia,
On a side note on the PLN : what is interesting in the report is the fact that they filed W in the PLN while the aircraft was not RVSM certified , and really flew at FL300.. also disregard of safety and implications for other aircraft .. Did not spot that one .
But one more thing in a long list ..
Lemme :Your speculations turned out to be quite correct , I have to say. . of course the engines did quit at different times as expected, , and a few bits we did not know before the report , but overall , not bad at all .Credits when it is due.
But do not take this as proof that it will always work like this in the future. I still maintain that to make such detailed speculations bring nothing , and if you are wrong , or if your calculations differ from the official report , it will cause more far more harm than good.
I already see in the EVA/LAX thread comments like " ADS-B ( e.g FR24) is better than radar " or " US controllers do not have to monitor and correct readbacks " etc.. statements posted as " facts" , and those arguments being used by others to call the EVA pilots and the controller various names and of course blaming / accusing . Dangerous games. Especially if there are victims and some of those victims family members look for immediate justice/ vengeance.
Last edited by ATC Watcher; 27th Dec 2016 at 13:27. Reason: addition
A clearer understanding of what happened does not mean that all of the safety lessons have been identified.
Consider:- "the first officer and observer repeatedly calculated the fuel and considered a fuel stop in Leticia but did not follow up"
What was discussed, decided, and why. What were the calculations based on, gauge, fuel used, GNS/FMS.
Distance remaining, ground speed, wind, fuel flow; consider the fuel display switching between contents and fuel used, hold-on button or cyclic selection, seven segment digital display format ...
and:- "an alarm if the fuel remaining was no longer sufficient for more than 20 minutes of flight, however, this system did not activate."
Why didn't the warning system activate (two or four feed tanks, two or more separate alerts?), system failure, or was there something in the tank, what ...
http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/5...ml#post9613312
Consider:- "the first officer and observer repeatedly calculated the fuel and considered a fuel stop in Leticia but did not follow up"
What was discussed, decided, and why. What were the calculations based on, gauge, fuel used, GNS/FMS.
Distance remaining, ground speed, wind, fuel flow; consider the fuel display switching between contents and fuel used, hold-on button or cyclic selection, seven segment digital display format ...
and:- "an alarm if the fuel remaining was no longer sufficient for more than 20 minutes of flight, however, this system did not activate."
Why didn't the warning system activate (two or four feed tanks, two or more separate alerts?), system failure, or was there something in the tank, what ...
http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/5...ml#post9613312
