Almost a repeat of Tenerife at Shanghai!
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I am just dying to know how a CVR recording from a modern plane that has just landed get over written.
The CVR contents can be erased (by pressing and holding the erase button), or it can be overwritten.
In this case it seems that the CVR was overwritten. Usually that means that the aircraft was allowed to be flown on the next flight segment without first preserving the CVR recording.
Sometimes CVRs get overwritten when the electrical system gets re-energized for some other reason (e.g., ground maintenance test), although there is a protection system that's supposed to shut down the CVR again within a few minutes if the engines are not operating.
In most jurisdictions, when there is a "reportable incident" then both the crew and the airline are responsible for preserving CVR and FDR data, usually in coordination with the jurisdiction's safety board.
The correct procedure to preserve the CVR is to pull the circuit breaker, until all data can be downloaded and secured.
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Confusion "rains" sic (reigns) he said.
I get the impression from some of the posts here, that having access to the original post #1 quoting the "Aviation Herald", and the subsequent CAAC report, that two issues are evident. Firstly there seems some confusion between the use of the English masculine nominative singular word "he", and the surname title of the A320 captain, namely "He". Secondly, parts of the quoted CAAC report are somewhat limited by the "Chinglish" issue.... forgiveable... but there non the less.
Those looking at the Aerodrome Chart in post #1 for ZSSS Shanghai/Hongqiao may note that there are 4 nominated "Hot spots" (as shown as "HS1, HS2....etc). A "Hot spot" is a location on the airport where previous incidents or possible confusion has/may occur. I note that the place where this incident occurred is at "HS2". Possible confusion being that taxyway "H4" is not a straight line. A landing aircraft on RWY36R and vacating left on "H4" for parking at terminal West of the runway complex, would (could) be instructed to "vacate H4 left, then left on B, then right on H4, and hold short (or cross) RWY36L. Sounds like too much confusing bull**** to me. Me...ATC for 43 years
I get the impression from some of the posts here, that having access to the original post #1 quoting the "Aviation Herald", and the subsequent CAAC report, that two issues are evident. Firstly there seems some confusion between the use of the English masculine nominative singular word "he", and the surname title of the A320 captain, namely "He". Secondly, parts of the quoted CAAC report are somewhat limited by the "Chinglish" issue.... forgiveable... but there non the less.
Those looking at the Aerodrome Chart in post #1 for ZSSS Shanghai/Hongqiao may note that there are 4 nominated "Hot spots" (as shown as "HS1, HS2....etc). A "Hot spot" is a location on the airport where previous incidents or possible confusion has/may occur. I note that the place where this incident occurred is at "HS2". Possible confusion being that taxyway "H4" is not a straight line. A landing aircraft on RWY36R and vacating left on "H4" for parking at terminal West of the runway complex, would (could) be instructed to "vacate H4 left, then left on B, then right on H4, and hold short (or cross) RWY36L. Sounds like too much confusing bull**** to me. Me...ATC for 43 years
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Here's some technical analysis....
This crew and their passengers were mighty lucky on this one. Bit less wind, bit more weight ... etc etc ... Pulling the aircraft into the air was a gamble that paid off .... this time ...!!
This crew and their passengers were mighty lucky on this one. Bit less wind, bit more weight ... etc etc ... Pulling the aircraft into the air was a gamble that paid off .... this time ...!!
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Peekay4, Thanks for a damn great answer, but your damn great answer leads to more questions. This first one you may not be able to answer.
Why was the aircraft allowed to turn around and take off for it's next leg after an incident allowing the CVR to be over written (If that is the case)? In South Africa. you will be ordered to vacate the runway if you are on one, stop and shut down immediately.
Where is the CVR delete button? Is it easily accessible in the cockpit?
Why was the aircraft allowed to turn around and take off for it's next leg after an incident allowing the CVR to be over written (If that is the case)? In South Africa. you will be ordered to vacate the runway if you are on one, stop and shut down immediately.
Where is the CVR delete button? Is it easily accessible in the cockpit?
Last edited by PPL Hobbyist; 21st Oct 2016 at 18:13.
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Oversight + incompetence is the usual reason.
The CVR Erase button is typically in the cockpit on the overhead panel, next to the CVR Test button. The CVR will be "erased" if the button is held (usually for 2 seconds) while the aircraft is on ground and parking brake is set. The CVR cannot be erased while the aircraft is flying.
Some countries / jurisdictions do not allow CVR Erase functionality, so the button is either disabled or completely removed (factory option to not have the button). I don't know what the regs are in China.
Dirty little secret: by design CVR Erase is not a "secure erase". Meaning, it is possible for the authorities to use data recovery techniques to reconstruct the CVR recording, even if a pilot "erased" the CVR. Once the recording has been overwritten, however, recovery is no longer possible.
As an aside, on the A330 the CVR circuit breaker is not accessible from the cockpit (it is in the avionics bay).
The CVR Erase button is typically in the cockpit on the overhead panel, next to the CVR Test button. The CVR will be "erased" if the button is held (usually for 2 seconds) while the aircraft is on ground and parking brake is set. The CVR cannot be erased while the aircraft is flying.
Some countries / jurisdictions do not allow CVR Erase functionality, so the button is either disabled or completely removed (factory option to not have the button). I don't know what the regs are in China.
Dirty little secret: by design CVR Erase is not a "secure erase". Meaning, it is possible for the authorities to use data recovery techniques to reconstruct the CVR recording, even if a pilot "erased" the CVR. Once the recording has been overwritten, however, recovery is no longer possible.
As an aside, on the A330 the CVR circuit breaker is not accessible from the cockpit (it is in the avionics bay).
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I agree. The PF knew his airspeed and capability to climb out before hitting the other aircraft. It is one of those split decisions that either make you a hero or a villain ! I am on the PF side in this case for the main reason that the probability of committing to the ability to stop was a consideration in weighing consequences.
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THE licenses of two air traffic controllers were revoked and 13 air traffic control officials were punished for a near miss at Hongqiao airport last week, China’s civil aviation authority said yesterday.
A China Eastern Airlines passenger aircraft nearly crashed into another plane, owned by the same carrier, during its takeoff on last Tuesday.
He Chao, the captain of the China Eastern’s A320 aircraft, was granted a “first-class merit,” along with other rewards because he successfully defused the crisis, the Civil Aviation Administration of China announced on its official website.
“The air traffic controllers on the control tower were to blame for the ‘serious accident symptoms,’ who forgot the planes’ movements and gave wrong orders to the pilots,” the administration said.
The licenses of the controllers, who were manning the commanding and monitoring seats, were revoked — in one of the cases for life. The controller in the commanding seat was banned from ever undertaking any air traffic control jobs, the administration said.
Thirteen officials with the East China Air Traffic Management Bureau as well as the bureau’s air traffic control center and safety management department were either given Party warnings, serious warnings, had demerits recorded or faced losing their positions, the administration added.
According to a detailed operation record, the A320 moved out from the boarding bridge at 11:54am and entered 36L runway at 12:03am following orders from the air traffic control tower. The controller then gave permission to take off a minute later, and the aircraft began its maneuvering.
The A320 captain and copilot spotted the A330 was about to taxi across the runway when their aircraft’s speed had reached about 200 kilometers per hour. The copilot of A320 initially braked before the captain took over the controls and triggered maximum acceleration to fly over the A330.
http://www.shanghaidaily.com/metro/s.../shdaily.shtml
A China Eastern Airlines passenger aircraft nearly crashed into another plane, owned by the same carrier, during its takeoff on last Tuesday.
He Chao, the captain of the China Eastern’s A320 aircraft, was granted a “first-class merit,” along with other rewards because he successfully defused the crisis, the Civil Aviation Administration of China announced on its official website.
“The air traffic controllers on the control tower were to blame for the ‘serious accident symptoms,’ who forgot the planes’ movements and gave wrong orders to the pilots,” the administration said.
The licenses of the controllers, who were manning the commanding and monitoring seats, were revoked — in one of the cases for life. The controller in the commanding seat was banned from ever undertaking any air traffic control jobs, the administration said.
Thirteen officials with the East China Air Traffic Management Bureau as well as the bureau’s air traffic control center and safety management department were either given Party warnings, serious warnings, had demerits recorded or faced losing their positions, the administration added.
According to a detailed operation record, the A320 moved out from the boarding bridge at 11:54am and entered 36L runway at 12:03am following orders from the air traffic control tower. The controller then gave permission to take off a minute later, and the aircraft began its maneuvering.
The A320 captain and copilot spotted the A330 was about to taxi across the runway when their aircraft’s speed had reached about 200 kilometers per hour. The copilot of A320 initially braked before the captain took over the controls and triggered maximum acceleration to fly over the A330.
http://www.shanghaidaily.com/metro/s.../shdaily.shtml
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I remember another 'nearly a repeat of Tenerife' type incident. Was at CDG.
As we taxied out in LVPs, they cleared a AF 340 for T/O on 27L- in French. He came thundering past us.
Then they cleared a BA 757 who'd just landed on 27R to cross 27L- in English.
My finger hovered over the PTT switch, but then I thought what if I block a very important message???
The tower called 'Air France xxx,Stoppez decollage!' (stop your takeoff!) and the 340 crew did a high speed abort. The 757 was handed off to ground without another word.
A new controller came on freq, no doubt the other had gone for a change of swimwear...
When we took off, we saw the skidmarks and they were impressive, the ones on the runway !
Never heard another word about it.
As we taxied out in LVPs, they cleared a AF 340 for T/O on 27L- in French. He came thundering past us.
Then they cleared a BA 757 who'd just landed on 27R to cross 27L- in English.
My finger hovered over the PTT switch, but then I thought what if I block a very important message???
The tower called 'Air France xxx,Stoppez decollage!' (stop your takeoff!) and the 340 crew did a high speed abort. The 757 was handed off to ground without another word.
A new controller came on freq, no doubt the other had gone for a change of swimwear...
When we took off, we saw the skidmarks and they were impressive, the ones on the runway !
Never heard another word about it.
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Some years ago again at CDG a shorts was hit by an aircraft taking off. Killed the First Officer. So I wonder if that ATC officer got banned for life.
In this Shanghai incident I find it "crass" to say forgetful controller it is just human error & putting people in fear of their jobs just causes stress so increasing the likely hood of more human error. The 330 crew should also have been looking out or did they forget too. Or was it foggy as was the case at CDG.
In this Shanghai incident I find it "crass" to say forgetful controller it is just human error & putting people in fear of their jobs just causes stress so increasing the likely hood of more human error. The 330 crew should also have been looking out or did they forget too. Or was it foggy as was the case at CDG.
As we all know these massive punishments only encourage coverups. If I made an honest error, but "got away with it", I'd put my hand up to prevent my colleagues from falling into the same trap in future. If doing that would get me fired....I'd have to think twice wouldn't I?
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IcePack
Yes. I remember the Shorts sat on the ground for ages before getting scrapped. It was an Air Liberte DC-9 that hit them with its left wingtip. Chopped the poor FO to pieces.
It was another classic CDG 'dual language ops' incident. The DC-9 got his T/O clearance in French. The Shorts got his line up clearance in English. He was entering the runway using one of the high speed exits in reverse so to speak, so they'd have had to look backwards to see if the runway was clear.
After this accident, use of the 'high speeds' to line up was forbidden.
They've kept on with the dual language stuff though.....
Yes. I remember the Shorts sat on the ground for ages before getting scrapped. It was an Air Liberte DC-9 that hit them with its left wingtip. Chopped the poor FO to pieces.
It was another classic CDG 'dual language ops' incident. The DC-9 got his T/O clearance in French. The Shorts got his line up clearance in English. He was entering the runway using one of the high speed exits in reverse so to speak, so they'd have had to look backwards to see if the runway was clear.
After this accident, use of the 'high speeds' to line up was forbidden.
They've kept on with the dual language stuff though.....
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There are 2 different issues here : ATC and the pilot reactions : The A320 crew reaction for me was very good : it prevented a collision. You had to be in his seat to pass any form of comment , distance left, , speed he had at the time , etc.. Good job.
For the A330 ,well, more difficult : were there red bars crossed ? what was Pilots visibility from his angle , or which frequency was he on , and which frequency was the order to stop given, step on/crossed transmissions ? etc.. lots of unknown to be able to comment seriously .
Now the apparent ATC error : ( I say apparent because we did not see any R/T transcript and analysis yet) but the Chinese CAA reactions seem to indicate it was the case. But we all know an incident such as this one rarely has a single cause.
Reading the various things posted so far , I cannot help thinking of the following scenario :
From a Western ATC point of view it would seem there should have been at least 4 controllers on duty in the TWR : one for each runway in use , one for ground and one supervisor. But we know that due staff shortages or in periods of low traffic, this is often reduced , the frequencies are collapsed sometimes down to a single controller , sometimes with the supervisor manning a control position , or coaching a trainee.
An indication as to how many controllers were on duty and who was doing what would help here.
Since the recent press release of the CAA indicating that a large number of management officials were disciplined as well , that would indicate to me that there might be a systemic management failure, where management allowed certain operations or position manning to take place that were not part of the procedures.
Just saying , having seen similar things many times before before . ( e.g Ueberlingen )
As to punishing everybody so harshly ( for life !!!) after such incident , this is totally unprofessional and absolutely contra productive for safety, as, knowing the consequences nobody there is going to report voluntary errors and incidents , and worse, nobody seeing an incident/error will report it knowing the consequences for his colleagues. We are back in the 1950's..
For the A330 ,well, more difficult : were there red bars crossed ? what was Pilots visibility from his angle , or which frequency was he on , and which frequency was the order to stop given, step on/crossed transmissions ? etc.. lots of unknown to be able to comment seriously .
Now the apparent ATC error : ( I say apparent because we did not see any R/T transcript and analysis yet) but the Chinese CAA reactions seem to indicate it was the case. But we all know an incident such as this one rarely has a single cause.
Reading the various things posted so far , I cannot help thinking of the following scenario :
From a Western ATC point of view it would seem there should have been at least 4 controllers on duty in the TWR : one for each runway in use , one for ground and one supervisor. But we know that due staff shortages or in periods of low traffic, this is often reduced , the frequencies are collapsed sometimes down to a single controller , sometimes with the supervisor manning a control position , or coaching a trainee.
An indication as to how many controllers were on duty and who was doing what would help here.
Since the recent press release of the CAA indicating that a large number of management officials were disciplined as well , that would indicate to me that there might be a systemic management failure, where management allowed certain operations or position manning to take place that were not part of the procedures.
Just saying , having seen similar things many times before before . ( e.g Ueberlingen )
As to punishing everybody so harshly ( for life !!!) after such incident , this is totally unprofessional and absolutely contra productive for safety, as, knowing the consequences nobody there is going to report voluntary errors and incidents , and worse, nobody seeing an incident/error will report it knowing the consequences for his colleagues. We are back in the 1950's..
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Noticed that the pilots of the aircraft crossing the runway was on ground frequency and therefore had no SA on the take-off clearance that was just issued on the tower frequency. This made me wonder how many pilots would actually listen in on other relevant frequencies (tower in this case) using one of the other radios on board, to gain SA on other traffic, especially when crossing runways controlled by other controllers on other frequencies.
My last experience where I wished for one more radio in my aircraft was when operating in and out of a middle eastern base where all coalition partners were using the local ground, tower and approach frequencies, while our US colleagues were operating on their own separate frequency. This was brought up several times during flight safety meetings as a severe SA degrading issue, especially since the local controllers were not very good at relaying the relevant traffic information. Therefore it would have been nice with one more radio (only have 2 in the F-16– one for ATC and one for in house between formation members) to be able to listen in and gain SA on other players in and around the field.
My last experience where I wished for one more radio in my aircraft was when operating in and out of a middle eastern base where all coalition partners were using the local ground, tower and approach frequencies, while our US colleagues were operating on their own separate frequency. This was brought up several times during flight safety meetings as a severe SA degrading issue, especially since the local controllers were not very good at relaying the relevant traffic information. Therefore it would have been nice with one more radio (only have 2 in the F-16– one for ATC and one for in house between formation members) to be able to listen in and gain SA on other players in and around the field.
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It might well have been procedures that were at fault, or procedures not adhered to. I know for a fact that at Amsterdam for instance an aircraft needing to cross an active runway is switched from GND to TWR to obtain the clearance to cross, and once clear is switched back to GND. Pretty sure that's standard procedure at most major airports.