AirAsia flies to Melb instead of KL . Navigation error
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AirAsia flies to Melb instead of KL . Navigation error
Yep, at one point after getting airborne the FO was going to cycle all three ADIRUs to OFF to 'reset the system'. The captain initially said nothing and the FO got as far as turning ADIRUs 1 & 3 off before the captain told him to stop! 
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"when autopilot engaged at 410 feet," says it all really. As many have suggested in this forum on previous occasions, what is wrong with hand flying the aircraft to (say) 10,000 feet or even transition altitude? Had one of them done this the other might have had time to reprogram the FMC from scratch providing, I suppose, the inbuilt systems in an A330 would allow the flight crew to do this once they were airborn?
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Last edited by CurtainTwitcher; 7th Sep 2016 at 08:49.
Colour me stupid
One small planes, a normal check is to make sure the DI and compass are aligned as part of the start-up checks. When flying with a GPS a similar "does the reported position agree with where I am" sanity check during start-up is useful.
Now, colour me stupid, and I am not familiar on type, but if the inertial nav initialisation position is significantly different from the current GPS coordinates, should that not bring up a very large warning that one (or both) are not to be trusted? Or was that the initial warning that they ignored?
Now, colour me stupid, and I am not familiar on type, but if the inertial nav initialisation position is significantly different from the current GPS coordinates, should that not bring up a very large warning that one (or both) are not to be trusted? Or was that the initial warning that they ignored?
ATC was the saving grace in this whole sorry episode. They picked up the aircraft's incorrect tracking immediately after take-off and then provided assistance to help the hapless crew get the aircraft back on the ground. The crew weren't able to do a visual approach back in to Sydney due to the weather, so ATC provided vectors all the way to Melbourne.
Getting everyone else out of the way!
A review of the ATC response to this occurrence identified that the controllers carried out several tasks that reduced the risk to both the occurrence aircraft and other aircraft in the area. They were the first to notice and alert the crew to the tracking problem, and provided assistance to identify that the aircraft’s main heading indicators were erroneous. Additionally, ATC quickly resolved a possible conflict with another aircraft lined-up and ready to depart on the parallel runway.
Subsequently, coordination with several ATC units and the availability of continuous radar coverage provided the crew with a safe diversion alternate and vectoring from Sydney all the way to final approach in Melbourne. The captain reported that ATC had prevented the situation becoming a ‘dire emergency’ and that in many ways they had ‘saved the day’.
Subsequently, coordination with several ATC units and the availability of continuous radar coverage provided the crew with a safe diversion alternate and vectoring from Sydney all the way to final approach in Melbourne. The captain reported that ATC had prevented the situation becoming a ‘dire emergency’ and that in many ways they had ‘saved the day’.
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And what were the Aussie ATC'ers doing when the flight departed radically from its filed route?
A few seconds later, ATC observed the aircraft turning left, contrary to the SID, and tracking towards the flight path for the active parallel runway, runway 16L. In response, ATC contacted the crew and requested confirmation that they were tracking via the SID and would be maintaining a heading of 155° before turning right. At the same time ATC held another aircraft in the line-up position for departure from runway 16L
paperHanger
I would have thought so. Some types certainly will warn " check present position" or similar if the entered position is wildy out from GPS.
It's interesting to see (from the report, if I'm reading it correctly), that they manually entered the gate position as a lat/long even though it seems they had GPS. Certainly on a similar type I know of if GPS is available then you must line select the GPS position into the IRS/ADIRU present position "boxes" at the start of the align process ( basically copy and paste), without amendment, precisely to avoid the sort of finger trouble described in the report.
TBH regardless of the above I'd have though there were plenty of other opportunites to catch the foul up before start, let alone takeoff (Gross distance checks, map display checks, etc....).
I am not familiar on type, but if the inertial nav initialisation position is significantly different from the current GPS coordinates, should that not bring up a very large warning that one (or both) are not to be trusted? Or was that the initial warning that they ignored?
It's interesting to see (from the report, if I'm reading it correctly), that they manually entered the gate position as a lat/long even though it seems they had GPS. Certainly on a similar type I know of if GPS is available then you must line select the GPS position into the IRS/ADIRU present position "boxes" at the start of the align process ( basically copy and paste), without amendment, precisely to avoid the sort of finger trouble described in the report.
TBH regardless of the above I'd have though there were plenty of other opportunites to catch the foul up before start, let alone takeoff (Gross distance checks, map display checks, etc....).
Last edited by wiggy; 7th Sep 2016 at 10:56.
They had all kinds of options available to them. They had full VOR and ILS capability and could easily have flown the approach back to Sydney. I guess not having a magenta line scared them.
The report also states that after almost 3 hours on the ground in Melbourne (during which time system checks found no unserviceability with the aircraft), the same crew flew on to Kuala Lumpur, for a total duty of 14 hours 53 minutes and total flight time of 10 hours 27 minutes.
Am I the only one who thinks it very unwise to continue a duty, obviously into discretion, after a significant incident?
Am I the only one who thinks it very unwise to continue a duty, obviously into discretion, after a significant incident?
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It will be interesting to learn of Air Asia's actions with the crew. Not only did they show a huge lack of procedural knowledge in the flight preparation, and discipline with disregard of warnings and mis-use of checklists, the F/O then exhibited huge lack of technical knowledge in his suggestion and subsequent attempt to realign the IRS's in the air. Not to mention that the view out of the side window after 400' is not what was expected.
"Oh, a/c is turning left and we expect to turn right. Why?" Heads down FMC-ing? Solution: disconnect, ask for vectors and clear critical airspace.
As someone said, why can they not fly an instrument approach to Sydney. They still had 1 IRS it would seem for attitude information.
It seems a little more than a re-training session is required.
"Oh, a/c is turning left and we expect to turn right. Why?" Heads down FMC-ing? Solution: disconnect, ask for vectors and clear critical airspace.
As someone said, why can they not fly an instrument approach to Sydney. They still had 1 IRS it would seem for attitude information.
It seems a little more than a re-training session is required.