Mid-Air Collision over Southern Germany (merged)
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Please feel free to correct me but wasn´t there an incident over Asia a few years ago where a BA(?) 744 came perilously close to another aircraft(Chinese747?).Conclusion was that 1 or both aircraft were provided with incorrect TCAS instructons.
The impending collision prevented by 1 or both aircrew responding to visual contact with the other aircraft,both aircraft missed each other by a couple of hundred metres.Anybody else remember that one?
I´ve flown over the block of airspace where Zurich/Rhein/Vien ACC´s border regularly for most of my professional career and often had radar vectors/Cruising Mach no. alterations/level changes for traffic avoidance with conflicting aircraft sometimes 2 or 3 ATC sectors or even Countries away.
NEVER 1 minute to loss of seperation!Something here doesn´t add up.I would prefer to hear the A/C -ATC voice transcripts before voicing an opinion.Any operating aircrew or scanner radio enthusiasts catch the instructions given by ATC?
Accidents are rarely the result of one factor,more a combination of events snowballing out of control.
Keep It Safe,Stupid!
Heart felt sympathies to all.
The impending collision prevented by 1 or both aircrew responding to visual contact with the other aircraft,both aircraft missed each other by a couple of hundred metres.Anybody else remember that one?
I´ve flown over the block of airspace where Zurich/Rhein/Vien ACC´s border regularly for most of my professional career and often had radar vectors/Cruising Mach no. alterations/level changes for traffic avoidance with conflicting aircraft sometimes 2 or 3 ATC sectors or even Countries away.
NEVER 1 minute to loss of seperation!Something here doesn´t add up.I would prefer to hear the A/C -ATC voice transcripts before voicing an opinion.Any operating aircrew or scanner radio enthusiasts catch the instructions given by ATC?
Accidents are rarely the result of one factor,more a combination of events snowballing out of control.
Keep It Safe,Stupid!
Heart felt sympathies to all.
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Firstly I would like to ask that we try and keep this thread along the lines of procedures and technical issues. Whilst it is an emotionally tragic accident and many would like to offer their condolences, this is not the place to do it. Please feel free to start a condolences thread on the Aircrew Notices forum.
Secondly, I would like to point out that what I have seen so far in the media is once again biased reporting of distorted facts interspread with assumptions of blame based on whoever has the most effective press agent. Whilst we cannot prevent speculation as it is only human to do so and calls not to specualte on here will be fruitless, at least we can hope for some 'informed' specualtion and discussion on PPRuNe. Anyone posting what I or other admins consider to be frivolous, insulting and/or anything that just sounds like someone wanting to see their username on this thread will have them deleted.
As has already been mentioned in a few of the other posts and picked up on by the BBC is our questioning of the Swiss reports (and apparent conclusions) that it was purely pilot error on the part of the Russian crew. I too find it incredible that both aircraft were not at least put on radar vectors to assure separation as a prelude to issuing a descent request to the Tu154. Whlst I am not an expert, but having flown through that airspace more times than I care to remember, the standard of controlling is usually very high. If as has been stated that the STCA equipment was out of service why did the controller leave the request for a descent so late? Surely at that time of night when traffic is nowhere as busy wasn't the decision made earlier to descend or vector the traffic?
How many times, especially at night have any of us missed an initial call? It doesn't matter whetner the crew of the Tu154 were Russian because it can and has happened to just about every one of us at one time or another that we have missed a call from ATC. The mix of accents is one reason and there is nothing we can do about that but also there is the 'callsign' itself. If the Tu154 was not a regular in that airspace it is possible that its callsign was not familiar to ATC and the identifier on the strip bore no resemblance to the callsign familiar to the crew. Flying for a new airline myself I have missed calls that controllers have made because they assumed that the three letter identifier on the strip meant something totally different from our callsign.
After a thorough investigation we will all be wiser and have learnt something from this tragedy but as we all know it takes time. In the meantime we are free to discuss the issues here and hope that the media luvvies pick up on sensible debate and not their usual misinterpreted sensationalism and as we have seen today, premature blame. As in any air accident there will be a chain of events, any one of which could have prevented the disaster. Ultimately the pilots get the 'blame' because the media luvvies need a scapegoat in their usual 'dumbing down' of facts but as we all know it should come down to a distribution of responsibilities over a series of events and we should hopefully become safer in the future. A high price to pay unfortunately.
Secondly, I would like to point out that what I have seen so far in the media is once again biased reporting of distorted facts interspread with assumptions of blame based on whoever has the most effective press agent. Whilst we cannot prevent speculation as it is only human to do so and calls not to specualte on here will be fruitless, at least we can hope for some 'informed' specualtion and discussion on PPRuNe. Anyone posting what I or other admins consider to be frivolous, insulting and/or anything that just sounds like someone wanting to see their username on this thread will have them deleted.
As has already been mentioned in a few of the other posts and picked up on by the BBC is our questioning of the Swiss reports (and apparent conclusions) that it was purely pilot error on the part of the Russian crew. I too find it incredible that both aircraft were not at least put on radar vectors to assure separation as a prelude to issuing a descent request to the Tu154. Whlst I am not an expert, but having flown through that airspace more times than I care to remember, the standard of controlling is usually very high. If as has been stated that the STCA equipment was out of service why did the controller leave the request for a descent so late? Surely at that time of night when traffic is nowhere as busy wasn't the decision made earlier to descend or vector the traffic?
How many times, especially at night have any of us missed an initial call? It doesn't matter whetner the crew of the Tu154 were Russian because it can and has happened to just about every one of us at one time or another that we have missed a call from ATC. The mix of accents is one reason and there is nothing we can do about that but also there is the 'callsign' itself. If the Tu154 was not a regular in that airspace it is possible that its callsign was not familiar to ATC and the identifier on the strip bore no resemblance to the callsign familiar to the crew. Flying for a new airline myself I have missed calls that controllers have made because they assumed that the three letter identifier on the strip meant something totally different from our callsign.
After a thorough investigation we will all be wiser and have learnt something from this tragedy but as we all know it takes time. In the meantime we are free to discuss the issues here and hope that the media luvvies pick up on sensible debate and not their usual misinterpreted sensationalism and as we have seen today, premature blame. As in any air accident there will be a chain of events, any one of which could have prevented the disaster. Ultimately the pilots get the 'blame' because the media luvvies need a scapegoat in their usual 'dumbing down' of facts but as we all know it should come down to a distribution of responsibilities over a series of events and we should hopefully become safer in the future. A high price to pay unfortunately.
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I find TCAS to be very accurate in all respects. There is no bigger wake up call than the 'TRAFFIC' booming in your ear from that speaker. When that happens my hands instinctively go for the thrust levers and the control column, thumbs poised to disconnect the automatics. But making a rash decision to quickly is a danger we must guard against. From training I do what TCAS says not what ATC say. Even if I'm visual with the A/C there is alwasy the possibility that in busy skies I've Identified the wrong A/C.
Within the last month I've been down to Venice through those same sectors at that time of night, it's was very quite. Low conntroller work load, not many birds around.
The cause of an accident is never any one issue it's a chain of events that leads to fatal consequences.
Why wasn't the 154 and/or the 757 given vectors a good 5 minutes previously?
Were all members at the controls or taking a toilet brake?
Was everyones TCAS working, was it switched on?
Was the scale on the Nav display turned down to a low enough scale, thus reducing one or everyones mental model?
Whatever happened it could have been any of us.
My condolences to all those families who have lost loved ones.
Within the last month I've been down to Venice through those same sectors at that time of night, it's was very quite. Low conntroller work load, not many birds around.
The cause of an accident is never any one issue it's a chain of events that leads to fatal consequences.
Why wasn't the 154 and/or the 757 given vectors a good 5 minutes previously?
Were all members at the controls or taking a toilet brake?
Was everyones TCAS working, was it switched on?
Was the scale on the Nav display turned down to a low enough scale, thus reducing one or everyones mental model?
Whatever happened it could have been any of us.
My condolences to all those families who have lost loved ones.
Last edited by Suggs; 2nd Jul 2002 at 15:19.
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I was Brants CRM Instructor in Bahrain, and absolutely devastated he is one of the dead. A lovely young man and how dreadful it is when you know someone involved in these horrific accidents. It's bad enough in instruction anyway analysing them without that personal tie.
My heartfelt sympathies with Paul and Brant's families, and DHL as this must be a real body blow to a very close knit and well run organisation. DHL in Bahrain is one of the most forward thinking Companies in CRM education I have encountered.
Last and not least sympathies to the poor crew and passengers of the Tupolev. Let us not judge at this point until we know all the facts. No-one intentionally gets things wrong.
Tragic loss of life and adds to what is turning out to be one of the worst years in fatalities worldwide. And we are only half way through
My heartfelt sympathies with Paul and Brant's families, and DHL as this must be a real body blow to a very close knit and well run organisation. DHL in Bahrain is one of the most forward thinking Companies in CRM education I have encountered.
Last and not least sympathies to the poor crew and passengers of the Tupolev. Let us not judge at this point until we know all the facts. No-one intentionally gets things wrong.
Tragic loss of life and adds to what is turning out to be one of the worst years in fatalities worldwide. And we are only half way through
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Recently did some interesting ATC simulator training. We sat with out backs to the screens until the Short Term Conflict Alert went off (10-20nm before returns merging) then turned around and tried to fix it. This is not separating, it is collision avoidance when separation has failed. Brilliant fun, but unknown realism, with the blip-drivers reacting immediately & turning the right way most of the time.
How to do this has changed with the advent of TCAS. An excellent CAA (UK) manual on the subject (which I have forgotten where I got, but was available on-line) suggests "leaving the vertical" to the TCAS to sort out, with ATC input restricted to headings, unless a full vertical separation standard (less likely to set off a TCAS) could be maintained. (My paraphrasing.)
These techniques are not documented anywhere, as yet, in our (Australian) manuals, and not everybody I work with has yet undertaken this training.
For every pat solution developed somewhere there is a reason it will not work somewhere else. Nothing I have said should be taken as a critisism of anybody. I will wait for the outcome of an investigation before I offer any opinion on this accident, but would encourage ATC everywhere to try these techniques and situations first in the simulator.
How to do this has changed with the advent of TCAS. An excellent CAA (UK) manual on the subject (which I have forgotten where I got, but was available on-line) suggests "leaving the vertical" to the TCAS to sort out, with ATC input restricted to headings, unless a full vertical separation standard (less likely to set off a TCAS) could be maintained. (My paraphrasing.)
These techniques are not documented anywhere, as yet, in our (Australian) manuals, and not everybody I work with has yet undertaken this training.
For every pat solution developed somewhere there is a reason it will not work somewhere else. Nothing I have said should be taken as a critisism of anybody. I will wait for the outcome of an investigation before I offer any opinion on this accident, but would encourage ATC everywhere to try these techniques and situations first in the simulator.
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Obviously it goes without saying that our thoughts here go out to those involved and I for one hope the cause can be found and action taken to prevent such a tragic loss of young lives in the future.
Much speculation has been made (here, in the Media and elsewhere) as to why (if?) the TCAS system directed the Boeing pilot to descend when the Tupolev was already in descent.
From doing a google seach it seems that there have been a number of occasions where a TCAS system has incorrectly directed a pilot to make a manouver that has put two aircraft on a direct collision course. It is only through the skill and judgement of the pilots (And perhaps good visibility) that a disaster has been averted.
It should also be remembered that last nights tragedy occurred during darkness..maybe if visibility had been better disaster could have been narrowly avoided.
Without wishing to pre-judge any investigation, serious attention needs to be paid to the TCAS system on board the aircraft and pilots need to be made aware that these systems are far from infallible.
More on previous TCAS "incidents" here:
http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/bulletin/jun01/cggwd.htm
http://www.rpi.edu/~woodhe/docs/wsj/flawed.txt
http://www.atsb.gov.au/aviation/rec/r19990159.cfm
http://news.airwise.com/stories/99/11/942324329.html
Much speculation has been made (here, in the Media and elsewhere) as to why (if?) the TCAS system directed the Boeing pilot to descend when the Tupolev was already in descent.
From doing a google seach it seems that there have been a number of occasions where a TCAS system has incorrectly directed a pilot to make a manouver that has put two aircraft on a direct collision course. It is only through the skill and judgement of the pilots (And perhaps good visibility) that a disaster has been averted.
It should also be remembered that last nights tragedy occurred during darkness..maybe if visibility had been better disaster could have been narrowly avoided.
Without wishing to pre-judge any investigation, serious attention needs to be paid to the TCAS system on board the aircraft and pilots need to be made aware that these systems are far from infallible.
More on previous TCAS "incidents" here:
http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/bulletin/jun01/cggwd.htm
http://www.rpi.edu/~woodhe/docs/wsj/flawed.txt
http://www.atsb.gov.au/aviation/rec/r19990159.cfm
http://news.airwise.com/stories/99/11/942324329.html
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STCA vs MTCD
Technical Question,
There are two types of (ATC) conflict avoidance tools referred to here;
Firstly, STCA (Short Term Conflict Alert), this usually gives an alert toward a conflict predicted within the next 90 seconds, in an Area environment, this would be very late, considering closing speeds and the likes. I would expect this is primarily used in an Approach (Terminal) environment.
Secondly, MTCD (Medium Term Conflict Detection), this usually detects conflicts in the next 15 minutes, which is not very appropriate for use in an Approach environment, but more readily used in an Area environment.
These are usually functions of the Radar Workstation, and as such should not be down for maintenance, it is a selectable function of the Radar Controller, furthermore, if one Radar Workstation was down, there should be a second (or more) workstation in the room that was operational and could have detected the conflict. STCA and MTCD are not like VOR's or ILS's that are removed for maintenance, they are integrated in the Radar Workstation.
The question is;
does this Swiss Sector have STCA and/or MTCD?
There are two types of (ATC) conflict avoidance tools referred to here;
Firstly, STCA (Short Term Conflict Alert), this usually gives an alert toward a conflict predicted within the next 90 seconds, in an Area environment, this would be very late, considering closing speeds and the likes. I would expect this is primarily used in an Approach (Terminal) environment.
Secondly, MTCD (Medium Term Conflict Detection), this usually detects conflicts in the next 15 minutes, which is not very appropriate for use in an Approach environment, but more readily used in an Area environment.
These are usually functions of the Radar Workstation, and as such should not be down for maintenance, it is a selectable function of the Radar Controller, furthermore, if one Radar Workstation was down, there should be a second (or more) workstation in the room that was operational and could have detected the conflict. STCA and MTCD are not like VOR's or ILS's that are removed for maintenance, they are integrated in the Radar Workstation.
The question is;
does this Swiss Sector have STCA and/or MTCD?
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TCAS Reversals
Just a few observations:
If, as reported above, the t154 left its level 25 seconds before collision, then that would have been just a few seconds after the B757 responded to its RA. Almost a worst case 'RA Reversal' Scenario.
Can anyone state categorically the TCAS fit on these aircraft?
Particularly Version numbers?
It is a not well known, but very important fact, that TCAS versions prior to 7 can not reverse when the RA is coordinated.
i.e. if either aircraft manoevres against the RA then you are both in big trouble.
Thats one of the reasons that the JAA ACAS mandate only deems v7 to be acceptable.
Is anyone still operating on v6.04 grandfather rights? If you don't know, ask one of your avionic engineers.
CPB
If, as reported above, the t154 left its level 25 seconds before collision, then that would have been just a few seconds after the B757 responded to its RA. Almost a worst case 'RA Reversal' Scenario.
Can anyone state categorically the TCAS fit on these aircraft?
Particularly Version numbers?
It is a not well known, but very important fact, that TCAS versions prior to 7 can not reverse when the RA is coordinated.
i.e. if either aircraft manoevres against the RA then you are both in big trouble.
Thats one of the reasons that the JAA ACAS mandate only deems v7 to be acceptable.
Is anyone still operating on v6.04 grandfather rights? If you don't know, ask one of your avionic engineers.
CPB
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with an aircraft approaching both the crew would have been on their toes because both sets of crew would have been in "contact"on the map with a zero next to the A/C symbol When the russian aircraft started it descent a little arrow would have pointed out its vertical path on the DHL aircraft's map provided the vs of the descending A/C was greater than 500ft/min the crew on the DHL obviously did not get this indication on their map due to the RA .
Is it a practice in those skies for an aircraft to announce Left level ........ for Level........ when advised by ATC to descend
Is it a practice in those skies for an aircraft to announce Left level ........ for Level........ when advised by ATC to descend
Last edited by purr; 2nd Jul 2002 at 16:16.
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Sorry guys and with all respect, Capt PPRuNe, makes me post in here
Please STOP blaming Russian crew.
1. They’ve been used on this aircraft and that crew for 3 YEARS period on Barcelona direction
2. They’ve have quite good experience on type and language
3. Obvious ATC error, you should be blind or something, I don’t believe you haven’t heard THE RULE: NO READBACK – NO COMMAND GIVEN, IMMEDIATE ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN
4. Russian RA86816 is RVSM able, ACAS equipped, in fact, the Tupolev 154 had been observed flying over the height monitoring station in Linz (Austria) less than an hour before the accident and the height-keeping performance conformed to the RVSM status
5. I believe Russians have facing TCAS alert with climb advisory in one hand and following repeatedly command from ground to descend (lets wait for some CVR facts)
6. At this time I’ve been informed that Authority of Bashkirian Airlines has start claim procedure for Swiss ATC
Please no findings who is guilty, it is really big tragedy for all of us Russians, visiting your friendly forum desk.
Thanks
Please STOP blaming Russian crew.
1. They’ve been used on this aircraft and that crew for 3 YEARS period on Barcelona direction
2. They’ve have quite good experience on type and language
3. Obvious ATC error, you should be blind or something, I don’t believe you haven’t heard THE RULE: NO READBACK – NO COMMAND GIVEN, IMMEDIATE ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN
4. Russian RA86816 is RVSM able, ACAS equipped, in fact, the Tupolev 154 had been observed flying over the height monitoring station in Linz (Austria) less than an hour before the accident and the height-keeping performance conformed to the RVSM status
5. I believe Russians have facing TCAS alert with climb advisory in one hand and following repeatedly command from ground to descend (lets wait for some CVR facts)
6. At this time I’ve been informed that Authority of Bashkirian Airlines has start claim procedure for Swiss ATC
Please no findings who is guilty, it is really big tragedy for all of us Russians, visiting your friendly forum desk.
Thanks
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To Purr and others:
It is clear from the published maps and text that the two aircraft were approaching each other virtually at right angles, rather than head-on. In that scenario TCAS is presumably programmed to call for a change of height (up or down) rather than heading to resolve the conflict.
It is clear from the published maps and text that the two aircraft were approaching each other virtually at right angles, rather than head-on. In that scenario TCAS is presumably programmed to call for a change of height (up or down) rather than heading to resolve the conflict.
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Sponix,
The incidents you list above, whilst certainly part of the communities TCAS learning process, are somewhat dated. To the best of my knowledge the issues raised have been addressed.
v7 TCAS compares the airdata presented to both transponders, not just the operating one, and flags 'Altitude fail' if they disagree, which disables the TCAS. So for erroneous altitude encoding to nail you, both ADCs have got to be in error by the same ammount, and become so at the same time. Highly unlikely.
As mentioned above, it appears the b757 manouevred first. From reports above, and the crews call to ATC, a descent was flown.
Someone else maintains that the t154 was also TCAS equipped.
If if it was equipped, (and on and serviceable), then they will have been receiving a 'Climb RA'. They descended. TCAS should still have been able to ressolve the situation by issuing a reversal to the b757 UNLESS it was pre version 7 (see my post above).
If it was not equipped, (or off) then they obviously followed their descent instruction. In this case, since it would not be a coordinated encounter, the b757 TCAS would be able to issue a reversal regardless of software state.
Now, pure speculation I admit, but lets say you are flying a non TCAS aircraft and you suddenly realise that ATC want you to descend urgently. As you commence your descent, you hear another aircraft saying 'TCAS Descent'. What goes through your mind?
CPB
The incidents you list above, whilst certainly part of the communities TCAS learning process, are somewhat dated. To the best of my knowledge the issues raised have been addressed.
v7 TCAS compares the airdata presented to both transponders, not just the operating one, and flags 'Altitude fail' if they disagree, which disables the TCAS. So for erroneous altitude encoding to nail you, both ADCs have got to be in error by the same ammount, and become so at the same time. Highly unlikely.
As mentioned above, it appears the b757 manouevred first. From reports above, and the crews call to ATC, a descent was flown.
Someone else maintains that the t154 was also TCAS equipped.
If if it was equipped, (and on and serviceable), then they will have been receiving a 'Climb RA'. They descended. TCAS should still have been able to ressolve the situation by issuing a reversal to the b757 UNLESS it was pre version 7 (see my post above).
If it was not equipped, (or off) then they obviously followed their descent instruction. In this case, since it would not be a coordinated encounter, the b757 TCAS would be able to issue a reversal regardless of software state.
Now, pure speculation I admit, but lets say you are flying a non TCAS aircraft and you suddenly realise that ATC want you to descend urgently. As you commence your descent, you hear another aircraft saying 'TCAS Descent'. What goes through your mind?
CPB
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News from Air Accident Investigation Body in Germany
Here is a link that takes you to the press releases by the german air accident investigation body.
http://www.bfuweb.de/aktuinfo-e28.htm
Gives you some info on flightpaths and as far as I can see is free of speculations and defensive actions like what I believe to see from the Swiss side now.
http://www.bfuweb.de/aktuinfo-e28.htm
Gives you some info on flightpaths and as far as I can see is free of speculations and defensive actions like what I believe to see from the Swiss side now.
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Seleco,
The current TCAS system, (TCAS 2) can only provide vertical collision avoidance. The reasons behind this can be read elsewhere on this thread, or do a search in Tech Log.
Ruslan
No professional pilot is going to try blame anybody until a full investigation is out (and probably not even then - more than anyone we realise how an honest mistake under time pressure can appear negligent to an armchair pilot).
However, can I just point out that if your belief number 5 is correct, then they, or their training, were at fault. I'm sorry about this, but you are the one suggesting that they had a climb RA that they manouevered opposite to.
CPB
The current TCAS system, (TCAS 2) can only provide vertical collision avoidance. The reasons behind this can be read elsewhere on this thread, or do a search in Tech Log.
Ruslan
No professional pilot is going to try blame anybody until a full investigation is out (and probably not even then - more than anyone we realise how an honest mistake under time pressure can appear negligent to an armchair pilot).
However, can I just point out that if your belief number 5 is correct, then they, or their training, were at fault. I'm sorry about this, but you are the one suggesting that they had a climb RA that they manouevered opposite to.
CPB
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Avoiding action ?
Based on the skyguide (Swiss ATC) press report, the first command to the T154 to decend was issued about 50 seconds before impact;
It will be interesting to see if the ATC used the words ..."Avoiding Action" or ..."For Traffic Avoidance" in this transmission.
I cannot believe that it is standard procedure to allow aircraft to be on converging headings at the same level with 50 seconds to go before crossing
It will be interesting to see if the ATC used the words ..."Avoiding Action" or ..."For Traffic Avoidance" in this transmission.
I cannot believe that it is standard procedure to allow aircraft to be on converging headings at the same level with 50 seconds to go before crossing
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Capt Pit Bull
Thanks for understanding and your kind input, but should note, your post or whoever is under Capt PPRune, makes me say in here. I do appreciate learn from this tragedy and prevent such kind of things to ever happen.
As for point 5, fully agree, but let’s wait for some CVR’s speculation before the verdict who has trained well enough
Thanks for understanding and your kind input, but should note, your post or whoever is under Capt PPRune, makes me say in here. I do appreciate learn from this tragedy and prevent such kind of things to ever happen.
As for point 5, fully agree, but let’s wait for some CVR’s speculation before the verdict who has trained well enough
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Have a listen to this interview with a SkyGuide spokesman.
He claims that getting aircraft which are on a converging course at same levels to change levels when they were only one quarter of a minute apart is normal Swiss procedure!
Am I the only Air Traffic Controller who finds this completely unbelievible?
http://news.bbc.co.uk/media/video/38...16_mark_vi.ram
He claims that getting aircraft which are on a converging course at same levels to change levels when they were only one quarter of a minute apart is normal Swiss procedure!
Am I the only Air Traffic Controller who finds this completely unbelievible?
http://news.bbc.co.uk/media/video/38...16_mark_vi.ram
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Fair enough Ruslan.
And anyway - lets not forget that even if this does turn out to be the case, the crew concerned may have been the last link in a sequence of events, but they weren't the only link.
CPB
And anyway - lets not forget that even if this does turn out to be the case, the crew concerned may have been the last link in a sequence of events, but they weren't the only link.
CPB