Emirates B777 gear collapse @ DXB?

[vilas]

Unless you practise, over and over, you may get it wrong

I have no problem if you want to practice but unless you know the system well you will never know the trap. In EK case what is there to practice if you know the system won't give you TOGA automatically so push the thrust manually which is a procedure not your superior airmanship and rotate. You want to do it 50 times?

Airbus Golden Rules all require one skill when all else fails: the ability to fly the aeroplane

Without a doubt it is true. But when all else fails, is not the same as being ignorant of a system capability. Just like you keep honing your manual skills what prevents a pilot from learning three different scenarios of 777 GA.

[vilas]

Blogs
To give you an example in airbus you need to push thrust levers to TOGA. And go rounds are routinely practiced in SIM. But it has happened in flight(three incidents) some pilots didn't know that thrust levers are also FMGS phase/mode selectors. So because aircraft was light or some other reason they didn't not hit TOGA position and FDs remained in approach phase taking them down. Their airlines thought they are smarter than the manufacturer so their SOP had postponed confirming the FMA to later stage. The aircraft in one case reached 14 feet AAL in poor visibility. As you would want them they disregarded FD pulled up manually then again followed FD went down then saved the day by flying without FD. But why all this? Had they known the system well that you got to hit TOGA whether you need it or not it wouldn't have happened.

[efatnas]

Disagree on what? The AP put him in trim on a nice stable way down, he turned off the AP in trim and everything. It's pretty hard to f... this up. If he needed some vertical guidance, just punch v/s and there it is. I tell my copilots to do that all the time if they have problems judging the rate. Again, it's just a technique, but disgagree why?

[framer]

Indeed, here in Dubai, we have the perfect example of the 'chimp' eliminating conscious thought and selecting the WRONG motor program, which then ran automatically!

It is not surprising that when under pressure, with a lot of mental processing filling up his brain that he chose a sub conscious motor skill that he had been practicing and using on a regular basis. If we make the assumption that he was mentally overloaded. ( assumption) , then it would have been very surprising for him to select a sub conscious motor skill that he hasn't needed for years, ie pushing the thrust up.
Have you ever swapped from a European car to a Japanese car and put the windshield wipers on instead of the indicator? That happens regularly to experienced drivers. They are making the selection with little or no mental effort and they are selecting the wrong action.
For 777 drivers the action of pushing the thrust up with their hand is no longer the go to course of action at a sub conscious level. If they have the mental space/ time to actively think about what is required then they will no doubt come up with the correct action, but if they have no processing power to allocate to the job, they won't.

It could possibly be a combination of such things, but I have little doubt, in the current climate, many of us (both old and bold, AND magenta line!) could easily have fallen into the same trap.

I would agree with that if it read " could easily have fallen into the same trap if it had been years since we had manually pushed a thrust lever forward."

[Oakape]

For 777 drivers the action of pushing the thrust up with their hand is no longer the go to course of action at a sub conscious level.

Only if one has allowed it to become that way. Possibly it is background, possibly it is over reliance on automation, possibly it is laziness & lack of airmanship, or possibly it is a combination of all of these.


I must say that my background on the B737, coupled with my personal philosophy, meant I always had my hand on the trust levers when flying the B777 at lower altitudes, while speed & configuration changes were happening, except during the rotate phase of the take-off.

[CONF iture]

Originally Posted by Oakape

Only if one has allowed it to become that way. Possibly it is background, possibly it is over reliance on automation, possibly it is laziness & lack of airmanship, or possibly it is a combination of all of these.

Or is it company policy ... ?
How is it seen to use manual thrust at EK ?

[4468]

Only if one has allowed it to become that way. Possibly it is background, possibly it is over reliance on automation, possibly it is laziness & lack of airmanship, or possibly it is a combination of all of these

Utter b0110ck5 I'm afraid!

I have flown the 777. (I current fly B747-400, and have flown 737 and A320 amongst others) To suggest that on every go-around the thrust levers are PUSHED forward after pressing the TOGA buttons is 'fanciful'!

BTW, if this pilot had briefed and run the CORRECT motor program, they wouldn't even have pushed the TOGA buttons!!!!

That's not required. It's not taught. It's not in the FCOM, and frankly, it may be your 'preference in hindsight' but that's all.

What happened here was lack of forethought. No more, no less! On a 'bad day' every single poster here could easily fall foul of this particular dark corner of operations.

It is just the 'chimp' (in ALL of us!!) jumping to the wrong choice of action. That's all.

Only non professional pilots, or t055er5 would think otherwise! Only current 777 pilots, barred from manual thrust can comment authoritatively on this!

Enjoy.

[Capn Bloggs]

Originally Posted by 4468

It's not in the FCOM, and frankly, it may be your 'preference in hindsight' but that's all.

That's a bit rich coming from an outfit where the PM pulls the reversers...


So, Vilas and 4468, we're getting lots of criticism of our position and the actions/inactions of this crew. Some of us have provided a solution; what's yours?

[4468]

I've heard no solution from you, regarding the ACTUAL problem exhibited here. That is selection of the WRONG motor program (muscle memory???)

Did you offer one?

As far as 'my outfit' "where the PM pulls the reversers". (It's in OUR FCOM!) Can you point me in the direction of an incident/accident where our procedure has caused any problem? Because I can point you in the direction of MANY accidents where the PF has pulled their own reversers (or hasn't!!!!) and THAT has resulted in excursions!

Open your mind my friend!

It's about safety!

[Capn Bloggs]

4468, are you serious? Read post #1601 at the top of this page.

I ask again: what's your solution?

Because I can point you in the direction of MANY accidents where the PF has pulled their own reversers (or hasn't!!!!) and THAT has resulted in excursions!

I'd be interested in those. Please detail them so I can have a look.

[4468]

Capn Bloggs

I see last year you wrote this:

No, fly it like it is supposed to be flown. We fly ours with the AT in, as we did on another type, as the book says (or allows). I haven't flown the 737 but apparently the pitch-power coupling gets ugly with AT in when hand-flying. That doesn't necessarily apply to other types. On my type, hand-flying with the AT engaged is terrific.

Maybe that was the problem in DXB? Because that's exactly what they were doing!

You still flying manually with auto thrust in??

Is that what you regard as "stick and rudder"? "Manual flying skills"?

Really?

I see you can't point me in the direction of any incident attributable to 'our' procedures. Thanks for that vote of confidence!

Try Wikipedia, "accidents and incidents involving runway overruns" there are at least 30 incidents there, none of which involve 'my' operator!

Enjoy!

There's a lot of folks here who are full of sh1t!

[Capn Bloggs]

Originally Posted by 4468

You still flying manually with auto thrust in??

Yes we are, 4468, because that's what the manufacturer intended.

Originally Posted by 4468

I see you can't point me in the direction of any incident attributable to 'our' procedures. Thanks for that vote of confidence!

You never asked me to. I asked you for the MANY (your caps) excursion incidents caused by the PF pulling the reversers. You have not yet provided them. And be a real man: don't scurry away suggesting I look at Wiki. You made the claim, you back it up.

I ask again: what is your solution to this?

[CONF iture]

Another FlightGlobal article :
OPINION: Why go-arounds may need simplifying post-EK521

If the cockpit alarm, warning of a long landing, proves to have been the trigger event for the go-around, investigators will have to explore the decision process that led the crew to abort touchdown when some 3km of runway remained.

Countless accidents have resulted from crews' failing to conduct a missed approach in the face of an unstable approach.

The Emirates probe might need to look not just at whether the go-around should have been better-handled, but whether it was even necessary at all.

[efatnas]

It's a roookkiiee mistake he made; comes from getting into the big bird before learning how to fly properly. As a local this was probably his first jet ever. Even if you lucky enough to fly something with a TOGA switch you always follow the throttles with your hand. As a matter of fact you supposed to have your hands on the throttle at all times below 3000 feet except at V1 rotate but for sure on a landing approach. The captain certainly didn't have the big picture. I literally kissed the ground twice in my life after sitting in the back on somebody's airline. Coincidentally it was twice on a B777, once on emirates, once on air france; just saying......

[Oakape]

To suggest that on every go-around the thrust levers are PUSHED forward after pressing the TOGA buttons is 'fanciful'!

Not suggesting that at all. What I am suggesting that the hand be on the thrust levers on every go-around (Boeing). That way they can be pushed up if they do not respond to the TOGA push. It is also the fastest feedback on whether or not thrust is responding to the PF's command.

[RAT 5]

Even if you lucky enough to fly something with a TOGA switch you always follow the throttles with your hand.

On B737, dual channel approach with AT, a GA is made by pressing TOGA. The autopilot rotates the a/c to GA attitude and AT advances thrust. IMHO PF should be following through on both controls with both hands during the approach and should do so during the initiation of the GA. PM should also confirm that 'Thrust is set' before gear is elected up. So PF follows through on advancing TL's and PM visually confirms the engine gauges. The TL's are NOT PUSHED. The crew confirm by tactile feedback and visual checking that the automatics have actioned what you selected. It is NOT ASSUMED they have done so.
On a single channel approach with AT the thrust levers advance with TOGA and they are 'followed through' by PF and thrust confirmed visually by PM; same as dual channel.
In a manual approach thrust is manual and GA thrust is set manually and confirmed.
The common feature of these 3 approaches is PF has their hand on TL's during thrust application. Once thrust is set they can choose to put both hands on control column or not. Thrust application is confirmed by PM visually and in all 3 cases PM feels the thrust levers advance. 2 pilots, 2 senses in use.
By just pressing TOGA and PF removing their hand, thrust confirmation is reduced to only 1 pilot 1 sense, visual, and by PNF. Is that the safest method?
What is being said about motor skills, muscle memory, training instincts etc. asks the question: if the normal action is to press & forget TOGA for a GA, but in this high stress scenario it is not the correct action, is the system design to the optimum? Are the SOP's optimum? If the system stays as it is, with the trap, then the SOP, perhaps, needs to be written to include PF having tactile feedback from the TL's; i.e. follow through after TOGA so that if they don't advance they need to be PUSHED. If the SOP is to press & forget then this trap will always be armed ready to bite someone else.
IMHO I do think the system design and the inhibitions need to be reviewed: not only for this Gotcha, but the SFX scenario as well. It has been stated by the consciencous training captains that they discuss/demo/train the traps & Gotchas. i.e. not ALL pilots benefit from this sensible training.
Is it correct that, in this day of more & more automatic dependancy, there should be systems certified with latent sneaky traps & Gotchas that are not documented/highlighted in FCOMS? First the info should be prominent, 2nd-ly the system should be reviewed and redesigned.

[Oakape]

As a local this was probably his first jet ever.

efatnas, if I remember correctly, the captain had time on the A330/340. So this wasn't his first jet ever. Knowing the EK system, he most likely would have started on the A330 as an F/O, added the A340 to be dual endorsed & then done his command upgrade on those types. He then would have transferred to the B777. The other possibility is that he may have done the command upgrade on the B777, instead of the Airbus.


The problem as I see it was relying on the automation to respond to the TOGA command & it not doing so. The reason it didn't respond was due to the system design. While the design solved a number of potential problems, it led to this other problem, as is often the case. Boeing designers probably thought that this issue was covered by the traditional operating technique of having the hand on the thrust levers while speed & configuration changes are taking place in order to get tactile feedback of auto thrust response, but this technique seems to be fading into the past due to a large number of reasons.


The reason he totally relied on the automation for the thrust increase is yet to be confirmed. However, I would not be surprised if it was as simple as 'that was the way he was trained'. You can't go off at the individual pilot when it is the training system that has led him down this path. There may also be some personal responsibility, for reasons I alluded to earlier, but it is far to early in the investigation to have this sort of information to hand. It also may never come to light.

[efatnas]

Oakape
I agree with everything you say. But an A330 won't teach him to fly either. A fighter or a commuter plane teaches flying skills, not a wide body. Developing instincts takes doing it over and over again. The skills are acquired over time. To push the TOGA switch on a go around, touch and go or whatever you want to call this, is ridiculous. What if I may ask did he do with his right hand after that? Grab the joke, probably.

[vilas]

So, Vilas and 4468, we're getting lots of criticism of our position and the actions/inactions of this crew. Some of us have provided a solution; what's yours?

Quality training. In that first is to impart good knowledge of the system. Trainee should be pointed out any traps or likely popular misunderstanding of the system especially in take off, landing GA phases where there is time constraint. Then resolve this into procedural actions because that is what a pilot actually does but may be more than one set of actions according to situations due to system design/constraint.
Then practice it to proficiency and during OPC/LPC set the traps and reaffirm the learning.
The only difference in your and my thinking is you consider getting rid automation and reliance on basic flying skills as panacea of all ills, well that may be the good option some times but not every time to hide ignorance of automation. Just as lack basic flying skills limits a pilots proficiency similarly lack of knowledge of automation will restrict a pilot's utility in all weather operations. For a professional pilot they are not exchangeable.

[vilas]

The topic is Boeing but then!
From airbus document below:


AUTOMATION
Imagine that you have a 3rd pilot on the flight deck who flies perfectly and does exactly what you tell him to do - but has no idea of safety and no fear of crashing !

AUTOMATION
Key Principles

• You maintain control of the aircraft ALWAYS
• Ensure you thoroughly understand the system and interfaces
• Use the appropriate level of automation for the situation
• Ensure both crew are fully aware of what has been programmed
• Monitor and anticipate continuously.

MANAGING AUTOMATION

• Decide on the flight path you want and condition of your aircraft.
• Instruct the automation to do it.
• Observe what the automation tells you it is going to do.
• Check that it is doing it.
• Monitor progress.
• Be prepared for what it is going todo next.
• Confirm that the a/c follows the flight path and is in the condition that you want.