Emirates B777 gear collapse @ DXB?

[BuzzBox]

The Boeing 777 Rejected Landing

[Dropp the Pilot]

...or seen from another angle, if the holy FMA says "rollout" (which it will in the cases being described here) there is no button-pushing, cajoling, jiggery-pokery, incantation, or human rights commission that will get it to change to anything which will direct you through a go-around.

You will need to be a pilot.

At least until you've struggled your way to 15 feet above the runway.

[Vessbot]

I propose that the programming in all autothrottle airplanes be changed so that the TOGA button is only active if the throttles are at least 75% forward of idle. This way, on every takeoff and goaround the pilot is forced to do most of the throttle advancement himself, and thus retain the instinctive muscle memory of doing that. Then in a shock/confusion/task-saturation scenario, this will be the default reflex to fall back on.

[Qanchor]

Again, a non-standard Flaps 25 / Idle reverse pushed by the "beancounters" was trained into the pilots, and on "the day" it all turned bad.

Supported by the beancounters yes, but conceived by an oddball who became even more odd

[c.j.shrimpton]

Buzzbox @ 1485

Thanks for posting this after all the discussion about rejected landing versus Go-around and at what point during go-around the thrust should be checked.

Quite simply, in a normal go around it is almost guaranteed that TOGA will give the required thrust and if it doesn't, there's time to sort it. Very near the ground or after a bounce this cannot be guaranteed so a check of the thrust is more urgent.

If the wheels are on the ground you can bet your pension that TOGA will NOT give the required thrust. This is how this aircraft is designed (and others like it - probably to satisfy certification requirements) and the crew must be aware of this if they attempt this manoeuvre. Therefore the first actions must be:-

1. MANUALLY advance the power levers.
2. Check SPEED
3. Stop frantically pressing TOGA until you are away from the ground.

An earlier post stated that the pilot "stuffed up" and PM failed to notice. (Judging by some of the posts in this thread, others might have made the same mistake for the same reason.) They might not have been fully aware of this Gotcha and may not been trained to do what is in effect a "touch and go" resorting instead to their more familiar go-around SOP.

As to the question that arose earlier in this thread as to whether this was an unnecessary rejected landing because of a spurious warning that the runway was too short, I would suggest caution until the full analysis of the performance is determined by the investigation. I've found that computers, much like women, have an annoying habit of sometimes being right. Earlier in this thread I saw that the density altitude was around 4000ft due to the extreme temperature and the low pressure. Landing groundspeeds are significantly higher in these conditions and a trawl through the performance graphs can sometimes throw up surprises. Depending on the weight, groundspeed and actual touchdown point, the warning may have been correct.

[portmanteau]

white knight, with respect you can only be 100% sure your statements are correct if you have spoken to the crew concerned. perhaps you have.

[deSitter]

So I've been following this extremely interesting latterly discussion and would like to ask if I have understood this correctly - it appears that the pilots forgot to do something as basic as add thrust in a timely manner because they were either regressing to procedures learned on a previous type, or victims of a modern training regime that emphasizes rote learning over understanding and piloting skill..

I had always assumed that landings were conducted with the airliner "bridled and saddled", that is, with the thrust levers in hand and held with vigilance should their immediate use be required, as say if some object were spotted on the runway that was not clearly visible on short final.. if these guys actually went out of their way to raise the gear before adding thrust.. is this just a simple misunderstanding of what the TOGA button/lever does? Thanks in advance.

-drl

[framer]

because they were either regressing to procedures learned on a previous type,

You're on the wrong track with that bit IMO.
If you are in a 737 the aircraft is 'bridled and saddled' as you put it (99% of time). I don't know about other airliners but the 777 is nearly always landed with automatics controlling the thrust.

[RAT 5]

Ref Buzzbox: Many thanks; finally some facts about what will happen and what should happen; i.e. be done. Plus some insight into training for these scenarios.

I make 3 comments.

1. A rejected landing after wheel touch down and speed brake up is not an EASA mandatory manoeuvre. The 'wave off' at 50' is. However, on the LST form this is called a 'rejected landing'. IT IS NOT. It is a low level GA with engines probably at medium thrust levels and sufficient height, perhaps, to avoid ground contact. It is a STANDARD GA.
2. If a real rejected landing, as per FCTM definition, there are some significant notes of difference. PF will call Go Round and increase thrust; speed brakes & auto brakes should stow & disconnect; accelerate and at Vref PM calls Rotate; do not change flap on the runway.
3. rotate should be commenced no later than 2000' from the end of the runway.

This manoeuvre can be executed for a number of reasons including a long landing with insufficient runway to stop. How many events have there been in the world where this manoeuvre executed correctly would have avoided tragedy? Is it a mandatory trained Manoeuvre? NO. WHY NOT?
It has been said many times that the all engine GA is one of the most screwed up, least practiced manoeuvres of all. This variant has huge potential for screw up and yet is often not trained at all, nor practiced. XAA's & training depts need to look at themselves very closely.

I had always assumed that landings were conducted with the thrust levers in hand and held with vigilance should their immediate use be required.

Precisely. Many over-runs might have been avoided if the landings had been conducted with a GA, even rejected landing, mentality other than a 'must land-itis' thinking. That is why I beat their knuckles when I saw cadets, even seasoned F/O's, flaring with their hands on the Thrust Reversers. It required quite an eye-opening discussion to explain why it was NOT a good idea, and a further refresher of the braking system to explain why it achieved zilch. What was worse was the panic s election of reverse accompanied by disarming of the auto brakes with feet after a F30 landing to make a short turnoff; even on a damp runway.

Back to the point of why is rejected landing not a mandatory trained manoeuvre? It is all very well to make a simple statement that a Go Round can be made from the runway up into the TR's have been deployed. It is quite another not to train crews to do it, both mentally & physically, especially as it is different from a GA. In various NTSB reports there has been criticism of airlines who had not trained crews in certain manoeuvres, which would have helped avoid an incident/accident, or trained them incorrectly; e.g. AA rudder failure after wake turbulence. In these cases training programs were changed. It will be interesting to see what recommendations are made after this report is concluded and if this manoeuvre replaces the 'normal GA from 50' in the LST.

[Bergerie1]

RAT 5,
Well said.

[4468]

I tend to agree with RAT 5, in so far as, I believe this crew could have, like many, been set up to fail here.

Just a point of information. At my employer, PF does NOT operate reversers! That is a job for PM. That simple fact allows me to pre-brief that PF does not remove their hand from the thrust levers unless they are happy we can stop, AND PM does not select reverse unless they are also happy we can safely stop. Either pilot can call go-around. We both have a very immediate investment, and clear responsibility, in the landing! ONLY when reverse is selected, are we committed to completing the landing! Not before.

At which point in the brief, a quick resume of HOW we would conduct a go-around after landing is included. It's debatable whether I would have thought such a briefing relevant before landing on a 4000m runway. However, we land on short runways so frequently that the 'how' is always reasonably fresh in the mind. Coincidentally I did one in the sim a month or so ago, and I think it may have been part of that recurrent?

I can see that Airbus has a more robust procedure for this particular manouvre. I can also see that something they do differently would have gone some way to mitigating what occurred here. It was always hammered into me on the Airbus that go-around thrust is selected, (which on the Airbus ALWAYS requires you to fully advance the thrust levers!) and flap is retracted one stage. THE NEXT STEP IS TO READ OUT LOUD THE FMAs! If they annunciate what you want to see, (would be THR/TOGA/TOGA on a Boeing) THEN gear is raised!

Incidentally, you can go-around quite easily with the gear down. Ask me how I know! But as we saw here, you can't go-around if the FMAs aren't correct!!

I would suggest to expect a recommendation to the manufacturer to include FMAs at a very early stage in all go-arounds. This simple change could have mitigated our colleagues incorrect actions. It helps to protect us all.

[portmanteau]

Recommendations must surely have gone out already regarding the parlous state of the slides. To learn that only one door was unaffected( except by fire outside!) makes the evac of everyone before the tank blew an epic feat. Presume the slide state is down to its age and little usage as well as the elements.

[notapilot15]

Originally Posted by alf5071h

Based on what is currently known, this was a 'normal', SOP, accident.
The crew followed normal procedures and behaved as they had been trained and had practiced many aspects in everyday operations; except, apparently, for one oversight in not checking the thrust increase for an infrequently encountered situation, and a specifically exceptional circumstance.

I think it is bit too early to prep the crowds for the final report.

[awair]

FMA callouts

Originally Posted by 4468

I would suggest to expect a recommendation to the manufacturer to include FMAs at a very early stage in all go-arounds. This simple change could have mitigated our colleagues incorrect actions. It helps to protect us all.

This is already SOP.
It is not specifically included in the written Go Around (or any) manouevre flow, because it is identified at a higher level of SOP.

[tdracer]

Just a clarification - it is possible to abort a landing after selecting reverse thrust as a last resort if the situation dictates (e.g. another aircraft or vehicle on the runway). It's something Boeing now designs for - the so called "Cranbrook scenario".
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pacifi...nes_Flight_314

[vilas]

it is possible to abort a landing after selecting reverse thrust as a last resort if the situation dictates (e.g. another aircraft or vehicle on the runway).

How will you judge whether you will overfly the vehicle or hit it harder? What happens if one reverser doesn't stow?

[tdracer]

What happens if one reverser doesn't stow?

The system is designed to make sure the reversers completely stow.
At Cranbrook, the problem was the T/R hadn't finished the stow cycle when the air/ground indication went 'air' - which closed the T/R isolation valve. The aerodynamic forces on the T/R then pushed it back open (clamshell type reverser).
Since Cranbrook, the thrust reverser systems have been designed to keep the isolation valve open until the reverser has completely stowed and locked, and the actuators are sized to insure they can overcome any aerodynamic forces at high engine power.

[glofish]

To all SOP gurus and FMA junkies:

You are most probably right in all your theories, assumptions, and recommendations. What you all forget however, is that we are all human. In very unexpected and thus stressful situations we tend to have a short brain f@rt and are reduced to a very basic existence and presence as a pilot.

That is when your basic skills should set in, your pilot instincts, your muscle memory or whatever you want to call it.
This will help you through the first ~10 seconds until you get back all your senses.

Many incidents and studies have unfortunately proven --, that the inevitably appearing statements like ‘it was displayed on the FMA’ or that ‘if you had analysed your instruments or indicators’ you would have had a clear picture as to which of the hundreds of magical SOPs or beautiful manoeuvres in the FCOMs would have helped you out of that situation, -- are a cry in the dark.
In moments as described above, our intellectual input receiving capacity is almost zero, the only thing that still works is our tactile input and basic skills and instincts.

Anyone pretending to be able to correctly absorb FMA, CDU and EICAS/ECAM indications at the same time and precision as the PFD indications and engine indicators, when you are confronted with an unusual and unexpected situation, you missed your vocation! You should have applied to Houston!

I admit, i never could. In my 35+ years of airline operation as a pilot, I have witnessed several such difficult situations and it always took me a few seconds to regain my composure and I was almost never able to use any indication in letters or digits, only very basic analogue and pictorial indications.
What helped me out of such situations were those primary, very basic indications and some extremely basic movements on stick and throttle.
Everything else followed a few moments later, they were then very helpful to get back to normal, but never the primary saviours.

But to do so, I am grateful that I was lucky enough to have been allowed a career that enabled me to train and gain experience as to acquire these skills.
I very much doubt that the majority of more recent pilot colleagues were given this opportunity.

That is a huge problem and might be the root cause of many ‘new’ kind of accidents.

[oicur12.again]

An interesting observation that may have been mentioned here already, its a long thread.

I am saddened to see ATC get involved in issuing instructions so early in the GA procedure.

Makes it hard to aviate, navigate then communicate!!!

[airtractor]

Bang on Glofish.