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Emirates B777 gear collapse @ DXB?

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Emirates B777 gear collapse @ DXB?

Old 12th Sep 2016, 15:29
  #1461 (permalink)  
 
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Andrasz, pilots would follow the missed approach procedure which is printed on the arrival charts precisely so that the pilots know what to do next without unnecessary contact with or by ATC at a critical time. Aviate Navigate Communicate, remember. Only when they have cleaned up and climbed away might ATC confirm the crew's intentions. No, ATC did not observe the aircraft going around before they issued their instruction which was before the gear was even selected up. They might have thought they did but they were not in the cockpit or inside the pilots heads, who might very well have been considering putting it down, regardless of sop when up comes an instruction to climb 4000ft......
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Old 12th Sep 2016, 15:34
  #1462 (permalink)  
 
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'Cool' Drivers

And part of the problem is that Captains, legally responsible to the management and the general public for the safe and sensible conduct of their flights, are referring to themselves, I suppose thinking they are being 'cool', as drivers. You are NOT. You are the Captain of an aircraft.
Drivers belong on golf courses or in lorries.
Prober
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Old 12th Sep 2016, 15:47
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Rat 5 I would assume someone on a command course should know their aircraft so technical stuff should be "as read" unless lack of knowledge shows up. The command check should be a complex senario possibly with no correct answer but the check airman should be looking at the methodology & reasoning the candidate is displaying. This crew I am sure knew the system but got "thrown" by the unusual nature of the event & failed to respond appropriately. I am not a great believer in the quoted "musle memory" as in my experience aeroplanes never fail or do what they do in the simulator. It takes a PILOT to cope. Unfortunately they are few & far between these days. Not the individuals fault it is their training departments. So many people apportion blame when in fact it is human to err & their selection & training are shown wanting.
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Old 12th Sep 2016, 16:28
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Slowly the situation is degenerating into the pointy end being occupied by dumbed down drivers being propped up by automation and a big of book of words.

Guys: I am with you. I was responding to 604's comment.
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Old 12th Sep 2016, 17:03
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Those of you who live in the UK may have heard a spoof radio ad about a computer controlled car, after listing a couple of imaginary features and then a third which says and if you see a deer off to the side running towards you-open the drive menu , select and click on the scary face icon , to begin evasive action-only if feature activated,

So if airlines mandate so much automatic flying why have the thrust levers at all with that philosophy: if they are there standing proudly up on the consol they are there for a reason -like to push fully forward if you need more thrust
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Old 12th Sep 2016, 18:00
  #1466 (permalink)  
 
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A go-around should not be a difficult or unusual manoeuvre but a BAULKED LANDING is!
Procedurally, there is very little difference between the two. Yes, the engines may be at a lower power setting and may take a bit longer to spool up, but the procedures are essentially the same. And if only the main gear touched down and the nosegear did not (which would be the case if the aircraft lands long and the pilots elect to go around) the procedure is essentially the same. And in all cases the critical part of the procedure is to increase thrust. Because in all cases the maneuver requires increasing the energy state of the aircraft (both airspeed and altitude must be increased, in this situation they cannot be traded). This absolutely requires lots of thrust. Changing attitude (bringing the nose up) and/or changing configuration (changing flap and/or gear position) without also increasing thrust will result in failure of the maneuver. For whatever reason, that appears to be what happened here; the pilots failed to ensure a sufficient increase in thrust. Clearly they had more than sufficient flying speed at touchdown because they traded that speed for 85 feet in altitude. But without more thrust, the outcome when they had used up their kinetic energy reserve was inevitable: the aircraft would descend. The only question is how severe will the impact be when the descending flight path intersects the ground? Fortunately the descent rate was low enough that the impact was survivable for all aboard and the aircraft held together enough to enable an orderly (well mostly) evacuation after the hull came to rest. Sadly, a firefighter subsequently died. One must wonder what the circumstances were of that tragedy. That death should (probably) not have happened.
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Old 12th Sep 2016, 19:22
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Procedurally, there is very little difference between the two. Yes, the engines may be at a lower power setting and may take a bit longer to spool up, but the procedures are essentially the same.
This crew did EXACTLY what they had ALWAYS done to go-around.

That's precisely why they crashed! Because they SHOULD have done something different!

The "procedures are (NOT) essentially the same"!

Sorry.
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Old 12th Sep 2016, 19:58
  #1468 (permalink)  
 
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This crew did EXACTLY what they had ALWAYS done to go-around.
That's precisely why they crashed! Because they SHOULD have done something different!
The "procedures are (NOT) essentially the same"!
Sorry.
Sorry indeed. If they did a go around without increasing thrust, the outcome would be essentially the same. The aircraft would settle and strike the ground. If going around without increasing thrust is this airline's standard procedure, there would be lots of crashed airplanes.

Or are you saying they pressed the TOGA button and always ASSUMED the thrust would increase automatically without verifying it? That will indeed work, until the thrust does not automatically increase, as it did in this case because of the weight on wheels.. The point is the increase in thrust is absolutely critical for a go around or a rejected landing. The pilots should NEVER assume the thrust has increased but should ALWAYS verify. That is a part of the procedure. That is easy in a B777 where the thrust levers actually move, unlike some aircraft where the thrust levers do not move. And even in the case of a B777, the pilots should follow up by checking the instruments and verifying the thrust has increased sufficiently for the situation and manually increase thrust if and as required.
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Old 12th Sep 2016, 21:13
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Originally Posted by fox niner
Airborne at second 23.
Thrust levers advanced at second 35.

That is 12 seconds. Now slowly count to 12, and realize how unbelievably long 12 seconds are.
How slow do you need to count 12 seconds???
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Old 12th Sep 2016, 21:50
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Autothrust Idle Mode

This was asked a lot of post's ago and I don't believe answered.
Question: Is it possible on the 777 that the autothrottle has transitioned to Idle on the FMA for the flare and when after touch down a balked landing is carried out by advancing the thrust levers and To/GA switches, due to the fact that TO/GA switches don't work on the ground would the autothrottle still be in idle mode ???
Thus should PF for whatever reason place both hands on the yoke having not pushed the To/Ga switches once airborne thus not commanding THRUST on FMA would the autothrottle still be in Idle mode and retard thrust levers to idle ???
It would be appreciated if any 777 pilots could shed some light.
Thank you.
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Old 12th Sep 2016, 21:50
  #1471 (permalink)  
 
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Based on what is currently known, this was a 'normal', SOP, accident.
The crew followed normal procedures and behaved as they had been trained and had practiced many aspects in everyday operations; except, apparently, for one oversight in not checking the thrust increase for an infrequently encountered situation, and a specifically exceptional circumstance.

If all preceding influences were to be known - acknowledged, then perhaps the industry could learn much more than cite the crew.
Consider:-
The tailwind approach was 'standard', and as might be expected resulted in an extended flare and longer touchdown than normal.
The crew followed the procedure for a RAAS alert, perhaps unexpected for the length of runway remaining. Was the alert distance optimised for shorter runways; what consideration was made for longer runways and, that with 'normal' tailwind landings alerts may be more frequent, - 'unwarranted' alerts. Were any of these assumptions published; more alerts were not expected, or accepting that there would be more alerts and 'GAs' (could this suggest ignoring the alert).
Was the context of the RAAS procedure fully explained / trained; as a Go Round, or as a Rejected Landing.

Does RAAS alert in the air or only on the ground. If airborne, selecting GA and then touching down is 'normal', the crew can depend on the highly reliable auto thrust system which is used every day.
If RAAS is ground use only then how might the crew identify the small window where the highly reliable auto thrust system cannot be depended on; is there a need for a 'different' procedure - RAAS SOP for Rejected Landing - not the GA SOP as suggested by the FCTM/FCOM text.
We have yet to see any pages for RAAS description and use.

Thus the crew in this normal, but unexpected operation followed the procedures, yet given human limitations apparently did not verify the thrust setting. The behaviour may have been normal; the AT was used routinely, presumable take-off thrust is checked, but with habit are the values actually read and compared with the expected value - a dependency on the very reliable AT system. Similarly for a GA, could the thrust increase and setting be as expected, apparently seen - 'wish think', and the mental workload compounded with over focus on SOPs. Selecting flaps, checking positive rate, mode annunciation, and then selecting gear up; all normal, trained for activities, as per the GA SOP.

How might this human weakness be identified in training. Did the instructors know about these human and technical factors.
Even if the exact conditions could be replicated, simulator training rarely represents the stress levels of real conditions. What chance of replicating the exact human behaviour; both pilots, at the same time. And where is the SOP for after selecting GA there is no thrust increase, ... Disconnect AT and move thrust levers (rarely if ever done).

This accident, even without a final report, is an opportunity to consider contributions and conjunctions, and thence what everyone might be review and as necessary change.
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Old 12th Sep 2016, 22:09
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Just to keep things on track

Someone below mentioned that go-around mode was not available through the TOGA switches because there was weight on the wheels. This is not correct.

The TOGA switches are disabled by height during any landing. They cease to function at 2 feet above the runway and remain disabled until the airplane spends several seconds above 15 feet in any subsequent climb.

If the lads had merely kept hammering away at the switches during the confusion this thread would not exist.
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Old 12th Sep 2016, 22:16
  #1473 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by alf5071h
This accident, even without a final report, is an opportunity to consider contributions and conjunctions, and thence what everyone might be review and as necessary change.
Alternately, it is an opportunity for management, and for that matter a portion of the industry, to ignore the layers of causation based on your well reasoned post about habit patterns and behavior, and find a scapegoat.


About 6 years ago I got involved in the discussions on the AF 447 crash here on PPRuNe. With that came growing sense of incredulity.


The pitch and power chorus, a faction of posters who kept on reminding the discussers of the basics, was well represented. With this incident, and a few others, the question that crops up in my mind is:
is one of the fundamentals most pilots are taught way in the beginning, that pitch+power=performance, and that pitch/power/configuration are of key influence on desired/expected performance, being (perhaps unintentionally) trained out of some pilots by the nature of day to day flying? If feel strange asking that question, but I ask it because of what in your post got my brain to grind its gears.
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Old 12th Sep 2016, 22:35
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Excellent contribution alf5071h. The supreme irony is that if the GA was initiated by pushing TOGA in the flare prior to touchdown that everything would have worked exactly as the crew expected and that aircraft would still be flying today. This latent thread would still be lurking, just waiting for the holes to line up next time.

Your highlighting of the RAAS, and how to deal with this warning is for me the key to this accident. This system seems to have caused confusion, if you look at the timeline I posted in post #1391 it was only 4 seconds from the RAAS callout until the aircraft became airborne. It would seem the PF reacted promptly to this callout.

The next aspect is the many contributions on this thread for a rejected landing / baulked approach. The many terms, and techniques again highlight the confusion for a GA after the wheels have touched down & prior to reverse being selected. There seems to be no "standard" technique, and Boeing manuals are very short on advice. Given this, how does the PM "know" how to react to one of these varieties of techniques and calls and resolve his own thinking about what is going on? Would the next Captain have ignored the RAAS callout in the same circumstances? If so, now the PM has to change his thinking to considering the level of braking action required and stopping distance remaining. There has to be a very quick change in thinking and both pilots have to be on the same page together to complete their task to avoid an accident.

This type of missed approach is quite rare, but a high risk manoeuvre given it appears to have virtually no standard training across the industry.
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Old 12th Sep 2016, 23:08
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'Cool' Drivers
And part of the problem is that Captains, legally responsible to the management and the general public for the safe and sensible conduct of their flights, are referring to themselves, I suppose thinking they are being 'cool', as drivers. You are NOT. You are the Captain of an aircraft.
Drivers belong on golf courses or in lorries.
Prober
Clearly, i missed the part in the initial report where the reference to the word "driver" was "part of the problem".

You can call him Skip, Guvnor, Boss or Captain, but if he ain't making the decisions, titles are irrelevant. And that was my point. In your day, perhaps you were a Captain, Captain. Today, it's just a title. Bestowed upon you as evidence of the fact that you are indeed a confirmed SOP slave.

Titles, Badges, Bars, and Braid,
Welcome to the club, you've made the grade.
Now you're a Captain, you can feel proud,
But make a decision, that ain't allowed.
If you want to play, you'll do as i say,
You've got the uniform, now go away.

Welcome to aviation today.

Last edited by 604driver; 13th Sep 2016 at 00:21.
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Old 12th Sep 2016, 23:23
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Captains are never "legally responsible to the management"! The management are just their employers!

There is a difference!🙄

The 3 legged stool is an important concept.

1) Disobey the company's SOPs? = Lose your job.

2) Disobey the ministry's rules? = Lose your licence.

3) Disobey the law? = Lose your liberty.

There is of course a fourth level, which includes losing your self respect, or losing your life.
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Old 12th Sep 2016, 23:26
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The TOGA switches are disabled by height during any landing. They cease to function at 2 feet above the runway and remain disabled until the airplane spends several seconds above 15 feet in any subsequent climb.
That seems odd design. What happens when RA fails like TK1951? When the airplane gets several seconds above 15 feet, is the TOGA button really necessary any more (except for the next approach)? Why did Boeing think TOGA should be disabled at all and now looking at these consequences maybe they will reconsider?

A simple voice alert of 'No TOGA' would inform the crew that their request for TOGA was not implemented by the automatics
Wouldn't some warning indeed be useful? So a button in some circumstances does absolutely nothing and doesn't tell pilots such a critical function is deactivated if they try to use it. But of course...

The point is the increase in thrust is absolutely critical for a go around or a rejected landing. The pilots should NEVER assume the thrust has increased but should ALWAYS verify. That is a part of the procedure.
Perhaps the training on this should include a deactivated TOGA button even at "minimums" to emphasise immediately verifying thrust increase.

A nice handy TOGA button that sometimes doesn't work is something to be very wary of.
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Old 12th Sep 2016, 23:42
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Another rejected landing that went wrong: Runway excursion - Boeing Co 747-438, VH-OJH, Bangkok Airport, Thailand, 23 September 1999 with a similar degree of confusion. Again, a non-standard Flaps 25 / Idle reverse pushed by the "beancounters" was trained into the pilots, and on "the day" it all turned bad.

At no stage during the landing roll did the crew attempt to select either idle reverse thrust or full reverse thrust. There was no comment on the CVR regarding reverse thrust.
page 11

Again confusion in everyones mind led to this high profile over-run.
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Old 13th Sep 2016, 00:14
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Originally Posted by portmanteau
Andrasz, pilots would follow the missed approach procedure which is printed on the arrival charts precisely so that the pilots know what to do next without unnecessary contact with or by ATC at a critical time. Aviate Navigate Communicate, remember. Only when they have cleaned up and climbed away might ATC confirm the crew's intentions. No, ATC did not observe the aircraft going around before they issued their instruction which was before the gear was even selected up.
ATC issued the 'instruction' AFTER the GA was inititated. It's all very well following a published missed approach procedure, but as pilots we may not be fully aware of other aircraft movements, In my experience it is very common for ATC to issue GA instructions that differ from those published!

ATC DID NOT INITIATE THE GO-AROUND. That was done by the crew after the RAAS 'long landing' warning.
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Old 13th Sep 2016, 00:38
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Land it,

The FMA will tell you if the TOGA push worked or not. That's why it's there.
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