Emirates B777 gear collapse @ DXB?
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Some comments on Checklists. B737 QRH: You have an engine shutdown and therefore a wounded bird. You may be or not under radar. Either way you would be hard pressed to respond to an RA, especially a climb. IMHO opinion selecting TA Only is rather helpful to reduce the risk. Yet, in the QRH for engine failures of all varieties it is No.9 in the checklist. It can take a long time to reach this. In other checklists it comes earlier. It seems as if this section is not considered important to Boeing. Why? Select TA by Recall takes <5secs and may avoid an undesirable moment. There are various QRH checklists where it is appropriate but not included at all. It took much persuasion to include it is the Emergency Descent QRH. Indeed some Boeing company pilots didn't understand there question.
After Sully went boating my airline included a double engine failure/ditching in the recurrence sessions. The SFI asked me why I called for 'locked' harness before splash time. I said it seemed common sense. I did not think the manufacturer included harness locks just for pilot incapacitation; which is the only time they are ever used. After checking the QRH for Ditching it does not include locking the shoulder harness. I wonder why.
After Sully went boating my airline included a double engine failure/ditching in the recurrence sessions. The SFI asked me why I called for 'locked' harness before splash time. I said it seemed common sense. I did not think the manufacturer included harness locks just for pilot incapacitation; which is the only time they are ever used. After checking the QRH for Ditching it does not include locking the shoulder harness. I wonder why.
Last edited by RAT 5; 21st Aug 2016 at 06:41.
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4468 - fascinating response !
No astronaut me, and procedure had been practised many times not only in Hunter but twin engined heavier machine with another crewmember who did not have a pole and throttle to play with, just radar and the rest, but he did have his own means of exit/ escape which he could opt to use at any time if he did not care for what was going on.
Event I described had an experienced ex-mil co. What we executed safely was discussed and agreed beforehand, had been practised in the sim by both separately, and of course the co was entitled to take control of any situation where he considered it to be heading towards an unsuccessful outcome.
That's the scenario in more detail for you delectation; perhaps you could expand on your misgivings for me.
Your
"This job is a TWO pilot operation! Both need to know EXACTLY what's coming next. Keep it SOP. Keep it simple." first; would you really throw away the advantage of height and speed in hand in order to perform an SOP ILS approach, which not only would take longer with the good engine at a higher power setting potentially straining it so unnecessarily that it too might quit? Then what ? Is that really such a good idea? I definitely still think not.
If you really do consider that to be the better option then I am glad I flew when I did with airmanship considerations being part of everyday life rather than being constrained like you unfortunately appear to be to a blinkered, always SOP lifestyle. No need to engage brain there. Pity. God forbid !
Next your
"Frankly, the industry can't sustain the rates of losses the 'old and bold' generation accepted. We may have different problems now, but flying is infinitely safer, for a very good reason, and it's not purely because aircraft are more reliable!"
My day included the Comet crash window problems, and ADF, VOR, backbeam ILS and other interesting approaches which were often the order of the day, all hand flown without the luxury of GPS and automation to touchdown that your generation enjoys. So you can go look up on Google what some of those vintage system approaches involved, as you appear to be one of the newer generation who would probably have packed it in when faced with some of those situations. Not entirely a question of old and bold and aircraft reliability at all actually.
Finally your
"I may be the only professional pilot here thinking this, but personally, I'm very glad there are very few (if any?) pilots like you left in the airlines."
I think and hope that you are ! So be it, but you don't know what you missed.
Had you been lucky enough to have been blessed and rostered with me you would probably have learnt a lot to your benefit, being polite and respectful to your seniors and betters perhaps being one of them ! As it is I am very happy that I did not suffer that misfortune. Nothing personal of course !
No astronaut me, and procedure had been practised many times not only in Hunter but twin engined heavier machine with another crewmember who did not have a pole and throttle to play with, just radar and the rest, but he did have his own means of exit/ escape which he could opt to use at any time if he did not care for what was going on.
Event I described had an experienced ex-mil co. What we executed safely was discussed and agreed beforehand, had been practised in the sim by both separately, and of course the co was entitled to take control of any situation where he considered it to be heading towards an unsuccessful outcome.
That's the scenario in more detail for you delectation; perhaps you could expand on your misgivings for me.
Your
"This job is a TWO pilot operation! Both need to know EXACTLY what's coming next. Keep it SOP. Keep it simple." first; would you really throw away the advantage of height and speed in hand in order to perform an SOP ILS approach, which not only would take longer with the good engine at a higher power setting potentially straining it so unnecessarily that it too might quit? Then what ? Is that really such a good idea? I definitely still think not.
If you really do consider that to be the better option then I am glad I flew when I did with airmanship considerations being part of everyday life rather than being constrained like you unfortunately appear to be to a blinkered, always SOP lifestyle. No need to engage brain there. Pity. God forbid !
Next your
"Frankly, the industry can't sustain the rates of losses the 'old and bold' generation accepted. We may have different problems now, but flying is infinitely safer, for a very good reason, and it's not purely because aircraft are more reliable!"
My day included the Comet crash window problems, and ADF, VOR, backbeam ILS and other interesting approaches which were often the order of the day, all hand flown without the luxury of GPS and automation to touchdown that your generation enjoys. So you can go look up on Google what some of those vintage system approaches involved, as you appear to be one of the newer generation who would probably have packed it in when faced with some of those situations. Not entirely a question of old and bold and aircraft reliability at all actually.
Finally your
"I may be the only professional pilot here thinking this, but personally, I'm very glad there are very few (if any?) pilots like you left in the airlines."
I think and hope that you are ! So be it, but you don't know what you missed.
Had you been lucky enough to have been blessed and rostered with me you would probably have learnt a lot to your benefit, being polite and respectful to your seniors and betters perhaps being one of them ! As it is I am very happy that I did not suffer that misfortune. Nothing personal of course !
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What's the reason for locking the shoulder harness? Does your airline not have tension reels on the shoulder straps?
Belt & braces! Would you trust yourself to a single safety item when you had a back-up and did not activate it? Why have a back-up and not use it? It is not an automatic system! Duh! Question: why is the lock lever there?
Belt & braces! Would you trust yourself to a single safety item when you had a back-up and did not activate it? Why have a back-up and not use it? It is not an automatic system! Duh! Question: why is the lock lever there?
Paxing All Over The World
Back to the original prang of this thread. Although I have followed the full thread, I cannot recall if we learnt: Was the pilot handling, the local Captain or the Australian FO?
Originally Posted by Sailor
Had you been lucky enough to have been blessed and rostered with me you would probably have learnt a lot to your benefit, being polite and respectful to your seniors and betters perhaps being one of them ! As it is I am very happy that I did not suffer that misfortune. Nothing personal of course !
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Well...he does have a point, even if it's tone was slightly offensive.
I used the same technique as Sailor years ago but I would side with his Chief Pilot these days. The industry and aircraft have changed and (with the obvious rider that SOP can't cover all situations) stepping outside trained manouvres and checklists is unnecessary and introduces "unknown unknowns". It sometimes is counter-intuitive but simply and dumbly following procedures really does work.
For example although following a glide profile would give some protection against a kegworth scenario, but in the modern vernacular it also introduces arguably more likely hazards of an unstablised approach.
The point being that sticking to someones SOPs, even if you know a better way, does not indicate a lack of individualism or the ability to get out the skills if a really needed.
I used the same technique as Sailor years ago but I would side with his Chief Pilot these days. The industry and aircraft have changed and (with the obvious rider that SOP can't cover all situations) stepping outside trained manouvres and checklists is unnecessary and introduces "unknown unknowns". It sometimes is counter-intuitive but simply and dumbly following procedures really does work.
For example although following a glide profile would give some protection against a kegworth scenario, but in the modern vernacular it also introduces arguably more likely hazards of an unstablised approach.
The point being that sticking to someones SOPs, even if you know a better way, does not indicate a lack of individualism or the ability to get out the skills if a really needed.
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The point being that sticking to someones SOPs, even if you know a better way, does not indicate a lack of individualism or the ability to get out the skills if a really needed.
Standard in SOP means exactly that: Standard.
Its definition is: "used or accepted as normal or average", which implies that there is an abnormal or above/below average, basically acknowledges another solution.
With a mind set like yours, better replace the "Standard" "S" with "Sectarian".
If man had never known a better way, you'd be still painting cave walls.
Nothing personal of course.
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RAT5
You talk rubbish and that's a nice way of putting it.
The SFI said I was the only one who locks the seat belts prior to ditching, as he rolled his eyes and dreamed of the session ending.
What do you do in your car? tie rope around the wife and kids just in case the belts don't work, belt and braces.
As for changing from RA to TA as a memory item on an engine failure, Airline manufacturers are trying to cut down on the amount of things that have to be memorised.
But email Boeing just in case, they might even send you a free pen for your brilliant for sight.
You talk rubbish and that's a nice way of putting it.
The SFI said I was the only one who locks the seat belts prior to ditching, as he rolled his eyes and dreamed of the session ending.
What do you do in your car? tie rope around the wife and kids just in case the belts don't work, belt and braces.
As for changing from RA to TA as a memory item on an engine failure, Airline manufacturers are trying to cut down on the amount of things that have to be memorised.
But email Boeing just in case, they might even send you a free pen for your brilliant for sight.
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The phrase "The blind leading the blind" comes to mind. And the arrogance, nastiness & rigid mind-set of some are starting to show. And then out come the personal attacks.
There are no SOP's to cover every possible situation than can & does arise in aviation. This is an industry that requires flexibility & an ability to think outside the box. There are times to strictly follow SOP's & times when one needs to have the foresight & systems knowledge to go outside the SOP's, in order to ensure a good outcome. It takes airmanship, experience & a flexible mindset in order to know the difference. And every airline I have worked for has had that 'last line of defence' in their manuals. It is also in the Boeing Flight Crew Training manual.
One has to remember that most SOP's are there because someone messed up. In many cases, they tend to bring the operation down to the lowest common denominator. This is often a butt-covering exercise by management in today's environment of 'someone else is always to blame for my mistakes'. They are designed to give the worst pilot in the operation the best possible chance of completing the operation safely, every time they take an aircraft into the air.
Selecting TCAS by memory & locking the shoulder harness for ditching are both examples of thinking outside the box. Tips that others may not have thought of & are worthy of being passed on for us all to think about & consider. Pilots who spend time considering these things often do better when faced with difficult circumstances. If I remember correctly, Sully had spent time considering what he would do & where he would go if he had to put an aircraft down after departure from New York. It served him, his crew & his passengers very well indeed.
However, one must always remember that the buck stops with the flight crew, particularly the captain. And as such, one needs to be in a position where a particular decision or action can be justified in light of the circumstances that were present at the time. Particularly when you go outside SOP's & particularly when it doesn't end well.
There are no SOP's to cover every possible situation than can & does arise in aviation. This is an industry that requires flexibility & an ability to think outside the box. There are times to strictly follow SOP's & times when one needs to have the foresight & systems knowledge to go outside the SOP's, in order to ensure a good outcome. It takes airmanship, experience & a flexible mindset in order to know the difference. And every airline I have worked for has had that 'last line of defence' in their manuals. It is also in the Boeing Flight Crew Training manual.
One has to remember that most SOP's are there because someone messed up. In many cases, they tend to bring the operation down to the lowest common denominator. This is often a butt-covering exercise by management in today's environment of 'someone else is always to blame for my mistakes'. They are designed to give the worst pilot in the operation the best possible chance of completing the operation safely, every time they take an aircraft into the air.
Selecting TCAS by memory & locking the shoulder harness for ditching are both examples of thinking outside the box. Tips that others may not have thought of & are worthy of being passed on for us all to think about & consider. Pilots who spend time considering these things often do better when faced with difficult circumstances. If I remember correctly, Sully had spent time considering what he would do & where he would go if he had to put an aircraft down after departure from New York. It served him, his crew & his passengers very well indeed.
However, one must always remember that the buck stops with the flight crew, particularly the captain. And as such, one needs to be in a position where a particular decision or action can be justified in light of the circumstances that were present at the time. Particularly when you go outside SOP's & particularly when it doesn't end well.
I'm with Sailor.
Some of the WWII ex - Lancaster Bomber "North Atlantic Barons" (ex- Sp33db1rd guys will understand!) couldn't even fly a respectable NDB approach to save their lives - some of them - but pop out of cloud too high, too fast, and not yet properly configured, and say "the runway's over there, Sir" (never forgetting the Sir ! ) and they would straighten up and fly a magificent manual approach to a textbook touchdown.
Surely there is a case for both philosophies ? Computer controlled for the "normal" operations that occur 99% of the time these days, and the North Atlantic Baron capability when the Chips are down and the computer has been hacked by Murphy ?
One of the NAB's once suggested to me that a public transport aeroplane should be capable of being flown by the company's worst pilot on a day when he felt poorly, the one we were on couldn't - in his opinion ( name suppressed to protect me from any litigation, but he was fresh off a British designed and built aeroplane). Surely the same should be said for when the aeroplane feels poorly? Remember, computers never fail, never fail, never fail, tho' sometime suffer from User mishandling, and Murphy is always with us.
Quote .. " when in doubt, lash out ". ( throttles, mixture, pitch, carb.heat all fully forward - fast ). Surely the same applies when one only has 2, or occasionally these days 4, levers to grab ? What's the problem ?
Some of the WWII ex - Lancaster Bomber "North Atlantic Barons" (ex- Sp33db1rd guys will understand!) couldn't even fly a respectable NDB approach to save their lives - some of them - but pop out of cloud too high, too fast, and not yet properly configured, and say "the runway's over there, Sir" (never forgetting the Sir ! ) and they would straighten up and fly a magificent manual approach to a textbook touchdown.
Surely there is a case for both philosophies ? Computer controlled for the "normal" operations that occur 99% of the time these days, and the North Atlantic Baron capability when the Chips are down and the computer has been hacked by Murphy ?
One of the NAB's once suggested to me that a public transport aeroplane should be capable of being flown by the company's worst pilot on a day when he felt poorly, the one we were on couldn't - in his opinion ( name suppressed to protect me from any litigation, but he was fresh off a British designed and built aeroplane). Surely the same should be said for when the aeroplane feels poorly? Remember, computers never fail, never fail, never fail, tho' sometime suffer from User mishandling, and Murphy is always with us.
Quote .. " when in doubt, lash out ". ( throttles, mixture, pitch, carb.heat all fully forward - fast ). Surely the same applies when one only has 2, or occasionally these days 4, levers to grab ? What's the problem ?
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For what little it's worth, in my limited time at the sharp end, in any non-normal situation I was happy enough to use SOP but - having done that - it was never a case of then just sitting back "fat, dumb, and happy".
The last item of any NNCL for me was always "think think think and then think some more".
- What's happening?
- What else can I do?
- How's this working?
- Anything else I need to think of?
- Rinse and repeat until safely on the ground with all donkeys fast asleep.
There was never a point in any non-normal situation where I'd just "sit back and relax" - always something to monitor or do or think ahead to.
The last item of any NNCL for me was always "think think think and then think some more".
- What's happening?
- What else can I do?
- How's this working?
- Anything else I need to think of?
- Rinse and repeat until safely on the ground with all donkeys fast asleep.
There was never a point in any non-normal situation where I'd just "sit back and relax" - always something to monitor or do or think ahead to.
There's a difference between doing "things right" (management) and doing the "right thing" (leadership).
Of course SOPs are important and one of the key ingredients to safe operation. However on certain occasions good pilots need original thought and this is what has been stifled by many airline management and training departments.
Of course SOPs are important and one of the key ingredients to safe operation. However on certain occasions good pilots need original thought and this is what has been stifled by many airline management and training departments.
My day included the Comet crash window problems, and ADF, VOR, backbeam ILS and other interesting approaches which were often the order of the day, all hand flown without the luxury of GPS and automation to touchdown that your generation enjoys.on
What's the reason for locking the shoulder harness? Does your airline not have tension reels on the shoulder straps?
But email Boeing just in case, they might even send you a free pen for your brilliant for sight.
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RAT 5
Your suggestions of adding something more to every procedure is not that benign. Firstly trying to do that you are likely to delay what is essential or forget it altogether. The thinking pilot myth cannot be carried too far. Pilots are made to practice certain situations over and over again to create mental templates and when it becomes a reality they recognise it as a, b, or c template and apply the practiced procedure. I don't think it is safe to be unnecessarily creative in the air. That should only be resorted to when something unusual happens like Hudson river because there is no readymade practiced solution. Last minute thought process that too in abnormal situation may not be correct. Memory item for TCAS is an unnecessary addition to memory items and locking harness for should the original design fails is superfluous. On route engine failure is not like emergency descent. You can turn away from the airway first, hold altitude by allowing the speed to drop to green dot/minimum manoeuvre give a PAN/MAYDAY call and only then descend and do engine fail drill. If at all an aircraft doesn't act appropriately to RA the other aircraft may get reversal or amended RA.
Your suggestions of adding something more to every procedure is not that benign. Firstly trying to do that you are likely to delay what is essential or forget it altogether. The thinking pilot myth cannot be carried too far. Pilots are made to practice certain situations over and over again to create mental templates and when it becomes a reality they recognise it as a, b, or c template and apply the practiced procedure. I don't think it is safe to be unnecessarily creative in the air. That should only be resorted to when something unusual happens like Hudson river because there is no readymade practiced solution. Last minute thought process that too in abnormal situation may not be correct. Memory item for TCAS is an unnecessary addition to memory items and locking harness for should the original design fails is superfluous. On route engine failure is not like emergency descent. You can turn away from the airway first, hold altitude by allowing the speed to drop to green dot/minimum manoeuvre give a PAN/MAYDAY call and only then descend and do engine fail drill. If at all an aircraft doesn't act appropriately to RA the other aircraft may get reversal or amended RA.
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Sitting in the left seat means that the final decision is yours - you are responsible for the safety of your passengers, crew and aircraft. BGO. Why you get paid the big bucks; or in our case not so big as we were an independent outfit with a tightfisted attitude. You get it right - no comment; get it wrong you have to answer for it. BGO again, but that is the nub of all aviation.
Our Chief Pilot was a good egg despite his light blue background; as may be obvious I was of the sort that operated from short runways that went up and down and having a hook helped to stop - before the vertical arrival sort took over. He always said that while in the cruise and starting to get bored perhaps, or at any time , ask yourself the question "What if ?" Ask the co, get his views and discuss. That way in the event of an unforeseen problem or nasty occurring you may just have already considered it. Not a bad philosophy and one that I remember still and use when sailing. The other good egg bit was that he flew all company types of which there were many - from props to heavies - and during his career managed to bend one of each type. As a result he was aware that all pilots are human and as such are capable of making the odd mistake. Having the rudder lock(external, pole with flag ) presented to him after arrival on chocks at destination at night by the chock jock was just one of his better ! Fortunately nothing bent on that one other than the pole in the slipstream.
Thread drift not withstanding some things never change. Unfortunately incidents and accidents will continue to happen due the nature of human frailty, be it from design, materials, maintenance, environmental issues, human error or any of the myriad combinations whereby all the holes in the cheese line up.
Keep on keeping the blue side up always helps !
Our Chief Pilot was a good egg despite his light blue background; as may be obvious I was of the sort that operated from short runways that went up and down and having a hook helped to stop - before the vertical arrival sort took over. He always said that while in the cruise and starting to get bored perhaps, or at any time , ask yourself the question "What if ?" Ask the co, get his views and discuss. That way in the event of an unforeseen problem or nasty occurring you may just have already considered it. Not a bad philosophy and one that I remember still and use when sailing. The other good egg bit was that he flew all company types of which there were many - from props to heavies - and during his career managed to bend one of each type. As a result he was aware that all pilots are human and as such are capable of making the odd mistake. Having the rudder lock(external, pole with flag ) presented to him after arrival on chocks at destination at night by the chock jock was just one of his better ! Fortunately nothing bent on that one other than the pole in the slipstream.
Thread drift not withstanding some things never change. Unfortunately incidents and accidents will continue to happen due the nature of human frailty, be it from design, materials, maintenance, environmental issues, human error or any of the myriad combinations whereby all the holes in the cheese line up.
Keep on keeping the blue side up always helps !