Emirates B777 gear collapse @ DXB?
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And I have cleared many many aircraft to land using the same mantra of 'Land - surface wind' - but the anemometer was not by the TDZ. Indeed in many airports it can be half a runway away from the TDZ. If you go back in the thread to the description of the winds at DXB you will see that they have a sea breeze front at certain times of day when the ambient wind is in a particular direction. So the tower provided surface wind may be totally misleading. I don't know perhaps they have LIDAR to provide a precise TDZ surface wind - but normally giving one surface wind for a 4km runway is a little misleading.
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Ian W
With all respect due to you (and you may well have even described the accident itself), I do struggle so, when I hear/read people saying "...the aircraft did this" or "the aircraft did that" and "...suddenly".
To be "harsh", if what you describe is what happened, I can only point out that the crew were not new to DXB or to the T7.
It was their "time to shine". And it may well be, they didn't.
Nor was the crew "new" to flying. Whilst "the book" states, call check power and verify Go Around thrust is set....and at a positive rate of climb, call positive rate, it "allows" for, shall we call it "discretion" (It is "a book" afterall. Mere pieces of paper. It doesn't actually "fly the plane").
By that I mean, if you don't think/feel/know....then don't call "positive rate". It's at your "discretion". You judge it !
If you think "ah.... it maybe xyz", then don't call it.
I apologise if it sounds "harsh", it is not meant in that way, nor is it direct at you. It's just, I hear "...then suddenly" alot these days !
With all respect due to you (and you may well have even described the accident itself), I do struggle so, when I hear/read people saying "...the aircraft did this" or "the aircraft did that" and "...suddenly".
To be "harsh", if what you describe is what happened, I can only point out that the crew were not new to DXB or to the T7.
It was their "time to shine". And it may well be, they didn't.
Nor was the crew "new" to flying. Whilst "the book" states, call check power and verify Go Around thrust is set....and at a positive rate of climb, call positive rate, it "allows" for, shall we call it "discretion" (It is "a book" afterall. Mere pieces of paper. It doesn't actually "fly the plane").
By that I mean, if you don't think/feel/know....then don't call "positive rate". It's at your "discretion". You judge it !
If you think "ah.... it maybe xyz", then don't call it.
I apologise if it sounds "harsh", it is not meant in that way, nor is it direct at you. It's just, I hear "...then suddenly" alot these days !
Unless there was an engine malfunction the power was not applied probably/possibly because of TOGA button inhibit. I was just hypothesizing (without apportioning error) how an aircraft could apparently have sufficient positive rate of climb for the crew to believe it was safe for gear to be selected up.
Controversial, moi?
I am not 777 guy but in the SFO case pilots stated something similar to what I said and later FAA asked Boeing to have a look at the auto throttle design. I am interested to know why is that? What does it exactly mean?
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that it is the one of the two situations where the Autothrottle system will not 'wake up'.
I'm assuming that like all Boeing the FMA's will annunciate THR HLD!
Actually it's not a 'normal' manoeuvre! It rarely happens on the line compared to taking off.
It should be a normal manoeuvre. It should not be complicated. It is rarely a surprise, knowing the Wx. On this occasion there seems to be a surprise element. Therefore, IMHO, a GA should be a simple profile. Thus it should be a similar to a 'normal' takeoff procedure. Following my philosophy any approach is a GA until TR's are selected. This helps reduce some of surprise element. Why make an easy job difficult. There are 4 basic associated manoeuvres: takeoff, all eng GA, eng fail on takeoff, eng fail GA. The more similar you can make these the more likely the accuracy of the crews performing calmly and accurately. Why oh why did Boeing make the B737 NG all eng GA different from the other 3 in that you accelerate by moving the flap lever. Where did that come from? There is also written that the flaps can start to be retracted at 400agl. What's the rush? Not must, but can be. I have watched a crew doing this at 400' with great stress (SOP's) placed on retracting the flaps ASAP. Guess what; >50% screw ups. WTF is the rush? It's a F15 takeoff starting above the ground. If acceleration on a F15 takeoff is OK at 1000' why change it on a higher stress manoeuvre like a GA? Why close the MCP speed window on a rarely performed possibly unexpected manoeuvre. From a human performance perspective it doesn't seem the smartest idea.
I found GA's were briefed in the same robotic manner as a takeoff brief. PF is a cassette player and PM is yawning. When the Wx predicted a likely GA my brief was was made with a little more emphasis. It then included what would happen next regarding a hold or diversion or 2nd approach. Was there radar or not etc. etc. Both of us touch drilled the GA. There was no doubt who would do what & when. In the heat of the moment I found the B757/767 was the same as a takeoff, so why complicate B737?
I'm assuming that like all Boeing the FMA's will annunciate THR HLD!
Actually it's not a 'normal' manoeuvre! It rarely happens on the line compared to taking off.
It should be a normal manoeuvre. It should not be complicated. It is rarely a surprise, knowing the Wx. On this occasion there seems to be a surprise element. Therefore, IMHO, a GA should be a simple profile. Thus it should be a similar to a 'normal' takeoff procedure. Following my philosophy any approach is a GA until TR's are selected. This helps reduce some of surprise element. Why make an easy job difficult. There are 4 basic associated manoeuvres: takeoff, all eng GA, eng fail on takeoff, eng fail GA. The more similar you can make these the more likely the accuracy of the crews performing calmly and accurately. Why oh why did Boeing make the B737 NG all eng GA different from the other 3 in that you accelerate by moving the flap lever. Where did that come from? There is also written that the flaps can start to be retracted at 400agl. What's the rush? Not must, but can be. I have watched a crew doing this at 400' with great stress (SOP's) placed on retracting the flaps ASAP. Guess what; >50% screw ups. WTF is the rush? It's a F15 takeoff starting above the ground. If acceleration on a F15 takeoff is OK at 1000' why change it on a higher stress manoeuvre like a GA? Why close the MCP speed window on a rarely performed possibly unexpected manoeuvre. From a human performance perspective it doesn't seem the smartest idea.
I found GA's were briefed in the same robotic manner as a takeoff brief. PF is a cassette player and PM is yawning. When the Wx predicted a likely GA my brief was was made with a little more emphasis. It then included what would happen next regarding a hold or diversion or 2nd approach. Was there radar or not etc. etc. Both of us touch drilled the GA. There was no doubt who would do what & when. In the heat of the moment I found the B757/767 was the same as a takeoff, so why complicate B737?
Last edited by RAT 5; 14th Aug 2016 at 09:16.
Originally Posted by Mouse
You cannot legislate for lack of knowledge, training or incompetence.
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Unless it caused by slack, disinterested crew that don't care about their own lives and those of their pax, you certainly can! Legislate more training!
You can take a horse to water, but..............
I understand your sentiment, but...........
You can take a horse to water, but..............
I understand your sentiment, but...........
Retired BA/BY,
I agree 100% with your reasoning about handflying to 20,000ft.
RAT 5,
Also your mindset that every approach was to a go-around until the thrust reversers were selected.
A very good piece of advice I was given early in my flying career was - 'Never let your aircraft go where your mind has not been before.'
You can't be too careful.
I agree 100% with your reasoning about handflying to 20,000ft.
RAT 5,
Also your mindset that every approach was to a go-around until the thrust reversers were selected.
A very good piece of advice I was given early in my flying career was - 'Never let your aircraft go where your mind has not been before.'
You can't be too careful.
I was once told by a UK CAA Training inspector to ensure crews covered the thrust levers and Control Column below MSA during my debrief after a TRE revalidation.
Having now moved to a ULC carrier, I get a bollocking from a line trainer for covering the thrust levers and control column below MSA.
Didn't argue with the LTC, no point, but I found the SOP in question in the Line Training notes, apparently they are worried about cadets freezing and overpowering the flight controls.
This is the problem, the guidance cadets are given is appropriate for their level of experience, the trainers use this guidance for all pilots in a one size fits all training programme.
Useless.
Having now moved to a ULC carrier, I get a bollocking from a line trainer for covering the thrust levers and control column below MSA.
Didn't argue with the LTC, no point, but I found the SOP in question in the Line Training notes, apparently they are worried about cadets freezing and overpowering the flight controls.
This is the problem, the guidance cadets are given is appropriate for their level of experience, the trainers use this guidance for all pilots in a one size fits all training programme.
Useless.
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Given that the precise impact of TOGA switches just pre- or post-ground contact may change one or more times in short time intervals, possibly generating confusion or misunderstandings, and since even a one-off ‘Check Thrust Set’ under AT does not guarantee thrust will not be gone a moment later, how about the following SOPs:
- No manual flying with AT On, i.e. AP Off means AT also Off
- All flying ‘close to the ground’, i.e. eg all flying below 500 ft agl is to be manual (in the above sense, AP and AT both Off) in all flight phases including GA. Only exception allowed for Cat III landing, but even then in case of GA disconnect both AP and AT
- Gear up only above 500 ft agl
I realise late gear up may hinder initial climb performance, but on the other hand calling gear up on the only evidence of positive climb or ROC when close to the ground leaves one exposed if ROC becomes negative right after…
- No manual flying with AT On, i.e. AP Off means AT also Off
- All flying ‘close to the ground’, i.e. eg all flying below 500 ft agl is to be manual (in the above sense, AP and AT both Off) in all flight phases including GA. Only exception allowed for Cat III landing, but even then in case of GA disconnect both AP and AT
- Gear up only above 500 ft agl
I realise late gear up may hinder initial climb performance, but on the other hand calling gear up on the only evidence of positive climb or ROC when close to the ground leaves one exposed if ROC becomes negative right after…
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'Never let your aircraft go where your mind has not been before.'
It's been quoted many times by one of the senior NTSB investigators on Air Crash Investigation and should be on the door of every training dept & crew room.
Didn't argue with the LTC, no point, but I found the SOP in question in the Line Training notes, apparently they are worried about cadets freezing and overpowering the flight controls.
This is the problem, the guidance cadets are given is appropriate for their level of experience, the trainers use this guidance for all pilots in a one size fits all training programme.
Useless.
Oh dear: sounds like another case of SOP's over-rides airmanship. I've worked only for Boeing airlines. There's not a whole load of difference between B757/767/738. However, in 8 airlines with 8 different CP's there were 8 different ways to do the same thing; and definitely some better than others. Some methods incorporated more airmanship. Some incorporated more rigid SOP's and less discretion. I learnt/was told that some ways were wrong, not allowed, dangerous = rigid SOP's. Some ways were general guidance and airmanship/best practice encouraged. What amazed was the rigid SOP brigade advocated use of airmanship. I remain confused but relaxed in my retirement.
It's been quoted many times by one of the senior NTSB investigators on Air Crash Investigation and should be on the door of every training dept & crew room.
Didn't argue with the LTC, no point, but I found the SOP in question in the Line Training notes, apparently they are worried about cadets freezing and overpowering the flight controls.
This is the problem, the guidance cadets are given is appropriate for their level of experience, the trainers use this guidance for all pilots in a one size fits all training programme.
Useless.
Oh dear: sounds like another case of SOP's over-rides airmanship. I've worked only for Boeing airlines. There's not a whole load of difference between B757/767/738. However, in 8 airlines with 8 different CP's there were 8 different ways to do the same thing; and definitely some better than others. Some methods incorporated more airmanship. Some incorporated more rigid SOP's and less discretion. I learnt/was told that some ways were wrong, not allowed, dangerous = rigid SOP's. Some ways were general guidance and airmanship/best practice encouraged. What amazed was the rigid SOP brigade advocated use of airmanship. I remain confused but relaxed in my retirement.
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I don't disagree Rat 5 that a GA should be a 'normal' manoeuvre... But by virtue of it being rarely flown it is NOT.
The thing I saw being screwed up the most, from my TRI/TRE days once upon a time ago, was the Go Around!!!!
And I do agree with you that you should be in GA mindset until the TRs are deployed, and I also second the touch drills which is exactly as I do for the GA brief! As an aside the last two GAs I flew were actually very unexpected Baulked Landings during the flare - both times due to huge wind shifts but the brief that we did held good!
The thing I saw being screwed up the most, from my TRI/TRE days once upon a time ago, was the Go Around!!!!
And I do agree with you that you should be in GA mindset until the TRs are deployed, and I also second the touch drills which is exactly as I do for the GA brief! As an aside the last two GAs I flew were actually very unexpected Baulked Landings during the flare - both times due to huge wind shifts but the brief that we did held good!
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Actually it's not a 'normal' manoeuvre! It rarely happens on the line compared to taking off. Go Arounds are often also poorly briefed compared to a take-off safety brief; if they are briefed at all!
And not knowing what you fly VONKLUFFEN but a take-off on my current type may be 180 tonnes heavier than a go around at max landing weight; The performance differences exacerbated by generally taking off with reduced thrust and going around with full attainable thrust! Makes the machine a TOTALLY different beast!
The Go Around also may come at the end of a tiring ULR 15 hour sector. Just another wee difference...
And not knowing what you fly VONKLUFFEN but a take-off on my current type may be 180 tonnes heavier than a go around at max landing weight; The performance differences exacerbated by generally taking off with reduced thrust and going around with full attainable thrust! Makes the machine a TOTALLY different beast!
The Go Around also may come at the end of a tiring ULR 15 hour sector. Just another wee difference...
Hi White:
Yep performance is different. Don't take it literally.
When I say normal I'm thinking as part of something when we go from A-B. Takeoff, climb,descent,app and GA. And that's what happens, GA is never briefed properly assuming it won't happen. It can and eventually will.
The rest should be easy...if no rush is present. If it is , that IS the beast you are taking about...
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that it is the one of the two situations where the Autothrottle system will not 'wake up'.
I'm assuming that like all Boeing the FMA's will annunciate THR HLD!
Actually it's not a 'normal' manoeuvre! It rarely happens on the line compared to taking off.
It should be a normal manoeuvre. It should not be complicated. It is rarely a surprise, knowing the Wx. On this occasion there seems to be a surprise element. Therefore, IMHO, a GA should be a simple profile. Thus it should be a similar to a 'normal' takeoff procedure. Following my philosophy any approach is a GA until TR's are selected. This helps reduce some of surprise element. Why make an easy job difficult. There are 4 basic associated manoeuvres: takeoff, all eng GA, eng fail on takeoff, eng fail GA. The more similar you can make these the more likely the accuracy of the crews performing calmly and accurately. Why oh why did Boeing make the B737 NG all eng GA different from the other 3 in that you accelerate by moving the flap lever. Where did that come from? There is also written that the flaps can start to be retracted at 400agl. What's the rush? Not must, but can be. I have watched a crew doing this at 400' with great stress (SOP's) placed on retracting the flaps ASAP. Guess what; >50 screw ups. WTF is the rush? It's a F15 takeoff starting above the ground. If acceleration on a F15 takeoff is OK at 1000' why change it on a higher stress manoeuvre like a GA? Why close the MCP speed window on a rarely performed possibly unexpected manoeuvre. From a human performance perspective it doesn't seem the smartest idea.
I found GA's were briefed in the same robotic manner as a takeoff brief. PF is a cassette player and PM is yawning. When the Wx predicted a likely GA my brief was was made with a little more emphasis. It then included what would happen next regarding a hold or diversion or 2nd approach. Was there radar or not etc. etc. Both of us touch drilled the GA. There was no doubt who would do what & when. In the heat of the moment I found the B757/767 was the same as a takeoff, so why complicate B737?
I'm assuming that like all Boeing the FMA's will annunciate THR HLD!
Actually it's not a 'normal' manoeuvre! It rarely happens on the line compared to taking off.
It should be a normal manoeuvre. It should not be complicated. It is rarely a surprise, knowing the Wx. On this occasion there seems to be a surprise element. Therefore, IMHO, a GA should be a simple profile. Thus it should be a similar to a 'normal' takeoff procedure. Following my philosophy any approach is a GA until TR's are selected. This helps reduce some of surprise element. Why make an easy job difficult. There are 4 basic associated manoeuvres: takeoff, all eng GA, eng fail on takeoff, eng fail GA. The more similar you can make these the more likely the accuracy of the crews performing calmly and accurately. Why oh why did Boeing make the B737 NG all eng GA different from the other 3 in that you accelerate by moving the flap lever. Where did that come from? There is also written that the flaps can start to be retracted at 400agl. What's the rush? Not must, but can be. I have watched a crew doing this at 400' with great stress (SOP's) placed on retracting the flaps ASAP. Guess what; >50 screw ups. WTF is the rush? It's a F15 takeoff starting above the ground. If acceleration on a F15 takeoff is OK at 1000' why change it on a higher stress manoeuvre like a GA? Why close the MCP speed window on a rarely performed possibly unexpected manoeuvre. From a human performance perspective it doesn't seem the smartest idea.
I found GA's were briefed in the same robotic manner as a takeoff brief. PF is a cassette player and PM is yawning. When the Wx predicted a likely GA my brief was was made with a little more emphasis. It then included what would happen next regarding a hold or diversion or 2nd approach. Was there radar or not etc. etc. Both of us touch drilled the GA. There was no doubt who would do what & when. In the heat of the moment I found the B757/767 was the same as a takeoff, so why complicate B737?
FCOM 2
And thx Rat, as you said why the rush!!! Damm!
Last edited by VONKLUFFEN; 13th Aug 2016 at 23:43. Reason: Include extra comment
White Knight says that when he was an IRE/TRE he saw many go-arounds mishandled on the simulator. That was my experience too but usually when the GA was unexpected, not during a ‘normal’ IR test when the trainee was expecting a GA after an ILS approach.
I believe a GA is a normal manoeuvre so far as aircraft handling goes – after all it is only a matter of changing from a descent to a climb even if it is at low level. The things that tend to catch people out during line flying are that (a) it is unexpected, (b) it is at light weight therefore the ROC is high, and (c) it might involve following a rather more difficult flight path than usual. If the GA is conducted with an engine out, the ROC is less but (c) there is the additional need for careful application of rudder.
However, the basic control of the aircraft ought still to be straight forward. I have seen too many pilots applying power in an overly aggressive way and then being caught out by the sudden pitch change from underslung engines, difficulty in applying the correct amount of rudder in the asymmetric case, and the high ROC causing them to overshoot the cleared altitude. All these problems can be controlled by applying a firm but judicious amount of power at the start of the GA.
But above all, I strongly support RAT 5’s contention that all approaches should be flown with a GA in mind right up to the point where reverse thrust is selected. I cannot emphasise too strongly that, at all times, one must have a well thought out ‘Plan B’ - whether it be the RTO on take-off, pre-thought out en-route alternates, the diversion alternate (and the initial route to get there) or a go-around on EVERY approach.
Thus, I would add to what I said before about ‘never letting your aircraft go where your mind had not been before’ by saying ALWAYS have a well thought out ‘Plan B’.
I used to fly old fashioned round-dial aircraft with only basic auto-throttles so I can’t comment on TOGA and all the other automatics you all have today. But I guess you still only have to press two buttons to make it return to a normal basic hand-flown aircraft!
I believe a GA is a normal manoeuvre so far as aircraft handling goes – after all it is only a matter of changing from a descent to a climb even if it is at low level. The things that tend to catch people out during line flying are that (a) it is unexpected, (b) it is at light weight therefore the ROC is high, and (c) it might involve following a rather more difficult flight path than usual. If the GA is conducted with an engine out, the ROC is less but (c) there is the additional need for careful application of rudder.
However, the basic control of the aircraft ought still to be straight forward. I have seen too many pilots applying power in an overly aggressive way and then being caught out by the sudden pitch change from underslung engines, difficulty in applying the correct amount of rudder in the asymmetric case, and the high ROC causing them to overshoot the cleared altitude. All these problems can be controlled by applying a firm but judicious amount of power at the start of the GA.
But above all, I strongly support RAT 5’s contention that all approaches should be flown with a GA in mind right up to the point where reverse thrust is selected. I cannot emphasise too strongly that, at all times, one must have a well thought out ‘Plan B’ - whether it be the RTO on take-off, pre-thought out en-route alternates, the diversion alternate (and the initial route to get there) or a go-around on EVERY approach.
Thus, I would add to what I said before about ‘never letting your aircraft go where your mind had not been before’ by saying ALWAYS have a well thought out ‘Plan B’.
I used to fly old fashioned round-dial aircraft with only basic auto-throttles so I can’t comment on TOGA and all the other automatics you all have today. But I guess you still only have to press two buttons to make it return to a normal basic hand-flown aircraft!
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Go Arounds should not be dangerous and should especially be part of the repertoire of any commercial pilot. Not only practiced in the sims regularly but perhaps it's time to practice them in real planes (without passengers) on a regular basis .
Nobody does touch and go training anymore in real planes on a regular basis?
Badly done they result in crashes. This one was badly done:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China_Airlines_Flight_676
This is much better:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4M2fZ8CfDLk
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xg4SZc7zDNs
Should be a piece of cake. And if it's not it should be.
Nobody does touch and go training anymore in real planes on a regular basis?
Badly done they result in crashes. This one was badly done:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China_Airlines_Flight_676
This is much better:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4M2fZ8CfDLk
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xg4SZc7zDNs
Should be a piece of cake. And if it's not it should be.
Last edited by armchairpilot94116; 14th Aug 2016 at 16:59.
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Actually, both Emirates and Qatar Airways regularly conduct "touch and go" training sorties. The latter at the now old Doha Airport. The former frequently at Dubai World Central and Ras Al Khaimah.
The erstwhile "source" websites (theqatar and theek) even post them on the day they've occurred.
The erstwhile "source" websites (theqatar and theek) even post them on the day they've occurred.
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Any modern aeroplane that has a serviceable autothrottle that will not wake up when the aeroplane is 30kts below Vmin is not "fine".