Emirates B777 gear collapse @ DXB?

[Julio747]

Errmmm...

Originally Posted by suninmyeyes

If the aircraft reached 150 feet in the bounce and the attempted goaround then the PNF was probably justified in calling "positive rate". One of the characteristics of the 777 is that although the landing flare is done with only one hand the rotate and goaround manoeuvre is done with both hands. Anyone who has seen lots of go-arounds on a 777 simulator will note the handling pilot gives a quick push on the TOGA switches and then pulls up to 15 degrees using both hands and looks at the PFD. The thrust levers then (should) go forward on their own. In the olden days the good old flight engineer made sure they did. These days the P2 very rarely backs them up. In the accident situation the non handling pilot was probably bringing the flap in to 20 and calling positive climb and raising the gear and then looking for the FMA indications and then wondering what was happening. Pitch and power saves the day however looking for and calling out the FMAs uses up valuable time, especially if you have not got the FMAs you are expecting (Thrust Toga Toga) The Asiana accident and now probably this one involved manual flying and an expectation of autothrottle to provide the required thrust.

I don't think anyone said they bounced 150 ft. If that source is valid, one has to assume the climbed there albeit briefly. Without bouncing.

The same source claims the wheels were down. That doesn't really add up looking at the wreckage.

But a toga at low level (bounce) and pitch up 15 degrees is likely to end in a tail strike. SOP at low level is toga thrust and maintain 5 degrees till you are out of there.

Another source says they bounced, tried a GA and failed (with wheels up, or on their way up).

So who to believe?

Hard landing (WS), bounced, wheels up and messed up the GA. Or no landing (WS?), and messed up the go around (wheels still down).

Without knowing what happened for sure, it seems churlish to speculate. Too much conflicting information from "inside sources" that we second guess the wrong scenario.

That said, we can take some lessons (even from erroneous scenarios).

If you push toga, make sure that you have toga. And if you bounced before you call GA, leave the wheels down.

[portmanteau]

This might have helped but....

Might not be news to others but I only recently discovered that if you run LiveATC with Flightradar you can see approximately where the transmissions to and from the aircraft are made. Tried the same thing with archived outputs including 521 crash only to find that Flightradar plays back at X 12 so cannot be matched to ATC. If anyone else wants to investigate further, today is probably the last day you can replay 3rd august on Flightradar.

[PukinDog]

Originally Posted by suninmyeyes

If the aircraft reached 150 feet in the bounce and the attempted goaround then the PNF was probably justified in calling "positive rate". One of the characteristics of the 777 is that although the landing flare is done with only one hand the rotate and goaround manoeuvre is done with both hands. Anyone who has seen lots of go-arounds on a 777 simulator will note the handling pilot gives a quick push on the TOGA switches and then pulls up to 15 degrees using both hands and looks at the PFD. The thrust levers then (should) go forward on their own. In the olden days the good old flight engineer made sure they did. These days the P2 very rarely backs them up. In the accident situation the non handling pilot was probably bringing the flap in to 20 and calling positive climb and raising the gear and then looking for the FMA indications and then wondering what was happening. Pitch and power saves the day however looking for and calling out the FMAs uses up valuable time, especially if you have not got the FMAs you are expecting (Thrust Toga Toga) The Asiana accident and now probably this one involved manual flying and an expectation of autothrottle to provide the required thrust.

A quick push of a toga button then a pull on the yoke with both hands while focusing on pitch w/o any visual verification or confirmation by either pilot using the engine readouts that GA thrust is being produced is a major breakdown in fundamentals. No engine performance = no climb performance. It would be like not checking T/O power while taking off, and I believe most SOPs call for doing the same during a GA. FMAs and auto-settings to go up, up and away are rendered meaningless without it so ensuring/confirming thrust is being developed/increasing is as high a priority as pitching up. Pitch up without thrust, you're boned. The prospect that thrust verification by engine readouts during a GA wouldn't be incorporated and prioritized, or if auto is lost both pilots not recognizing and reverting to manual means to achieve it, is disconcerting.

[Capi_Cafre']

Wouldn't the failure of the thrust levers to move under the PF's hand when TOGA was selected have provided instant feedback?

[Lost in Saigon]

Wouldn't the failure of the thrust levers to move under the PF's hand when TOGA was selected have provided instant feedback?

Only if he actually had his hand on the thrust levers. I see too many pilots think they need two hands on the control wheel.

[Judd]

Only if he actually had his hand on the thrust levers. I see too many pilots think they need two hands on the control wheel.

The two hands on the wheel at rotation so beloved of Boeing pilots, goes back in history where it was purely started by some operators as a symbolic movement to indicate V1 had been attained and to avoid the temptation of a startled pilot to abort after V1 while his hand was still on the throttles.

Symbolism has no place in the cockpit but nowadays if the PF does a one hand rotation (happens all the time with an Airbus side stick of course), in a Boeing all hell breaks lose in the simulator with most checkies. One excuse given by pilots who have spent their entire airline career using two-handed rotations, is that a one handed rotation tends to pull down the wheel and thus cause an unwanted turn. Even if that happened momentarily it is easily corrected.

The current tendency for the PF to press TOGA in a GA and rely on the autothrottles to do their thing, without keeping his hand on the thrust levers to ensure required thrust is set, needs to be reviewed - especially if it is found to be a factor in the Emirates go-around crash. After all, it is nothing more than basic airmanship. There have been at least two accidents in the distant past that I recall, (one a 737 and the other an A310?)where an autothrottle clutch motor was defective and only one throttle went forward for the commanded high thrust level. In both cases the crew failed to take instant corrective action and the aircraft rolled and went in.

[gatbusdriver]

1 " GO AROUND FLAPS 20 "

2 " POSITIVE CLIMB/RATE "

3 " GEAR UP "

1 happened for a reason (if it was called). Bounced landing? Minor/significant windshear?

2 With 145 kts (ish) Vref you can easily establish a positive rate of climb, so the question is was TOGA hit and was the thrust supplied.

3 As PF this is an automatic response whether positive climb is established or not (or not for the V1 cut when PM forgets to call it!)


Regards

[Capn Bloggs]

goes back in history where it was purely started by some operators as a symbolic movement to indicate V1 had been attained and to avoid the temptation of a startled pilot to abort after V1 while his hand was still on the throttles.

Sounds like an entirely reasonable idea to me.

Rotate with both hands and after the gear is selected up place one hand back on throttles. Pretty simple, I would have thought. "Encourages" you to keep it in trim, too.

[em3ry]

So they assumed they had thrust because they were climbing and by the time they realized otherwise it was too late?

[Metro man]

Would two hands on the control wheel be a hang over from the early days of large transport aircraft where you needed the strength of both arms to get the nose off the ground ?

[xhamster]

So much discussion on other threads regarding EK rosters and fatigued crew and now a 2nd accident happens involving a UAE carrier and the chatter amongst pilots is on auto-throttle and TOGA buttons...are we missing the bigger picture here? The investigations may prove pilot error or system error but it won't quantify the effect of fatigue on the crew to trap the error. EK and FZ pilots have been screaming fatigue and **** rosters for years and nothing has improved. Now two accidents have occured. Fatigue is always a factor. Every airline in UAE has fatiguing rosters. It's the way the entire nation likes to operate. Abuse your workers. So f*** you management for not making any improvements.

[Capn Bloggs]

Originally Posted by Bugsmasher

But at the end of the day the automation is only there to assist the crew in doing what the crew want the aircraft to do because the crew is in charge, not the automation.

This is getting a bit too off-topic and philosophical for my small brain.

No it isn't, actually. Increasingly, pilots are becoming disconnected from their machines: not enough Sim training, poor design, and refusal of the powers in charge to let them hand-fly. This is not simply a case of "fundamentally it's the responsibility of the crew to fly the aircraft correctly", which is of course very true. But if we aren't given the training and currency to maintain the skills we need in these sort of situations, then it's not our fault alone. Incredibly, it appears that not even Boeing has a procedure for a Go Around after a bad bounce in all it's manuals. What hope has your average line driver got to get it right when it happens perhaps once in a lifetime?

[BugSmasher1960]

Originally Posted by Capn Bloggs

No it isn't, actually. Increasingly, pilots are becoming disconnected from their machines: not enough Sim training, poor design, and refusal of the powers in charge to let them hand-fly. This is not simply a case of "fundamentally it's the responsibility of the crew to fly the aircraft correctly", which is of course very true. But if we aren't given the training and currency to maintain the skills we need in these sort of situations, then it's not our fault alone. Incredibly, it appears that not even Boeing has a procedure for a Go Around after a bad bounce in all it's manuals. What hope has your average line driver got to get it right when it happens perhaps once in a lifetime?

Very interesting post - thanks.

Would most agree that in terms of responsibility, it falls somewhere between pilots and their airlines though? (as opposed to "somewhere between the pilots and the automation").

Follow-up question Mr. Speaker. In GA aircraft - after a bad bounce - pretty much the immediate priority is to get the power on (the more the better) - is that not also the case with the heavy metal (a little simplistic I know, but it's starting to look like this was perhaps the critical thing that wasn't done here).

[BuzzBox]

Originally Posted by BugSmasher1960
In the case of this crash then - if spoilers were auto-armed and deployed when the WOW switch tripped - but thrust levers didn't auto-advance when TOGA was pressed (because of the WOW being tripped) - then I'm wondering if that would mean that the spoilers would still have been deployed when they tried to go-around? (assuming sufficient excess energy to get airborne again, for some reason).

According to the B777 technical training manual (my emphasis):

"During landing, the auto speedbrake operates when all these
conditions occur:

* The main landing gear is on the ground
* The speedbrake lever is in the ARMED position
* Both left and right thrust resolver angles are not at the
takeoff position
* Both thrust resolver angle signals are valid.

Before landing, the pilots arm the speedbrake lever. During the
flare, the pilots move both thrust levers to idle. At touch down,
the auto speedbrake actuator fully extends the speedbrake
lever. This commands all spoilers to fully deploy.

The auto speedbrake retracts to the DOWN position if any of the
above conditions changes after the auto speedbrake has fully
extended."

Consequently, the speedbrakes should retract as soon as the aircraft becomes airborne again, even if the thrust levers are not at the take-off position.

[maligno]

1.- anybody knows why Captain Ibrahim Alseouni had only 7000 hrs?
Being staff number 202xxx, how is that possible?
I estimate not less than 17 years in EK.

Another UAE prominent family Golden Boy?

2.- EK Media centre

http://www.emirates.com/media-centre...rd-august-2016

OPERATIONAL INCIDENT??? Aircraft crashed and burnt and it is an OPERATIONAL INCIDENT???

get out of there guys, you might be the next one...and you do not know it, because fatigue don't let you think about it...

[maligno]

Hmmm, Sheik Ahmed failed to clarify that too...If the Captain has OVER 7000 hours Total, why he did not mention more precisely the total flying hours from both Pilots?

Everybody knows that EK has highly UNEXPERIENCED FO's with less than 2000 hours, flying wide bodies...scary

[sceh]

If they have over 7000 hours but, say, 7500 or 8000, the release would say 'over 7500'. It is a bit like these people who say ' we are now in the top 6 companies..'. In other words, they are sixth. In other words, these guys have 7000 hours only.
The release says the y are cooperating with the authorities - I should hope so since they are one and the same.
The end result of this will be to blame Boeing, the weather and the co-pilot. Simple

[Visual Procedures]

Maligno, you estimate wrong. By a long way. 11 is the answer you're looking for.

Full Wings is on to something..

It appears there were some GAs by other aircraft prior to the event itself. A tailwind on approach turning to a headwind on landing is a positive shear and leads to increasing IAS, the auto throttle reducing power and a tendency to get high and/or float..

The flightradar data shows a long flare as they encounter the positive shear. Perhaps they realise they are coming to the end of the tdz and give it away, or perhaps whilst trying to get her on the ground they hit nose wheel first causing the bounce..

Positive climb, (150'? possible..) gear up.. Now they've gone back up into the negative shear.. IAS drops, the aircraft starts to sink..

[maligno]

11 years??? NO WAY! this would be my 11th Anniversary in HELL (EK)

and i was 3xxxxx

This Habibi has been at least 17 years in EK...but, why only OVER 7000hrs?

[Snyggapa]

I think 'over 7000' is a reasonable statement. It is saying in effect that the FO was not a newly qualified pilot, the likelihood is that the captain had more but that doesn't need saying as this is a 'good news' message about how well they did.

Shame they forgot to pay credit the firefighter who lost his life, but I guess that would have spoiled the 'good news'