Emirates B777 gear collapse @ DXB?
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I teach bounce recovery training in the 777 at my carrier.
1. Re-establish a "landing attitude" (~4 to 5 degrees pitch) to prepare for a possible second contact with the runway.
For such situations, i suggest (not teach) to apply the GPWS "pull up" warning procedure. Because it's something we train quite often and will save your day.
2. MANUALLY advance the thrust levers to GA thrust limit
3. When airborne and climbing, select TOGA
The rest is as per normal GA.
Of particular note is that a SINGLE PUSH of TOGA on any G/A commands a thrust that will give you "approximately 2000'/min VSI) for passenger comfort. With both engines running, you have to hit TOGA twice to get true G/A thrust.
For such threatening situations, what i often suggest is:
Don't go for modes, go for moves.
Move the levers and yokes yourself, you can check the automation/FMA later
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Cazalet33
Yours is of the most valuable sentences for people who understand, on this thread.
Reminds me a bit of the AF flight at CDG some time ago that barely escaped... They did a G/A w/o moving the thrust levers to the TOGA position. Went down on the ILS to 63'. But escaped. NO SUCH LUCK this time.
Yours is of the most valuable sentences for people who understand, on this thread.
Reminds me a bit of the AF flight at CDG some time ago that barely escaped... They did a G/A w/o moving the thrust levers to the TOGA position. Went down on the ILS to 63'. But escaped. NO SUCH LUCK this time.
Could you pls share date and AC registration of AF snafu at CDG ? Interested to see if BEA reported it. tnx. fly safe.
There is a lot of stuff on here which seems unlikely as has already been pointed out. There are however some things which seem pretty factual.
The captain was local with 7000 hours (sounds ok but probably a newish captain). The first officer was a Qantas guy on loan with again lots of hours, one year at Emirates (so in reality not too much 777 time).
The weather was 49c with windshear and low QNH all affecting performance. The position of the gear, communication etc. indicate a go-around was being attempted. Everyone got off alive, which shows how solid Boeing build them and what a great job the cabin crew did given the pictorial evidence.
Go-arounds are one of the worst flown manoeuvers in airline flying. Autothrottle logic as a contributing factor has caught people out on several occasions, for example Turkish in Amsterdam and Asiana in SFO. There does seem to be a possible scenario developing.
The captain was local with 7000 hours (sounds ok but probably a newish captain). The first officer was a Qantas guy on loan with again lots of hours, one year at Emirates (so in reality not too much 777 time).
The weather was 49c with windshear and low QNH all affecting performance. The position of the gear, communication etc. indicate a go-around was being attempted. Everyone got off alive, which shows how solid Boeing build them and what a great job the cabin crew did given the pictorial evidence.
Go-arounds are one of the worst flown manoeuvers in airline flying. Autothrottle logic as a contributing factor has caught people out on several occasions, for example Turkish in Amsterdam and Asiana in SFO. There does seem to be a possible scenario developing.
Good post Glofish. Fly the airplane.
The rumor I heard from insiders was that it was a complete handling f@# up.
That, combined with the not-so-stellar performance of a straight -300 and the high pressure altitude, did them in.
But once in a while these things happen, bottom line is that everyone got out in one piece. Good work by the cabin crew.
Real sad the firefighter died.
And for the pax carrying their carry-on off the plane, we'd better get used to it, fact of life.
The rumor I heard from insiders was that it was a complete handling f@# up.
That, combined with the not-so-stellar performance of a straight -300 and the high pressure altitude, did them in.
But once in a while these things happen, bottom line is that everyone got out in one piece. Good work by the cabin crew.
Real sad the firefighter died.
And for the pax carrying their carry-on off the plane, we'd better get used to it, fact of life.
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The time period we are talking about lasts only 55 seconds.
521 came on to the Tower frequency 13 seconds after tape started. (as shown on video)
At start + 14 Twr acknowledges.....plan to vacate at M9
At start + 20 521 acks
At start + 26 Twr clears aircraft to land
At start + 32 521 acks
At start + 35 565 checks in with Twr at 6 miles
At start + 38 Twr acks...plan to vacate at M9
At start + 42 565 acks
At start + 46 Twr tells 521 continue straight climb to 4000 feet
At start + 48 521 acks
At start + 1 min 08 secs Twr tells 565 to go around
The crash landing is underway by now. The transmissions can be clearly heard and match the sub-titles. The only time in which 521 might have made a go around call
would have been in the gap between the end of 565's ack at + 42 and Twr's climb call to 521 at + 46. 2 to 3 seconds at most. There was no such call nor any indication of simultaneous transmissions. One conclusion must be that Twr saw some reason not to continue to land and wasted no words or time in telling aircraft to climb away.
521 came on to the Tower frequency 13 seconds after tape started. (as shown on video)
At start + 14 Twr acknowledges.....plan to vacate at M9
At start + 20 521 acks
At start + 26 Twr clears aircraft to land
At start + 32 521 acks
At start + 35 565 checks in with Twr at 6 miles
At start + 38 Twr acks...plan to vacate at M9
At start + 42 565 acks
At start + 46 Twr tells 521 continue straight climb to 4000 feet
At start + 48 521 acks
At start + 1 min 08 secs Twr tells 565 to go around
The crash landing is underway by now. The transmissions can be clearly heard and match the sub-titles. The only time in which 521 might have made a go around call
would have been in the gap between the end of 565's ack at + 42 and Twr's climb call to 521 at + 46. 2 to 3 seconds at most. There was no such call nor any indication of simultaneous transmissions. One conclusion must be that Twr saw some reason not to continue to land and wasted no words or time in telling aircraft to climb away.
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Hi, PORTMANTEAU
1.- If the records have passed some kind of "supervision" of the UAE authorities I'm not so confident on the real contents.
2.- When I mention the "timing", I mean the TOTAL timeline, from that "second zero" to the last crew member to abandon the hull. I think it could be a good amount of minutes...
Coming from military, and having served in SAR all of my career (chopper, navy), I've been in close relation with people in extreme conditions (desperation, anger, resignation, etc) and the EVAC video dosen't seem to me to reflect an EXTREME PANIC inside the a/c.
I guess things weren't "that wrong" for pax or they couldn't take a real idea of what was happening.
There is one sure-thing: the CC were absolutely aware of what they had to do. And they did "hats off".
1.- If the records have passed some kind of "supervision" of the UAE authorities I'm not so confident on the real contents.
2.- When I mention the "timing", I mean the TOTAL timeline, from that "second zero" to the last crew member to abandon the hull. I think it could be a good amount of minutes...
Coming from military, and having served in SAR all of my career (chopper, navy), I've been in close relation with people in extreme conditions (desperation, anger, resignation, etc) and the EVAC video dosen't seem to me to reflect an EXTREME PANIC inside the a/c.
I guess things weren't "that wrong" for pax or they couldn't take a real idea of what was happening.
There is one sure-thing: the CC were absolutely aware of what they had to do. And they did "hats off".
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A sidenote after listening to the tapes:
The words "delay not determined" should be removed from the ATC vocabulatory. It ranks up there with pilots "due to operational reasons we have to, etc, etc.
If there is a crash on the runway, say so. If the ATC radar is down, say so. If will save a number of calls asking for information.
The words "delay not determined" should be removed from the ATC vocabulatory. It ranks up there with pilots "due to operational reasons we have to, etc, etc.
If there is a crash on the runway, say so. If the ATC radar is down, say so. If will save a number of calls asking for information.
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guadaMB, You are entitled to your opinion of course, freedom of speech and all that but it is disappointing that you and several others assume automatically that events will be covered up and reports fabricated. I can assure you that Emirates, the airport and the UAE aviation authority are totally professional and will investigate and report completely in accordance with ICAO procedures as they have done many times in the past. Any suggestion that they will not is absolutely out of order.
formationdriver:
comment and full report on 2011 Air France B777 event can be accessed at
picma.org.uk/?q=content/2011-b772-cat-3-loss-control-paris-france.
But the original post 326 (by swish266) gets it the wrong way round. It states "Yours is of the most valuable sentences for people who understand, on this thread. Reminds me a bit of the AF flight at CDG some time ago that barely escaped... They did a G/A w/o moving the thrust levers to the TOGA position. Went down on the ILS to 63'. But escaped. NO SUCH LUCK this time., that Captain as PF DID push the thrust levers all"
In fact it was the reverse. The Captain (PF) did not press the TOGA switches but pushed the autothrust disconnect buttons instead. He fully advanced the thrust levers and pulled on the control column. However the autopilot remained engaged and coupled to the glideslope. Consequently the aircraft accelerated with increasing nose down pitch.
The PNF initially concentrated on the G/A reconfiguration, and the relief crew member called the pitch discrepancy from correct G/A attitude. Both pilots then applied nose-up control inputs, pulling 1.84G and disconnecting the autopilot at a minimum Radio Altitude of 63 ft. achieving a maximum pitch angle of 19 deg.
Subsequently the Captain applied nose down inputs while the F/O applied nose up and a second high G oscillation occurred. The gear was finally selected up some 25 seconds after the initial g-around call, at a height of 870ft. and the aircraft positioned for a second Cat 3 autoland.
comment and full report on 2011 Air France B777 event can be accessed at
picma.org.uk/?q=content/2011-b772-cat-3-loss-control-paris-france.
But the original post 326 (by swish266) gets it the wrong way round. It states "Yours is of the most valuable sentences for people who understand, on this thread. Reminds me a bit of the AF flight at CDG some time ago that barely escaped... They did a G/A w/o moving the thrust levers to the TOGA position. Went down on the ILS to 63'. But escaped. NO SUCH LUCK this time., that Captain as PF DID push the thrust levers all"
In fact it was the reverse. The Captain (PF) did not press the TOGA switches but pushed the autothrust disconnect buttons instead. He fully advanced the thrust levers and pulled on the control column. However the autopilot remained engaged and coupled to the glideslope. Consequently the aircraft accelerated with increasing nose down pitch.
The PNF initially concentrated on the G/A reconfiguration, and the relief crew member called the pitch discrepancy from correct G/A attitude. Both pilots then applied nose-up control inputs, pulling 1.84G and disconnecting the autopilot at a minimum Radio Altitude of 63 ft. achieving a maximum pitch angle of 19 deg.
Subsequently the Captain applied nose down inputs while the F/O applied nose up and a second high G oscillation occurred. The gear was finally selected up some 25 seconds after the initial g-around call, at a height of 870ft. and the aircraft positioned for a second Cat 3 autoland.
Last edited by slast; 5th Aug 2016 at 12:08.
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Couple of things to point out, that seem glaringly obvious to me.
A modern jet airliner, adequately handled, should never strike the ground with the gear in any position other than down and locked. I have no idea if that was the case here, but purely from the damage it seems it was not?
A 777, in any configuration, has sufficient thrust in all certified environmental conditions, to climb away from a runway. There has been no mention of lack of available engine power.
We are all human. Even the finest of aviators have bad days! I will be extremely surprised if human factors are not a major contributor here.
There but for the grace of God.
Being the carrier it is, it's difficult not to wonder whether other issues may also have played a part, and may continue into the investigation?
A modern jet airliner, adequately handled, should never strike the ground with the gear in any position other than down and locked. I have no idea if that was the case here, but purely from the damage it seems it was not?
A 777, in any configuration, has sufficient thrust in all certified environmental conditions, to climb away from a runway. There has been no mention of lack of available engine power.
We are all human. Even the finest of aviators have bad days! I will be extremely surprised if human factors are not a major contributor here.
There but for the grace of God.
Being the carrier it is, it's difficult not to wonder whether other issues may also have played a part, and may continue into the investigation?
Which brings us to this go around after the wheels touched.
Is that trained?
How often is it trained?
How often during the sim training are various errors made?
What are the most common errors?
If you are a Professional Pilot, how well do you know your aircraft systems?
If you know how it works, you can make it work. If you don't know how it works, you'll sometimes have difficulty in making it work. That's true for machines less complicated than a 777 as well.
@keepitrealok: thanks for your points on A-N-C.
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 5th Aug 2016 at 12:19.
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formationdriver:
comment and full report on 2011 Air France B777 event can be accessed at
picma.org.uk/?q=content/2011-b772-cat-3-loss-control-paris-france.
But the original post 326 (by swish266) gets it the wrong way round. It states "Yours is of the most valuable sentences for people who understand, on this thread. Reminds me a bit of the AF flight at CDG some time ago that barely escaped... They did a G/A w/o moving the thrust levers to the TOGA position. Went down on the ILS to 63'. But escaped. NO SUCH LUCK this time., that Captain as PF DID push the thrust levers all"
In fact it was the reverse. The Captain (PF) did not press the TOGA switches but pushed the autothrust disconnect buttons instead. He fully advanced the thrust levers and pulled on the control column. However the autopilot remained engaged and coupled to the glideslope. Consequently the aircraft accelerated with increasing nose down pitch.
The PNF initially concentrated on the G/A reconfiguration, and the relief crew member called the pitch discrepancy from correct G/A attitude. Both pilots then applied nose-up control inputs, pulling 1.84G and disconnecting the autopilot at a minimum Radio Altitude of 63 ft. achieving a maximum pitch angle of 19 deg.
Subsequently the Captain applied nose down inputs while the F/O applied nose up and a second high G oscillation occurred. The gear was finally selected up some 25 seconds after the initial g-around call, at a height of 870ft. and the aircraft positioned for a second Cat 3 autoland.
comment and full report on 2011 Air France B777 event can be accessed at
picma.org.uk/?q=content/2011-b772-cat-3-loss-control-paris-france.
But the original post 326 (by swish266) gets it the wrong way round. It states "Yours is of the most valuable sentences for people who understand, on this thread. Reminds me a bit of the AF flight at CDG some time ago that barely escaped... They did a G/A w/o moving the thrust levers to the TOGA position. Went down on the ILS to 63'. But escaped. NO SUCH LUCK this time., that Captain as PF DID push the thrust levers all"
In fact it was the reverse. The Captain (PF) did not press the TOGA switches but pushed the autothrust disconnect buttons instead. He fully advanced the thrust levers and pulled on the control column. However the autopilot remained engaged and coupled to the glideslope. Consequently the aircraft accelerated with increasing nose down pitch.
The PNF initially concentrated on the G/A reconfiguration, and the relief crew member called the pitch discrepancy from correct G/A attitude. Both pilots then applied nose-up control inputs, pulling 1.84G and disconnecting the autopilot at a minimum Radio Altitude of 63 ft. achieving a maximum pitch angle of 19 deg.
Subsequently the Captain applied nose down inputs while the F/O applied nose up and a second high G oscillation occurred. The gear was finally selected up some 25 seconds after the initial g-around call, at a height of 870ft. and the aircraft positioned for a second Cat 3 autoland.
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4468, your post indicates that you have never flown into an airport with severe windshear, as can happen frequently. To have variable winds, not just gusting, means you can have a strong headwind suddenly become a strong tailwind, losing 40, 50kts or even more. That has nothing to do with certification or pressure altitudes. Start a go around from a bounce and have a 40kt airspeed loss from wind change and you are not going upwards, regardless of which engine spec or what weight you are.
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What's with all the systems knowledge d!ck swinging on here?
What has a vnav engine out anomaly got to do with this accident? Or AF or SQ?
Why don't you muppets start an "I know more than you do" thread in the tech section and leave this thread for relevant info.
I'm sick of reading through all this crap.....
LJ
What has a vnav engine out anomaly got to do with this accident? Or AF or SQ?
Why don't you muppets start an "I know more than you do" thread in the tech section and leave this thread for relevant info.
I'm sick of reading through all this crap.....
LJ
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Had you read the post for comprehension, you'd have noticed that a VNAV engine out scenario was not the only place this bug could manifest itself. And it could to limit thrust to cruise thrust in a go-around. If you can't see the possible relevance, you may not understand the incident at hand.
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Things that are puzzleing me:
Isn't there ANY other airport videos (except the ones taken by possible pax or civilians at the airport public facilities, mainly throug windows)?????
Isn't there ANY records of the ramp sector? And the runway?
And ANY from the inbound sector (this meaning the planes APPROACHING) just to determine if the T7 came with or without the gear extended, for example????
These UAE's are crystal-clear giving info... Sure.
Isn't there ANY other airport videos (except the ones taken by possible pax or civilians at the airport public facilities, mainly throug windows)?????
Isn't there ANY records of the ramp sector? And the runway?
And ANY from the inbound sector (this meaning the planes APPROACHING) just to determine if the T7 came with or without the gear extended, for example????
These UAE's are crystal-clear giving info... Sure.
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The report...should prove interesting (in so much as, how it gets compiled).
"On completion of the investigation, GCAA shall prepare and publish the final investigation report," said Ismaeil Al Hosani, AAIS assistant director general.
The authority also warned against sharing videos, news or pictures of the accident on social media.
"Sharing such practices is considered to be irresponsible and disrespectful to the victims and is punishable under UAE law," it said
No speculation. No comments. No pictures. Not even a "pre lim" report.
Of note, Sheikh Ahmed Bin Saeed Al-Maktoum (chairman at EK) is also a board member at the GCAA.
What will the report say ?
My guess "pilot error". A standard procedure.... badly executed, by a "well rested" crew.
Edit 1 Anyone come across the rosters of the crew yet ?
Edit 2 And will Emirates "Fatigue Committee" provide info in the GCAA report as well as EK's existing "Fatigue Management System".
"On completion of the investigation, GCAA shall prepare and publish the final investigation report," said Ismaeil Al Hosani, AAIS assistant director general.
The authority also warned against sharing videos, news or pictures of the accident on social media.
"Sharing such practices is considered to be irresponsible and disrespectful to the victims and is punishable under UAE law," it said
No speculation. No comments. No pictures. Not even a "pre lim" report.
Of note, Sheikh Ahmed Bin Saeed Al-Maktoum (chairman at EK) is also a board member at the GCAA.
What will the report say ?
My guess "pilot error". A standard procedure.... badly executed, by a "well rested" crew.
Edit 1 Anyone come across the rosters of the crew yet ?
Edit 2 And will Emirates "Fatigue Committee" provide info in the GCAA report as well as EK's existing "Fatigue Management System".
Last edited by ArchieBabe; 5th Aug 2016 at 13:35.
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I am a retired senior crew member & can fully understand all the comments regards passengers taking their belongings with them in an emergency evacuation. However, I think we should consider the culture of passengers from this region where the aircraft was flying. I operated many flights from the area & there was always an issue with cabin baggage. When all the overhead bins were full in one cabin we would utilise bins that were less full in other cabins. The culture of passengers in this region made them totally averse to handing you their bag for safe keeping unless it was stowed in the locker above their seat. so I'm not at all surprised passengers were trying to remove items from the overhead bins in an emergency. Also my airline introduced a new initiative to speed up boarding where a second yellow tagged bag was allowed to be put under the seat in front of you. We all know what happens to loose items in the cabin & bags in the overhead bins when they open in an emergency.
Furthermore, passengers from all regions rarely consider others welfare or safety.
This is a Pilot's rumour network so I would like to say thank you to all ppruners who have recognised the great job by the cabin crew, a completely successful evacuation.
Furthermore, passengers from all regions rarely consider others welfare or safety.
This is a Pilot's rumour network so I would like to say thank you to all ppruners who have recognised the great job by the cabin crew, a completely successful evacuation.