Emirates B777 gear collapse @ DXB?
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@Sober Lark, Ratings and Data Analytics in aviation are very innovative in selective presentation. They will find a way to include or exclude data points. Most notorious example is AI182. Entire world knows that accident has nothing to do with airliner, but rating agencies kept the hull loss and fatalities to keep its safety rating down for 30 years.
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TOGA swithces are inactive after touchdown. you need to push the levers forward if you want to GA after a bounce. if you forget that and just push the switches and rotate the aircraft with both hands on the wheel, the outcome will be exactly what happened yesterday.
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Was thinking more a case of trying to G/A before landing and just pushing the levers forward..instead of the TOGA switches.Followed by the thrust levers retracting and then the impact with the runway followed by the bounce..then crash.
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Cazalet33
Yours is of the most valuable sentences for people who understand, on this thread.
Reminds me a bit of the AF flight at CDG some time ago that barely escaped... They did a G/A w/o moving the thrust levers to the TOGA position. Went down on the ILS to 63'. But escaped. NO SUCH LUCK this time.
Yours is of the most valuable sentences for people who understand, on this thread.
Reminds me a bit of the AF flight at CDG some time ago that barely escaped... They did a G/A w/o moving the thrust levers to the TOGA position. Went down on the ILS to 63'. But escaped. NO SUCH LUCK this time.
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Seeing as we are discussing the TOGA switch inhibition now, could someone point out where in the FCOM/FCTM this info is located. A while back I had trouble finding this info and I was sure that there was something about it being inhibited perhaps below 2 feet until perhaps 3 seconds above 5 feet after getting airborne or something like that. I was told that this info had been removed from the FCOM.
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It's a Standard Call at US Military air bases, and apparently other military air bases. Seems like I've heard this from civilian tower controllers also, but can't put my finger on exactly where or when.
Re "...safety record - Zero deaths in 30 years", the industry should note the comment "That we should be thinking beyond numbers, the border between a hull loss and a fatal accident may be relatively thin sometimes." page 4 in
A Statistical Analysis of Commercial Aviation Accidents 1958-2015
Our safety thoughts should focus more on those positive aspects which have avoided fatalities; e.g. Cabin Crew, AFRS, ATC comms, airport layout.
A Statistical Analysis of Commercial Aviation Accidents 1958-2015
Our safety thoughts should focus more on those positive aspects which have avoided fatalities; e.g. Cabin Crew, AFRS, ATC comms, airport layout.
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Seeing as we are discussing the TOGA switch inhibition now, could someone point out where in the FCOM/FCTM this info is located
If the sequence of events was truly as described by the FlyDubai witness then it would seem a mistake was made bringing the gear up too early after the aborted touchdown. The drag incurred by the cycling of the main gear doors is very large and in high temperatures and low density air that is going to have a very detrimental effect on your climb ability.
I've often had RR engines red line temporarily in hot and high conditions on take off.
Obviously pure speculation (it is a rumour network!) but if the ground/air switches had toggled then TOGA would have been unavailable until after take off thus manual thrust required, were the flaps selected to 20 or the gear selected up first? It will make interesting reading and of great interest to those of us who operate this type to hot and high destinations.
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In Brazilian airspace, all local operators (airlines, GA, etc) are required to state landing gear status when contacting the tower on approach, unless told not to by NOTAM on a specific airport.
Great job by the CC on the EK accident, glad all came out of it alive
Great job by the CC on the EK accident, glad all came out of it alive
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Interesting how little information has been released just over 24 hours after the incident.
Who are the investigating authorities ?
Who are the investigating authorities ?
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Mystery Sheet
A couple years ago I was flying 777 and landing in EWR. Crew of 4 pilots. During landing with wx clear.. winds light and variable,, no traffic in the air or on the ground, no external factors and GE engines normally spooled for approach. We hit a massive smash of something from the right and was forced off centerline. I slammed the throttles forward attempting a G/A but the aircraft didn't respond. Control was marginal and I didn't call for gear up as we continued marginally uncontrolled descent.. Managed to get back close to centerline with full power and smashed the landing. Rammed into reverse and smashed the brakes as the spoilers came up.. Me 6000 hours of 777 PIC time. and 30,000 total time. FO 500 777, IRO C5 driver and other IRO I don't remember.. Stopped on the runway turnoff and all expressed total surprise and wonderment. None of had ever seen anything like that before.. I asked the company for FOQUA data to see what happened and they refused.
Don't be so quick to blame the crew. Mystery sheet happens in aviation.
Don't be so quick to blame the crew. Mystery sheet happens in aviation.
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The TO/GA switches are inhibited when on the ground and enabled again when in the air for a go–around or touch and go.
It is not crystal clear and i remember me pushing the switches multiple times and shoving up the levers in the sim with a similar scenario to finally get TOGA .....
(Ahhhh, wishing back the spring-loaded firewall switch of the MD11: Shove the levers through the spring resistance and the AP and AT go off, max available thrust kicks in, FD commands wings level and max nose up and no automatic reversal whatsoever happens until the pilot switches stuff back on to his liking.
That could save your day.)
Humans have the ability to find patterns in every aspect of life, including speculative views of events based on very limited data.
Does the 777 FD logic represent a poorly engineered technology, something which enables opportunity for 'error', being a mismatch between the procedure for bounced landing vs an airborne GA. (Note a conceptual similarity with SFO 777 auto thrust; it's so much easier to blame the human, demand more training, vigilance, monitoring; opposed to re-engineering the aircraft to help the often resource limited pilot). How many 777 FD 'near misses' have their been, written off as human error, not understanding the system, or because other pilots manage to cope (they know/ remember), then everyone is expected to cope in all situations, all of the time.
As an extremely speculative thought, with the hazard of biased false pattern matching.
What if this is similar to BA 38.
Un-commanded thrust reduction late on final ... Heavy landing ... GA procedure, but no thrust response ... Then a subsequent heavier landing .. Fuel tank rupture, and Fire.
But then that's just a pattern, a figment of imagination ... ... Or is it worth a thought for safety if only to dismiss it?
Does the 777 FD logic represent a poorly engineered technology, something which enables opportunity for 'error', being a mismatch between the procedure for bounced landing vs an airborne GA. (Note a conceptual similarity with SFO 777 auto thrust; it's so much easier to blame the human, demand more training, vigilance, monitoring; opposed to re-engineering the aircraft to help the often resource limited pilot). How many 777 FD 'near misses' have their been, written off as human error, not understanding the system, or because other pilots manage to cope (they know/ remember), then everyone is expected to cope in all situations, all of the time.
As an extremely speculative thought, with the hazard of biased false pattern matching.
What if this is similar to BA 38.
Un-commanded thrust reduction late on final ... Heavy landing ... GA procedure, but no thrust response ... Then a subsequent heavier landing .. Fuel tank rupture, and Fire.
But then that's just a pattern, a figment of imagination ... ... Or is it worth a thought for safety if only to dismiss it?
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Captain Doug:
Makes me think of the 777 at Heathrow.
Your incident likely demonstrates how automation engineers don't always do such a sterling job. And, your company's attitude was appalling. Makes them part of the problem rather than the solution.
Mystery sheet happens in aviation.
Your incident likely demonstrates how automation engineers don't always do such a sterling job. And, your company's attitude was appalling. Makes them part of the problem rather than the solution.