Emirates B777 gear collapse @ DXB?
Original post deleted. I don't want to start a slanging match on Rejected Landing procedures. Lets wait until Boeing come up with an official one. In the meantime I'll continue to use the procedure that my Company have trained me to use.
Last edited by Bleve; 11th Sep 2016 at 04:50. Reason: Decorum
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This might be an interesting scenario to throw at crews when they do the GA simulator check, fail the autothrottle just as they are about to push the TOGA button.
F-16GUY,
I completely agree with you about muscle memory doing well to mitigate the startle effect, but the problem in this case as it relates to thrust may be the only muscle some are training/developing as PF is finger muscle that clicks the TOGA while not bothering to keep a hand there long enough to get feedback of a proper response (levers advancing) as pitch/attitude is changed, and as PM, muscle memory that has the hand moving from the flap lever immediately to the gear lever in anticipation of the next manual manipulation and jumping to the PTT if ATC calls. When muscle memory is in action there can be a tendency for the mind to follow or focus/fixate there. Great if it's the next, correct step in a procedure, but bad if it isn't or the current step hasn't been satisfied. All my comments are in reference to Appendix C of the GCAA's prelim accident report linked in Post #1218 which is an excerpt of Boeing/EK FCOM Procedures for Go Around and Missed Approach.
The pertinent Boeing/EK FCOM procedure found as the Report's Appendix C is in the familiar format that shows procedural items in the order they are to be accomplished and the respective duties of the PF and PM. Essentially, these are the initial items, and all 3 Steps are directly related to both pilots manipulating and focusing on aviating fundamentals that change the path of the aircraft and POSITIVELY establish a different phase of flight;
1) PF - Simultaneously push the TOGA switch and call "Flaps 20" PM - Position Flap Lever to 20.
2) PF and PM/Both - Verify the rotation to GA attitude. Verify that the thrust increases
3) PM - Verify that the thrust is sufficient for the go around, or adjust as needed.
Let's assume the respective duties of the PF and PM for Step 1 were accomplished. In Step 1 there are 3 muscle memory, physical manipulations going on: PF pitching & TOGA switch-pressing, plus the PM moving the flap handle. So what is the next step in the procedure and where is the next muscle memory manipulation? Step 2 directs both PF and PM to verify that thrust is advancing. If the PF leaves his hand on the levers long enough after pressing TOGA to gain tactile feedback without looking it would be satisfied. I believe (or hope), most pilots do this. If the PF's hand is gone, then this verification by the PF must be accomplished some other way. During that same step, how does the PM also verify thrust is advancing? Someone maintained nobody requires or trains looking at engine instruments. I'd say the PM will have a difficult time accomplishing his responsibility for Step 2, and certainly for Step 3 (since thrust output isn't verified by thrust lever angle), without using them.
You can see where this is going; to completely satisfy Steps 2 and 3 of the procedure Thrust Lever awareness and the engine instruments must be included in the scan at this point, otherwise there is no way to verify thrust advancement or setting in order to know if it's sufficient and/or needs adjustment. Having it in a scan is eyeball muscle memory that leads to the cognitive act necessary to satisfy the defined responsibilities. A good scan that includes the proper things at the proper time is fundamental to Aviate first.
And that's why there must be utter clarity as to what focus points are be taught, practiced, and muscle memory being developed....including eyeball muscle direction... for a given procedure. The manufacturer/Company FCOM is clear where the focus needs to be even if automation is used during a G/A or M/A, because automation can fail or be inhibited. In the case of thrust, the procedure directs the PM should be ready to adjust it if necessary.
So what are PMs doing here after Step 1 in the procedure? Are they anticipating and monitoring the incorrect thing(s) and therefore developing the wrong muscle memory when it comes to eyeball focus and hand placement? It seems this could be happening because after the first 3 steps have been accomplished, the FCOM continues...
4) PM - Verify a positive rate of climb on the altimeter. Call "Positive Climb".
5) PF - Verify a positive rate of climb on the altimeter and call "Gear Up".
6) PM - Set the Landing Gear lever to UP and confirm the F/Ds are ON.
According to the prelim report the nosewheel never touched the runway, and 4 seconds passed between the time and aircraft went airborne again and movement of the flap lever to 20. The aircraft was pitched or pitching up, the Flap lever was manipulated, and let's assume the TOGA switch was pressed (although inhibited). Let's assume that was the end of Step 1.
Steps 2 and 3 which require not only verification by both PF and PM that thrust is advancing, but another step (3) for the PM to verify sufficient thrust and standby to adjust if necessary.
But look at the timeline in the report; Flap lever movement to 20 signifying completion of Step 1 is followed a mere 2 seconds later by the raising of the gear lever. Movement of the gear lever is Step 6. Think about that time span between those 2 physical manipulations and what is supposed to occur between them. There is no way verification of thrust advancement, followed by verification of thrust production could take place if focus and attention were redirected that quickly to things of lesser priority.
2 seconds between manipulation of 2 different levers indicates the hand most likely went from one lever straight to the other. Muscle memory to the wrong place? Another factor coming into play is what 604driver pointed out. The lack of an SOP audible callout referencing thrust, which serves to reinforce the FCOM's directive to verify at this point in the procedure, increases the chance that it may be missed.
And here's a real kicker. It was during that 2 second span between flap lever selection to 20 and gear handle placement to up that ATC transmitted go around instructions, and it was read back correctly. 2 seconds between manipulating 2 different levers while also cognitively absorbing ATC instructions in order to read them back correctly strongly indicates muscle memory of the hand traveling straight from flaps to gear while cognitive focus diverted even further away from critical items of Aviating and into items related to Nav and Communicate. Again, this is all happening below 85' with a PF perhaps fixated on pitching alone (worried about a tailstrike, more WS, or whatever). The aircraft by every definition deep into a critical phase of flight where for those seconds there should be absolute surety on the part of both pilots as to the procedural steps, their duties, and both 100% in the loop where flying the aircraft by one is 100% backed-up by the other.
The problem is, if the muscle memory were developed in accordance to what the procedure dictates as far as focal points and duties, that hand should be anticipating a possible the need to adjust the thrust levers, not the raise the gear. Yet how many times do we see the hands moving towards the gear? Thrust application is supremely time critical, raising the gear is not.
12 seconds elapsed between becoming airborne and thrust application, the autothrottle transitioning to thrust mode which would indicate re-manipulation of the now uninhibited TOGA switch rather than someone manually doing so. 8 seconds elapsed between flap lever manipulation and thrust application, during which time (and before a height of 85') the gear was raised and an ATC instruction readback was transmitted.
The belated reference to decaying airspeed is something gleaned from a PFD and signifies a belated awareness that "something" was amiss. What that something is must had to then be cognitively figured-out. If cognitive focus/scans were performed in line with how the procedure is written, there would have been a comment regarding insufficient thrust a good 10 seconds earlier.
Obviously, I'm a member of the "Flaps 20, Check Thrust" callout school of thinking where checking this hyper-critical item comes as a command to the PM to direct his attention/incorporate it into his scan to note both engines spooling and reaching the target, adjust if necessary, and a reminder to the PF himself when initiating the procedure to get it in there one way or another in the first place.
I completely agree with you about muscle memory doing well to mitigate the startle effect, but the problem in this case as it relates to thrust may be the only muscle some are training/developing as PF is finger muscle that clicks the TOGA while not bothering to keep a hand there long enough to get feedback of a proper response (levers advancing) as pitch/attitude is changed, and as PM, muscle memory that has the hand moving from the flap lever immediately to the gear lever in anticipation of the next manual manipulation and jumping to the PTT if ATC calls. When muscle memory is in action there can be a tendency for the mind to follow or focus/fixate there. Great if it's the next, correct step in a procedure, but bad if it isn't or the current step hasn't been satisfied. All my comments are in reference to Appendix C of the GCAA's prelim accident report linked in Post #1218 which is an excerpt of Boeing/EK FCOM Procedures for Go Around and Missed Approach.
The pertinent Boeing/EK FCOM procedure found as the Report's Appendix C is in the familiar format that shows procedural items in the order they are to be accomplished and the respective duties of the PF and PM. Essentially, these are the initial items, and all 3 Steps are directly related to both pilots manipulating and focusing on aviating fundamentals that change the path of the aircraft and POSITIVELY establish a different phase of flight;
1) PF - Simultaneously push the TOGA switch and call "Flaps 20" PM - Position Flap Lever to 20.
2) PF and PM/Both - Verify the rotation to GA attitude. Verify that the thrust increases
3) PM - Verify that the thrust is sufficient for the go around, or adjust as needed.
Let's assume the respective duties of the PF and PM for Step 1 were accomplished. In Step 1 there are 3 muscle memory, physical manipulations going on: PF pitching & TOGA switch-pressing, plus the PM moving the flap handle. So what is the next step in the procedure and where is the next muscle memory manipulation? Step 2 directs both PF and PM to verify that thrust is advancing. If the PF leaves his hand on the levers long enough after pressing TOGA to gain tactile feedback without looking it would be satisfied. I believe (or hope), most pilots do this. If the PF's hand is gone, then this verification by the PF must be accomplished some other way. During that same step, how does the PM also verify thrust is advancing? Someone maintained nobody requires or trains looking at engine instruments. I'd say the PM will have a difficult time accomplishing his responsibility for Step 2, and certainly for Step 3 (since thrust output isn't verified by thrust lever angle), without using them.
You can see where this is going; to completely satisfy Steps 2 and 3 of the procedure Thrust Lever awareness and the engine instruments must be included in the scan at this point, otherwise there is no way to verify thrust advancement or setting in order to know if it's sufficient and/or needs adjustment. Having it in a scan is eyeball muscle memory that leads to the cognitive act necessary to satisfy the defined responsibilities. A good scan that includes the proper things at the proper time is fundamental to Aviate first.
And that's why there must be utter clarity as to what focus points are be taught, practiced, and muscle memory being developed....including eyeball muscle direction... for a given procedure. The manufacturer/Company FCOM is clear where the focus needs to be even if automation is used during a G/A or M/A, because automation can fail or be inhibited. In the case of thrust, the procedure directs the PM should be ready to adjust it if necessary.
So what are PMs doing here after Step 1 in the procedure? Are they anticipating and monitoring the incorrect thing(s) and therefore developing the wrong muscle memory when it comes to eyeball focus and hand placement? It seems this could be happening because after the first 3 steps have been accomplished, the FCOM continues...
4) PM - Verify a positive rate of climb on the altimeter. Call "Positive Climb".
5) PF - Verify a positive rate of climb on the altimeter and call "Gear Up".
6) PM - Set the Landing Gear lever to UP and confirm the F/Ds are ON.
According to the prelim report the nosewheel never touched the runway, and 4 seconds passed between the time and aircraft went airborne again and movement of the flap lever to 20. The aircraft was pitched or pitching up, the Flap lever was manipulated, and let's assume the TOGA switch was pressed (although inhibited). Let's assume that was the end of Step 1.
Steps 2 and 3 which require not only verification by both PF and PM that thrust is advancing, but another step (3) for the PM to verify sufficient thrust and standby to adjust if necessary.
But look at the timeline in the report; Flap lever movement to 20 signifying completion of Step 1 is followed a mere 2 seconds later by the raising of the gear lever. Movement of the gear lever is Step 6. Think about that time span between those 2 physical manipulations and what is supposed to occur between them. There is no way verification of thrust advancement, followed by verification of thrust production could take place if focus and attention were redirected that quickly to things of lesser priority.
2 seconds between manipulation of 2 different levers indicates the hand most likely went from one lever straight to the other. Muscle memory to the wrong place? Another factor coming into play is what 604driver pointed out. The lack of an SOP audible callout referencing thrust, which serves to reinforce the FCOM's directive to verify at this point in the procedure, increases the chance that it may be missed.
And here's a real kicker. It was during that 2 second span between flap lever selection to 20 and gear handle placement to up that ATC transmitted go around instructions, and it was read back correctly. 2 seconds between manipulating 2 different levers while also cognitively absorbing ATC instructions in order to read them back correctly strongly indicates muscle memory of the hand traveling straight from flaps to gear while cognitive focus diverted even further away from critical items of Aviating and into items related to Nav and Communicate. Again, this is all happening below 85' with a PF perhaps fixated on pitching alone (worried about a tailstrike, more WS, or whatever). The aircraft by every definition deep into a critical phase of flight where for those seconds there should be absolute surety on the part of both pilots as to the procedural steps, their duties, and both 100% in the loop where flying the aircraft by one is 100% backed-up by the other.
The problem is, if the muscle memory were developed in accordance to what the procedure dictates as far as focal points and duties, that hand should be anticipating a possible the need to adjust the thrust levers, not the raise the gear. Yet how many times do we see the hands moving towards the gear? Thrust application is supremely time critical, raising the gear is not.
12 seconds elapsed between becoming airborne and thrust application, the autothrottle transitioning to thrust mode which would indicate re-manipulation of the now uninhibited TOGA switch rather than someone manually doing so. 8 seconds elapsed between flap lever manipulation and thrust application, during which time (and before a height of 85') the gear was raised and an ATC instruction readback was transmitted.
The belated reference to decaying airspeed is something gleaned from a PFD and signifies a belated awareness that "something" was amiss. What that something is must had to then be cognitively figured-out. If cognitive focus/scans were performed in line with how the procedure is written, there would have been a comment regarding insufficient thrust a good 10 seconds earlier.
Obviously, I'm a member of the "Flaps 20, Check Thrust" callout school of thinking where checking this hyper-critical item comes as a command to the PM to direct his attention/incorporate it into his scan to note both engines spooling and reaching the target, adjust if necessary, and a reminder to the PF himself when initiating the procedure to get it in there one way or another in the first place.
Last edited by PukinDog; 11th Sep 2016 at 02:59.
Bleve,
Well done. By rotating to 15 degrees nose up so early you will have a tail strike. By retracting the flaps too early you may increase the severity of the tail strike.
Try thrust/10* degrees NU/pause (then scratch private parts to if itchy to use more time...)
THEN call flap 20 etc AFTER ground separation/RoC confirmed by RA,altimeter,VSI and 15 deg NU established
* A degree or so below FCOM tailstrike figure with compressed struts
Well done. By rotating to 15 degrees nose up so early you will have a tail strike. By retracting the flaps too early you may increase the severity of the tail strike.
Try thrust/10* degrees NU/pause (then scratch private parts to if itchy to use more time...)
THEN call flap 20 etc AFTER ground separation/RoC confirmed by RA,altimeter,VSI and 15 deg NU established
* A degree or so below FCOM tailstrike figure with compressed struts
Last edited by The Banjo; 11th Sep 2016 at 04:42. Reason: Pitch clatification
Original post deleted. I don't want to start a slanging match on Rejected Landing procedures. Lets wait until Boeing come up with an official one. In the meantime I'll continue to use the procedure that my Company have trained me to use.
Last edited by Bleve; 11th Sep 2016 at 04:52. Reason: Decorum
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The banjo
I am in agreement with you. This is very much true on any aircraft. You rotate enough to avoid nose wheel contact. Leave everything as it is. Once climbing and safely away from ground then first retract flaps then gear. What Bleve suggests will lead to tail strike. Touch and go is different than rejected/baulked landing
I am in agreement with you. This is very much true on any aircraft. You rotate enough to avoid nose wheel contact. Leave everything as it is. Once climbing and safely away from ground then first retract flaps then gear. What Bleve suggests will lead to tail strike. Touch and go is different than rejected/baulked landing
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Excellent posts PukinDog. Two further thoughts for consideration -
1. The F/O was on secondment from Qantas & may well be off the B737. The B737 go-around procedure is -
PF calls "Go-around - Flap 5".
PM selects flap, monitors pitch attitude, along with V/S and movement on the altimeter.
PM calls "Positive rate"
PF calls "Gear up - check thrust".
PM selects gear up & then checks thrust & adjusts as necessary.
If he is off the B737, it may be that in this situation he fell back on his previously trained procedure (as often happens, particularly when under stress) & was going to check the thrust after the gear was selected up. In the 6 second period from selecting gear up until the thrust levers were pushed up, the low speed was noticed & the F/O called "check speed". They both may have gone to the engine instruments at this time, resulting in the thrust levers being moved forward, or perhaps it was just an automatic reaction to the low speed call. Either way, there seems to have been some delay in processing the information & it may well be due to the startle factor of the low speed situation.
2. In the Singapore Airlines B777 landing incident at Munich, the issue of no F/D and A/T response to pressing the TOGA switches while on the ground was a contributing factor. It seems that the opportunity to deal with this issue & train for it has been missed by B777 operators around the world.
1. The F/O was on secondment from Qantas & may well be off the B737. The B737 go-around procedure is -
PF calls "Go-around - Flap 5".
PM selects flap, monitors pitch attitude, along with V/S and movement on the altimeter.
PM calls "Positive rate"
PF calls "Gear up - check thrust".
PM selects gear up & then checks thrust & adjusts as necessary.
If he is off the B737, it may be that in this situation he fell back on his previously trained procedure (as often happens, particularly when under stress) & was going to check the thrust after the gear was selected up. In the 6 second period from selecting gear up until the thrust levers were pushed up, the low speed was noticed & the F/O called "check speed". They both may have gone to the engine instruments at this time, resulting in the thrust levers being moved forward, or perhaps it was just an automatic reaction to the low speed call. Either way, there seems to have been some delay in processing the information & it may well be due to the startle factor of the low speed situation.
2. In the Singapore Airlines B777 landing incident at Munich, the issue of no F/D and A/T response to pressing the TOGA switches while on the ground was a contributing factor. It seems that the opportunity to deal with this issue & train for it has been missed by B777 operators around the world.
Last edited by Oakape; 11th Sep 2016 at 06:10.
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PukinDog
Thank you for a very articulate and thought provoking post. Yours, combined with Oakape, have highlighted some very valid HF concerns. When we talk about encouraging resilience, airmanship, awareness and suspicion within flight operations, it's the factors you describe that we refer to. And as mentioned, under stress and high workload, the threat of type reversion is high. 600-1000 hours to feel comfortable with a new type.
Unfortunately, if an airline supports a training culture of learning by rote, the desire or ability of the student to consider the elements mentioned above are difficult to incorporate. Combine this with a fear culture, real or perceived, of disciplinary action for even minor non compliance, and the holes in the cheese begin to align.
Harry
Thank you for a very articulate and thought provoking post. Yours, combined with Oakape, have highlighted some very valid HF concerns. When we talk about encouraging resilience, airmanship, awareness and suspicion within flight operations, it's the factors you describe that we refer to. And as mentioned, under stress and high workload, the threat of type reversion is high. 600-1000 hours to feel comfortable with a new type.
Unfortunately, if an airline supports a training culture of learning by rote, the desire or ability of the student to consider the elements mentioned above are difficult to incorporate. Combine this with a fear culture, real or perceived, of disciplinary action for even minor non compliance, and the holes in the cheese begin to align.
Harry
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Flying with one hand and keeping the other hand on the throttles, OR directly behind them, gives immediate tactile feel if the thrust levers do, or don't, move. I've watched small women fly airliners one handed, with one hand on the throttles, and watch guys that weigh at least twice as much take their hand off the throttles to fly with two hands. It's flying, not weight lifting. By doing that they lose any tactile feedback.
Last edited by misd-agin; 11th Sep 2016 at 07:04. Reason: Typos
Consider if it had been a more normal GA as all airline pilots train for, but the TOGA switch was broken or the autothrottle failed. They would still have crashed as they were not checking the thrust.
but the problem in this case as it relates to thrust may be the only muscle some are training/developing as PF is finger muscle that clicks the TOGA while not bothering to keep a hand there long enough to get feedback of a proper response (levers advancing) as pitch/attitude is changed,
Why is this the case? Because we have designed auto systems and SOP's that mean a previously competent pilot loses the muscle memory of advancing thrust with almost no conscious effort. We can go on and on all day about how they should have delved into their memory banks to recall the correct sequence of checking and verification at that moment in time but it won't stop it happening again next year or next week. The action of advancing the thrust levers manually has to be so familiar to a pilot that they do it with little or no conscious effort. By having 777 pilots flare their aircraft with automated thrust reduction day in day out for years on end we have taken something that used to be subconscious bread and butter 'flying' and made it a ' procedure' to be used only on the very rare occasion that the system fails or you are weight on wheels. When that occasion arrives you are having a bad day and likely to have reduced cognitive ability due to the startle factor.
The only way around this is to let pilots fly their aeroplanes.
1. The F/O was on secondment from Qantas & may well be off the B737. The B737 go-around procedure is -
PF calls "Go-around - Flap 5".
PF calls "Go-around - Flap 5".
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Portmanteau - this is nothing to do with racism and bigotry. A child of three could figure out that a plane can't land with the wheels UP (two seconds after first touch) nor climb when the engines are on IDLE. All the guff about windshear is all well and good but since they were warned they should have taken it into account. Reading the report gives the impression to ordinary folk that the pilot screwed up which with 'over 7000 hours' should not have happened. If it had been blowing hard with rain at night there might be some excuse. It wasn't, there isn't and if calling out an incompetent local pilot is racism then all is lost..
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Nah - I am, regretfully, not a pilot but I have friends in Air France who tell me they do a certain number of hours per year. I am not sure if this is their choice, a recommendation or an order but it sounds like a good idea.
PukinDog,
Great post. Given the timeline as published, it’s highly likely that much of what you theorise actually happened.
I think we’re seeing the result of a procedure that is a mixture of memory/reflex items and ones that need thought/decision being performed without much cognition. Probably learnt behaviour as that worked on every other occasion and the training environment didn’t emphasise the procedure nor close the feedback loop by checking if it was being executed correctly. Both the PF and PM in this accident appear to be operating in this manner.
There is much concentration on mode awareness, technical knowledge, etc. but I think the most important fact, which seems to have eluded the crew here, is that when you’ve got the yoke in one hand and the thrust levers in the other, you are in control of the aeroplane and its performance, just like the basic aircraft you learned to fly on. That such primacy can be overcome by long-term exposure to contemporary airline operations shows the magnitude of the problem.
Great post. Given the timeline as published, it’s highly likely that much of what you theorise actually happened.
I think we’re seeing the result of a procedure that is a mixture of memory/reflex items and ones that need thought/decision being performed without much cognition. Probably learnt behaviour as that worked on every other occasion and the training environment didn’t emphasise the procedure nor close the feedback loop by checking if it was being executed correctly. Both the PF and PM in this accident appear to be operating in this manner.
There is much concentration on mode awareness, technical knowledge, etc. but I think the most important fact, which seems to have eluded the crew here, is that when you’ve got the yoke in one hand and the thrust levers in the other, you are in control of the aeroplane and its performance, just like the basic aircraft you learned to fly on. That such primacy can be overcome by long-term exposure to contemporary airline operations shows the magnitude of the problem.
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1. So it might have been a bounce in fact - but you don't retract the gear after a bounce....
2. So it's probably a go-around - but then throttles should be advanced ....
3. So it might have been a bounce in fact - but you don't retractt the gear after a bounce....
4. So it's probably a go-around - but then throttles should be advanced....
5. So it might have been a bounce in fact......
........ ........
......... ..........
And in a punitive culture like this ME company seems to be, the Captain was probably thinking about the report or the visit to the office, from the very first second of the "incident" - thus hampering his accident-resolution capabilities (if any) I had that one day in Europe on our very nice dutch-built liner : we had barely started any check-list or actions, that the F/O was already elaborating about reporting the incident.....
2. So it's probably a go-around - but then throttles should be advanced ....
3. So it might have been a bounce in fact - but you don't retractt the gear after a bounce....
4. So it's probably a go-around - but then throttles should be advanced....
5. So it might have been a bounce in fact......
........ ........
......... ..........
And in a punitive culture like this ME company seems to be, the Captain was probably thinking about the report or the visit to the office, from the very first second of the "incident" - thus hampering his accident-resolution capabilities (if any) I had that one day in Europe on our very nice dutch-built liner : we had barely started any check-list or actions, that the F/O was already elaborating about reporting the incident.....
Both the PF and PM in this accident appear to be operating in this manner.
That such primacy can be overcome by long-term exposure to contemporary airline operations shows the magnitude of the problem.
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And in a punitive culture like this ME company seems to be, the Captain was probably thinking about the report or the visit to the office, from the very first second of the "incident" - thus hampering his accident-resolution capabilities
In my humble, FWIW, SOP's are removing airmanship qualities from the airman. The reason i believe this is happening, is because it makes it "easier" to recruit and train a procedures person. The art of flying, sadly, seems to have been reduced to a sodding flow chart. i.e. If X happens, do Y. (whilst trying but failing miserably to cover all eventualities).
An airman is constantly evaluating his/her environment and reacting, sometimes with subtly, other times less so, to the information fed back, with airmanship decisions, whereas Flow Chart SOP culture seems to relieve the airman of his decision making capabilities, and it's proving to be a dangerous direction the industry is going in. And here in this accident, it would seem, there is an SOP that says x has happened so do y.... and they're never even trained to do y!
They probably had at a guess, 6,000 successful landings between them and 0 baulked landings... And the Flow Chart SOP said "Run along and do something you have never done before because in the authors' opinion, it's the safest thing to do, whether you've been trained for it or not". And then yes, would have gotten a rollicking for adding another landing to their total rather than completing the manoeuvre the SOP called for.
Add to this, the fact that it appears that this mentality has developed into an acceptance, that flow chart SOP and automated equipment go hand in hand to enhance safety. I think that this direction is somewhat misguided.
So i wonder if, in this case, the thought really was about tea and biscuits or if it was, in fact, x has happened i must do y!!!
Last edited by 604driver; 11th Sep 2016 at 23:38.