Emirates B777 gear collapse @ DXB?
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Sim training is ok, no doubt. But let's face it: The sim is programmed with the performance of tables and manufacturer's values. With such given parameters it will always give you a success, if correctly executed. So there is only some value to training for situations we are debating.
In real life it sometimes looks and feels quite different. All the armchair pilots and optimists who never came close to a RRT7, take it from someone who has flown many years in the pit and on the ship involved: It is not rare that we doubt the tables and pray to (set in your favourite) that no donkey gets stubborn .....
We will never be able to simulate and fully train every situation that might arise. What helps is experience, and that is what you get climbing the ladder, as it has been around for some time. From a underpowered piston twin to a not very much better equipped TP, then single aisle jets on many, many multiple legs for some years.
Today there are a lot of pilots who might have hours (
), but not that many sectors. Too much penny pinching and a lot of local pride puts bums on heavy seat too quickly.
Extreme situations are a tad more survivable and/or easier to hide on smaller equipment. It's trial and error with a better chance of a good outcome, but it gives you invaluable experience that helps once you fly some heavier and less forgiving metal.
It might just be that the insurance companies will have a look into this matter, just as they did after the Gulf Air accident in BAH some years ago.
Money matters and we might see some change to the better if the cutting back in training and experience and some national pride suddenly start eating into the holy grail of profits.
In real life it sometimes looks and feels quite different. All the armchair pilots and optimists who never came close to a RRT7, take it from someone who has flown many years in the pit and on the ship involved: It is not rare that we doubt the tables and pray to (set in your favourite) that no donkey gets stubborn .....
We will never be able to simulate and fully train every situation that might arise. What helps is experience, and that is what you get climbing the ladder, as it has been around for some time. From a underpowered piston twin to a not very much better equipped TP, then single aisle jets on many, many multiple legs for some years.
Today there are a lot of pilots who might have hours (
), but not that many sectors. Too much penny pinching and a lot of local pride puts bums on heavy seat too quickly. Extreme situations are a tad more survivable and/or easier to hide on smaller equipment. It's trial and error with a better chance of a good outcome, but it gives you invaluable experience that helps once you fly some heavier and less forgiving metal.
It might just be that the insurance companies will have a look into this matter, just as they did after the Gulf Air accident in BAH some years ago.
Money matters and we might see some change to the better if the cutting back in training and experience and some national pride suddenly start eating into the holy grail of profits.
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There's got to be a better way than 'hoping' in a GA...
Lonewolf, #960, again no disagreement.
... what has changed more ... The total aviation system?
We have the same 'reliable' aircraft, same 'unreliable' human, and an evolving operational environment. The intensity and complexity of modern operations defy simple understanding, accidents are rare, and few have a single cause or solution, yet public and professional expectation is for increased safety with more fights and lower cost.
In many ways we are operating too close to the edge of safety boundaries(*), there are more unforeseen interactions, and there are new societal effects on the human operator.
Perhaps if we considered all aircraft as potentially unreliable, humans as an asset, capable of rescuing situations, then we might learn more from normal operations than attempting to train and constrain them with more SOPs.
Buzz, #962, just because a 20 yr old design was approved does not mean that the assumptions made then hold true today. Operators and individuals are very good at adapting to 'small problems', and formalise their workarounds with more training.
The danger is that with more and more adaptions and training demands on memory, the more likely that the human will encounter resource limiting situations, combinations of 'challenging factors' (surprise, unexpected, low experience, or infrequently trained), then the risk of crossing a safety boundary increases.
'Small problems' are the essence of safety reports, yet few of this type are made because humans would rather adapt than report an 'error' (the opportunity of finding out why vs avoiding embarrassment); when we identify a mistake we infer that we will not suffer the the same one again, we can cope, etc. But error-inducing-situations are rarely the same, even though the small problem is, and with increasing operational pressures the human is unable to detect these new situations (context), and the situation escalates to a safety incident.
The safety task is to identify these small problems, relate them to the complexity of modern operations by reviewing previous assumptions and considering new contexts.
And for the assessors (operators and regulators) to be aware of the human weakness that because they knew of the problem, they managed, so it won' be a problem for anyone else, thus do nothing.
(*) page 20 http://ihi.hamad.qa/en/images/Keynote_Haraden.pdf
... what has changed more ... The total aviation system?
We have the same 'reliable' aircraft, same 'unreliable' human, and an evolving operational environment. The intensity and complexity of modern operations defy simple understanding, accidents are rare, and few have a single cause or solution, yet public and professional expectation is for increased safety with more fights and lower cost.
In many ways we are operating too close to the edge of safety boundaries(*), there are more unforeseen interactions, and there are new societal effects on the human operator.
Perhaps if we considered all aircraft as potentially unreliable, humans as an asset, capable of rescuing situations, then we might learn more from normal operations than attempting to train and constrain them with more SOPs.
Buzz, #962, just because a 20 yr old design was approved does not mean that the assumptions made then hold true today. Operators and individuals are very good at adapting to 'small problems', and formalise their workarounds with more training.
The danger is that with more and more adaptions and training demands on memory, the more likely that the human will encounter resource limiting situations, combinations of 'challenging factors' (surprise, unexpected, low experience, or infrequently trained), then the risk of crossing a safety boundary increases.
'Small problems' are the essence of safety reports, yet few of this type are made because humans would rather adapt than report an 'error' (the opportunity of finding out why vs avoiding embarrassment); when we identify a mistake we infer that we will not suffer the the same one again, we can cope, etc. But error-inducing-situations are rarely the same, even though the small problem is, and with increasing operational pressures the human is unable to detect these new situations (context), and the situation escalates to a safety incident.
The safety task is to identify these small problems, relate them to the complexity of modern operations by reviewing previous assumptions and considering new contexts.
And for the assessors (operators and regulators) to be aware of the human weakness that because they knew of the problem, they managed, so it won' be a problem for anyone else, thus do nothing.
(*) page 20 http://ihi.hamad.qa/en/images/Keynote_Haraden.pdf
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BBK:
All of which was surely well recorded.
Trouble with that the data recorders are in possession of a country with an "over vested" interest in this airline.
Much much easier to blame the pilots in the absence of some real details of what occurred.
Trouble with that the data recorders are in possession of a country with an "over vested" interest in this airline.
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Every guy who's had an engine failure said the plane was easier to fly than the simulator. We assume it's the slight pitch, roll and yaw forces you can feel that a simulator cannot completely replicate.
For risk and cost reasons simulators are the way to go.
For risk and cost reasons simulators are the way to go.
Last edited by misd-agin; 17th Aug 2016 at 18:27. Reason: Grammar.
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"Generally agree, however, some machines can be a "handful", esp on one engine, that may require a few seconds of "two hands". Better then, IMO, to hit TOGA, feel the throttles advancing than push 'em up and hope TOGA engages while temporarily hands off."
A need for two hands typically goes along with inadequate rudder use or not having a steady rudder input. It's a standard debriefing item - "'if you push enough rudder, and freeze it, the aileron inputs will stop."
A need for two hands typically goes along with inadequate rudder use or not having a steady rudder input. It's a standard debriefing item - "'if you push enough rudder, and freeze it, the aileron inputs will stop."
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The JAL 777 go-around appears to show that their intention was to ensure proper clearance prior to rotating to the go-around attitude to reduce the chance of a tailstrike.
We do EBT as well but a long as two years ago, we were doing go-arounds in the sim due to vis going to zero at the moment of touchdown.
We do EBT as well but a long as two years ago, we were doing go-arounds in the sim due to vis going to zero at the moment of touchdown.
Paxing All Over The World
The JAL GA shows across (effectively) 36 seconds of picture.
- First wheel touch (Right main) after 14 seconds of observation. Spoilers deploy but (as far as I can see) no reverse.
- Between 4 and 5 seconds later, the GA has been called as the nose lifts.
- There are some 10 seconds of maintaining height whilst thrust builds as (probably) throttles had been fully retarded at WOW.
- Some 15 seconds after first wheel touch, the nose pitches up as GA power has been fully established.
- The video ends before the gear starts to move, althougfh fairing doors may be moving.
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To a pilot it looks well handled as well!
And who knows what made them make the g/a. Might be aircraft training (touch and go's with the occasional wave off), could have been a runway incursion, could have been anything but it was wave off at a challenging moment with probably thrust levers closed and it looks certainly well done!
And what is scary about this one?
Only the subject of the thread is!
And who knows what made them make the g/a. Might be aircraft training (touch and go's with the occasional wave off), could have been a runway incursion, could have been anything but it was wave off at a challenging moment with probably thrust levers closed and it looks certainly well done!
And what is scary about this one?
Only the subject of the thread is!
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Nothing scary I think it was handled well. The main problem with rejected landing is trying to avoid contact(or second contact) with the runway and/or aggressive rotation. Initial rotation should be enough to ensure that the nose gear won't contact before the main gear. Gear is a strong part of the aircraft but the tail or fuselage will be damaged badly. That is why there should be no hurry in changing configuration. Once the aircraft is climbing away then the standard go round procedure can be followed by rotating to GA attitude and GA flaps and then gear. At this stage no one knows what was done.
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aterpster " Trouble with that the data recorders are in possession of a country with an "over vested" interest in this airline."
We are still waiting further info from FlyDubai accident, I am guessing that & the Emirates report will be "delayed" until we have forgotten it ever happened . . . . a technique that seems to have worked pretty well thus far for a European loco who trashed one (fortunately without fatalities) 8 years ago . . . and yet . . . no public dissemination of any relevant info.
We are still waiting further info from FlyDubai accident, I am guessing that & the Emirates report will be "delayed" until we have forgotten it ever happened . . . . a technique that seems to have worked pretty well thus far for a European loco who trashed one (fortunately without fatalities) 8 years ago . . . and yet . . . no public dissemination of any relevant info.
Originally posted by PEI 3721
...just because a 20 yr old design was approved does not mean that the assumptions made then hold true today. Operators and individuals are very good at adapting to 'small problems', and formalise their workarounds with more training.
...just because a 20 yr old design was approved does not mean that the assumptions made then hold true today. Operators and individuals are very good at adapting to 'small problems', and formalise their workarounds with more training.
The inhibit function is documented in the aircraft's FCOM, but it seems that some operators have procedures that cover rejected landings and some don't. Some operators train their pilots in those procedures and some don't. Why is that so? Why haven't ALL operators adopted the same procedures and trained their pilots accordingly?
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Every guy who's had an engine failure said the plane was easier to fly than the simulator. We assume it's the slight pitch, roll and yaw forces you can feel that a simulator cannot completely replicate.
For risk and cost reasons simulators are the way to go.
Back in the second half of the 1960's, my parents built a new house in a development on the edge of my hometown. The airport was ~5 miles away, and we could literally see it out our back window (sadly they eventually built up behind us blocking the view 
). Back then, a major US operator did pilot training there - I spent untold hours sitting on the dirt mounds behind my house watching 727s do simulated engine out approaches, go-arounds, touch and goes, etc. (the smoke trails behind the JT8Ds made it readily apparent if the engine was being used - I've always assumed the engines were at idle rather than being shutdown). Effective I'm sure, also rather expensive and undoubtedly rather risky. The landing pattern routed them directly over all four schools in my neighborhood (two elementary, junior high, and high school) as well as my house. We used to joke that if one went down, they wanted it to be sure it made headlines 
.
We do much of our flight testing out of Moses Lake (central Washington) which used to be a SAC bomber base with a long runway. Thirty years ago, we would share the airfield with JAL, who kept at least one 747 there for crew training (during a 767 flight test/photo shoot, we very nearly had a mid-air with a JAL 747 that was coming in for a landing while we were taking off the opposite direction
).
Of course now days, nearly all of that training is done in simulators - with obvious cost savings and it's certainly much safer (I've yet to hear of anyone getting hurt when they crashed the simulator
). But I've also noticed that many (most?) simulators are fixed - full motion simulators being far more costly.
Have we gone too far in the simulation direction?
). Back then, a major US operator did pilot training there - I spent untold hours sitting on the dirt mounds behind my house watching 727s do simulated engine out approaches, go-arounds, touch and goes, etc. (the smoke trails behind the JT8Ds made it readily apparent if the engine was being used - I've always assumed the engines were at idle rather than being shutdown). Effective I'm sure, also rather expensive and undoubtedly rather risky. The landing pattern routed them directly over all four schools in my neighborhood (two elementary, junior high, and high school) as well as my house. We used to joke that if one went down, they wanted it to be sure it made headlines .We do much of our flight testing out of Moses Lake (central Washington) which used to be a SAC bomber base with a long runway. Thirty years ago, we would share the airfield with JAL, who kept at least one 747 there for crew training (during a 767 flight test/photo shoot, we very nearly had a mid-air with a JAL 747 that was coming in for a landing while we were taking off the opposite direction
).Of course now days, nearly all of that training is done in simulators - with obvious cost savings and it's certainly much safer (I've yet to hear of anyone getting hurt when they crashed the simulator
). But I've also noticed that many (most?) simulators are fixed - full motion simulators being far more costly. Have we gone too far in the simulation direction?
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Have we gone too far in the simulation direction?
But pressure in a situation of shear disbelief ("f*ck, did this really just happen???") and fear ("holy s#it, now my bum is really under threat ....") is completely different and it this very pressure that can make a difference.
I am by no means advocating astronautical training with upsets and so on, but I am no longer sure if more automation, more techniques trained in the sim, even more sops (that mainly please managers and regulators) will help mitigating the reduced experience and hands on training. There must be a better balance than what appears lately.
Originally Posted by RetiredA4
That JAL B777 Go-Around was scary.
Glofish, are you glad they didn't do a GPWS manoeuvre? I am.
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I am by no means advocating astronautical training with upsets and so on, but I am no longer sure if more automation, more techniques trained in the sim, even more sops (that mainly please managers and regulators) will help mitigating the reduced experience and hands on training. There must be a better balance than what appears lately.