EgyptAir 804 disappears from radar Paris-Cairo
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Chances of locator beacons transmittors working
1) Fixed ELTs(Qty 2) - Works only in case of over land crashes.
2) Portable ELT(Qty 1) - Someone has to turn it on and not under water
3) Beacons on rafts(Qty 8) - Need salt water contact to activate, but has to be above water level to transmit.
4) ULBs on CVR/FDR(Qty 2) - Underwater only, limited range, limited life.
Big assumption these are maintained properly.
So sonar sweeps and ROV visual searches have better probability than these.
2) Portable ELT(Qty 1) - Someone has to turn it on and not under water
3) Beacons on rafts(Qty 8) - Need salt water contact to activate, but has to be above water level to transmit.
4) ULBs on CVR/FDR(Qty 2) - Underwater only, limited range, limited life.
Big assumption these are maintained properly.
So sonar sweeps and ROV visual searches have better probability than these.
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you would expect the search to 'spiral outward' then, say filling a circle of 25 nm diameter, perhaps Cazalet33 can say something about this,
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Looking at the marinetraffic web site, the PMS Burullus has simply vanished without trace. Its position was last reported, what, 48 hours ago.
In the past half hour or so a French Warship described as "9014" (no other details given) has now appeared on the same bit of Mediterranean. As yet there is only one position report so there is no track to see. It is shown as heading just north of west at 10 kts.
In the past half hour or so a French Warship described as "9014" (no other details given) has now appeared on the same bit of Mediterranean. As yet there is only one position report so there is no track to see. It is shown as heading just north of west at 10 kts.
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During the search for AF447 they used a French nuclear submarine...
source
Submarine begins search for Air France jet's black boxes - World - CBC News
Are they doing it now secretly ?
source
Submarine begins search for Air France jet's black boxes - World - CBC News
Are they doing it now secretly ?
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1) Fixed ELTs(Qty 2) - Works only in case of over land crashes.
2) Portable ELT(Qty 1) - Someone has to turn it on and not under water
3) Beacons on rafts(Qty 8) - Need salt water contact to activate, but has to be above water level to transmit.
4) ULBs on CVR/FDR(Qty 2) - Underwater only, limited range, limited life.
Big assumption these are maintained properly.
2) Portable ELT(Qty 1) - Someone has to turn it on and not under water
3) Beacons on rafts(Qty 8) - Need salt water contact to activate, but has to be above water level to transmit.
4) ULBs on CVR/FDR(Qty 2) - Underwater only, limited range, limited life.
Big assumption these are maintained properly.
What you need is a device that is fitted to the plane that uses very little power whilst listening for someone out to locate it, then when it detects a signal of someone or something hunting it down, it responds and uses its battery up when it knows that there is something close by looking, and picking up its transmission signals
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Looking at the marinetraffic web site, the PMS Burullus has simply vanished without trace. Its position was last reported, what, 48 hours ago.
This will keep the news helos and other aircraft from interfering...
2 days ago.
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Ideally a beacon should transmit every so often last known position & depth (5,10,30,60 minutes?), but be listening as well. When it detects a trigger signal, it will go into full transmit for 1,3,6 hrs? It would then revert to the previous mode to save battery until triggered again. It would be good if it transmitted the received trigger signal strength too. The trick is that the beacon receiver will be affected similarly as the surface receivers are. Signals can be blocked by terrain as well as thermoclines (temperature layers in the water that can reflect/refract signals), however the surface trigger transmitters can have a lot more power. Of course ideally you don't want to be transmitting whilst trying to listen, so the beacon would need to know to transmit at a set minute of the hour (:00?)
In this scenario you could drop 100's (1000's?) of buoys with the transmitter & receiver over the suspected area, thus covering a much larger area more quickly. Some of the buoys could be designed to sink to a specified depth & the return to the surface (or part of the buoy) to transmit a found beacon.
At the moment it seems a bit old fashioned the way searching is done. Even today 1000 receivers could be made, dropped on the area, slowly sink down to the seabed & then if one of them detects a pinger, release a transmitter back to the surface & transmit its location & depth of detection. Hopefully several will pick-up the signal & a map can be made to narrow the location further.
Can we do better with today's technology than we are at the moment?
In this scenario you could drop 100's (1000's?) of buoys with the transmitter & receiver over the suspected area, thus covering a much larger area more quickly. Some of the buoys could be designed to sink to a specified depth & the return to the surface (or part of the buoy) to transmit a found beacon.
At the moment it seems a bit old fashioned the way searching is done. Even today 1000 receivers could be made, dropped on the area, slowly sink down to the seabed & then if one of them detects a pinger, release a transmitter back to the surface & transmit its location & depth of detection. Hopefully several will pick-up the signal & a map can be made to narrow the location further.
Can we do better with today's technology than we are at the moment?
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Ideally a beacon should transmit every so often last known position & depth (5,10,30,60 minutes?), but be listening as well....
Of course ideally you don't want to be transmitting whilst trying to listen, so the beacon would need to know to transmit at a set minute of the hour (:00?)
Of course ideally you don't want to be transmitting whilst trying to listen, so the beacon would need to know to transmit at a set minute of the hour (:00?)
This method enabled the automatic keying of a low efficiency medium power W/T transmitter powered by batteries for a lot longer than would otherwise be the case.
The Wall Street Journal writes about the history of the avionics bay smoke detector:
Smoke Alerts Like That on Flight 804 Have Raised Questions in the Past
(Paywall, use this Google search to try to circumvent: Google Search for Article)
Smoke Alerts Like That on Flight 804 Have Raised Questions in the Past
(Paywall, use this Google search to try to circumvent: Google Search for Article)
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WSJ article May 27-28, 2016
Another link to the WSJ article titled, Smoke Alerts Like That on Flight 804 Have Raised Questions in the Past
http://on.wsj.com/1OSGvk0
NTSB links on this incident:
Current Synopsis, Preliminary:
http://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.av...no=2&pgsize=20
Dockets:
Accident ID DCA11IA040 Mode Aviation occurred on April 04, 2011 in New Orleans, LA United States Last Modified on January 18, 2012 14:01 Public Released on January 18, 2012 14:01 Total 49 document items
I'm wondering why the final report has not been released.
http://on.wsj.com/1OSGvk0
NTSB links on this incident:
Current Synopsis, Preliminary:
http://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.av...no=2&pgsize=20
Dockets:
Accident ID DCA11IA040 Mode Aviation occurred on April 04, 2011 in New Orleans, LA United States Last Modified on January 18, 2012 14:01 Public Released on January 18, 2012 14:01 Total 49 document items
I'm wondering why the final report has not been released.
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ELT transmitted two bursts (NAOO)
At 2.36am (Local) NOAA “received two bursts from the beacon, but was unable to make a location”. “They received the beacon ID and were able to correlate that with the beacon that was on MS 804”.
Satellites Captured Doomed EgyptAir Jet?s Distress Signals - Bloomberg
Business: Washington Post Business Page, Business News
Satellites Captured Doomed EgyptAir Jet?s Distress Signals - Bloomberg
Business: Washington Post Business Page, Business News
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Thank you thf, for bringing this up, and airman1900 for linking the NTSB reports. It's a very intersting reading about smoke detection system and related procedure.
Concerning MS 804, beside using optical detectors (see Airbus statement), I would add that the smoke warning(s) were triggered several hours after take off. At this point, such warnings would be very unlikely resulting from prior ground contamination of smoke detectors, which is what happen in most cases.
Also, ACARS of MS 804 are reporting two warnings at 0:26 and 0:27 (Lavatory and Avionics), which make it even less likely that they were related to nearly simultaneous faults of two detectors reporting spurious alarms. They are related to different compartiments and systems.
Moreover, both warnings were possibly triggered by cockpit adjacent areas (Lavatory A door is only a few centimenters away from the cockpit door while the avionics bay is right below the cockpit's floor) ; on top of it, the avionics vent system is using cockpit air to refresh both instrument panel and the whole bay, where the avionics smoke detector check the exhaust ducts for particles.
Finally, the two system faults reported at 0:26 and 0:28 are telling something related to the cockpit right windows heating sensors (sliding first, then fixed one) ; both window sensors faulted... but not the right windshield which is also heated by the same WHC-2. Hence, one could think that it wasn't related to the state of WHC-2 in the bay which was still working on the right windshield and triggered no fault on its own. In case of such a single fault reported, one would suspect the sensor first, the computer next and the wiring last. Now, if the computer is not at fault, we are still left with two faults with different wirings, sensors, and circuit breakers...
So far, and without any further evidence, I would rather suspect that those smoke warnings reported were actually real ones ; also, it seems to be more likely due to an external system cause, probably in cockpit, like a sudden surge of temp close to the right sliding windows ; the original event would have to last for at least 1-3 minutes (0:26 to 0:28) in order to trigger the second sensor fault on the fixed right window.
Considering that the investigation is in possession of the full ACARS content, they would have more details on each time stamping; they would also be able to tell if any probable delay happened during the string of ACARS between 0:26 and 0:29. But based on what we have, it's still possible to make some sense out of the first faults reported.
Of course, it's not the only scenario as one could also suspect a more complicated sequence, like a wiring combustion or electrical issue contaminating one and second right window heating system. It's only less likely because it would alert the crew of something wrong (like smell) in the cockpit, and probably well before this point.
Now, looking at any previous report of incident at cruise involving cockpit windows overheating in A320 might be more interesting than spurious smoke warning events, in order to understand if this could make more sense than an external surge of temp in cockpit.
Concerning MS 804, beside using optical detectors (see Airbus statement), I would add that the smoke warning(s) were triggered several hours after take off. At this point, such warnings would be very unlikely resulting from prior ground contamination of smoke detectors, which is what happen in most cases.
Also, ACARS of MS 804 are reporting two warnings at 0:26 and 0:27 (Lavatory and Avionics), which make it even less likely that they were related to nearly simultaneous faults of two detectors reporting spurious alarms. They are related to different compartiments and systems.
Moreover, both warnings were possibly triggered by cockpit adjacent areas (Lavatory A door is only a few centimenters away from the cockpit door while the avionics bay is right below the cockpit's floor) ; on top of it, the avionics vent system is using cockpit air to refresh both instrument panel and the whole bay, where the avionics smoke detector check the exhaust ducts for particles.
Finally, the two system faults reported at 0:26 and 0:28 are telling something related to the cockpit right windows heating sensors (sliding first, then fixed one) ; both window sensors faulted... but not the right windshield which is also heated by the same WHC-2. Hence, one could think that it wasn't related to the state of WHC-2 in the bay which was still working on the right windshield and triggered no fault on its own. In case of such a single fault reported, one would suspect the sensor first, the computer next and the wiring last. Now, if the computer is not at fault, we are still left with two faults with different wirings, sensors, and circuit breakers...
So far, and without any further evidence, I would rather suspect that those smoke warnings reported were actually real ones ; also, it seems to be more likely due to an external system cause, probably in cockpit, like a sudden surge of temp close to the right sliding windows ; the original event would have to last for at least 1-3 minutes (0:26 to 0:28) in order to trigger the second sensor fault on the fixed right window.
Considering that the investigation is in possession of the full ACARS content, they would have more details on each time stamping; they would also be able to tell if any probable delay happened during the string of ACARS between 0:26 and 0:29. But based on what we have, it's still possible to make some sense out of the first faults reported.
Of course, it's not the only scenario as one could also suspect a more complicated sequence, like a wiring combustion or electrical issue contaminating one and second right window heating system. It's only less likely because it would alert the crew of something wrong (like smell) in the cockpit, and probably well before this point.
Now, looking at any previous report of incident at cruise involving cockpit windows overheating in A320 might be more interesting than spurious smoke warning events, in order to understand if this could make more sense than an external surge of temp in cockpit.
Last edited by takata; 28th May 2016 at 23:09.
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Takata.
Concerning AS 804, beside using optical detectors (see Airbus statement), I would add that the smoke warning(s) were triggered several hours after take off. At this point, such warnings would be very unlikely resulting from prior ground contamination of smoke detectors, which is what happen in most cases.
Concerning AS 804, beside using optical detectors (see Airbus statement), I would add that the smoke warning(s) were triggered several hours after take off. At this point, such warnings would be very unlikely resulting from prior ground contamination of smoke detectors, which is what happen in most cases.
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I would suspect the sensor or the wiring well before assuming that there is a computer issue. Of course, sometimes it is wiring to the computer that is the problem.
It might be interesting to consider that the wires for temp probes are usually significantly smaller than any other wires in a wiring bundle and are thus the first to melt through if the bundle overheats for some reason. (Those tiny wires can also be the devil to crimp although I suspect in aircraft standards are a bit higher than for the marine stuff that I deal with.)
Slightly related case in point -- this week the state of charge gauge on our electric utility vehicle (think 'glorified golf cart') failed. It is cheap junk and since the car ran fine and the charger reported no issues I was going to disregard it and replace later. Actually thinking about this thread and the importance of checking out all electrical faults, I opened the battery compartment and found that one battery had been venting acid, eating through the copper connectors. The one that was eaten completely through first was the small one for the state of charge meter. The big ones that carry a lot of amps @ 48V were partially eaten through.
It might be interesting to consider that the wires for temp probes are usually significantly smaller than any other wires in a wiring bundle and are thus the first to melt through if the bundle overheats for some reason. (Those tiny wires can also be the devil to crimp although I suspect in aircraft standards are a bit higher than for the marine stuff that I deal with.)
Slightly related case in point -- this week the state of charge gauge on our electric utility vehicle (think 'glorified golf cart') failed. It is cheap junk and since the car ran fine and the charger reported no issues I was going to disregard it and replace later. Actually thinking about this thread and the importance of checking out all electrical faults, I opened the battery compartment and found that one battery had been venting acid, eating through the copper connectors. The one that was eaten completely through first was the small one for the state of charge meter. The big ones that carry a lot of amps @ 48V were partially eaten through.
As a passenger you are probably not driven mad by all the mis-information dressed up as factual information and delivered by flight simmers who research stuff on the net then pretend they are professional pilots.
To a passenger it comes across as knowledgable and experienced, to actual airline pilots it is obviously rubbish.
Personally I have no problem at all with pax who post here if they preface their posts with that fact, or, if they don't give advice or operational opinions.
To a passenger it comes across as knowledgable and experienced, to actual airline pilots it is obviously rubbish.
Personally I have no problem at all with pax who post here if they preface their posts with that fact, or, if they don't give advice or operational opinions.
Another link to the WSJ article titled, Smoke Alerts Like That on Flight 804 Have Raised Questions in the Past
Smoke Alerts Like That on Flight 804 Have Raised Questions in the Past - WSJ
NTSB links on this incident:
Current Synopsis, Preliminary:
http://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.av...no=2&pgsize=20
Dockets:
Accident ID DCA11IA040 Mode Aviation occurred on April 04, 2011 in New Orleans, LA United States Last Modified on January 18, 2012 14:01 Public Released on January 18, 2012 14:01 Total 49 document items
I'm wondering why the final report has not been released.
Smoke Alerts Like That on Flight 804 Have Raised Questions in the Past - WSJ
NTSB links on this incident:
Current Synopsis, Preliminary:
http://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.av...no=2&pgsize=20
Dockets:
Accident ID DCA11IA040 Mode Aviation occurred on April 04, 2011 in New Orleans, LA United States Last Modified on January 18, 2012 14:01 Public Released on January 18, 2012 14:01 Total 49 document items
I'm wondering why the final report has not been released.
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contamination
Silver, sorry but my comment about ground contamination wasn't related to your point.
I was refering to NTSB discussion involving spurious smoke detection which is all about the Avionics bay fire detection (see above NTSB report linked) and the following Airbus procedure ; it's not about the toilets that one can avoid being flagged while smoking.
Indeed, most of false AVNCS SMOKE triggered in flight were due to contamination on the ground released after the take-off phase. And it's an old discussion lasting since a while.
My other point was to underline that both Lavatories and Avionics were detected in MS 804 ACARS, almost simultaneously, and several hours after take-off. It's unlikely related with someone trying to smoke in lavatories that get the smoke detector warning in Avionics bay triggered.
TFU 26.15.15.001 in July 1999
*DESCRIPTION: SOME OPERATORS HAVE REPORTED MANY CASES OF SPURIOUS AVIONICS SMOKE WARNINGS, LEADING TO "AVIONICS SMOKE" OR "LAND ASAP" ECAM MESSAGES. THESE WARNINGS HAVE MAINLY BEEN REPORTED ON GROUND, HOWEVER THERE HAVE BEEN A FEW CASES GENERATED IN FLIGHT, SHORTLY AFTER TAKE-OFF AND GEAR RETRACTION.
*CONSEQUENCES: N/A
*INVESTIGATION STATUS: THE AIRCRAFT FLIGHT PHASE CONFIGURATION WHERE AVIONICS SMOKE WARNINGS HAVE BEEN GENERATED FALL INTO TWO MAIN CATEGORIES; ON GROUND AND TAKE-OFF.
- ON GROUND - WITH THE AIRCRAFT ON GROUND THE AVIONICS VENTILATION IS SET TO 'OPEN LOOP', WHEREBY OUTSIDE AIR IS USED TO PROVIDE VENTILATION FOR THE AVIONICS COMPARTMENT. IN ENVIRONMENTS WHERE HIGH HUMIDITY AND/OR CONTAMINATION EXISTS (JET EFFLUX/BLOWN DUST ETC). IT IS POSSIBLE FOR THE SENSITIVITY OF THE AVIONICS SMOKE DETECTOR TO BE AFFECTED CREATING AN ALARM CONDITION.
- TAKE-OFF - THE AVIONICS SMOKE WARNINGS ARE INHIBITED FROM 80KTS TO 1500 FEET. DURING THIS TIME IF THE AVIONICS DETECTOR GOES INTO ALARM THEN A 'LAND ASAP' (IN AMBER) IS GENERATED ON ECAM. THE ONLY WAY TO IDENTIFY THE CAUSE OF THE AMBER WARNING IS BY DEPRESSING THE RECALL BUTTON ON THE ECAM CONTROL PANEL. INVESTIGATIONS HAVE DETERMINED THAT SOME OF THESE 'LAND ASAP' WARNINGS HAVE BEEN GENERATED DUE TO A PREVIOUSLY LATCHED, BUT INHIBITED AVIONICS SMOKE WARNING THAT HAD BEEN GENERATED WHILST THE AIRCRAFT WAS ON GROUND. INVESTIGATIONS HAVE SHOWN THAT THE IONIZATION TYPE SMOKE DETECTORS SENSITIVITY IS SUBJECT TO THE AMBIENT TEMPERATURE, PRESSURE AND AIR CONTAMINATION WITH MOISTURE, DUST OR POLLUTION. THE HIGHEST SENSITIVITY TRANSLATED INTO A VOLTAGE SHIFT BEING ON THE GROUND AND DURING TAKE-OFF.
*INTERIM SOLUTION: N/A
*MAINTENANCE ADVICE: IN CASE OF AN 'AVIONICS SMOKE' WARNING TRIGGERED AND LATCHED ON GROUND, FWC1 AND FWC 2 SHOULD BE RESETED ONE AT A TIME BY MEANS OF THEIR C/B (3WW C/B 49VU FOR FWC1 AND 2WW C/B 121VU FOR FWC2). THIS WILL CLEAR THE LATCHED CONDITION OF THE WARNING IF THE AVIONICS SMOKE CONDITIONS HAVE DISAPPEARED. THEN AN UNDUE 'LAND ASAP' ALARM WILL BE AVOIDED. OPS ADVICE: N/A REPERCUSSION ON A/C DISPATCH: N/A PERMANENT OR FINAL SOLUTION: A NEW GENERATION OF SMOKE DETECTOR PN CGDU2000-00 USING AN OPTICAL TECHNOLOGY HAS BEEN DEVELOPED IN ORDER TO REPLACE THE 'OLD' GENERATION OF IONIZATION TYPE SMOKE DETECTOR. THIS NEW GENERATION TYPE OF SMOKE DETECTOR HAS A DIFFERENT TRIGGERING PRINCIPLE AND IS THEREFORE NOT AFFECTED BY THE TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE CONDITIONS. IN SERVICE EVALUATION (6 MONTH PERIOD) OF AVIONICS OPTICAL SMOKE DETECTOR PN CGDU2000-00 HAS BEEN PROPOSED TO TWO OPERATORS. DEDICATED SB A320-26-1052 HAS BEEN RELEASED MID JULY 2000. THE IN SERVICE EVALUATION HAS BEEN COMPLETED SUCCESSFULLY. SB A320-26-1052 REVISION HAS BEEN RELEASED THE 30TH OF AUGUST TO INCORPORATE ALL AIRLINES IN THE EFFECTIVITY.
I was refering to NTSB discussion involving spurious smoke detection which is all about the Avionics bay fire detection (see above NTSB report linked) and the following Airbus procedure ; it's not about the toilets that one can avoid being flagged while smoking.
Indeed, most of false AVNCS SMOKE triggered in flight were due to contamination on the ground released after the take-off phase. And it's an old discussion lasting since a while.
My other point was to underline that both Lavatories and Avionics were detected in MS 804 ACARS, almost simultaneously, and several hours after take-off. It's unlikely related with someone trying to smoke in lavatories that get the smoke detector warning in Avionics bay triggered.
TFU 26.15.15.001 in July 1999
*DESCRIPTION: SOME OPERATORS HAVE REPORTED MANY CASES OF SPURIOUS AVIONICS SMOKE WARNINGS, LEADING TO "AVIONICS SMOKE" OR "LAND ASAP" ECAM MESSAGES. THESE WARNINGS HAVE MAINLY BEEN REPORTED ON GROUND, HOWEVER THERE HAVE BEEN A FEW CASES GENERATED IN FLIGHT, SHORTLY AFTER TAKE-OFF AND GEAR RETRACTION.
*CONSEQUENCES: N/A
*INVESTIGATION STATUS: THE AIRCRAFT FLIGHT PHASE CONFIGURATION WHERE AVIONICS SMOKE WARNINGS HAVE BEEN GENERATED FALL INTO TWO MAIN CATEGORIES; ON GROUND AND TAKE-OFF.
- ON GROUND - WITH THE AIRCRAFT ON GROUND THE AVIONICS VENTILATION IS SET TO 'OPEN LOOP', WHEREBY OUTSIDE AIR IS USED TO PROVIDE VENTILATION FOR THE AVIONICS COMPARTMENT. IN ENVIRONMENTS WHERE HIGH HUMIDITY AND/OR CONTAMINATION EXISTS (JET EFFLUX/BLOWN DUST ETC). IT IS POSSIBLE FOR THE SENSITIVITY OF THE AVIONICS SMOKE DETECTOR TO BE AFFECTED CREATING AN ALARM CONDITION.
- TAKE-OFF - THE AVIONICS SMOKE WARNINGS ARE INHIBITED FROM 80KTS TO 1500 FEET. DURING THIS TIME IF THE AVIONICS DETECTOR GOES INTO ALARM THEN A 'LAND ASAP' (IN AMBER) IS GENERATED ON ECAM. THE ONLY WAY TO IDENTIFY THE CAUSE OF THE AMBER WARNING IS BY DEPRESSING THE RECALL BUTTON ON THE ECAM CONTROL PANEL. INVESTIGATIONS HAVE DETERMINED THAT SOME OF THESE 'LAND ASAP' WARNINGS HAVE BEEN GENERATED DUE TO A PREVIOUSLY LATCHED, BUT INHIBITED AVIONICS SMOKE WARNING THAT HAD BEEN GENERATED WHILST THE AIRCRAFT WAS ON GROUND. INVESTIGATIONS HAVE SHOWN THAT THE IONIZATION TYPE SMOKE DETECTORS SENSITIVITY IS SUBJECT TO THE AMBIENT TEMPERATURE, PRESSURE AND AIR CONTAMINATION WITH MOISTURE, DUST OR POLLUTION. THE HIGHEST SENSITIVITY TRANSLATED INTO A VOLTAGE SHIFT BEING ON THE GROUND AND DURING TAKE-OFF.
*INTERIM SOLUTION: N/A
*MAINTENANCE ADVICE: IN CASE OF AN 'AVIONICS SMOKE' WARNING TRIGGERED AND LATCHED ON GROUND, FWC1 AND FWC 2 SHOULD BE RESETED ONE AT A TIME BY MEANS OF THEIR C/B (3WW C/B 49VU FOR FWC1 AND 2WW C/B 121VU FOR FWC2). THIS WILL CLEAR THE LATCHED CONDITION OF THE WARNING IF THE AVIONICS SMOKE CONDITIONS HAVE DISAPPEARED. THEN AN UNDUE 'LAND ASAP' ALARM WILL BE AVOIDED. OPS ADVICE: N/A REPERCUSSION ON A/C DISPATCH: N/A PERMANENT OR FINAL SOLUTION: A NEW GENERATION OF SMOKE DETECTOR PN CGDU2000-00 USING AN OPTICAL TECHNOLOGY HAS BEEN DEVELOPED IN ORDER TO REPLACE THE 'OLD' GENERATION OF IONIZATION TYPE SMOKE DETECTOR. THIS NEW GENERATION TYPE OF SMOKE DETECTOR HAS A DIFFERENT TRIGGERING PRINCIPLE AND IS THEREFORE NOT AFFECTED BY THE TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE CONDITIONS. IN SERVICE EVALUATION (6 MONTH PERIOD) OF AVIONICS OPTICAL SMOKE DETECTOR PN CGDU2000-00 HAS BEEN PROPOSED TO TWO OPERATORS. DEDICATED SB A320-26-1052 HAS BEEN RELEASED MID JULY 2000. THE IN SERVICE EVALUATION HAS BEEN COMPLETED SUCCESSFULLY. SB A320-26-1052 REVISION HAS BEEN RELEASED THE 30TH OF AUGUST TO INCORPORATE ALL AIRLINES IN THE EFFECTIVITY.