EgyptAir 804 disappears from radar Paris-Cairo
@ Lurker40752: The fault identified in the Jetstar incident affects aircraft fitted with windows manufactured between January 2007 and October 2008. SU-GCC was manufactured in 2003 so not affected (unless a window replacement occurred from that batch).
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How about? How about? How about? How about waiting until the recorders have been found and analysed by trained experts in the field of accident investigation?
I was thinking of posting regarding an anti-terrorism theory but why bother ... I can outsmart people but I'm damned if I'll outstupid them!
Psychophysiological entity
The current pumped into the screens seems to be astonishingly high. In the 70's I had an incandescent lump metal hit me from a poor side window connector. It came from the opposite DV window as it was closed.
One night, despite being pretty quick with getting the windshield heat off, fragments of hot glass were spitting onto our clothes.
One night, despite being pretty quick with getting the windshield heat off, fragments of hot glass were spitting onto our clothes.
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Cheers Above the Clouds, exactly the answer I was looking for as well. I understand it would have to be a class D extinguisher, may I ask what the composition is, for example is it a Copper or Graphite based extinguisher?
Scheduled timings (gate-to-gate) for SU-GCC's rotations were:
.....According to FlightRadar24, it spent 1 hour 20 minutes on the ground at Tunis (09:33Z to 10:53Z), which is broadly consistent with the schedule, though bear in mind that the 1:20 includes taxi in/out as FR24's timings are for landing and takeoff (though it refers to them as ATA/ATD).
.....According to FlightRadar24, it spent 1 hour 20 minutes on the ground at Tunis (09:33Z to 10:53Z), which is broadly consistent with the schedule, though bear in mind that the 1:20 includes taxi in/out as FR24's timings are for landing and takeoff (though it refers to them as ATA/ATD).
Clearly there's a trend amongst those who are able to interpret the available information, which is pretty meagre, to discount malicious action but I don't see how or why it can be discounted completely. Tunisia itself, whilst currently "quiet" is actually in a very precarious state.
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After using the fire ext to stop the fire the offending lithium runaway is put in to a specially made sealable fire proof bag that can be filled with up to 5 litres of water to keep the lithium battery cooled, then the bag would stowed in a safe area usually a metal container in the galley.
However, I work _a lot_ with LiPo batteries (the kind in the iPad for example), and I would seriously recommend that you talk to someone about those procedures.
A fire-extinguisher will only pause a lithium fire. Once oxygen reaches the battery, it will flame up again.
Also, putting a lithium based battery into water is questionable at best, as water has plenty of oxygen in it. It might contain the flames, but it might not.
The industry standard (for us that makes the devices, not the end-users obviously) is to have a two buckets half-full of sand. When on fire, toss the battery into one, and pour the sand from the other bucket on top of it.
There are also "LiPo sacks" that are made of fire-resistant materials, designed specifically to contain LiPo fires. Some users that push the batteries a lot (more risk), charge in these sacks. I don't know how you use your iPads, but I'm guessing that this will be inconvenient and/or not allowed.
Sorry for the OT. Couldn't figure out the if there's a PM function on here.
Now, back to watching quietly
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Thanks @Andrasz there seems to have been multiple reports of windshield overheating in A320/330 spanning many years, an AD was issued back in '03 for the same concern.
@ skirdlov
The chances for any malicious device to have been planted at any previous stopover decreases exponentially as one goes back (Paris being the most likely). Paris, Cairo & Tunis all have their fair share of loonies, in this respect I would not single out any. Also not mentioned here previously, the role of those three security personnel on board is not limited to in-flight, they also maintain ramp security during turn-arounds, and they are the ones who actually open/close the cargo doors. Anyone trying to gain access to the avionics bay would have to dodge them. Not saying it cannot be done, but rather unlikely during a short turnaround.
For those suspecting the catering trolleys, they undergo a security screening prior to loading (lust like checked luggage) at most airports I'm aware of, Cairo certainly included. Again, things have been missed by screeners before, but still...
Last, Egyptair is not an obvious target. Inside Egypt it is a National institution, and while there are several groups opposed to the government, their main targets are the armed forces or tourism infrastructure. It could be expected that an Egyptair flight would mainly be full with Egyptians, not foreigners (as was the case), it would be a very atypical target for any local group. For foreign groups, targeting a western carrier with the same effort creates much more impact. The terrorism theory does not really add up, especially as there have been no claims in the past 3 days. One may always argue about the lone perpetrator, but getting a device on board an aircraft these days requires considerable skill and organization beyond the means of a single untrained fanatic.
The chances for any malicious device to have been planted at any previous stopover decreases exponentially as one goes back (Paris being the most likely). Paris, Cairo & Tunis all have their fair share of loonies, in this respect I would not single out any. Also not mentioned here previously, the role of those three security personnel on board is not limited to in-flight, they also maintain ramp security during turn-arounds, and they are the ones who actually open/close the cargo doors. Anyone trying to gain access to the avionics bay would have to dodge them. Not saying it cannot be done, but rather unlikely during a short turnaround.
For those suspecting the catering trolleys, they undergo a security screening prior to loading (lust like checked luggage) at most airports I'm aware of, Cairo certainly included. Again, things have been missed by screeners before, but still...
Last, Egyptair is not an obvious target. Inside Egypt it is a National institution, and while there are several groups opposed to the government, their main targets are the armed forces or tourism infrastructure. It could be expected that an Egyptair flight would mainly be full with Egyptians, not foreigners (as was the case), it would be a very atypical target for any local group. For foreign groups, targeting a western carrier with the same effort creates much more impact. The terrorism theory does not really add up, especially as there have been no claims in the past 3 days. One may always argue about the lone perpetrator, but getting a device on board an aircraft these days requires considerable skill and organization beyond the means of a single untrained fanatic.
Despite the replies above normal strength spirits are NOT flammable. Spirit will only sustain combustion (the definition for flammable, no?) at a strength of about 100' proof or over.
Sure, under special circumstances, heated or chucked them on a heated surface the alcohol may flash off and burn - briefly - but then so would wine to a lesser degree. On an aeroplane the far, far more serious problem would be the heat source required to achieve this brief flame.
The bottom line is that spirits are not what is conventionally considered flammable and do not constitute a fire hazard under any normal circumstance.
Sure, under special circumstances, heated or chucked them on a heated surface the alcohol may flash off and burn - briefly - but then so would wine to a lesser degree. On an aeroplane the far, far more serious problem would be the heat source required to achieve this brief flame.
The bottom line is that spirits are not what is conventionally considered flammable and do not constitute a fire hazard under any normal circumstance.
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Describe the Smoke configuration of the avionics A320 ventilation system.
-- Used in response to the Avionics Equipment Ventilation Computer (AEVC) sensing smoke in the avionics compartment.
-- The BLOWER and EXTRACTpbs are placed to the OVRD (override) position inaccordance with ECAM procedure.
-- This closes the inlet valve, stops the blower fan, and isolates the cargo under floor and aircraft skin heat exchanger.
-- Conditioned air is provided by the air conditioning system through an air conditioning inlet valve.
-- The extract fan draws the conditioned air through the avionics compartment, and expels it through the small internal flap within the closed extract valve.
Source:Airbus 320 Part-1 (of 3) Flashcards - Cram.com
Wouldn't feeding the fire with fresh air make it more intense? I also read that the flight deck has a halon portable fire extinguisher, any reason why inaccessible areas of aircraft don't have inbuilt halon extinguishers?
-- Used in response to the Avionics Equipment Ventilation Computer (AEVC) sensing smoke in the avionics compartment.
-- The BLOWER and EXTRACTpbs are placed to the OVRD (override) position inaccordance with ECAM procedure.
-- This closes the inlet valve, stops the blower fan, and isolates the cargo under floor and aircraft skin heat exchanger.
-- Conditioned air is provided by the air conditioning system through an air conditioning inlet valve.
-- The extract fan draws the conditioned air through the avionics compartment, and expels it through the small internal flap within the closed extract valve.
Source:Airbus 320 Part-1 (of 3) Flashcards - Cram.com
Wouldn't feeding the fire with fresh air make it more intense? I also read that the flight deck has a halon portable fire extinguisher, any reason why inaccessible areas of aircraft don't have inbuilt halon extinguishers?
But anyone is, of course, free to come up with their own definition.
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Despite the replies above normal strength spirits are NOT flammable.
5% (strong beer) 62 °C
10% (wine) 49 °C
40% (whisky) 26 °C
100% (pure spirit) 13 °C
Whisky is not ignitable at temperature when it is drinkable :-)
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Question:
From a strict "Configuration Management" point of view.
Assuming that the airline provides Ipads/laptops to the pilots.
Are these Ipads/laptops considered to be part of:
a. the Configuration of the airplane,
b. the 'configuration' of the pilot (dont know a better 'word' to described this),
c. part of the 'configuration' of the pilot when entering the cockpit, but becoming part of the Configuration of the airplane by either c1.connecting the ipad/laptop to airplane power and/or airplane network, or c2. inserting part and/or serial number in an airplane database or airplane carried document/log.
From a strict "Configuration Management" point of view.
Assuming that the airline provides Ipads/laptops to the pilots.
Are these Ipads/laptops considered to be part of:
a. the Configuration of the airplane,
b. the 'configuration' of the pilot (dont know a better 'word' to described this),
c. part of the 'configuration' of the pilot when entering the cockpit, but becoming part of the Configuration of the airplane by either c1.connecting the ipad/laptop to airplane power and/or airplane network, or c2. inserting part and/or serial number in an airplane database or airplane carried document/log.
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Given the close location of the avionics bay to the cockpit, the obvious critical paths of data transfer between the two and that it appears the cockpit floor is not sealed from immunity to smoke eminating from the bay; it is concerning to learn that there is no supression in the avionics bay.
They must have their reasons and done the necessary risk analysis and effects etc and certification clearly is not required. Surprising nontheless.
They must have their reasons and done the necessary risk analysis and effects etc and certification clearly is not required. Surprising nontheless.
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@Local Variation
I am not sure (like so many on here) but fire suppression in an avionics bay is surely liable to do an awful lot of damage, if triggered, as these things often are, falsely.
I stand to be corrected by someone more current.
I am not sure (like so many on here) but fire suppression in an avionics bay is surely liable to do an awful lot of damage, if triggered, as these things often are, falsely.
I stand to be corrected by someone more current.
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[QUOTE=andrasz;9384639]@aussiepax: read...think...write... in that order
@Ian W: A severe fire needs two things - etc.............
The Fire Triangle.
Fire (not just on a an aircraft) needs 3 things - heat, fuel and oxygen.
@Ian W: A severe fire needs two things - etc.............
The Fire Triangle.
Fire (not just on a an aircraft) needs 3 things - heat, fuel and oxygen.