EgyptAir 804 disappears from radar Paris-Cairo
Sims Fly Virtually
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Years (many!) since I was "in the business", but I wonder if anyone else noticed in the pictures of the debris (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/5...ml#post9383765 - post 907) that nothing out of the clothing, belongings, aircraft parts, etc, seemed to be burned or scorched?
Perhaps the debris so far located (or photographed for public consumption) was from the opposite end of the aircraft from where the presumed fire started, and break-up separated those parts from the fire, - or can an inference be drawn, or at least postulated?
Perhaps the debris so far located (or photographed for public consumption) was from the opposite end of the aircraft from where the presumed fire started, and break-up separated those parts from the fire, - or can an inference be drawn, or at least postulated?
I can tell you from my own experience that there was no white mist
I can certainly can remember there being white mist back in the days of being subject to rapid decompressions as part of altitude chamber runs...
Originally Posted by wiggy
I can certainly can remember there being white mist back in the days of rapid decompressions as part of altitude chamber runs...
I've never had a rapid decompression in an aircraft but there was misting in the hypoxia run.
The 360 degrees turn, as described by the Greek Defence Minister, is a good pilot manoeuvre to increase drag and thus accelerate the descent.
Basil - good point, thanks.
Last edited by wiggy; 21st May 2016 at 16:02. Reason: Spolling......
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Progressive flight control system failure and Avionics Smoke ?
From the NY Times
¨ First, there was a problem with the autoflight control computer. The jet would have been flying near its maximum speed and elevation at that time. That is the most efficient way for jetliners to fly, and it is safe, but pilots prefer to rely on autopilot systems in those conditions because if they were to ever lose control of the plane, it could be hard to regain, Mr. Mann said. The last message had to do with the spoiler elevator controller, which essentially controls the flaps responsible for pitch and roll control. The computer controlling these failed as well.
“It looks to me like you have a progressive flight control system failure,” Mr. Mann said. It is over the course of two minutes, which might have seemed like an eternity on that plane, but is relatively fast.This is also the moment that the plane left Greek airspace, and at 2:29:40 a.m., Greek controllers lost the aircraft’s trace, just inside Egyptian airspace, about halfway between Crete and Egypt.
Around this time, the plane made a 90-degree turn to the left and then a full circle to the right, dropping precipitously to 15,000 feet from 37,000 and then plunging again to 9,000 feet before it disappeared from radar.
The crew never gave any indication of a technical problem or other difficulties on board, even during the final, fatal minutes when the plane itself was transmitting data indicating a catastrophic failure.
One former crash investigator said that radar evidence pointing to a series of sharp maneuvers in the moments before radar contact was lost suggested that the plane was almost certainly not under the control of the pilots. Whatever upset the Airbus was so sudden and violent that it could not be compensated for by the plane’s automated safety systems.
“In my mind, this basically opens two axes of possibility: either a sudden technical problem or some kind of illicit or terrorist act,” said the expert, Alain Bouillard, a former chief investigator for the French Bureau of Investigations and Analyses.¨
¨ First, there was a problem with the autoflight control computer. The jet would have been flying near its maximum speed and elevation at that time. That is the most efficient way for jetliners to fly, and it is safe, but pilots prefer to rely on autopilot systems in those conditions because if they were to ever lose control of the plane, it could be hard to regain, Mr. Mann said. The last message had to do with the spoiler elevator controller, which essentially controls the flaps responsible for pitch and roll control. The computer controlling these failed as well.
“It looks to me like you have a progressive flight control system failure,” Mr. Mann said. It is over the course of two minutes, which might have seemed like an eternity on that plane, but is relatively fast.This is also the moment that the plane left Greek airspace, and at 2:29:40 a.m., Greek controllers lost the aircraft’s trace, just inside Egyptian airspace, about halfway between Crete and Egypt.
Around this time, the plane made a 90-degree turn to the left and then a full circle to the right, dropping precipitously to 15,000 feet from 37,000 and then plunging again to 9,000 feet before it disappeared from radar.
The crew never gave any indication of a technical problem or other difficulties on board, even during the final, fatal minutes when the plane itself was transmitting data indicating a catastrophic failure.
One former crash investigator said that radar evidence pointing to a series of sharp maneuvers in the moments before radar contact was lost suggested that the plane was almost certainly not under the control of the pilots. Whatever upset the Airbus was so sudden and violent that it could not be compensated for by the plane’s automated safety systems.
“In my mind, this basically opens two axes of possibility: either a sudden technical problem or some kind of illicit or terrorist act,” said the expert, Alain Bouillard, a former chief investigator for the French Bureau of Investigations and Analyses.¨
AF447 ACARS
Many more ACARS maintenance messages were issued by AF447.
Considerable speculation swirled around these messages until recovery of the CVR and FDR which showed a thoroughly different scenario to the many that had previously been theorized.
At present we have a few puzzle pieces and many more to recover.
Considerable speculation swirled around these messages until recovery of the CVR and FDR which showed a thoroughly different scenario to the many that had previously been theorized.
At present we have a few puzzle pieces and many more to recover.
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The final sequence of ACMS messages transmitted via ACARS was
ANTI ICE R WINDOW
R SLIDING WINDOW SENSOR
SMOKE LAVATORY SMOKE
AVIONICS SMOKE
R FIXED WINDOW SENSOR
AUTO FLT FCU 2 FAULT
F/CTL SEC 3 FAULT
I was considering the sequence of the faults/messages and the absence of some others and ignoring the AVIONICS SMOKE ECAM, it would lead one to suspect an avionics bay event that led to some kind of fire.
Following LAND ASAP in the QRH's SMOKE/FUMES/AVNCS SMOKE procedure, the next action states 'IF PERCEPTIBLE SMOKE APPLY IMMEDIATELY: '. The use of the word perceptible there is because in the case of AVIONICS smoke crew will likely smell the smoke before any ECAM warning is displayed. . The AVIONICS SMOKE detector is very slow to actually trigger an ECAM. I'm even suspecting the Lav smoke detector picked up smoke before the avionics detectors did.
(I had some initial speculations this might be an EFB issue (window mounted (iPad plugged into an 400 HZ f/d supply or some such other jerry rigged setup), which flared up and caused the WHC faults. Back in the day, prior to AIRBUS introducing the new LITHIUM PED FIRE procedure, some recommended moving the smoking device to the FWD LAV))
So while I'm inclined to think this is the result of some issue with, or upstream of, WHC 1 (or 2) and that the subsequent faults are probably related to the spreading fire, what I don't understand with that scenario is why there were so few ECAMS included in the ACMS ACARS msg. Surely there would have at least been a record of a ANTI ICE WNDSHIELD ECAM if that were the case?
ANTI ICE R WINDOW
R SLIDING WINDOW SENSOR
SMOKE LAVATORY SMOKE
AVIONICS SMOKE
R FIXED WINDOW SENSOR
AUTO FLT FCU 2 FAULT
F/CTL SEC 3 FAULT
I was considering the sequence of the faults/messages and the absence of some others and ignoring the AVIONICS SMOKE ECAM, it would lead one to suspect an avionics bay event that led to some kind of fire.
Following LAND ASAP in the QRH's SMOKE/FUMES/AVNCS SMOKE procedure, the next action states 'IF PERCEPTIBLE SMOKE APPLY IMMEDIATELY: '. The use of the word perceptible there is because in the case of AVIONICS smoke crew will likely smell the smoke before any ECAM warning is displayed. . The AVIONICS SMOKE detector is very slow to actually trigger an ECAM. I'm even suspecting the Lav smoke detector picked up smoke before the avionics detectors did.
(I had some initial speculations this might be an EFB issue (window mounted (iPad plugged into an 400 HZ f/d supply or some such other jerry rigged setup), which flared up and caused the WHC faults. Back in the day, prior to AIRBUS introducing the new LITHIUM PED FIRE procedure, some recommended moving the smoking device to the FWD LAV))
So while I'm inclined to think this is the result of some issue with, or upstream of, WHC 1 (or 2) and that the subsequent faults are probably related to the spreading fire, what I don't understand with that scenario is why there were so few ECAMS included in the ACMS ACARS msg. Surely there would have at least been a record of a ANTI ICE WNDSHIELD ECAM if that were the case?
Last edited by nnc0; 21st May 2016 at 16:37.
oldchina
The issue of controllability has to do with the reverser efflux effect on control surfaces at specific speed configurations.
Deployment at altitude is quite different than early climb
Old Boeing Driver
"... the Lauda 004 incident comes to mind. There is still controversy about whether a high speed deployment would be survivable"
Apparently not, according to Boeing and the final report, at least not at cruise altitude. Certification tests showed it should be controllable but they were made at lower altitude. When Boeing flew the Lauda scenario in the simulator the loss of control was so rapid that there was no possibility of catching it in time.
"... the Lauda 004 incident comes to mind. There is still controversy about whether a high speed deployment would be survivable"
Apparently not, according to Boeing and the final report, at least not at cruise altitude. Certification tests showed it should be controllable but they were made at lower altitude. When Boeing flew the Lauda scenario in the simulator the loss of control was so rapid that there was no possibility of catching it in time.
The issue of controllability has to do with the reverser efflux effect on control surfaces at specific speed configurations.
Deployment at altitude is quite different than early climb
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Given a scenario of uncontrollable fire on board,the best fire extinguisher at hand was 37,000' below them....Any recovered flight deck parts could play a major part in the puzzle...and possibly answer the question as to why no distress call was given.....The Egyptair 777 came to my mind too..
All guessing...aren't we!!!!!!
All guessing...aren't we!!!!!!
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The final sequence of ACMS messages transmitted via ACARS was
ANTI ICE R WINDOW
R SLIDING WINDOW SENSOR
SMOKE LAVATORY SMOKE
AVIONICS SMOKE
R FIXED WINDOW SENSOR
AUTO FLT FCU 2 FAULT
F/CTL SEC 3 FAULT
I was considering the sequence of the faults/messages and the absence of some others and ignoring the AVIONICS SMOKE ECAM, it would lead one to suspect an avionics bay event that led to some kind of fire.
Following LAND ASAP in the QRH's SMOKE/FUMES/AVNCS SMOKE procedure, the next action states 'IF PERCEPTIBLE SMOKE APPLY IMMEDIATELY: '. The use of the word perceptible there is because in the case of AVIONICS smoke crew will likely smell the smoke before any ECAM warning is displayed. . The AVIONICS SMOKE detector is very slow to actually trigger an ECAM. I'm even suspecting the Lav smoke detector picked up smoke before the avionics detectors did.
(I had some initial speculations this might be an EFB issue (window mounted (iPad plugged into an 400 HZ f/d supply or some such other jerry rigged setup), which flared up and caused the WHC faults. Back in the day, prior to AIRBUS introducing the new LITHIUM PED FIRE procedure, some recommended moving the smoking device to the FWD LAV))
So while I'm inclined to think this is the result of some issue with, or upstream of, WHC 1 (or 2) and that the subsequent faults are probably related to the spreading fire, what I don't understand with that scenario is why there were so few ECAMS included in the ACMS ACARS msg. Surely there would have at least been a record of a ANTI ICE WNDSHIELD ECAM if that were the case?
ANTI ICE R WINDOW
R SLIDING WINDOW SENSOR
SMOKE LAVATORY SMOKE
AVIONICS SMOKE
R FIXED WINDOW SENSOR
AUTO FLT FCU 2 FAULT
F/CTL SEC 3 FAULT
I was considering the sequence of the faults/messages and the absence of some others and ignoring the AVIONICS SMOKE ECAM, it would lead one to suspect an avionics bay event that led to some kind of fire.
Following LAND ASAP in the QRH's SMOKE/FUMES/AVNCS SMOKE procedure, the next action states 'IF PERCEPTIBLE SMOKE APPLY IMMEDIATELY: '. The use of the word perceptible there is because in the case of AVIONICS smoke crew will likely smell the smoke before any ECAM warning is displayed. . The AVIONICS SMOKE detector is very slow to actually trigger an ECAM. I'm even suspecting the Lav smoke detector picked up smoke before the avionics detectors did.
(I had some initial speculations this might be an EFB issue (window mounted (iPad plugged into an 400 HZ f/d supply or some such other jerry rigged setup), which flared up and caused the WHC faults. Back in the day, prior to AIRBUS introducing the new LITHIUM PED FIRE procedure, some recommended moving the smoking device to the FWD LAV))
So while I'm inclined to think this is the result of some issue with, or upstream of, WHC 1 (or 2) and that the subsequent faults are probably related to the spreading fire, what I don't understand with that scenario is why there were so few ECAMS included in the ACMS ACARS msg. Surely there would have at least been a record of a ANTI ICE WNDSHIELD ECAM if that were the case?
Since we had AF447 ACARS discussed to death, we should be aware of that ACARS are designed to report "system fault" (and related message). Taken independently a "system fault" can cover quite a lot of events. First, it's hard to figure out the sequence of those events simply at looking at ACARS order, and next, it's hard to figure out what caused the fault to be reported without other data from the maintenance computer.
Nonetheless, ACARS are telling us that between take off and the end of the report :
1. this flight was uneventfull (system wise) until 00.26
2. events took place at cruise (6)
3. ACARS stopped at 00.29, hence 3-4 minutes of reporting.
Next, out of the ACARS report between 00.26 & 00.29, only "SMOKE" looks serious enough for causing the end of ACARS transmission 3-4 minutes later ; excepted from it, those ACARS are telling us that none of the aircraft vital system (and airframe) was actually compromised up to the end of transmission... because nothing else was reported than three minor "faults" up to 00.29. Whatever caused the loss happened after.
Also, whatever caused the smoke to be detected at the first place won't be read from ACARS only ; nothing can tell us if a system "faulting" is the cause or the consequence of a SMOKE event without any further data. So far, all we can do is to think about what action would take the crew while displayed "SMOKE" in lavatory then avionics :
Whilst it seems the acars msg has been confirmed, has it been confirmed that these were the total of the messages ? Given the subsequent flight path, is it plausible that the ap was still engaged, and if not, would an acars msg on disconnect be expected?SLF, so pls don't be too harsh.
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ACARS might end transmittng following action of the crew after an "Avionics Smoke" ECAM is tiggered.
if ELEC EMER CONFIG is applied, ACARS should not be powered anymore as far as I can tell.
if ELEC EMER CONFIG is applied, ACARS should not be powered anymore as far as I can tell.
Speculations
I think one of the important pieces to this event is the time it took to go from FL370 to 15,000 feet.
I think I saw in some earlier post that radar showed this to be a rather short time. A shorter time that an emergency descent would take.
Maybe someone here can refresh that information.
I would think a cabin, avionics bay, or lav fire would allow time for some emergency call.
I know they may have been in a poor ATC communication area, but maybe another aircraft on the frequency would have heard them.
I think I saw in some earlier post that radar showed this to be a rather short time. A shorter time that an emergency descent would take.
Maybe someone here can refresh that information.
I would think a cabin, avionics bay, or lav fire would allow time for some emergency call.
I know they may have been in a poor ATC communication area, but maybe another aircraft on the frequency would have heard them.
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Forgive my ignorance, but I see only "hours and minutes" recorded in the times of these events. Are seconds within minutes not displayed?
Given the above - can we know if these events occur simultaneously and simply appear in the order they do so in this list by some accident of software logic - oris their order on the list absolutely defined by the order in which they occurred?
Also....without "seconds" how can we know the events of minute 26 and minute 27 did not actually occur within seconds of one another....?
Would this information be available to aircrew handling a sequence of errors and therefore allow them to perhaps make a causal link between errors?
I am not involved in the air industry at all, but I do handle systems where error reporting allows me to trace a causal event through real time error reporting.
Given the above - can we know if these events occur simultaneously and simply appear in the order they do so in this list by some accident of software logic - oris their order on the list absolutely defined by the order in which they occurred?
Also....without "seconds" how can we know the events of minute 26 and minute 27 did not actually occur within seconds of one another....?
Would this information be available to aircrew handling a sequence of errors and therefore allow them to perhaps make a causal link between errors?
I am not involved in the air industry at all, but I do handle systems where error reporting allows me to trace a causal event through real time error reporting.
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I haven't seen any timed data from the radar source anywhere. Only the manoeuvers were described, but it's way too vague at this point. No com reported is somewhat a clue about the situation of the crew by itself. One can imagine a fast pace of events taking place in a very short time.
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conjecture
With Avionics Smoke, Lavatory smoke, and SEC 3.
The relation of unrelated ( or related ) failures avionics smoke, lavatory smoke and a SEC 3 fault is disturbing and perturbing.
What if the cockpit filled up with smoke ?
The avionics smoke checklist is not easy, and in my opinion should be trained more often, it the real world it does not happen as in the simulator.
I could understand the crew being too busy ( aviating ) to make a radio call.
The possibility of a Electrical fire comes to mind?
Then how does this lead to the appearance that they lost control of the airplane ?
The investigators have their work cut out for them, and the results will take a while to come out.
As we see how conclusions were jumped too immediately. Once again, the experts who know the most at this point will say the least, until the facts come out.
The relation of unrelated ( or related ) failures avionics smoke, lavatory smoke and a SEC 3 fault is disturbing and perturbing.
What if the cockpit filled up with smoke ?
The avionics smoke checklist is not easy, and in my opinion should be trained more often, it the real world it does not happen as in the simulator.
I could understand the crew being too busy ( aviating ) to make a radio call.
The possibility of a Electrical fire comes to mind?
Then how does this lead to the appearance that they lost control of the airplane ?
The investigators have their work cut out for them, and the results will take a while to come out.
As we see how conclusions were jumped too immediately. Once again, the experts who know the most at this point will say the least, until the facts come out.