EgyptAir 804 disappears from radar Paris-Cairo

[unworry]

To the earlier post (now deleted?) suggesting a recurrence of of Egyptair 667 a few years back:

Though that incident and resulting hull loss was probably due to a cockpit fire from an electrical fault on the RHS oxy hose/system ... that aircraft was a B772. Enough said.

[frankpgh]

It is interesting to me that we "only" have 19 pages of comments. I think it is because it is such a puzzle. The ACARS data gives enough information to keep people focused on trying to explain those messages. Without those, the speculation is all over the place.

Would it be possible to reverse the thought process and speculate as to what messages may be transmitted via ACARS based on some of the theories presented? I don't have the knowledge to do this, but a bus pilot would.

For example, what ACARS messages would you expect to see if there was an explosive decompression? If a message indicating a drop in cabin altitude would be expected but not received, it would be less likely to be the initial cause (and within 3 minutes would you expect that such a message should have been generated?).

What messages would you expect to see if a fire started in avionics? Etc. Just looking for other opportunities to extrapolate upon what we know.

[andrasz]

I would hold my breath on the validity of the ACARS data. It has neither been confirmed by Egyptair or Airbus, the two parties who surely must have been aware of its existence were it genuine for two days now. There is nothing damning for either party in the contents, and releasing or at least acknowledging it would have given a credibility boost to other official statements, indicating that they really tell what they know. I see no good reason why especially Egyptair would want to reject this relatively positive PR opportunity at this very difficult time. Unless of course there is no such ACARS data, and somebody made it up... It is now all over the mainstream press, quoting AVH (though CNN seems to have obtained it independently from same unnamed source, which if genuine can only be from MS or AB).

[SLFplatine]

The Egyptian authorities were quite quick to point to the likelihood of a terrorist (or criminal) cause stating it was not likely to have been a technical aircraft issue with the EgyptAir plane. Too quick, to my simple but cynical mind.
Metrojet 9268 -despite the fact that by early November American and British authorities suspected a bomb and in mid November the Russian Security Services were certain it was a terrorist attack (not to mention Daesh (ISIL) in the Sinai claimed responsibility) the Egyptian investigative team, headed by one Ayman al-Muqaddam (who will lead the investigation of EgyptAir 804) issued a preliminary report in December stating: "no evidence that there is an act of terror or illegal intervention"

[Bobman84]

All those talking about fire - can you name one incident where a fire on board a passenger jet aircraft was never relayed onto ATC or even other aircraft in the area?

[pattern_is_full]

Simple answer, Bobman: "There is a first time for everything."

[Coagie]

Since there is no fire suppression in the avionics Bay of an A320, is there a procedure when the avionics bay smoke detector goes into alarm?

[DaveReidUK]

Originally Posted by andrasz

It is now all over the mainstream press, quoting AVH (though CNN seems to have obtained it independently from same unnamed source, which if genuine can only be from MS or AB).

No, it could just as easily have originated from whichever ACARS datalink service provider Egyptair use - if so, most likely ARINC/GLOBALink or SITA.

[Propduffer]

gulfairs

A difference that jumps out at me is the fact that you had the "aviate" part under control; this doesn't seem to be the case with MS804. It appears that the flight crew was already overtasked, and in any event, a turn in MS 804's case would have taken him away from the nearest runway. Straight ahead, he surely knew that he was almost close enough to see the lights of Alexandria. Also, the sky was all his at that time on that night, afik there was only one other aircraft even within VHF distance.

But some are more procedure bound than others; under the Dryfus model, an "expert" has the ability to: "Transcend reliance on rules, guidelines, and maxims" if the situation calls for it. This guy had 6,000 hours as a commercial pilot, he certainly wasn't a novice.

But you may be right, as the problem began he may have thought he had it under control and was just beginning to go through a checklist. So he cleared his airspace first.

[andrasz]

Originally Posted by DaveReidUK

... it could just as easily have originated ...

Agreed, though perhaps a bit less easily, as these organisations have stricter protocols & controls on who/how can access such data. The origin seems to be a screencap photo, probably taken with a phone.

[pilotmike]

@ Pace

I am not convinced for a number of reasons firstly if the aircraft left Paris is would expose a very serious security hole at Paris which would have implications for thousands of aircraft operating out of there

What a ridiculous statement.

On that basis, presumably you're similarly "not convinced" 9/11 happened because "the implications for aviation" would be too great.

This sort of nonsense - along with "why don't we find a way to discretely pass our coordinates instead of flying the plane when things get tough" - is why most have simply given up hoping to find any serious contributions here.

[jack11111]

BBC

BBC World Service quoting AVHerald about ACARS messaging on MS804.

[mover625]

MS 804

On May 20th 2016 The Aviation Herald received information from three independent channels, that ACARS (Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System) messages with following content were received from the aircraft:

00:26Z 3044 ANTI ICE R WINDOW
00:26Z 561200 R SLIDING WINDOW SENSOR
00:26Z 2600 SMOKE LAVATORY SMOKE
00:27Z 2600 AVIONICS SMOKE
00:28Z 561100 R FIXED WINDOW SENSOR
00:29Z 2200 AUTO FLT FCU 2 FAULT
00:29Z 2700 F/CTL SEC 3

As far as I understand the R sliding window electrical power comes from DC Bus 2 and since there is no sliding window position sensor presumably the right sliding window messages are due to loss of electrical power to the window.


Any Airbus people out there want to comment?

[paulmoscow]

BEA confirmed that the messages are genuine.

[Right Way Up]

I believe the messages ANTI ICE R WINDOW, R SLIDING WINDOW SENSOR, R FIXED WINDOW SENSOR are all messages you would expect with failure of the WHC 2. That along with SEC 3 and FCU 2 would suggest a partial failure of the DC Bus 2. (DC Bus 2 also powers CIDS 2 - poss link with toilet smoke?)

[goeasy]

Yes. On the bus there is NO window open sensor/indication.

These messages are purely relating to window heat which operates at all times engines are running.

But don't let facts get in the way of a load of drivel here!

[JosV]

mover625. Looking at the FCOM, there are a lot of systems that will go INOP when DC Bus 2 fails, but they also note that failure could happen on a sub bus, which obviously would take out less.
As a list of equipment (not complete) dependent on Bus 2 (which includes all the ACARS warnings):
INOP SYS
SPLR 1+2+5, ELAC 2(1), SEC 2+3
VHF 2, CTR TK PUMP 2, LGCIU 2
REVERSER 2, CAB PR 2,
FAC 2, L TK PUMP 2, R TK PUMP 2
ENG 1 LOOP B, ENG 2 LOOP A, PACK 2 REGUL
FCDC 2, MAIN GALLEY, Y ELEC PUMP (if selected ON)
BRAKES SYS 2, F/O STAT, R WSLHD HEAT
R WNDW HEAT, AP 2, FCU 2
LGCIU 1 (2)

Other INOP SYS
SFCC 2, R cabin fan, F/O wiper
F/O rain rplnt, Eng 1 and 2 fire ext btl 2, Autobrake (due to loss of 2 SECs)
BMC 2 Bleed, X feed auto control, RMP 2
FQI channel 2 zone controller, sec channel SDCU 2
Brake fan, Eng 2 oil low press and qty ind, R loudspeaker
rudder trim ind, FMGC 2 CDLS

[wiggy]

don't let facts get in the way of a load of drivel here!

The speculation might be drivel but OTOH (and as paulmoscow has mentioned) the BEA ( French Accident Investigation Bureau) do now seem to be verifying the information that the likes of CNN have been putting out in the last day or so.

I'll see if I can track down an official BEA statement but in the meantime French media report from this morning here:

Des fumées détectées dans l'avion d'EgyptAir juste avant sa disparition

In short the report says the BEA is confirming there were ACARS transmissions indicating smoke in the cabin before communications were lost, but they are still not willing to speculate on the cause of the accident, waiting for the recorders, etc.

[mono]

I think the drivel refers to the rampant speculation and, frankly BS written on here by people who have no idea about the A320 or indeed aviation in general. Not the ACARS messages themselves.

[Squawk_ident]

Heading after KUMBI

Propduffer wrote:

I think we can put that idea to rest. The plane was on it's assigned airway with protected airspace to the rear.../...

Because of the very few traffics at this time, it looks like MSR804 got direct clearances until KUMBI. The Heading is 139 untill KUMBI. Just after KUMBI the aircraft turns right heading 147. This is not the correct heading towards BLT VORDME on the UL612. The normal one on this track is 134 deg.
The heading 147 looks like a short cut manually initiated and can only be on ATC request/order or the crew decision. We know that the Greek ATC lost the voice contact but not the radar one at the FIR handover. The Greek ATC could not have allowed this direct because they are not in charge after KUMBI. What about the Egyptian ATC? If the MSR804 modified his heading at the FIR boundary with an nonstandard track, it might be because the voice contact was established with Cairo? But the squawk remains 1455. Normally the squawk code changes at the FIR but not for the MSR804 although it may be a FR24 bug. Can we imagine that the MS804 contacted Cairo Center and got a direct to clearance? Another possibility is that just after KUMBI something wrong happened and the crew decided to take a short way.

The last reliable FR24 contact from the F-LGPR2 station is at N 33.2037 E 29.1597. After the FR24 shows "EST" as estimated. It means that the latest station able to receive the ADS-B signals lost contact and FR24 calculates the track with the latest available data.

KUMBI N33.7139 E28.7500
F-LGRP2 Squawk 1455 N 33.3093 E 29.0776
F-LGRP2 Squawk 1455 N 33.2037 E 29.1597
EST N33.0868 E29.2503...

French media now announce that the BEA confirms that smoke was detected in the cabin (ACARS)