EgyptAir 804 disappears from radar Paris-Cairo
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Why is it difficult to fly at altitude?
Magplug stated "It is difficult enough hand flying a big jet at high altitude with everything working normally"
Why is it difficult?
I have flown B-720, 707, 737, 727, 757,767,777, MD-11 and have found they all fly normally at high altitudes.
Why is it difficult?
I have flown B-720, 707, 737, 727, 757,767,777, MD-11 and have found they all fly normally at high altitudes.
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I'm curious about the incendiary device, Pace. Is there any history of using such devices to bring down planes? Why would a terrorist organization go for an incendiary rather than a bomb with a more certain effect? Why would a terrorist organization want to leave any ambiguity about its role in the disaster?
Improvised Explosive Devices often do not function as expected. But an IED in the forward galley, possibly in a refreshment cart, that caused a minor Abdulmutallab style explosion followed by a severe fire in the area of the avionics bay/cockpit rear wall but completely contained not causing an explosive decompression would fit the 'evidence' so far.
Not sure if this has been covered previously, and I'm not inclined to wade through 500-odd posts this morning, but those contributors referring to an avionics/electronics bay may not all be aware that the A320 has two such compartments separate in the forward fuselage. (Their official names escape me at the moment.)
1) A small bay or compartment accessed just forward of the nose L/G bay (hence roughly beneath the cockpit), accessed by a small plug-type oval hatch in the bottom of the fuselage ;
2) A larger electronics bay/compartment between the nose L/G bay and the forward hold. So it is beneath the forward passenger cabin.
(1) Contains, among other things, the two main batteries, LGCIUs and SEC 3.
(2) Contains, among many other things, the remaining FCCs,
Right now I can't remember where the WHCs are located.
1) A small bay or compartment accessed just forward of the nose L/G bay (hence roughly beneath the cockpit), accessed by a small plug-type oval hatch in the bottom of the fuselage ;
2) A larger electronics bay/compartment between the nose L/G bay and the forward hold. So it is beneath the forward passenger cabin.
(1) Contains, among other things, the two main batteries, LGCIUs and SEC 3.
(2) Contains, among many other things, the remaining FCCs,
Right now I can't remember where the WHCs are located.
It would be interesting to know how long MS804 spent in Tunis before the leg to CDG and the state of the local security environment there.
The media concentration on security in Paris seems to overlook an important consideration, given the extent of the Tunisian contribution to Daish/ISIL - which exceeds that of any other country.
The media concentration on security in Paris seems to overlook an important consideration, given the extent of the Tunisian contribution to Daish/ISIL - which exceeds that of any other country.
@aussiepax: read...think...write... in that order
@Ian W: A severe fire needs two things - an ignition source, but more importantly a volatile fuel that is able to propagate the fire in a rapid way. There is no good flammable material in the galley, especially in the food cart. The various plastics burn slowly, especially in the thin cabin athmosphere at FL370. In another life I conduct expeditions to remote areas where standard practice is to burn any combustible trash, remove all other. I know how difficult and time consuming it is to burn plastic garbage. It requires a liberal dousing of diesel for it to properly catch fire, and without wind the flames die repeatedly. As all catering and cabin materials are made of certified (relatively) fire retardant materials, I find it a bit hard to envision an accessible fire on board strong enough that it cannot be put out with the extinguishers. With SR111 the problem was that the fire was inaccessible, and the severity was not recognized until too late. Similarly with the two 74F accidents, the crew had no access to the fire location.
@Ian W: A severe fire needs two things - an ignition source, but more importantly a volatile fuel that is able to propagate the fire in a rapid way. There is no good flammable material in the galley, especially in the food cart. The various plastics burn slowly, especially in the thin cabin athmosphere at FL370. In another life I conduct expeditions to remote areas where standard practice is to burn any combustible trash, remove all other. I know how difficult and time consuming it is to burn plastic garbage. It requires a liberal dousing of diesel for it to properly catch fire, and without wind the flames die repeatedly. As all catering and cabin materials are made of certified (relatively) fire retardant materials, I find it a bit hard to envision an accessible fire on board strong enough that it cannot be put out with the extinguishers. With SR111 the problem was that the fire was inaccessible, and the severity was not recognized until too late. Similarly with the two 74F accidents, the crew had no access to the fire location.
It would be interesting to know how long MS804 spent in Tunis before the leg to CDG and the state of the local security environment there.
The media concentration on security in Paris seems to overlook an important consideration, given the extent of the Tunisian contribution to Daish/ISIL - which exceeds that of any other country.
The media concentration on security in Paris seems to overlook an important consideration, given the extent of the Tunisian contribution to Daish/ISIL - which exceeds that of any other country.
MS843 DEP CAI 08:15L 06:15Z
MS843 ARR TUN 10:35L 09:35Z
MS844 DEP TUN 11:35L 10:35Z
MS844 ARR CAI 15:40L 13:40Z
According to FlightRadar24, it spent 1 hour 20 minutes on the ground at Tunis (09:33Z to 10:53Z), which is broadly consistent with the schedule, though bear in mind that the 1:20 includes taxi in/out as FR24's timings are for landing and takeoff (though it refers to them as ATA/ATD).
Back in 1966 I was involved in a severe incident when we temporarily lost control of a large jet transport. The problem started when the whole aircraft filled with dense smoke and we thought we were on fire. The captain initiated a descent when we could not see the flight instruments and we found ourselves in a spiral dive from which we were very lucky to recover, see:-
http://www.pprune.org/accidents-clos...ml#post9069763
All I would like to say to the many people who have posted here is that things can go wrong very quickly and that smoke and fire on board an aircraft is something that can be very difficult to deal with.
http://www.pprune.org/accidents-clos...ml#post9069763
All I would like to say to the many people who have posted here is that things can go wrong very quickly and that smoke and fire on board an aircraft is something that can be very difficult to deal with.
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@aussiepax: read...think...write... in that order
@Ian W: A severe fire needs two things - an ignition source, but more importantly a volatile fuel that is able to propagate the fire in a rapid way. There is no good flammable material in the galley, especially in the food cart. The various plastics burn slowly, especially in the thin cabin athmosphere at FL370. In another life I conduct expeditions to remote areas where standard practice is to burn any combustible trash, remove all other. I know how difficult and time consuming it is to burn plastic garbage. It requires a liberal dousing of diesel for it to properly catch fire, and without wind the flames die repeatedly. As all catering and cabin materials are made of certified (relatively) fire retardant materials, I find it a bit hard to envision an accessible fire on board strong enough that it cannot be put out with the extinguishers. With SR111 the problem was that the fire was inaccessible, and the severity was not recognized until too late. Similarly with the two 74F accidents, the crew had no access to the fire location.
@Ian W: A severe fire needs two things - an ignition source, but more importantly a volatile fuel that is able to propagate the fire in a rapid way. There is no good flammable material in the galley, especially in the food cart. The various plastics burn slowly, especially in the thin cabin athmosphere at FL370. In another life I conduct expeditions to remote areas where standard practice is to burn any combustible trash, remove all other. I know how difficult and time consuming it is to burn plastic garbage. It requires a liberal dousing of diesel for it to properly catch fire, and without wind the flames die repeatedly. As all catering and cabin materials are made of certified (relatively) fire retardant materials, I find it a bit hard to envision an accessible fire on board strong enough that it cannot be put out with the extinguishers. With SR111 the problem was that the fire was inaccessible, and the severity was not recognized until too late. Similarly with the two 74F accidents, the crew had no access to the fire location.
There presumably was no flammable material in Abdulmutallab's underpants or the cabin of NW253 yet the IED he had there caused a fire in the cabin wall that had to be put out. The bottom trays of many meal carts are also full of plastic miniature bottles of spirits. So 'imagine' a muted explosion (i.e. more fire than explosion) that blows down and forward from the bottom of a cart into the avionics bay and rear wall of the cockpit. Now get to that area with your fire extinguisher.
Chemical and electrical fires are significantly different than burning trash.
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Electronic Flight Bags With Lithium Battery Installations
These problems experienced by users of lithium batteries raise concern about the use of these batteries in commercial aviation. Accordingly, the proposed use of lithium batteries in Astronautics electronic flight bags on Airbus A318, A319, A320, and A321 series airplanes has prompted the FAA to review the adequacy of existing regulations in Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 25. Our review indicates that the existing regulations do not adequately address several failure, operational, and maintenance characteristics of lithium batteries that could affect the safety and reliability of lithium battery installations.
https://www.federalregister.gov/arti...nic-flight#h-9
These problems experienced by users of lithium batteries raise concern about the use of these batteries in commercial aviation. Accordingly, the proposed use of lithium batteries in Astronautics electronic flight bags on Airbus A318, A319, A320, and A321 series airplanes has prompted the FAA to review the adequacy of existing regulations in Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 25. Our review indicates that the existing regulations do not adequately address several failure, operational, and maintenance characteristics of lithium batteries that could affect the safety and reliability of lithium battery installations.
https://www.federalregister.gov/arti...nic-flight#h-9
We have procedures in place and train for exactly such an event either in the cockpit or the cabin.
What does your procedure involve? Do you have fire resistant gloves on the flight deck?
( serious question)
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Gloves yes and a specially designed fire proof bag.
After using the fire ext to stop the fire the offending lithium runaway is put in to a specially made sealable fire proof bag that can be filled with up to 5 litres of water to keep the lithium battery cooled, then the bag would stowed in a safe area usually a metal container in the galley.
After using the fire ext to stop the fire the offending lithium runaway is put in to a specially made sealable fire proof bag that can be filled with up to 5 litres of water to keep the lithium battery cooled, then the bag would stowed in a safe area usually a metal container in the galley.
Originally Posted by Ian W
...meal carts are also full of plastic miniature bottles of spirits...
Egyptair is actually a dry airline. However I'm not contesting what you say is possible, I just think its improbable.
Last edited by andrasz; 22nd May 2016 at 10:59.
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Example of IPads w lithium batteres used as EFB's
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I haven't heard anything about pings from the flight recorders being detected yet. Always wondered whether marine seismic vessels would be of any help. They tow very long arrays of geophones (lengths of kilometers typically). Of course the sensors are tuned to normal sound frequencies, but I don't think it would be too difficult to swap out a geophone for a sensor tuned to the ping frequency of the black boxes. There are marine seismic vessels all over the world (and, these days, probably quite a few which are idle).
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'Windshield Fire Exposes Airbus Faults
European safety regulators may require European operators of Airbus A330s and A320s to replace aircraft windshields following an investigation into a June 2009 Jetstar flight from Japan that was diverted to Guam after a fire ensued at the base of the right main windshield.
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) on Friday concluded the right windshield experienced an overheating failure, which was related to the use of a polysulfide sealant (PR1829) within the body of the electrical connector terminal block. The sealant caused unintended heating effects when the windshield was being heated subsequently causing the thermal breakdown of the sealant, which ignited the fire.
Airbus initiated a safety program in early 2010 to identify and replace all windshields that had been produced using the sealant within the electrical connector. The manufacturer replaced some 1,500 units within the fleet.
The ATSB has been advised that due to limited fleet-wide completion of Airbus' replacement program, the European Aviation Safety Agency is considering implementing an Airworthiness Directive, which will require all European operators flying the specified aircraft to have all windshields replaced.'
AFAIK no Directive was issued, was this aircraft included in the windshield replacement program?
European safety regulators may require European operators of Airbus A330s and A320s to replace aircraft windshields following an investigation into a June 2009 Jetstar flight from Japan that was diverted to Guam after a fire ensued at the base of the right main windshield.
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) on Friday concluded the right windshield experienced an overheating failure, which was related to the use of a polysulfide sealant (PR1829) within the body of the electrical connector terminal block. The sealant caused unintended heating effects when the windshield was being heated subsequently causing the thermal breakdown of the sealant, which ignited the fire.
Airbus initiated a safety program in early 2010 to identify and replace all windshields that had been produced using the sealant within the electrical connector. The manufacturer replaced some 1,500 units within the fleet.
The ATSB has been advised that due to limited fleet-wide completion of Airbus' replacement program, the European Aviation Safety Agency is considering implementing an Airworthiness Directive, which will require all European operators flying the specified aircraft to have all windshields replaced.'
AFAIK no Directive was issued, was this aircraft included in the windshield replacement program?
