B-738 Crash in Russia Rostov-on-Don
Ozsync is correct. The pitch mode will remain in TOGA until a different pitch mode is selected or ALT ACQ engages based on the MCP setting. The flight director should pitch for ( in this case) flap 15 speed for MAUW and remain in TOGA.
There seems to be an assumption that he was definitely trying to level off, I think he may well have just been trying to fly the nose back to a reasonable attitude and overcooked the trim element. Ie he kept running stab until he actually had about 15 degrees pitch at which point the machine was trimmed for 300kts.
There seems to be an assumption that he was definitely trying to level off, I think he may well have just been trying to fly the nose back to a reasonable attitude and overcooked the trim element. Ie he kept running stab until he actually had about 15 degrees pitch at which point the machine was trimmed for 300kts.
I might have missed it but wind shear go around and flap 15?
The report says that thrust was reduced after the flap overspeed protection activated, then the thrust was put back to TOGA shortly afterwards. There was a brief period where the flaps came out again until the overspeed condition returned.
What would you be experiencing on the controls if you were flying? As the aircraft is accelerating past its trim speed, there would be an increasing nose-up moment. Reducing the attitude while keeping the power on would only exacerbate the situation. At that point, recovery is only possible by removing power and/or increasing pitch (or retracting the flaps) but the opposite was done.
The -ve g into the ground is the only real clue as to why the wrong control inputs were being made. The aircraft was about as far from stalling as you can get, yet it was being treated as though this was the condition. Reduced/negative g sensitivity? Can’t rule it out yet...
It’s possible the final roll was caused by asymmetric damage to the flaps as they were well into the overspeed regime.
Join Date: Jun 2000
Location: last time I looked I was still here.
Posts: 4,507
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Thanks FW. Do we know if they actually had a WS warning?
Back to the CVR being very important. Not only will it show a 'state of mind' before the event, it will give insight into why and perhaps how the GA was made. The FDR only shows the technical parameters. Many people are focusing on the human factors here.
Back to the CVR being very important. Not only will it show a 'state of mind' before the event, it will give insight into why and perhaps how the GA was made. The FDR only shows the technical parameters. Many people are focusing on the human factors here.
According to the report:
This is on the first, successful, GA.
They (MAK) have this to say about the second attempt:
If they can discern the trim wheel motion on the CVR, they’d have certainly picked up a WS warning, so it seems reasonable to assume there wasn’t one.
they informed the ATC officer of windshear on final (based on the on-board windshear warning) and went around climbing to FL 50 (1500 m), then climbing again to FL 80 (2450 m) to hold.
They (MAK) have this to say about the second attempt:
One of the probable causes of the go-around decision could have been the 20-knot increase of indicated speed to as much as 176 knots within 3 seconds, which might have been an indication of a windshear.
Join Date: Jun 2000
Location: last time I looked I was still here.
Posts: 4,507
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
It is quite possible they had a WS strong enough to put them outside the stabilized approach criteria, triggering a go around.
At what height is your landing gate for stabilised approach?
At what height is your landing gate for stabilised approach?
Join Date: Oct 2011
Location: In a hold
Posts: 161
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Also the trim system has a low and high speed criteria dependant upon whether the flaps are up or down, so with the flaps out as in this case the 12secs of trimming would have occurred at the high speed rate from the trim system thus compounding the issue...
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: Hotel Sheets, Downtown Plunketville
Age: 76
Posts: 0
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Thanks FW. Do we know if they actually had a WS warning?
Back to the CVR being very important. Not only will it show a 'state of mind' before the event, it will give insight into why and perhaps how the GA was made. The FDR only shows the technical parameters. Many people are focusing on the human factors here.
Back to the CVR being very important. Not only will it show a 'state of mind' before the event, it will give insight into why and perhaps how the GA was made. The FDR only shows the technical parameters. Many people are focusing on the human factors here.
This begins with an understanding of the reason(s) for the go- around. The point touched earlier in the thread was the apparent " early " or "premature" decision to abandon the landing attempt. I would suggest the only reasonable conclusion that may be ascribed to this decision is for safety reasons. For reasons yet unknown, but which hopefully will emerge in due course, the crew decided it was unsafe to continue with the decision. Perhaps the CVR transcript will reveal whether this was in the landing brief. If not, then the possibility arises that the actions lay in the single mind of the PF and must therefore been unilateral, with its attendant risks of uncoordinated responses of the crew at a time when swift coordinated action was required most.
Join Date: Sep 2008
Location: Been around the block
Posts: 629
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Join Date: Mar 2003
Location: Stansted
Posts: 210
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Fly26 is absolutely right and demonstrated this in the sim recently the rate at which the trim moves when the flaps are extended is very fast indeed as opposed to when flaps up.
Most 73 drivers probably know this and some don't but next time in the sim ask your instructor to do it and see the effect!
Also reading some of the detail it does contain some of the factors I have observed more and more in the sim especially with new pilots and some old but the tendency to fly with aircraft with trim and treating the trim as the primary flight control.
Instead of using elevator to it best effect the easy thing is just to thumb the trim and keep trimming. You will certainly get a response from the aircraft but not necessarily the one you intended - perhaps!
Most 73 drivers probably know this and some don't but next time in the sim ask your instructor to do it and see the effect!
Also reading some of the detail it does contain some of the factors I have observed more and more in the sim especially with new pilots and some old but the tendency to fly with aircraft with trim and treating the trim as the primary flight control.
Instead of using elevator to it best effect the easy thing is just to thumb the trim and keep trimming. You will certainly get a response from the aircraft but not necessarily the one you intended - perhaps!
Join Date: Sep 2005
Location: milky way
Posts: 247
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
There is no way any medium experienced and psycho physically fit pilot would trim him self into the ground unintentionally and while climbing during a GA or WS escape. I [personally think one of the pilot probably the PF become suddenly incapacitated and the other had no time to recover or a runaway trim condition occurred that due to fatigue they were unable to deal with it.
For those not really acquainted with modern commercial aviation slavery style think about what your driving performance would be if you slept only a few hours in the afternoon ( family permitting) and than embarked in a 5 hours journey in the middle of the night while there'll be no way you can get out of your car for a piss and a breathe of fresh air during this time and you'll have the perspective of having to pass trough a tunnel which is only five inches larger than your car at 200 km per hours at the end of your trip..that renders the idea more or less of the condition they were operating .. I believe.
For those not really acquainted with modern commercial aviation slavery style think about what your driving performance would be if you slept only a few hours in the afternoon ( family permitting) and than embarked in a 5 hours journey in the middle of the night while there'll be no way you can get out of your car for a piss and a breathe of fresh air during this time and you'll have the perspective of having to pass trough a tunnel which is only five inches larger than your car at 200 km per hours at the end of your trip..that renders the idea more or less of the condition they were operating .. I believe.
Last edited by furbpilot; 23rd Apr 2016 at 08:07.
Gender Faculty Specialist
The omission from the preliminary report of a windshear warning for the second approach ( as opposed to the first where they identified it) has me thinking that the go-around decision was not based on a windshear warning and that a normal go around was the intention. This is backed up ( in my mind) by the raising of the gear and selection of flap 15. The fire walling of the engines is an issue. This speaks to the state of mind of the PF and introduces challenges to flight path / airspeed / attitude control that are significant.
Gender Faculty Specialist
Framer, agreed, it's confusing. Firewalling the engines is part of the WEM on the NG, reconfiguring isn't. What I want to understand is if they went around for WS (warning or pilot identified) why reconfigure. If they intended a standard go around why firewall the engines.
Chesty, as I have speculated, the Windshear Escape was foremost in the flying pilot's mind, and he simply fire walled the thrust without thinking, which is a typical fatigue related rule-based error.
The application of beyond rated thrust in a very light aircraft was clearly the initiation of the sequence leading to the loss of control and a rational explanation for it I suspect will not be forthcoming.
This may simply have gone around because the speed was impossible to control, and the chances of a successful approach were low.
The application of beyond rated thrust in a very light aircraft was clearly the initiation of the sequence leading to the loss of control and a rational explanation for it I suspect will not be forthcoming.
This may simply have gone around because the speed was impossible to control, and the chances of a successful approach were low.