B-738 Crash in Russia Rostov-on-Don
QUOTE
I agree, framer. I'm not out, but it's a site for 'professional pilots'. There's some interesting stuff as the awful facts about another accident surface. Would be appreciated if those not flying planes for a living looked and didn't touch.
That is arrogant. The contributions by qualified meteorologists on this thread have been significant. I doubt if many of us fly planes for a living.
I agree, framer. I'm not out, but it's a site for 'professional pilots'. There's some interesting stuff as the awful facts about another accident surface. Would be appreciated if those not flying planes for a living looked and didn't touch.
That is arrogant. The contributions by qualified meteorologists on this thread have been significant. I doubt if many of us fly planes for a living.
Right....I'm in 
Bring on the Met guys and anyone with relevant information.
TWT made a post ( and then deleted it) confidently stating that the trim switch is only on the Captains side. He didn't say " I think the trim switch is only on the Captains side" or " Maybe the trim switch is on the Captains side" , he confidently told all and sundry that this is the case.
Now.....nobody who has ever held a type rating on a 737 would ever say that or think that yet here he is skewing a conversation, holding zero responsibility, mis advising the Met guys , the Airbus guys, the ATCO's , the media, everyone ( except those 737 rated) because for a milli second he gets to feel like he is an expert. For every half decent post there are six posts that are complete rubbish/ ego trips/ lies.
The reason this is frustrating is because a few years ago this site was full of professionals who gave insightful opinions, now, it is not.
The money will dry up when good info can no longer be gained from this site.
PS I wasn't having a go at you Mr Snuggles, just the guy who fed you duff gen.
Bring on the Met guys and anyone with relevant information.
TWT made a post ( and then deleted it) confidently stating that the trim switch is only on the Captains side. He didn't say " I think the trim switch is only on the Captains side" or " Maybe the trim switch is on the Captains side" , he confidently told all and sundry that this is the case.
Now.....nobody who has ever held a type rating on a 737 would ever say that or think that yet here he is skewing a conversation, holding zero responsibility, mis advising the Met guys , the Airbus guys, the ATCO's , the media, everyone ( except those 737 rated) because for a milli second he gets to feel like he is an expert. For every half decent post there are six posts that are complete rubbish/ ego trips/ lies.
The reason this is frustrating is because a few years ago this site was full of professionals who gave insightful opinions, now, it is not.
The money will dry up when good info can no longer be gained from this site.
PS I wasn't having a go at you Mr Snuggles, just the guy who fed you duff gen.
Originally Posted by GBV
could flight level 80 be 800 meters? That would be around 3200ft-3500ft which is the altitude they reached during both go-arounds...
And 3281 feet is 1000 metres, not 800
Join Date: Feb 2008
Location: Subterranea
Age: 70
Posts: 187
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
No lady yelling STABILIZER MOTION, STABILIZER MOTION, STABILIZER MOTION on the NG.
So how are we supposed to discover a runaway trim? After 6 hours flight time, at night, ****ty weather, tired and turbulence. Very easy to miss.
Unless the PM was trimming? That would be weird too.
Join Date: Dec 2000
Location: I used to know
Posts: 175
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
PBY and others.
Oldkingcoal, votex et al have repeatedly said that Fly dubai do NOT do dual autopilot approaches, they would NOT have done a single autopilot approaches. In this case the captain (That's the guy who on this occasion was in the left seat) would have flown the approach manually using the HUD.
Therefore there was no autopilot go around. At the very least the initial part of the go around would therefore have been flown manually.
Please take this into consideration when putting forward your non type rated theories.
From the possible translation theories could this strange word refer to the VS thumbwheal. Which would match the description of the "thing on a computer mouse"?
KS
Could you expand on the statement refering to stall and wing drop by MAK?
Oldkingcoal, votex et al have repeatedly said that Fly dubai do NOT do dual autopilot approaches, they would NOT have done a single autopilot approaches. In this case the captain (That's the guy who on this occasion was in the left seat) would have flown the approach manually using the HUD.
Therefore there was no autopilot go around. At the very least the initial part of the go around would therefore have been flown manually.
Please take this into consideration when putting forward your non type rated theories.
From the possible translation theories could this strange word refer to the VS thumbwheal. Which would match the description of the "thing on a computer mouse"?
KS
Could you expand on the statement refering to stall and wing drop by MAK?
Last edited by PT6Driver; 26th Mar 2016 at 11:19. Reason: typos
Join Date: Oct 1999
Location: LGW
Posts: 74
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Strange. Just can’t get my head around it either. Cannot imagine them missing something so serious or not being able to pull out of the dive. Regardless of stabilizer position, the B737 still has manual reversion and enough force should have gotten them out of a dive.
As said above, the trick is to find out why they went from close to 15-20 deg nose up to nose down. All I can think of is that now that the Windshear warning was gone they were trying to get back to a clean configuration.
In context I guess when they departed they had the following:
APS 42.5T
Traffic Load 5.5T
Take-off Fuel: 20.0T
TOW 68.0T
Burn to 1st App 9.5T
First approach 58.5T
Further 2.5h hold 6.5T
2nd Approach 52.0T
Vref 30 at 52T is approx. 132 kts
Limit speeds:
F1: 250
F5: 250
F10: 210
F15: 200
F25: 190
F30: 175
F40: 162
So it looks like they would have still had a 40 margin for flap overspeed during the initial go around. When the windshear warning stopped they would have selected flaps 15 and gear up. Followed by flap retraction in accordance with the bug. Looks like it never got to that.
As said above, the trick is to find out why they went from close to 15-20 deg nose up to nose down. All I can think of is that now that the Windshear warning was gone they were trying to get back to a clean configuration.
In context I guess when they departed they had the following:
APS 42.5T
Traffic Load 5.5T
Take-off Fuel: 20.0T
TOW 68.0T
Burn to 1st App 9.5T
First approach 58.5T
Further 2.5h hold 6.5T
2nd Approach 52.0T
Vref 30 at 52T is approx. 132 kts
Limit speeds:
F1: 250
F5: 250
F10: 210
F15: 200
F25: 190
F30: 175
F40: 162
So it looks like they would have still had a 40 margin for flap overspeed during the initial go around. When the windshear warning stopped they would have selected flaps 15 and gear up. Followed by flap retraction in accordance with the bug. Looks like it never got to that.
Join Date: Oct 2008
Location: UK
Posts: 361
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The crash videos seem to be consistent with a lighting pattern indicating gear down. This may not have been a regular go around, but windshear escape, the altitude from which it started being consistent with system parameters. It could be possible to forget the gear however (been there, done that), especially IF fatigue is a factor, but I wouldn't expect to see that level of performance with gear down at standard GA thrust.
As for Colgan, that was a crash where the captain had repeatedly failed check rides and so therefore has to have been of suspect ability, and a relatively inexperienced FO, both of whom managed to grossly mishandle the situation. That flight crew profile does not appear to match this incident, but that does not mean any human is immune from making mistakes.
As for Colgan, that was a crash where the captain had repeatedly failed check rides and so therefore has to have been of suspect ability, and a relatively inexperienced FO, both of whom managed to grossly mishandle the situation. That flight crew profile does not appear to match this incident, but that does not mean any human is immune from making mistakes.
Join Date: Jul 2004
Location: Found in Toronto
Posts: 615
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
In reference to some of the points mentioned above.
On the ATC recording at time 5:58 the crew advise in case of a go-around they will climb to FL80.
The B737-800 FCOM 2 Section 4.20.2 states that the auto pilot will disconnect automatically in case of:
Pushing TO/GA on a single channel approach:
- Below 2000 ft RA
- with flaps not up or
- G/S engaged
Also if they had a STAB Trim runaway it would have been obvious to the crew from the sound of the trim wheel and would be quickly discovered by the investigators given the associated sounds on the CVR.
I would be much more inclined to believe it was due to tailplane icing such as in the
October 1994 American Eagle ATR72 crash which was further investigated in NASA's Tailplane Icing program of March 2000.
On the ATC recording at time 5:58 the crew advise in case of a go-around they will climb to FL80.
The B737-800 FCOM 2 Section 4.20.2 states that the auto pilot will disconnect automatically in case of:
Pushing TO/GA on a single channel approach:
- Below 2000 ft RA
- with flaps not up or
- G/S engaged
Also if they had a STAB Trim runaway it would have been obvious to the crew from the sound of the trim wheel and would be quickly discovered by the investigators given the associated sounds on the CVR.
I would be much more inclined to believe it was due to tailplane icing such as in the
October 1994 American Eagle ATR72 crash which was further investigated in NASA's Tailplane Icing program of March 2000.
Join Date: Jul 2005
Location: btw SAMAR and TOSPA
Posts: 566
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
It is NEVER a clearance, in no part of the world.
The required clearance would read: In case of go around climb to and maintain FL80.
I hope your airborne appearance is limited to simulator skies, otherwise I suggest to revisit an ICAO phraseology RT lesson asap.
Join Date: Feb 2001
Location: Singapore
Posts: 89
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Spotted this on Channel News Asia..
"Pull up!": Russian TV airs final words of pilots in Flydubai jet crash - Channel NewsAsia
"Pull up!": Russian TV airs final words of pilots in Flydubai jet crash - Channel NewsAsia
Join Date: Aug 2008
Location: Betwixt and between
Posts: 666
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Threemiles,
Thanks for that. Great explanation. BTW, have you noticed how on the TCAS display how the an aircraft ahead can jump around in azimuth and also how a level aircraft ahead can show alternating climbs and descents with changes of around 100ft?
Data are from Air Data Computer. No data are calculated outside the airframe. Most likely recorded FDR data will appear 100% the same, albeit at a higher sampling rate.
MSL altitiude is from GPS (height over ellipsoid) and transmitted as an offset to QNE baro altitude.
Open remains the source of VS. There are two options: GPS or Baro. Depends on the supplier of the avionics.
MSL altitiude is from GPS (height over ellipsoid) and transmitted as an offset to QNE baro altitude.
Open remains the source of VS. There are two options: GPS or Baro. Depends on the supplier of the avionics.
Originally Posted by three miles
Originally Posted by Util BUS
At 6:03 the controller responds to their intention to climb to FL80 with "Roger" although this is non-standard terminology I would have accepted it to me "Approved" in that part of the world.
Roger is very much so ICAO standard terminology and means, I acknowledge receipt of your transmission.
Roger is very much so ICAO standard terminology and means, I acknowledge receipt of your transmission.
The required clearance would read: In case of go around climb to and maintain FL80.
I hope your airborne appearance is limited to simulator skies, otherwise I suggest to revisit an ICAO phraseology RT lesson asap.
I accept that, but therefore they acknowledged the intention to climb to FL80.
The fact they didn't deny a clearance to FL80 could have been interpreted as a clearance-by-omission.
I've never flown to Russia, but I know plenty of people who have, and their non-standardness extends beyond just units. Phraseology is not always from the ICAO textbook, and in this instance, whilst it should not be accepted as a clearance, it is very possible that the controller meant it as an approval.
Join Date: Sep 2005
Location: Moscow, Russia
Posts: 1,011
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
@pt6driver
"At an altitude of about 900 meters and a speed of more than 400 kilometers per hour, the plane banked left and hit the ground in the left edge of the runway almost vertically, at an angle of 60 degrees," Tass news agency quoted a source with Russia's air transport authorities as saying.
From MAK sources after reading FDR around March 20.
"At an altitude of about 900 meters and a speed of more than 400 kilometers per hour, the plane banked left and hit the ground in the left edge of the runway almost vertically, at an angle of 60 degrees," Tass news agency quoted a source with Russia's air transport authorities as saying.
From MAK sources after reading FDR around March 20.
Join Date: Dec 2006
Location: Florida and wherever my laptop is
Posts: 1,350
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
o how does the plane go from 0° to 45°-90° bank angle without lateral deviation ?
Forward motion provided, a passenger jet makes a turn when it banks, isn't it ?
Forward motion provided, a passenger jet makes a turn when it banks, isn't it ?
Join Date: Sep 1999
Posts: 541
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Accidently trimming by hitting the wrong switch?
A. The auto pilot will disconnect if you use stabilizer trim.
B. If you fly manually, you will feel this after a few turns of the trim wheel. It would be very weird if you continue to trim and fight the out of trim with the yoke at the same time.
Unless the PM was trimming? That would be weird too.
A. The auto pilot will disconnect if you use stabilizer trim.
B. If you fly manually, you will feel this after a few turns of the trim wheel. It would be very weird if you continue to trim and fight the out of trim with the yoke at the same time.
Unless the PM was trimming? That would be weird too.
If the PF is flying manually there is no AP disconnect wailer to let the PM know the error of his ways.Environmental noises(wshear rain) may camouflage the trim wheel noise.PM isnt holding the stick so is unaware of the forces on the stick that he is unintentionally creating.Only PF.If this situation is not corrected almost instantly by PF( trim cutout switches/remove PM's hand from stick) then at this altitude,it could be fatal.
Icing is not the cause.99% sure of this.
All conjecture but this had to be catastrophic flt control problem.Whether pilot induced or not.Vmca encounter also possible.
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: Around the corner
Posts: 171
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
PT6driver quote:PBY and others.
Oldkingcoal, votex et al have repeatedly said that Fly dubai do NOT do dual autopilot approaches, they would NOT have done a single autopilot approaches. In this case the captain (That's t
PT6Driver, it has already been said on Russian TV that they DID USE the autopilot.
Oldkingcoal, votex et al have repeatedly said that Fly dubai do NOT do dual autopilot approaches, they would NOT have done a single autopilot approaches. In this case the captain (That's t
PT6Driver, it has already been said on Russian TV that they DID USE the autopilot.
Guest
Join Date: Apr 2009
Location: On the Beach
Posts: 3,336
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Green-dot:
No one wore noise-cancelling headsets during my career. Now, most crews do. I have to wonder in some circumstances if that could create a possible safety problem because of greatly diminished ability to hear flight deck aural advisories or warnings? Or, other pertinent sounds?
The good old DC-8 Trim in motion "wrong answer" buzzer would have had a function in identifying such conditions . . . .