B-738 Crash in Russia Rostov-on-Don
Join Date: Sep 2005
Location: milky way
Posts: 247
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Two ( Russian) aircraft went around and continued to the alternate..frontal weather with little chance of improvement more probably worsening...holding for two hours makes no sense.if not that you are under commercial pressure or worried of possible consequences...
Join Date: Jul 2007
Location: Germany
Posts: 556
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
too_much, while already on final approach, just before initiating the go-around, they were given an updated QNH 997, when shortly before it was 998. The difference is less than 30 feet, so I can't see that playing any role here.
The difference to standard pressure setting is roughly 27 ft/hPa * (1013-997) hPa = 432 feet.
Do we have any indication if or when they set the altimeter setting to standard during their go-around? At one point they would have to do it since they had announced that they would climb to FL 080 (transition altitude being 3240 ft (900 m QFE)). Increasing the setting in the Kollsman window also increases the indicated altitude, so how would that influence things?
Bernd
The difference to standard pressure setting is roughly 27 ft/hPa * (1013-997) hPa = 432 feet.
Do we have any indication if or when they set the altimeter setting to standard during their go-around? At one point they would have to do it since they had announced that they would climb to FL 080 (transition altitude being 3240 ft (900 m QFE)). Increasing the setting in the Kollsman window also increases the indicated altitude, so how would that influence things?
Bernd
Join Date: Jan 2005
Location: Cloud Cookoo Land
Posts: 1,270
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Aluminium Shuffler makes an extremely valid statement about the ALT AQR gotcha with a two engined go around in the 737. A low missed approach altitude or failure to set the correct altitude, should it be higher than the platform altitude at which the approach was commenced can lead to a nasty shock. It's worth re-emphasising that this isn't completely understood by all 737 pilots and very often isn't discussed in training. It wasn't until I started training folk In the -800 sim that I was able to witness such an occurrence. Flight director pitch command leading to a rapid forward pitch input by PF, coupled with the A/T in speed mode, retarding thrust to control the commanded speed resultant from the speed window opening at ALT AQR. The forward pitch input was so abrupt (due to startle factor as both crew hadn't expected to level off as soon - the MCP altitude hadn't been correctly set for the GA) that it overshot. An equally abrupt reverse pitch input was added, leading to oscillations in pitch and resultant speed excursion.
I'm not at all saying that this is what happened in Rostov, however it's easy to see where things can go wrong. It has amazed me how many guys that I fly with are unaware of this trap and it is something that should be briefed as a relative TEM item. It also stuns me how many people want to engage level change during flap retraction in a two engined missed approach and don't discuss what will happen with commanded speed. Definitely a focus area for training departments.
I'm not at all saying that this is what happened in Rostov, however it's easy to see where things can go wrong. It has amazed me how many guys that I fly with are unaware of this trap and it is something that should be briefed as a relative TEM item. It also stuns me how many people want to engage level change during flap retraction in a two engined missed approach and don't discuss what will happen with commanded speed. Definitely a focus area for training departments.
Join Date: Aug 2000
Posts: 1,499
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
If we go with the botched go around scenario, what puzzles me is this: How did they end up with a 60 degree bank? That is a strong indication of a stall before they lost control. Or possibly poorly handled engine failure followed by loss of control.
The aircraft will issue a bank warning, and the reflex is to correct this when it happens, IF you have positive control over the aircraft.
The aircraft will issue a bank warning, and the reflex is to correct this when it happens, IF you have positive control over the aircraft.
"Mildly" Eccentric Stardriver
too-much. I did suggest earlier that they may have descended to 630 FEET. It would tie in with the point at which they commenced both go-arounds. That doesn't explain what happened afterwards though.
Join Date: Jul 2007
Location: Germany
Posts: 556
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
too_much, I transcribed what was available and never heard anyone mix up QFE/QNH. What do you mean?
As far as I can tell, QNH is only given on request, or when the controller already knows that one flight is flying according to QNH altitudes, and even then apparently always gives QFE as well.
Herod, there is no indication that anything was wrong with the glidepath up until such time as they went around, both times. Both final approaches sit snug on top of each other in the 3D flight path representations I have seen, such as this one.
They also always explicitly acknowledged "metres", and will almost certainly have had charts with the conversions.
As far as I can tell, QNH is only given on request, or when the controller already knows that one flight is flying according to QNH altitudes, and even then apparently always gives QFE as well.
Herod, there is no indication that anything was wrong with the glidepath up until such time as they went around, both times. Both final approaches sit snug on top of each other in the 3D flight path representations I have seen, such as this one.
They also always explicitly acknowledged "metres", and will almost certainly have had charts with the conversions.
Thread Starter
Join Date: Jun 2001
Location: Rockytop, Tennessee, USA
Posts: 5,898
Likes: 0
Received 1 Like
on
1 Post
Anyone have an updated QNH for time of approach? And how much it differ from
The QNE in terms of real altitude?
Maybe it could explain why the GA was not at minimums but an incorrect QNH setting called minimums early??
The QNE in terms of real altitude?
Maybe it could explain why the GA was not at minimums but an incorrect QNH setting called minimums early??
I don't think this was the case here but that type of mistake has certainly resulted in a mishap before.
Join Date: Jan 2000
Posts: 37
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
A Reason He Held for 1:40 Maybe
Elsewhere, its been stated he was leaving to start a new job with RyanAir. If he was due to leave the UAE shortly after returning from this flight, say the day after getting back, a diversion and subsequent rest period might have caused him to miss his booked flight out of there or caused him to be late for any number of things that ordinarily wouldn't affect our planning, so maybe this might explain the 2 hour holding... To get back home. The EK flight to Lca from Dxb departs around 0830L from memory. Just putting it out there.
Join Date: Aug 2000
Posts: 1,499
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
If he was holding when other aircraft went around and diverted, that could have made him extend his holding time. That is what I would have done.
If the local guys can't land, that is a strong indication for me to stay away, or wait for an improvment in the weather.
He had fuel, and lots of it.
If the local guys can't land, that is a strong indication for me to stay away, or wait for an improvment in the weather.
He had fuel, and lots of it.
Join Date: Jan 2003
Location: Emirates Living - The Meadows
Age: 79
Posts: 405
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
For the love of god!!! The 2 hours holding is standard FDB operations. We are routinely sent to somewhere we knew we couldn't get into with little prospect of being able to get into it with boatloads of fuel and told give it a go. If you didn't then you came under the scrutiny of the chief pilot who had a penchant for bullying crew and making careers untenable.
9/10 times we would do just that fly 3/4/5hrs get their hold have a look try again if necessary and more times that not we would divert.
The route they were flying was not one that more senior pilots would ever pick as it is known for crap weather, is captain only landing and its dark o'clock. It was just one of those places that you hoped to not get on your roster and if you did and if you couldn't swap it then you hoped you had one of those nights where there was a break in the crap weather and you could get in. If not you rocked up with extra stuff as you knew you could easily end up in a hotel.
FDB heap commercial pressure on crews way past the normal anyone else but if you have your family stuck in the middle east you have a choice do what they ask be it carry lithium batteries, operate outside of FTLs, ignore assaults on crew etc or loose your job and possibly your career.
It wasn't that we didn't know that but most of us just took the money and hoped to not be the crew of FZ981 before we got either enough money/hours/experience in LHS, etc to move to somewhere else.
The chief pilots favourite saying is "if you don't like it leave!" it was his solution to every problem given and the culture of fear has eroded the culture of safety to such an extent that most pilots were unlikely torpor anything but the most serious incidents as they knew they were simply raising their heads above the parapet.
Re the numerous posts from experts on here who have not operated in the Middle east, who have not flown in Russian airspace and who do not know anything about HGS/HUD ops suggest you use the two ears more than the one mouth and though of course you are interested but your conjecture does nothing to help do anything other than muddy the waters.
FDB never ever do coupled approaches. All CAT3a, CAT2 and CAT1 are manually flown to the ground. All low vis is hand flown. All low vis is hand flown on the HGS. All approaches in Russia are flown on QNH we have LIDO tables with a conversion table on EVRY Plate.
If you find a pilot in FZ unfamiliar with flying in metres and getting wind in metres per second then they are very very new indeed. There would have been little to no confusion in the crews mind about altimeter settings, when to set or change and wind in mps as it is an almost every day occurrence in Russia and we have/had 18 routes to Russia which is pretty significant.
What happened, I have a guess the same as any other pilot and more so with other 737 pilots and even more so with 737NG pilots. The factors are facts and everything else at this stage is clearly conjecture. Did they make and error in the GA, was their catastrophic failure of something or other, was it an act of god? That will all come out pretty soon.
What isn't conjecture however is that colleagues are dead and the weather was crap on departure, estimated to be crap at ETA, estimated to be crap until way past the point of full tanks and they left with the FDB standard cunning plan of well maybe it will be okay. If you want a fact it is that not many airlines would consider that normal they would simply wait at base until it was at least predicted to be likely and then leave.
FZ don't do that why? ask the Chief Pilot. He as an uber pilot and uber human knows better than everyone else he evens knows that black is in fact white and can prove it when called upon to do so and is above the law as demonstrated on innumerous occasions.
So yes whilst of course factors such as starting a new job etc would have been a factor the reality is FDB take 7 days minimum to sort your visa out when you leave and frequently take longer because we the crew do not matter, were not humans are simply slaves to be abused at their whim so why would looking after us or our families matter. So yes these factors exist but lets be honest we have all heard the tape. They called the GA and did it so the why were they there and why wait so long is simple, that is what NCC demanded they do. Why because the Chief Pilot lets them do whatever they please and refuses to exert any control over what is directly his area of responsibility because nothing is important except his pay check.
I hope the money is worth it and I hope the families of the departed get to see him face to face, look him in the eye in the full knowledge of how he runs his ship.
9/10 times we would do just that fly 3/4/5hrs get their hold have a look try again if necessary and more times that not we would divert.
The route they were flying was not one that more senior pilots would ever pick as it is known for crap weather, is captain only landing and its dark o'clock. It was just one of those places that you hoped to not get on your roster and if you did and if you couldn't swap it then you hoped you had one of those nights where there was a break in the crap weather and you could get in. If not you rocked up with extra stuff as you knew you could easily end up in a hotel.
FDB heap commercial pressure on crews way past the normal anyone else but if you have your family stuck in the middle east you have a choice do what they ask be it carry lithium batteries, operate outside of FTLs, ignore assaults on crew etc or loose your job and possibly your career.
It wasn't that we didn't know that but most of us just took the money and hoped to not be the crew of FZ981 before we got either enough money/hours/experience in LHS, etc to move to somewhere else.
The chief pilots favourite saying is "if you don't like it leave!" it was his solution to every problem given and the culture of fear has eroded the culture of safety to such an extent that most pilots were unlikely torpor anything but the most serious incidents as they knew they were simply raising their heads above the parapet.
Re the numerous posts from experts on here who have not operated in the Middle east, who have not flown in Russian airspace and who do not know anything about HGS/HUD ops suggest you use the two ears more than the one mouth and though of course you are interested but your conjecture does nothing to help do anything other than muddy the waters.
FDB never ever do coupled approaches. All CAT3a, CAT2 and CAT1 are manually flown to the ground. All low vis is hand flown. All low vis is hand flown on the HGS. All approaches in Russia are flown on QNH we have LIDO tables with a conversion table on EVRY Plate.
If you find a pilot in FZ unfamiliar with flying in metres and getting wind in metres per second then they are very very new indeed. There would have been little to no confusion in the crews mind about altimeter settings, when to set or change and wind in mps as it is an almost every day occurrence in Russia and we have/had 18 routes to Russia which is pretty significant.
What happened, I have a guess the same as any other pilot and more so with other 737 pilots and even more so with 737NG pilots. The factors are facts and everything else at this stage is clearly conjecture. Did they make and error in the GA, was their catastrophic failure of something or other, was it an act of god? That will all come out pretty soon.
What isn't conjecture however is that colleagues are dead and the weather was crap on departure, estimated to be crap at ETA, estimated to be crap until way past the point of full tanks and they left with the FDB standard cunning plan of well maybe it will be okay. If you want a fact it is that not many airlines would consider that normal they would simply wait at base until it was at least predicted to be likely and then leave.
FZ don't do that why? ask the Chief Pilot. He as an uber pilot and uber human knows better than everyone else he evens knows that black is in fact white and can prove it when called upon to do so and is above the law as demonstrated on innumerous occasions.
So yes whilst of course factors such as starting a new job etc would have been a factor the reality is FDB take 7 days minimum to sort your visa out when you leave and frequently take longer because we the crew do not matter, were not humans are simply slaves to be abused at their whim so why would looking after us or our families matter. So yes these factors exist but lets be honest we have all heard the tape. They called the GA and did it so the why were they there and why wait so long is simple, that is what NCC demanded they do. Why because the Chief Pilot lets them do whatever they please and refuses to exert any control over what is directly his area of responsibility because nothing is important except his pay check.
I hope the money is worth it and I hope the families of the departed get to see him face to face, look him in the eye in the full knowledge of how he runs his ship.
Join Date: Mar 2014
Location: Brussels
Posts: 131
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Two ( Russian) aircraft went around and continued to the alternate..frontal weather with little chance of improvement more probably worsening...holding for two hours makes no sense.if not that you are under commercial pressure or worried of possible consequences...
You will note all the brow-beaten captains in certain airlines diverting immediately, because they have no fuel. While I like to take extra if possible, and hold. Not having to divert can save shed-loads of money, if you get it right. Which I have done on many occasions - while everyone around me was diverting - and ending up as the first one in (after two hours holding, you are invariably at the bottom of the stack).
But I do remember holding for two hours once, and having to go back home. :-(
Join Date: Mar 2011
Location: outside the box
Age: 40
Posts: 81
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I don't know if it 's been mentioned before but what if they missed pressing the TOGA button.. I know it's an amateur mistake to make but if it happened, FDs would point down to the Rwy and lead to crew confusion.
Come on, don't beat about the bush, say what you really think!
Join Date: Jul 2004
Location: Found in Toronto
Posts: 615
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
For the love of god!!! The 2 hours holding is standard FDB operations. We are routinely sent to somewhere we knew we couldn't get into with little prospect of being able to get into it with boatloads of fuel and told give it a go. If you didn't then you came under the scrutiny of the chief pilot who had a penchant for bullying crew and making careers untenable................................................... ..............
......................................................
.................
hope the money is worth it and I hope the families of the departed get to see him face to face, look him in the eye in the full knowledge of how he runs his ship.
......................................................
.................
hope the money is worth it and I hope the families of the departed get to see him face to face, look him in the eye in the full knowledge of how he runs his ship.
Join Date: Sep 2015
Location: Nice
Posts: 19
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Vortex:
FZ don't do that why? ask the Chief Pilot. He as an uber pilot and uber human knows better than everyone else he evens knows that black is in fact white and can prove it when called upon to do so and is above the law as demonstrated on innumerous occasions.
FZ don't do that why? ask the Chief Pilot. He as an uber pilot and uber human knows better than everyone else he evens knows that black is in fact white and can prove it when called upon to do so and is above the law as demonstrated on innumerous occasions.
Now where have I seen this management attitude before? Ah, I know ... XXX airline, XXX airline, and XXX airline, and let's not forget XXX airline. And then there is XXX airline, XXX airline, and.......
.
BTW. Was this particular aircraft on V-bars?
Join Date: Aug 2000
Posts: 1,499
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
They will most likely be expecting to go around the second time and possibly over breif the procedure.
For sure highly unlikely that anything went wrong with go around.
Plus the call to the tower "going around" normally comes after TOGA/thrust set flap 15 and positive rate gear up. Normally....
For sure highly unlikely that anything went wrong with go around.
Plus the call to the tower "going around" normally comes after TOGA/thrust set flap 15 and positive rate gear up. Normally....
Join Date: Jan 2006
Location: US
Posts: 2,205
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
HOTAS - Hands On Throttle And Stick.
Military term for modern switchology design. But the BASIC concept still applies, fly with one hand and have one hand on the thrust/throttle levers, even when the A/T's are engaged.
I've seen 105 lbs (48 kg) women fly airliners with one hand so I'm constantly amazed, and dismayed, by 105 kg (230 lbs) men that think they need two hands to fly an airliner.
A hand on the thrust/throttle levers (ignoring AB a/c) gives instantaneous feedback if the engine power changes when you don't expect it to.
Military term for modern switchology design. But the BASIC concept still applies, fly with one hand and have one hand on the thrust/throttle levers, even when the A/T's are engaged.
I've seen 105 lbs (48 kg) women fly airliners with one hand so I'm constantly amazed, and dismayed, by 105 kg (230 lbs) men that think they need two hands to fly an airliner.
A hand on the thrust/throttle levers (ignoring AB a/c) gives instantaneous feedback if the engine power changes when you don't expect it to.
