A321 explosion at Mogadishu
Whether that will happen depends on a number of factors, not least on how much residual value there is in a 19-year-old airframe.
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Clearly the damage is repairable.
Whether that will happen depends on a number of factors, not least on how much residual value there is in a 19-year-old airframe.
Whether that will happen depends on a number of factors, not least on how much residual value there is in a 19-year-old airframe.
Another "having thought of" ...
Perhaps FL140 has some relation. Typically somewhere above FL100 the fasten seatbelt is turned off and a bit later passengers are allowed to turn on approved electronic devises, give that a minute more and that could coincide with near FL140. Assuming a climb rate of 1-2,000 fpm.
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On the question of repairs...
I'm slightly rusty and stand to be corrected here but I think this is right:
From an insurance point of view, aircraft are treated much like ships. The policy is an Agreed Value Policy (not like your car). The OEM doesn't really have a say in whether the airframe is repaired or is treated as a Constructive Total Loss ("CTL") - which is what happens when the estimated cost of repair gets close to the agreed value, and there is a risk that it might exceed it - the matter is negotiated between the underwriters and the insured, which is when your broker really earns his pay, but the OEM can, and occasionally does, offer to repair at a figure below the hull value. A CTL means that the hull underwriters pay the agreed value and leave the insured owner to dispose of the remains.
In this case there is another question - if the loss was due to a bomb, it is a War Peril and as such the War Risks policy pays and the hull loss does not figure on the OEM's record of losses.
My hunch is that this aircraft will be a CTL due to the difficulty of making temporary repairs at Mogadishu - an airport that I last flew out of aboard an Aden Airways DC3...
Another case of a bomb in the lifejacket pouch (post 51) was the PAL 747 - PR 434 - in 1994 - one pax lost, aircraft diverted and landed.
I'm slightly rusty and stand to be corrected here but I think this is right:
From an insurance point of view, aircraft are treated much like ships. The policy is an Agreed Value Policy (not like your car). The OEM doesn't really have a say in whether the airframe is repaired or is treated as a Constructive Total Loss ("CTL") - which is what happens when the estimated cost of repair gets close to the agreed value, and there is a risk that it might exceed it - the matter is negotiated between the underwriters and the insured, which is when your broker really earns his pay, but the OEM can, and occasionally does, offer to repair at a figure below the hull value. A CTL means that the hull underwriters pay the agreed value and leave the insured owner to dispose of the remains.
In this case there is another question - if the loss was due to a bomb, it is a War Peril and as such the War Risks policy pays and the hull loss does not figure on the OEM's record of losses.
My hunch is that this aircraft will be a CTL due to the difficulty of making temporary repairs at Mogadishu - an airport that I last flew out of aboard an Aden Airways DC3...
Another case of a bomb in the lifejacket pouch (post 51) was the PAL 747 - PR 434 - in 1994 - one pax lost, aircraft diverted and landed.
Last edited by Methersgate; 9th Feb 2016 at 12:53.
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My hunch is a quick on site repair (basically glue or nail a plate on) and then fly to the south of France (Perpignan) unpressurized. There it either gets repaired or stripped for spare parts, whichever gives most residual value.
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thf's post Al Jereera
This is what I have been alluding to.
In fact the Turkish flight in question had been cancelled for two days straight including the day of the incident itself citing "winds out of limits".
The conditions in Mogadishu were standard Mogadishu ...pretty much straight down the track 20kts .. which leads to some questions of course.
In fact the Turkish flight in question had been cancelled for two days straight including the day of the incident itself citing "winds out of limits".
The conditions in Mogadishu were standard Mogadishu ...pretty much straight down the track 20kts .. which leads to some questions of course.
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I'd imagine that a quick and dirty boilerplate repair would be achievable by any sheet metal worker worth their salt. Cut out the damaged skin panel with nice rounded corners, generously stop drill the cracks, drop in a flush repair panel, and put a 3-4 frame wide boilerplate repair panel over the top picking up on the existing fastener holes. That would be sufficient to ferry fly the old bird back unpressurized to facility where a permanent repairs can be carried out. There were aircraft flown out of the Balkans in worse shape. Aluminum structures are remarkably repairable.
Another "having thought of" ...
Perhaps FL140 has some relation. Typically somewhere above FL100 the fasten seatbelt is turned off and a bit later passengers are allowed to turn on approved electronic devises, give that a minute more and that could coincide with near FL140. Assuming a climb rate of 1-2,000 fpm.
Perhaps FL140 has some relation. Typically somewhere above FL100 the fasten seatbelt is turned off and a bit later passengers are allowed to turn on approved electronic devises, give that a minute more and that could coincide with near FL140. Assuming a climb rate of 1-2,000 fpm.
One could further not disregard the probability that he had no control over the device at the one end of the scale, or that he had no disclosure from the courier/maker as to the intention of the device at the other end...
iPad battery failure, or atomic powered Heart Pace-Maker
To me it seems remarkably lucky that the individual believed to be responsible for this was allocated the seat they were.
One could further not disregard the probability that he had no control over the device at the one end of the scale, or that he had no disclosure from the courier/maker as to the intention of the device at the other end...
As for the repairability of the aircraft - based on the photos I've seen it should be a straight forward repair, basically replace a couple skin panels and stringers. As Busbert notes, aluminum panels can be readily repaired and the industry has had lots of practice. Recall that the United 747 that lost the cargo door out of Honolulu suffered far worse damage yet was repaired and returned to service.
pacemaker red herring
Originally Posted by flyems
iPad battery failure, or atomic powered Heart Pace-Maker
For most of us watts are more natural units than curies or disintegrations, so perhaps it may help to say that at time of manufacture the thermal decay heat was about a tenth of a watt (obviously electric power generation was rather less).
Pu-238 is not the stuff you want to make bombs of, and is actually regarded as a contaminant by bomb makers.
A speculation that the Mogadishu event could have been pacemaker caused is ill-informed and foolish. None of the battery types used have potential for so energetic an event. Especially not the atomic-powered ones.
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WSJ article - Feb 9, 2016
Somali Plane Revelations Add to Fears of Insider Attacks - WSJ
From the above article:
From the above article:
Minister says an aviation worker was involved in Daallo Airlines attack
By Robert Wall and Heidi Vogt
Updated Feb. 9, 2016 5:42 p.m. ET
LONDON—Somalia’s transport minister on Tuesday said that an employee at the country’s civil aviation office aided the bombing of a Djibouti-bound plane last week, reinforcing concern among security experts that insider attacks are among the biggest threats to commercial flights.
...
Surveillance footage released by Somali officials over the weekend purports to show two men walking together through the airport terminal. One of the men takes an item from under his arm and passes it to a third man, walking in the opposite direction.
Somalia’s minister for transport and aviation, Ali Jama Jangali, Tuesday said that one of the men shown in the security camera footage was an airport employee who had worked “for a number of years” in the civil aviation office. “When he was recruited and how he was recruited, at what point he started working with them, all that is under investigation,” Mr. Jangali said. The other man in the video—the one who actually handed off the laptop—wasn't an airport employee, he said.
...
Somalia’s transport minister Mr. Jangali acknowledged there were “lapses” and “negligence,” though he did not provide details. “We are trying to ensure that those lapses never happen again,” he said.
By Robert Wall and Heidi Vogt
Updated Feb. 9, 2016 5:42 p.m. ET
LONDON—Somalia’s transport minister on Tuesday said that an employee at the country’s civil aviation office aided the bombing of a Djibouti-bound plane last week, reinforcing concern among security experts that insider attacks are among the biggest threats to commercial flights.
...
Surveillance footage released by Somali officials over the weekend purports to show two men walking together through the airport terminal. One of the men takes an item from under his arm and passes it to a third man, walking in the opposite direction.
Somalia’s minister for transport and aviation, Ali Jama Jangali, Tuesday said that one of the men shown in the security camera footage was an airport employee who had worked “for a number of years” in the civil aviation office. “When he was recruited and how he was recruited, at what point he started working with them, all that is under investigation,” Mr. Jangali said. The other man in the video—the one who actually handed off the laptop—wasn't an airport employee, he said.
...
Somalia’s transport minister Mr. Jangali acknowledged there were “lapses” and “negligence,” though he did not provide details. “We are trying to ensure that those lapses never happen again,” he said.
Last edited by airman1900; 9th Feb 2016 at 23:19. Reason: Added more from article
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So what side of safety are the stuffy pilots going to pontificate now on?
It seems there are plenty of opinions claiming USA/TSA security is annoyingly unnecessary. How does that compare to the breeches happening tarmac side in the rest of the Americas, Europe, Africa, ME &'Asia? Having your choices into countries of risk, whether on the origin or destination end, describe your preferred security measures ?
I'd welcome what works and the retort from others why it doesn't. We'll never have a perfect world. Our jobs are to keep pax, cargo and ourselves safe. Inconvenience to employees is not factored into this strategy. It just is a way of life. So, in light of tarmac breeches happening around continents, what security is worth sticking to?
It seems there are plenty of opinions claiming USA/TSA security is annoyingly unnecessary. How does that compare to the breeches happening tarmac side in the rest of the Americas, Europe, Africa, ME &'Asia? Having your choices into countries of risk, whether on the origin or destination end, describe your preferred security measures ?
I'd welcome what works and the retort from others why it doesn't. We'll never have a perfect world. Our jobs are to keep pax, cargo and ourselves safe. Inconvenience to employees is not factored into this strategy. It just is a way of life. So, in light of tarmac breeches happening around continents, what security is worth sticking to?
A speculation that the Mogadishu event could have been pacemaker caused is ill-informed and foolish. None of the battery types used have potential for so energetic an event. Especially not the atomic-powered ones.
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So what side of safety are the stuffy pilots going to pontificate now on?
It seems there are plenty of opinions claiming USA/TSA security is annoyingly unnecessary. How does that compare to the breeches happening tarmac side in the rest of the Americas, Europe, Africa, ME &'Asia? Having your choices into countries of risk, whether on the origin or destination end, describe your preferred security measures ?
I'd welcome what works and the retort from others why it doesn't. We'll never have a perfect world. Our jobs are to keep pax, cargo and ourselves safe. Inconvenience to employees is not factored into this strategy. It just is a way of life. So, in light of tarmac breeches happening around continents, what security is worth sticking to?
It seems there are plenty of opinions claiming USA/TSA security is annoyingly unnecessary. How does that compare to the breeches happening tarmac side in the rest of the Americas, Europe, Africa, ME &'Asia? Having your choices into countries of risk, whether on the origin or destination end, describe your preferred security measures ?
I'd welcome what works and the retort from others why it doesn't. We'll never have a perfect world. Our jobs are to keep pax, cargo and ourselves safe. Inconvenience to employees is not factored into this strategy. It just is a way of life. So, in light of tarmac breeches happening around continents, what security is worth sticking to?
Who watches the watchmen?
So this has been a problem for a long time. At some point you have to trust someone and that trust can be misplaced. For example, a regime where crossing into airside is controlled has to trust that a pilot will not give a bootful of left rudder at a critical moment, so as the pilot is trusted not do that, confiscating his 6ml pot of yoghurt is a little foolish. Slightly different level for flight attendants but not much. Why should TSA be allowed to cross back and forth groundside to airside all the time without search - they could be split groundside crew and airside crew, etc etc.
As with all security it is people security that is always the weak point and is the most difficult to enforce as who watches the watchmen?
Who Watches Who
Who Watches the Watchmen
it is the unseen who watches the watchmen
That is where the corrective action needs to go so I don't expect it ever to become visible to the public masses.
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A year ago or so, I watched a security officer take a litre bottle of water through the security check. I asked for the supervisor and mentioned what I had just witnessed. He was courteous and understanding but said that it was permitted for security staff to bring food and bottles air side. I pointed out that it would only take one rogue (or threatened) staff member to bring in one or several bottles, which were ehm not filled with H2O, over a period of time and then, on a given day, pass them on to a "passenger". Even though he shared my concerns as far as I know the dispensation still stands! This is BRUSSELS, not some vague third world airport!
