Faro 1992 New Documentary
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Faro 1992 New Documentary
http://www.timefornews.nl/170468_dis...ljW5tI.twitter
Binnenland :: ‘Martinair-ramptoestel Faro onder druk goedgekeurd’
Martinair crash Faro keeps the Dutch busy
Binnenland :: ‘Martinair-ramptoestel Faro onder druk goedgekeurd’
Martinair crash Faro keeps the Dutch busy
Last edited by Winnerhofer; 16th Jan 2016 at 23:06.
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The 'self appointed' expert / CEO of MARTINAIR, Martin Schroder reported within 24 hours of the crash that the cause was windshear, and still ( after 23+ years ) doesn't have 'the balls' to admit that his statement was way too premature.
If he is a man, he should deeply bend his head in shame.
If MARTINAIR was a Japanese company, the CEO would already have stepped off the roof of the Amsterdam Hilton...
If he is a man, he should deeply bend his head in shame.
If MARTINAIR was a Japanese company, the CEO would already have stepped off the roof of the Amsterdam Hilton...
Last edited by BedakSrewet; 17th Jan 2016 at 03:13. Reason: typo
From that last link:
Say what, now?
Parts of the investigation documents have been classified by the Netherlands and will first be open to the public by the year 2073.
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The Dutch Accident Investigation Board is full of incompetent " investigators" who have their own agenda.
Just look at the MH investigation, where they refuse to take into account any Russian data and eat out of the hands of the Ukrainians.
Just look at the MH investigation, where they refuse to take into account any Russian data and eat out of the hands of the Ukrainians.
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Just look at the MH investigation, where they refuse to take into account any Russian data and eat out of the hands of the Ukrainians.
Now back on topic: yes a CEO stating what the "facts" are so quickly normally only happens in places like Indonesia or let's say Russia (Pun intended...)
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Hell, I guess that if a dutch pilot takes off without clearance they will try to find a way to blame somebody else.... oh wait.
Also in that respect is the premature reaction of Martin Schroder not a surprise, how disturbing it may be.
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Hush Money
*'Martinair bood ons zwijggeld'|Binnenland| Telegraaf.nl
"Martinair offered us hush money '
Martinair has put pressure on relatives of the Faro-ramp to stop their own research or ask critical questions. With money and houses the airline put the survivors to silence.
According to a family in Maassluis, who says eighteen years to be busy all the facts of the plane crash in Faro in 1992 to get into the open, a year after the disaster was a contact Martinair at the door with the offer of "five tons guilders 'or a' spacious house.
"We are there when not addressed, because we just wanted the truth and uncovering it," said Iem Vroombout in the AD. "We said we only wanted to hear the truth. When the man stood again within five minutes outside."
The incident occurred after a television appearance of Vroombout in 1993 in which he told about his experiences in Faro. Corrie and Iem lost in the disaster their 14 year old daughter and myself decided to investigate the facts. That led to a new, critical report on the crash, which was published yesterday in the AD.
According to the new research caused Forecasting errors by the crew of the fatal plane crash in which 56 people were killed.
"Martinair offered us hush money '
Martinair has put pressure on relatives of the Faro-ramp to stop their own research or ask critical questions. With money and houses the airline put the survivors to silence.
According to a family in Maassluis, who says eighteen years to be busy all the facts of the plane crash in Faro in 1992 to get into the open, a year after the disaster was a contact Martinair at the door with the offer of "five tons guilders 'or a' spacious house.
"We are there when not addressed, because we just wanted the truth and uncovering it," said Iem Vroombout in the AD. "We said we only wanted to hear the truth. When the man stood again within five minutes outside."
The incident occurred after a television appearance of Vroombout in 1993 in which he told about his experiences in Faro. Corrie and Iem lost in the disaster their 14 year old daughter and myself decided to investigate the facts. That led to a new, critical report on the crash, which was published yesterday in the AD.
According to the new research caused Forecasting errors by the crew of the fatal plane crash in which 56 people were killed.
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It is really annoying to be discussing an accident from the past without at least having an accident report to review. The original report was published in Portuguese, but there is an unofficial English version here: http://www.vliegrampfaro.nl/wp-conte...rt-English.pdf
There appears to be a lot in common here with the MD-11 rollover accidents.
There appears to be a lot in common here with the MD-11 rollover accidents.
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That report makes very interesting reading.
Since the flight crew survived the accident (the Captain with only minor injuries) and presumably talked to the airline's management, I do not think a statement within 24 hours is "premature". Also the report makes it quite clear that the accident was at least initiated by windshear, although compounded by crew actions.
I find particularly interesting the statement that the PF probably applied insufficient nose-up input due to an unrecognized "mode change" (from CWS to manual) caused by "dual inputs" by the Captain and FO in response to aircraft roll.
Since the flight crew survived the accident (the Captain with only minor injuries) and presumably talked to the airline's management, I do not think a statement within 24 hours is "premature". Also the report makes it quite clear that the accident was at least initiated by windshear, although compounded by crew actions.
I find particularly interesting the statement that the PF probably applied insufficient nose-up input due to an unrecognized "mode change" (from CWS to manual) caused by "dual inputs" by the Captain and FO in response to aircraft roll.
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Whether or not even experienced first officers get enough practice landing in bad conditions, it would seem that a stabilized approach had not been achieved by one thousand feet....
A very very wet runway at Faro, torrential and gusty CB showers....a heavy aircraft with possible engine thrust reversers u/s.... reading the entire report, basically, the braking conditions exceeded the LDA.....
A very very wet runway at Faro, torrential and gusty CB showers....a heavy aircraft with possible engine thrust reversers u/s.... reading the entire report, basically, the braking conditions exceeded the LDA.....
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NTSB
National Transportation Safety Boar d
October 26, 1994
Mr . Luis Alberto Figueira Lima Da Silv a Investigator-in-Charge, Avn Inspection Div . Directorate of Civil Aviation
Rua B Edificio G
1700 Aeroporto Lisboa, PORTUGA L
Dear Luis Alberto Figueira Lima Da ,
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the confidential draft repor t concerning the landing accident at Faro, Portugal involving a Martinai r DC-10-30 on December 21 . 1992.
It appears that the airplane and autoflight systems worked properly . Information from the quick access recorder indicates that the speed error (which is one of the parameters controlling the autothrottle computer an d
translates how hard the computer wants to push the throttles forward) suddenly increases when the throttles were reduced to idle at 150 feet radio
altitude, rather than at 50 feet when the normal autothrottle retard mod e would have been in effect . The report contradicts itself when on page B- 5 it indicates the above information, but later, on the last sentence on pag e D-3, it states "The power was reduced at 150 ft instead of at 50 ft b y autothrottle action." Consideration might be given to changing the latter sentence to indicate manual intervention by the crew .
Washington, D .C. 20594
Martinair's Flight Crew Operating Manual (FCOM) dated March 1, 198 9 states on page 05-60-09 of Volume II, approach precautions for windshea r procedures. It appears from the report that the following procedures wer e not followed :
Achieve a stabilized approach no later than 1000 feet AGL
Avoid large thrust reductions or trim changes in response to sudde n airspeed increases as these may be followed by airspeed decreases .
Consider using the recommended flap setting . (Recommended landing flap setting is minimum flap setting authorized for normal landing
configuration .)
Use the autopilot and autothrottles for the approach to provide more monitoring and recognition time . If using the autothrottles, manually back - up the throttles to prevent excessive power reduction during an increasin g performance shear .
During the approach . use of flaps 50, the low airspeed, and throttl e
movement to idle, minimized the flight crews options for recovery and increased the recovery time required . Once the autopilot was disengaged ,
CWS with ATS remained : functions which were inappropriately used by the flightcrew .
If the commission feels that windshear was present during the approac h then consideration should be given to recommending implementation o r review of crew training for windshear recovery .
Sincerely ,
Alfred W . Dickinson U.S . Accredited Rep
October 26, 1994
Mr . Luis Alberto Figueira Lima Da Silv a Investigator-in-Charge, Avn Inspection Div . Directorate of Civil Aviation
Rua B Edificio G
1700 Aeroporto Lisboa, PORTUGA L
Dear Luis Alberto Figueira Lima Da ,
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the confidential draft repor t concerning the landing accident at Faro, Portugal involving a Martinai r DC-10-30 on December 21 . 1992.
It appears that the airplane and autoflight systems worked properly . Information from the quick access recorder indicates that the speed error (which is one of the parameters controlling the autothrottle computer an d
translates how hard the computer wants to push the throttles forward) suddenly increases when the throttles were reduced to idle at 150 feet radio
altitude, rather than at 50 feet when the normal autothrottle retard mod e would have been in effect . The report contradicts itself when on page B- 5 it indicates the above information, but later, on the last sentence on pag e D-3, it states "The power was reduced at 150 ft instead of at 50 ft b y autothrottle action." Consideration might be given to changing the latter sentence to indicate manual intervention by the crew .
Washington, D .C. 20594
Martinair's Flight Crew Operating Manual (FCOM) dated March 1, 198 9 states on page 05-60-09 of Volume II, approach precautions for windshea r procedures. It appears from the report that the following procedures wer e not followed :
Achieve a stabilized approach no later than 1000 feet AGL
Avoid large thrust reductions or trim changes in response to sudde n airspeed increases as these may be followed by airspeed decreases .
Consider using the recommended flap setting . (Recommended landing flap setting is minimum flap setting authorized for normal landing
configuration .)
Use the autopilot and autothrottles for the approach to provide more monitoring and recognition time . If using the autothrottles, manually back - up the throttles to prevent excessive power reduction during an increasin g performance shear .
During the approach . use of flaps 50, the low airspeed, and throttl e
movement to idle, minimized the flight crews options for recovery and increased the recovery time required . Once the autopilot was disengaged ,
CWS with ATS remained : functions which were inappropriately used by the flightcrew .
If the commission feels that windshear was present during the approac h then consideration should be given to recommending implementation o r review of crew training for windshear recovery .
Sincerely ,
Alfred W . Dickinson U.S . Accredited Rep
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AFM
1.17.1.4 - DC-10 Aircraft Operation Manual:
Section 3 - Paragraph 3.1.17 Procedures of operation with unserviceable thrust engine reverse:
Thrust reversers: a fan thrust reverser:
· aircraft shall not depart an airport/ station where repair or replacement can be made,
· the unserviceable fan thrust reverser is secured and stowed according to MAI78-00-01,
· when dispatching from a wet or contaminated runway, the thrust used for take-off shall not be less than full A rating.
Section 3 - Paragraph 3.1.17 Procedures of operation with unserviceable thrust engine reverse:
Thrust reversers: a fan thrust reverser:
· aircraft shall not depart an airport/ station where repair or replacement can be made,
· the unserviceable fan thrust reverser is secured and stowed according to MAI78-00-01,
· when dispatching from a wet or contaminated runway, the thrust used for take-off shall not be less than full A rating.
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I suspect none of this would have happened if the held until the thunderstorm was gone.
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Top secret until 2073 is no less than a cover up.
One sure wonders what it is that is so embarrasing/frightening that it has to be kept hidden until there is nobody left alive that can take an interest.
It must have been a major ****up not directly related to the accident itself.
I guess a major part of the civil servants got there hands dirty to an extent that, if it were to become public, all hell would have broken loose.
Things were quite smelly back in the days of the RLD, the competent authority.
There are things with a heavy odour right now with the successor, ILENT, as my recent dealings with them confirmed.
One sure wonders what it is that is so embarrasing/frightening that it has to be kept hidden until there is nobody left alive that can take an interest.
It must have been a major ****up not directly related to the accident itself.
I guess a major part of the civil servants got there hands dirty to an extent that, if it were to become public, all hell would have broken loose.
Things were quite smelly back in the days of the RLD, the competent authority.
There are things with a heavy odour right now with the successor, ILENT, as my recent dealings with them confirmed.
It would be instructive to know on what basis the documents were sealed.
It is not anything military and with McDD out of the picture, there is no manufacturer's reputation to protect.
Does Dutch law allow such arbitrary deep-sixing of the results of inquiries?
It is not anything military and with McDD out of the picture, there is no manufacturer's reputation to protect.
Does Dutch law allow such arbitrary deep-sixing of the results of inquiries?