BREAKING NEWS: airliner missing within Egyptian FIR
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And how many heavy checks did JAL 123 have in the 12,000-odd cycles before that repair let go? I wouldn't attach any great weight at all to the fact that a check was performed in 2014.
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Latest press release 'external activity'.
Or the start of an attempt by the airline to avoid taking responsibility if it turns out to be down to inadequate repairs post-tail-strike or poor maintenance - period ?
Take your choice.
Or the start of an attempt by the airline to avoid taking responsibility if it turns out to be down to inadequate repairs post-tail-strike or poor maintenance - period ?
Take your choice.
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Is This Any Way to Run an Airline?
This ought to be of special interest to all you airline professionals.
From a report of Russian news service RIA Novosti, an audit of Kogalymavia (the corporation operating aircraft under the brand Metrojet), undertaken as part of the accident investigation, has discovered that wages are two months in arrears (выявлена задолженность по заработной плате за 2 месяца).
Incomprehensible as it may seem to those of us from the West, there are numerous precedents for Russians continuing at their jobs during extended periods while their employer is too cash poor to pay them.
We can try to imagine the ramifications for airline operations, of being too broke to pay workers.
____________________________
I try to console myself by hoping that gross structural failure occurred at cruise altitude, with enough Gs to prevent use of O2 masks. If it played out that way, maybe all were beyond pain or fear within about 20 seconds ...
From a report of Russian news service RIA Novosti, an audit of Kogalymavia (the corporation operating aircraft under the brand Metrojet), undertaken as part of the accident investigation, has discovered that wages are two months in arrears (выявлена задолженность по заработной плате за 2 месяца).
Incomprehensible as it may seem to those of us from the West, there are numerous precedents for Russians continuing at their jobs during extended periods while their employer is too cash poor to pay them.
We can try to imagine the ramifications for airline operations, of being too broke to pay workers.
____________________________
I try to console myself by hoping that gross structural failure occurred at cruise altitude, with enough Gs to prevent use of O2 masks. If it played out that way, maybe all were beyond pain or fear within about 20 seconds ...
Notice no-one had posted anything about this but it does appear the split of the tail section, is right near the back edge of the rear cargo hold door - would i be right in saying this? Right near the Airbus a321 logo
some notes on ADS-B
In earlier posts assumptions were made about ADS-B, some correct and some others slightly less. These notes should help to clarify.
ADS-B was implemented for the sole purpose of traffic information and collision avoidance provided to airborne and groundbased equipment. Tracking over time was and is not a main goal.
Although data may be interrogated, the transmitters mostly send it insollicited and once per second in a so called broadcast (to anybody listening) , hence the B after ADS. Many aircraft broadcasting once per second within the range of about 100 nautical miles require the following characteristics:
Messages must be short and well distributed over the 1 second period. As the data is repeated, there is no error correction required, but error recognition must be excellent When a message is corrupted, the system can wait for the next one in sequence.
Data is not broadcast in one long message but sliced into parts (registers) containing no more than 56 bits (7 bytes) and protected against wrong reading by a 24 bit parity which provides reliable error detection. It takes about 1/10000th of a second to send a slice, so the theoretical max number of well distributed broadcasts would be 10000 within the same range. The practical limit is of course far less and even if there are only 2 aircraft within range, they may occasionally block each other out.
Short messages mean data condensed to the minimum. Thus e.g a timestamp in not included as it is meaningless in real time navigation. Anything else than 3d-position, 3d-vector and aircraft id is not repeated in the standard broadcast. It may be interrogated though in special cases and TCAS advisories may be exchanged between aircraft. More data can be sent as a response to a radar scan by means of mode S transponders. The last thing one would do is synchronize all the broadcasts as they would effectively block each other out within the same range.
Data sources may be different. The most simple ADS-B device, the FLARM, derives all values from an internal GPS. In complex aircraft equipment, the data may be provided by computers or other complex sensors. Mode-S transponders send pressure altitude while FLARM send msl altitude. V-Speed may also be derived from different sensors or simply by differentiating altitude changes. Roll data is not required for collision avoidance (TCAS gives only up and down advisories, never left or right) and is therefore not part of the squitter messages. Same applies for other conditions. But there is a ground mode and an airbourne mode, ground mode not transmitting values like speed etc. If you want to know more, google “ads-b for dummies”.
Both airborne and ground equipment may now process these raw data and make assumptions about other flight parameters. But any follow-on calculation assumes a reasonable flight enveloppe. Thus, in a crash analysis, processed ADS-B data as provided by FR24 must be used cautiously.
ADS-B was implemented for the sole purpose of traffic information and collision avoidance provided to airborne and groundbased equipment. Tracking over time was and is not a main goal.
Although data may be interrogated, the transmitters mostly send it insollicited and once per second in a so called broadcast (to anybody listening) , hence the B after ADS. Many aircraft broadcasting once per second within the range of about 100 nautical miles require the following characteristics:
Messages must be short and well distributed over the 1 second period. As the data is repeated, there is no error correction required, but error recognition must be excellent When a message is corrupted, the system can wait for the next one in sequence.
Data is not broadcast in one long message but sliced into parts (registers) containing no more than 56 bits (7 bytes) and protected against wrong reading by a 24 bit parity which provides reliable error detection. It takes about 1/10000th of a second to send a slice, so the theoretical max number of well distributed broadcasts would be 10000 within the same range. The practical limit is of course far less and even if there are only 2 aircraft within range, they may occasionally block each other out.
Short messages mean data condensed to the minimum. Thus e.g a timestamp in not included as it is meaningless in real time navigation. Anything else than 3d-position, 3d-vector and aircraft id is not repeated in the standard broadcast. It may be interrogated though in special cases and TCAS advisories may be exchanged between aircraft. More data can be sent as a response to a radar scan by means of mode S transponders. The last thing one would do is synchronize all the broadcasts as they would effectively block each other out within the same range.
Data sources may be different. The most simple ADS-B device, the FLARM, derives all values from an internal GPS. In complex aircraft equipment, the data may be provided by computers or other complex sensors. Mode-S transponders send pressure altitude while FLARM send msl altitude. V-Speed may also be derived from different sensors or simply by differentiating altitude changes. Roll data is not required for collision avoidance (TCAS gives only up and down advisories, never left or right) and is therefore not part of the squitter messages. Same applies for other conditions. But there is a ground mode and an airbourne mode, ground mode not transmitting values like speed etc. If you want to know more, google “ads-b for dummies”.
Both airborne and ground equipment may now process these raw data and make assumptions about other flight parameters. But any follow-on calculation assumes a reasonable flight enveloppe. Thus, in a crash analysis, processed ADS-B data as provided by FR24 must be used cautiously.
@Golf-Mike-Mike - Personally i was thinking along the lines of bomb in the hold, would be the most likely place the for the aircraft to slit if an explosion occurred inside but something like that would also make sence - or would it just be a weak spot anyway?
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THR RED ACC - Bravo and thanks for saying what most were thinking.
Lets look at a realistic scenario - Russia escalates in Syria a few weeks ago, Russian airplane departing an area known for insurgent activity stops flying, abruptly in mid air, shortly after the military escalation. Hmmmmmm......
Stop with the ADS-B, Scuba tanks, Dangerous goods, AWACS, Space Aliens.
Lets look at a realistic scenario - Russia escalates in Syria a few weeks ago, Russian airplane departing an area known for insurgent activity stops flying, abruptly in mid air, shortly after the military escalation. Hmmmmmm......
Stop with the ADS-B, Scuba tanks, Dangerous goods, AWACS, Space Aliens.
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Hydraulic fluid EI-ETJ Rudder
skridlov, I noticed a few days ago & posted about it (#258). It's probably nothing.
A hydraulic fluid leakage from the A321-231 EI-ETJ rudder seems persistent. On this photo from 2 weeks ago it's there
Photos: Airbus A321-231 Aircraft Pictures | Airliners.net
The leakage has been going on for at least 2-3 years. Looking further at similar age A321s, it is not typical. 2013:
Photos: Airbus A321-231 Aircraft Pictures | Airliners.net
A hydraulic fluid leakage from the A321-231 EI-ETJ rudder seems persistent. On this photo from 2 weeks ago it's there
Photos: Airbus A321-231 Aircraft Pictures | Airliners.net
The leakage has been going on for at least 2-3 years. Looking further at similar age A321s, it is not typical. 2013:
Photos: Airbus A321-231 Aircraft Pictures | Airliners.net
Last edited by keesje; 2nd Nov 2015 at 10:26. Reason: add ref
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Anyone remember the size of the debris field from the Lockerbie bomb?
From my memory it was something like 80 miles not 8. If there was a bomb inside the pressure hull I would expect something similar. If the stab departed I would expect the aircraft to tumble until it broke up at a much lower horizontal velocity and therefore a smaller debris field.
From my memory it was something like 80 miles not 8. If there was a bomb inside the pressure hull I would expect something similar. If the stab departed I would expect the aircraft to tumble until it broke up at a much lower horizontal velocity and therefore a smaller debris field.
OK, I'll ask again. Please excuse my non-professional interest.
Photo Metrojet Airbus A321-231 EI-ETJ
This link posted previously, seems to show something that may be related to the loss of this aircraft (corrosion or fluid leakage?). Or doesn't it?
Perhaps someone familiar with the maintenance might care to comment?
Photo Metrojet Airbus A321-231 EI-ETJ
This link posted previously, seems to show something that may be related to the loss of this aircraft (corrosion or fluid leakage?). Or doesn't it?
Perhaps someone familiar with the maintenance might care to comment?
@FE Hoppy My thinking is that maybe the aircraft instead suffered serious damage, decompression and damage to flight controls, electronics occurred, resulting in the decent seen on Flightradar, and then the trail section broke free, due to stress/fracture etc. Of Course until we know if/if not it was bombed we don't know but i guess we should soon, cockpit voice recorder and wreckage testing will be definite
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G-APEC RPB break and elevator loss
Indeed, some resemblance....
remember well this crash, happened in the village close to where I was living at that time, I was on the crashsite before emergency services had fully deployed...
ASN Aircraft accident Vickers 951 Vanguard G-APEC Aarsele
https://www.gov.uk/aaib-reports/15-1...2-october-1971
Some interesting reading in view of what happened to this A321....to say that the same occured is a bit strong, but not impossible...
remember well this crash, happened in the village close to where I was living at that time, I was on the crashsite before emergency services had fully deployed...
ASN Aircraft accident Vickers 951 Vanguard G-APEC Aarsele
https://www.gov.uk/aaib-reports/15-1...2-october-1971
Some interesting reading in view of what happened to this A321....to say that the same occured is a bit strong, but not impossible...
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Consider small explosive device which ruptures skin and forces Horisontal Stabilaser either to separate or to move to extreme position, with following aerodynamic forces to tear it of completely, either alone or together with tail section along old rupture/repair lines.
Reuters: Russian jet not hit from outside, no distress call made
Source: "a source in the committee analyzing the black box recorders"
Crashed Russian jet not hit from outside, no distress call made: investigator source | Reuters
The Russian airliner that crashed in Egypt on Saturday was not struck from the outside and the pilot did not make a distress call before it disappeared from radar, a source in the committee analyzing the black box recorders said.
The source declined to give more details but based his comments on the preliminary examination of the black boxes recovered from the flight. A civil aviation ministry source said earlier that the analysis of the flight recorders was ongoing.
The source declined to give more details but based his comments on the preliminary examination of the black boxes recovered from the flight. A civil aviation ministry source said earlier that the analysis of the flight recorders was ongoing.
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a source in the committee analyzing the black box recorders said.
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Indeed, some resemblance....
ASN Aircraft accident Vickers 951 Vanguard G-APEC Aarsele
(A rear bulkhead blowout)
ASN Aircraft accident Vickers 951 Vanguard G-APEC Aarsele
(A rear bulkhead blowout)
Yes, but after that incident, Bae and Airbus always put blowout panels in the tail, to stop the vertical fin being blown apart by cabin pressure. The effectiveness of these was demonstrated in the 1986 Thai A-300 grenade incident, when the rear bulkhead failed but the cabin pressure was released.
I am presuming the A-320 series also has blow-out panels in the tail?
Champagne anyone...?
As I'm now an "aviation expert" according to the Daily Hate I better respond to this. The skin on the other side is indeed folded inwards however look closer; the ends of the torn skin are folded outwards. The inner section has a heavy window. When the tail section hit the ground the heavy window bent the skin back in. The torn end, bending outwards, still remains in its original bent position.
Ask me anything. I'm now an official expert. In everything.
Ask me anything. I'm now an official expert. In everything.
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My question is:
Given a bomb perhaps in the rear cargo hold, it would release a blast with extreme heat around.. Now, since the main wreckage (wings, fuselage, hence forward cargo hold) has caught fire, why there is a number of baggages -supposedly coming from the rear cargo hold- intacted and not burnt?
Given a bomb perhaps in the rear cargo hold, it would release a blast with extreme heat around.. Now, since the main wreckage (wings, fuselage, hence forward cargo hold) has caught fire, why there is a number of baggages -supposedly coming from the rear cargo hold- intacted and not burnt?