BA 777 on fire in Las Vegas
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AD Issued. Root Cause still out There.
Excerpts Only, Use Link for full texts.
2015-27-01. GE90-76B, -77B, -85B, -90B, and -94B engines with high-pressure compressor (HPC) stage 8-10 spool, part number 1694M80G04, installed. SUMMARY: This AD requires performing an eddy current inspection (ECI) or ultrasonic inspection (USI) of the high-pressure compressor (HPC) stage 8-10 spool and removing from service those parts that fail inspection. This AD was prompted by an uncontained failure of the HPC stage 8-10 spool, leading to an airplane fire. Effective January 27, 2016. Compliance by; (1) Perform an eddy current inspection or ultrasonic inspection of the stage 8 aft web upper face of the HPC stage 8-10 spool for cracks as follows: (i) For HPC stage 8-10 spools with serial number (S/N) GWNHC086 or GWNHB875, inspect within 150 cycles-in-service (CIS), after the effective date of this AD. (ii) For HPC stage 8-10 spools with S/N GWNHC154, GWNHA455, GWNHC153, or GWNHB516, inspect within 300 CIS, after the effective date of this AD. (2) Remove from service any HPC stage 8-10 spool that fails the inspection required by paragraph (e)(1) of this AD and replace the spool with a spool eligible for installation. Discussion. We received a report of an HPC stage 8-10 spool uncontained failure resulting in an airplane fire. Ongoing investigations have determined that a crack initiated in the stage 8 aft web upper face of the HPC 8-10 spool and propagated until spool rupture. The root cause of the crack initiation is not yet known. Costs of Compliance. We estimate that this AD affects 1 engine installed on an airplane of U.S. registry. We also estimate that it will take about 7 hours per engine to comply with this AD. The average labor rate is $85 per hour. Required parts cost about $780,000 per engine. Based on these figures, we estimate the total cost of the AD to U.S. operators to be $780,595. Link > http://www.airweb.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgad.nsf/0/70e7b9e69301df4186257f380054ed8a/$FILE/2015-27-01.pdf -----------------------------
Prior ADs With mentions of HPC spools web cracks.
2009-07-03 – 80 series, 2002-25-08 – 45/50, and – 80s, 99-24-15 - 50 and -80 series,
For Full AD and Details, Query By AD number at FAA’s AD Query website; Link > Airworthiness Directives
Excerpts Only, Use Link for full texts.
2015-27-01. GE90-76B, -77B, -85B, -90B, and -94B engines with high-pressure compressor (HPC) stage 8-10 spool, part number 1694M80G04, installed. SUMMARY: This AD requires performing an eddy current inspection (ECI) or ultrasonic inspection (USI) of the high-pressure compressor (HPC) stage 8-10 spool and removing from service those parts that fail inspection. This AD was prompted by an uncontained failure of the HPC stage 8-10 spool, leading to an airplane fire. Effective January 27, 2016. Compliance by; (1) Perform an eddy current inspection or ultrasonic inspection of the stage 8 aft web upper face of the HPC stage 8-10 spool for cracks as follows: (i) For HPC stage 8-10 spools with serial number (S/N) GWNHC086 or GWNHB875, inspect within 150 cycles-in-service (CIS), after the effective date of this AD. (ii) For HPC stage 8-10 spools with S/N GWNHC154, GWNHA455, GWNHC153, or GWNHB516, inspect within 300 CIS, after the effective date of this AD. (2) Remove from service any HPC stage 8-10 spool that fails the inspection required by paragraph (e)(1) of this AD and replace the spool with a spool eligible for installation. Discussion. We received a report of an HPC stage 8-10 spool uncontained failure resulting in an airplane fire. Ongoing investigations have determined that a crack initiated in the stage 8 aft web upper face of the HPC 8-10 spool and propagated until spool rupture. The root cause of the crack initiation is not yet known. Costs of Compliance. We estimate that this AD affects 1 engine installed on an airplane of U.S. registry. We also estimate that it will take about 7 hours per engine to comply with this AD. The average labor rate is $85 per hour. Required parts cost about $780,000 per engine. Based on these figures, we estimate the total cost of the AD to U.S. operators to be $780,595. Link > http://www.airweb.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgad.nsf/0/70e7b9e69301df4186257f380054ed8a/$FILE/2015-27-01.pdf -----------------------------
Prior ADs With mentions of HPC spools web cracks.
2009-07-03 – 80 series, 2002-25-08 – 45/50, and – 80s, 99-24-15 - 50 and -80 series,
For Full AD and Details, Query By AD number at FAA’s AD Query website; Link > Airworthiness Directives
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Required parts cost about $780,000 per engine. Based on these figures, we estimate the total cost of the AD to U.S. operators to be $780,595.
No wonder tickets are cheap!
Real world? Possibly not!
Last edited by Wirbelsturm; 7th Apr 2016 at 15:50.
FAA Typo
Taken from 2009-07-03 comments:
One commenter, FedEx Express, states that it appears that the proposed AD costs of compliance total to U.S. operators of $594,500,
is inaccurate and might be the cost of a single spool replacement, rather than the accumulated total of the proposed action,
if the estimate of 10 affected units is accurate.
We agree that the proposed AD total is inaccurate.
We had a typo in the proposed AD costs of compliance. The total cost should have been $5,594,500.
We corrected the total in the final rule AD.
One commenter, FedEx Express, states that it appears that the proposed AD costs of compliance total to U.S. operators of $594,500,
is inaccurate and might be the cost of a single spool replacement, rather than the accumulated total of the proposed action,
if the estimate of 10 affected units is accurate.
We agree that the proposed AD total is inaccurate.
We had a typo in the proposed AD costs of compliance. The total cost should have been $5,594,500.
We corrected the total in the final rule AD.
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Not sure where the comma issue is but the FAA state that an engineer is $85 an hour (7 hour fix at $85 an hour = the $595 difference), even BMW charge Ł100 an hour for labor!!!! I just find it laughable what the manufactures assume and the operators charge and the engineers get paid.
Irrespective of who bears the brunt of the costs this was an issue that had been flagged up to GE prior to the incident through NDT and endoscopic investigation.
I have a feeling that some fairly hefty costings have been done behind the scenes in this recovery!
As to a Billion it was always 1 Million x 1 Million in my schooling! Perhaps that's why I'm poor!
Irrespective of who bears the brunt of the costs this was an issue that had been flagged up to GE prior to the incident through NDT and endoscopic investigation.
I have a feeling that some fairly hefty costings have been done behind the scenes in this recovery!
As to a Billion it was always 1 Million x 1 Million in my schooling! Perhaps that's why I'm poor!
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Lots of good reading in this NTSB accident docket:
https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/h...docketID=59741
This actual excerpt from one of the BA manuals reminds me of that infamous non-handling, non-landing pilot procedure joke making the rounds two decades ago.
https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/59500-59...741/602177.pdf
https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/h...docketID=59741
This actual excerpt from one of the BA manuals reminds me of that infamous non-handling, non-landing pilot procedure joke making the rounds two decades ago.
General
The following allocation of duties is specified for the workload associated with normal operation. However, the Commander must assess any exceptional workload associated with nonnormal conditions and assign revised duties as necessary.
i. P1 and P2 roles must be allocated for every flight. Each flight starts with:
a. PF duties undertaken by P1.
b. PM duties undertaken by P2.
ii. It is British Airways policy to employ a monitored approach policy. Prior to top-of-descent:
a. PF duties are undertaken by P2.
b. PM duties are undertaken by P1.
iii. For a planned manual landing PF duties revert to P1 if:
a. Stable Approach Requirements are met; and
b. Visual Reference Requirements are met.
iv. For a planned autoland PF duties revert to P1 if:
a. Stable Approach Requirements are met; and
b. The aircraft passes 1000 R.
Note: Only BA Captains, or First Officers undergoing Command Conversion Courses and occupying the left-hand flight crew compartment seat, may operate as P1 during Low Visibility Operations. The definition of Low Visibility (OM A 8.22.1 Low Visibility Operations) is subtly different from that specified for First Officer handling limits, defined in BA as Take-off in less than 600 m RVR or Landing in worse than Cat I conditions.
The following allocation of duties is specified for the workload associated with normal operation. However, the Commander must assess any exceptional workload associated with nonnormal conditions and assign revised duties as necessary.
i. P1 and P2 roles must be allocated for every flight. Each flight starts with:
a. PF duties undertaken by P1.
b. PM duties undertaken by P2.
ii. It is British Airways policy to employ a monitored approach policy. Prior to top-of-descent:
a. PF duties are undertaken by P2.
b. PM duties are undertaken by P1.
iii. For a planned manual landing PF duties revert to P1 if:
a. Stable Approach Requirements are met; and
b. Visual Reference Requirements are met.
iv. For a planned autoland PF duties revert to P1 if:
a. Stable Approach Requirements are met; and
b. The aircraft passes 1000 R.
Note: Only BA Captains, or First Officers undergoing Command Conversion Courses and occupying the left-hand flight crew compartment seat, may operate as P1 during Low Visibility Operations. The definition of Low Visibility (OM A 8.22.1 Low Visibility Operations) is subtly different from that specified for First Officer handling limits, defined in BA as Take-off in less than 600 m RVR or Landing in worse than Cat I conditions.
Document 9 is far more revealing, especially the nonsense of changing over thrust lever handling in an RTO.I am thinking of how BA can justify it and am left without any answers.
Document 17 shows how Boeing suggest it should be done,
Document 17 shows how Boeing suggest it should be done,
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https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/59500-59...741/602179.pdf
https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/59500-59...741/602187.pdf
Tubby
The Genesis comes from the Trident..certainly the most difficult aircraft to fly on approach especially with the BEA procedures. Recently a very old manager admitted that they had made a mistake..the mistake being believing that by training up “wunder mensch” to pole the aircraft whilst P1’s contribution was to guard the auto throttle (we weren’t allowed manual throttle) then everyone and anyone could be a captain.
This philosophy was certainly reflected in the Staines, Bilbao and Heraklion accidents; it may have been a factor in the Heathrow flypast as at the time of the captains conversion the board had apparently put the training department under pressure to pass all. BEA had a policy of everyone was fit for command whereas BOAC rightly did not.
Ps there was talk in the mid 70s of putting the captain on the third seat and let the co pilots do the flying, presumably to reduce the appalling accident rate. Unfortunately some of our management infiltrated BOAC when BA was formed and took their ideas with them.
This philosophy was certainly reflected in the Staines, Bilbao and Heraklion accidents; it may have been a factor in the Heathrow flypast as at the time of the captains conversion the board had apparently put the training department under pressure to pass all. BEA had a policy of everyone was fit for command whereas BOAC rightly did not.
Ps there was talk in the mid 70s of putting the captain on the third seat and let the co pilots do the flying, presumably to reduce the appalling accident rate. Unfortunately some of our management infiltrated BOAC when BA was formed and took their ideas with them.
Yes the Monitored Approach still lingers on in BA.
Not universally popular. On the formation of GSS the separate BA cargo B744 operation, the Chief pilot was ex BEA and a fan of the MA system. The new crews gathered from several airlines including ex BA not so impressed with the old BEA system. It was put to a vote and as a result GSS flew the aircraft the “normal” way. Allowing much needed handling practice of the whole sector from take off to landing,when in suitable weather and no continuous A/T SOP. Autopilot out A/T out.
A friend of mine on the BA A380 in 2 years has never manually flown the aircraft much above 1000ft even in CAVOK, usually being handed control for landing off a coupled approach at 500/800 ft when on an ILS with mandatory full time A/T.
No wonder accidents due poor manual handling continue to occur.
Not universally popular. On the formation of GSS the separate BA cargo B744 operation, the Chief pilot was ex BEA and a fan of the MA system. The new crews gathered from several airlines including ex BA not so impressed with the old BEA system. It was put to a vote and as a result GSS flew the aircraft the “normal” way. Allowing much needed handling practice of the whole sector from take off to landing,when in suitable weather and no continuous A/T SOP. Autopilot out A/T out.
A friend of mine on the BA A380 in 2 years has never manually flown the aircraft much above 1000ft even in CAVOK, usually being handed control for landing off a coupled approach at 500/800 ft when on an ILS with mandatory full time A/T.
No wonder accidents due poor manual handling continue to occur.
FWIW As I recall well post Trident days the 744 went with Boeing procedures initially but eventually things changes..
As for the 777, fortunately, fingers crossed can't speak for the efficiency of the current BA method outside of the sim, but there does seem some at least some logic to the BA way....but both parties have got to remember to do their bits.
As for the 777, fortunately, fingers crossed can't speak for the efficiency of the current BA method outside of the sim, but there does seem some at least some logic to the BA way....but both parties have got to remember to do their bits.
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Manual handling with autothrust engaged is not permitted on the approach in the 747-400 with BA, nor is it on any other BA type with a pitch-power couple (767 and 737 as was).
Re BA SOPS (i.e. not GSS) and autothrottle, etc.....the 744 -
1. What TC said...the SOP was/is autothrottle out if manually flying the aircraft.
I'm not versed in the 380 but reasonably up to speed on ULH ops at BA....with that in mind..
Landing pilot (
) not supposed to take control above 1000 feet...etc...that's true...but it doesn't routinely have to be a coupled approach down to that point, so unless there is a fleet specific rule there's no reason why your friend can't hand fly the bird down the approach if they are the non landing pilot, before the 1000 'handover, if conditions permit...
As part of the descent brief I always mention if I think it's a good day for hand flying and encourage my colleagues to knock the autopilot out if conditions are suitable...good grief, even knackered old me can hand fly a 777 down from F240 on a good day on an early arrival into LHR and most of the guys I fly with can manage to hand fly off the LHR holds and produce an acceptable ILS whilst also pondering: "WTF is this Bovington hold our American friends are on about....." ....
In your friends defence I'd say being a FO or SFO on a ULH fleet doesn't give you much opportunity for hand flying ( 'cos of the dilution in stick time due to heavy sectors, not because of BA SOPs) but that has always gone with the territory...if your friend really wants to fly the aircraft they need to speak up more during the descent brief and discuss the matter....this idea that BA somehow ban hand flying is nonsense..
1. What TC said...the SOP was/is autothrottle out if manually flying the aircraft.
A friend of mine on the BA A380 in 2 years has never manually flown the aircraft much above 1000ft even in CAVOK, usually being handed control for landing off a coupled approach at 500/800 ft when on an ILS with mandatory full time A/T.
Landing pilot (
) not supposed to take control above 1000 feet...etc...that's true...but it doesn't routinely have to be a coupled approach down to that point, so unless there is a fleet specific rule there's no reason why your friend can't hand fly the bird down the approach if they are the non landing pilot, before the 1000 'handover, if conditions permit...As part of the descent brief I always mention if I think it's a good day for hand flying and encourage my colleagues to knock the autopilot out if conditions are suitable...good grief, even knackered old me can hand fly a 777 down from F240 on a good day on an early arrival into LHR and most of the guys I fly with can manage to hand fly off the LHR holds and produce an acceptable ILS whilst also pondering: "WTF is this Bovington hold our American friends are on about....." ....
In your friends defence I'd say being a FO or SFO on a ULH fleet doesn't give you much opportunity for hand flying ( 'cos of the dilution in stick time due to heavy sectors, not because of BA SOPs) but that has always gone with the territory...if your friend really wants to fly the aircraft they need to speak up more during the descent brief and discuss the matter....this idea that BA somehow ban hand flying is nonsense..
Last edited by wiggy; 17th Nov 2017 at 08:14.
It's as Tay Cough described ( personally I don't agree with that bit of the SOPs, but we are stuck with it) - obviously (?) that is not the same as a ban on hand flying the other "bits" when appropriate
(up/down/left/right etc..
)
(up/down/left/right etc..
)
Full time mandatory speed control by A/T is not manual flying in my book! Speed control using the throttle/ thrust lever is just as important in maintaining your flying skills.
Shows up in the very poor single engine thrust control shown by the pilot handling, after engine failure, in the BA Airbus which took off with an unlatched cowling.
Apparently done once every 2 years in the sim!
Shows up in the very poor single engine thrust control shown by the pilot handling, after engine failure, in the BA Airbus which took off with an unlatched cowling.
Apparently done once every 2 years in the sim!
