BA 777 on fire in Las Vegas
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Thanks, suninmyeyes......it sure was surreal watching it happen but our respective autopilots ( pun intended!) kicked in and we did what we are trained and expected to do. So glad it was a good outcome and I'm sure it will be fully followed up in what we can all learn from it and do differently next time.
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I know that if I were to reject a takeoff, having informed ATC I was stopping I would be very grateful for any immediate feedback from ATC as to whether they could see any smoke, flames, inferno etc. Fortunately in the absence of any ATC info there was an extra flight crew member on hand to go back and see what the passengers and cabin crew could see.
At 00:54 - Stopping message from BA2276 which crosses with ATC who have obviously seen what is going on and are already telling a Delta to go around. The DAL requires confirmation of go round instructions as the transmission is garbled by the cross with the stop message
At 01:09 - ATC transmission saying fire services on the way stepped on by BA 2276 reporting a fire and requesting fire services
01:17 - ATC confirm RFFS on the way
01:53 - aircraft reports evacuation.
02:01 - someone (RFFS?) cleared all the way down 7 Left
Last edited by Suzeman; 13th Sep 2015 at 21:27.
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A little more info to help explain.......and I've listened to the tapes, spoken to the ATCT supervisor on duty and was part of the "action" on the day.
First, and as you can imagine, the controller was VERY busy and kept her cool with at least two go-arounds in quick succession and a major incident developing. Also, being a dynamic situation, there is the inevitable stepping on transmissions.
By the time anyone could get a word in edgewise, both controller and pilots KNEW there was a fire, no question. Therefore, there was little point in taking up valuable R/T time with the obvious. In fact, the pilots did eventually call for fire services and the controller confirmed on the way. You are not going to get a picture perfect or textbook response every time to an emergency situation. They both did exceptional, in my opinion.
Cannot say for sure what the third pilot was saying/doing in the cabin prior to evacuation but in any event, one uses CRM (Crew Resource Management or whatever your airline calls it). An extra set of eyes and comms is always good.
The evacuation command would come at the end of the engine fire checklist, once it's established the fire is not out. That's why there's a "longish " gap.
The sequence of actions in any abnormal situation during the start of the takeoff roll is:
1. Stop aircraft.
2. Assess the situation.
3. Do the necessary drills per the checklist and verify all complete.
4. Make the evac decision - if required.
5. Make the PA call.
And get out using nearest exit........
Hopefully, this explains any or all gaps in R/T and what some have described as a long time to evacuate the aircraft. The crew were also VERY busy!
The almost indecipherable transmission near the end is the airport operations vehicle requesting approval to enter the runway. Like police and other emergency services vehicles, they all have vehicle call signs, big numbers on the side and roof and a full iComm radio set up with ATC and aircraft plus a lot more!
First, and as you can imagine, the controller was VERY busy and kept her cool with at least two go-arounds in quick succession and a major incident developing. Also, being a dynamic situation, there is the inevitable stepping on transmissions.
By the time anyone could get a word in edgewise, both controller and pilots KNEW there was a fire, no question. Therefore, there was little point in taking up valuable R/T time with the obvious. In fact, the pilots did eventually call for fire services and the controller confirmed on the way. You are not going to get a picture perfect or textbook response every time to an emergency situation. They both did exceptional, in my opinion.
Cannot say for sure what the third pilot was saying/doing in the cabin prior to evacuation but in any event, one uses CRM (Crew Resource Management or whatever your airline calls it). An extra set of eyes and comms is always good.
The evacuation command would come at the end of the engine fire checklist, once it's established the fire is not out. That's why there's a "longish " gap.
The sequence of actions in any abnormal situation during the start of the takeoff roll is:
1. Stop aircraft.
2. Assess the situation.
3. Do the necessary drills per the checklist and verify all complete.
4. Make the evac decision - if required.
5. Make the PA call.
And get out using nearest exit........
Hopefully, this explains any or all gaps in R/T and what some have described as a long time to evacuate the aircraft. The crew were also VERY busy!
The almost indecipherable transmission near the end is the airport operations vehicle requesting approval to enter the runway. Like police and other emergency services vehicles, they all have vehicle call signs, big numbers on the side and roof and a full iComm radio set up with ATC and aircraft plus a lot more!
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I haven't read this entire thread, but if what alexb757 says is correct, then I'm staggered. Are there REALLY people suggesting that 60 secs is a 'long' time, to bring a 300 tonne jet, from 100mph to an unexpected stop, run methodically through the Fire Eng checklist. (to give the extinguishant a chance!) whilst running in parallel a continuous situational assessment. Before carefully and methodically reading through the Evacuation Checklist, and finally commanding an evacuation!
60 seconds to methodically, AND ACCURATELY run through that lot, seems remarkably swift to me. That's why there are so many professionals here, who believe the actions of the crew in an exceptional situation, saved many lives.
As was once said to me. Pilots (and in this case, crew too) don't get paid for what they do. They get paid for what they CAN do! And these most definitely drew heavily on their bank of experience and top quality training!
Well done all.
60 seconds to methodically, AND ACCURATELY run through that lot, seems remarkably swift to me. That's why there are so many professionals here, who believe the actions of the crew in an exceptional situation, saved many lives.
As was once said to me. Pilots (and in this case, crew too) don't get paid for what they do. They get paid for what they CAN do! And these most definitely drew heavily on their bank of experience and top quality training!
Well done all.
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they never mention bags being left on evacuation.
Do the other manufacturers have a similar failure rate? or is this a peculiarity of GE's design and manufacturing processes that make their engines vulnerable to these types of failures?
Compared to 50 years ago, jet engines are incredibly reliable.
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Insurance question
Where a hull loss (as here) is caused by the direct failure of an engine (admittedly not proven in this case) would the engine manufacturer/maintenance organisation be liable for the loss?
Here it would appear that the flight deck crew did all they could to deal with the emergency and to mitigate the damage, the AFS got there as fast as might be reasonably expected but still the fire penetrated the fuselage and cause what is likely to be damage beyond economic repair.
I suspect that there will be claims (and counter claims) between BA and GE to sort this one out; does anyone know what happens in reality? In motor insurance there is a "knock for knock" approach does the same apply to aviation?
A curious MB.
Here it would appear that the flight deck crew did all they could to deal with the emergency and to mitigate the damage, the AFS got there as fast as might be reasonably expected but still the fire penetrated the fuselage and cause what is likely to be damage beyond economic repair.
I suspect that there will be claims (and counter claims) between BA and GE to sort this one out; does anyone know what happens in reality? In motor insurance there is a "knock for knock" approach does the same apply to aviation?
A curious MB.
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Thanks alexb757 for filling in a bit of background; in these situations there's always a lot going on that would not be obvious to people who weren't there. And as you say, in a dynamic situation there will inevitably be stepping on transmissions.
It looks to me to be a textbook example of how it should be done, so congratulations to crew, ATC, RFFS and other airport personnel.
It looks to me to be a textbook example of how it should be done, so congratulations to crew, ATC, RFFS and other airport personnel.
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Excellent handling of a serious incident
Thanks so much for your posts alexb757.
Training and experience are absolutely essential during any crisis situation, but alone these two factors are rarely sufficient if we look back and carefully analyse past serious aviation incidents.
Common sense can be very helpful but it is especially the ability to remain as calm as possible during extreme "crisis" pressure that can make the difference in between success and failure, simply because our brain does not function properly in "panic mode", whatever the experience and training, if we panic our assessment capabilities are seriously deteriorated.
This incident has shown how important is to remain calm under pressure, this concept applies to all parties involved.
This skill is reinforced through training and experience but there is also an element of "having the right person in the right job", this is why we must urgently stop the greedy aviation trend to indefinitely reduce costs (lower salaries, longer hours, etc) because the end result will be catastrophic.
No doubts that the very complex response to this incident was fantastic: pilots, cabin crew, atc and fire services all did an incredible job.
This is different from the Hudson river where the hero was basically only one.
I have learnt again that we need well trained and experienced people in aviation, we cannot make the mistake on focusing only on pilots, ATC and firemen are also essential, as it is the cabin crew staff, e.g. too often CC are seen as simple "cabin service" employees when the reality is that they are absolutely essential to achieve a successful evacuation which means saving many lives through a very quick escape.
Evacuations do not happen very often, but they do happen indeed, next time could be any of us either as passengers or on duty, this incident could have killed many people if mishandled hence we must continue to reiterate how important it is to establish good working conditions in aviation because this simply means good safety
Training and experience are absolutely essential during any crisis situation, but alone these two factors are rarely sufficient if we look back and carefully analyse past serious aviation incidents.
Common sense can be very helpful but it is especially the ability to remain as calm as possible during extreme "crisis" pressure that can make the difference in between success and failure, simply because our brain does not function properly in "panic mode", whatever the experience and training, if we panic our assessment capabilities are seriously deteriorated.
This incident has shown how important is to remain calm under pressure, this concept applies to all parties involved.
This skill is reinforced through training and experience but there is also an element of "having the right person in the right job", this is why we must urgently stop the greedy aviation trend to indefinitely reduce costs (lower salaries, longer hours, etc) because the end result will be catastrophic.
No doubts that the very complex response to this incident was fantastic: pilots, cabin crew, atc and fire services all did an incredible job.
This is different from the Hudson river where the hero was basically only one.
I have learnt again that we need well trained and experienced people in aviation, we cannot make the mistake on focusing only on pilots, ATC and firemen are also essential, as it is the cabin crew staff, e.g. too often CC are seen as simple "cabin service" employees when the reality is that they are absolutely essential to achieve a successful evacuation which means saving many lives through a very quick escape.
Evacuations do not happen very often, but they do happen indeed, next time could be any of us either as passengers or on duty, this incident could have killed many people if mishandled hence we must continue to reiterate how important it is to establish good working conditions in aviation because this simply means good safety
Originally Posted by Madbob
Where a hull loss (as here) is caused by the direct failure of an engine (admittedly not proven in this case) would the engine manufacturer/maintenance organisation be liable for the loss?
Here it would appear that the flight deck crew did all they could to deal with the emergency and to mitigate the damage, the AFS got there as fast as might be reasonably expected but still the fire penetrated the fuselage and cause what is likely to be damage beyond economic repair.
I suspect that there will be claims (and counter claims) between BA and GE to sort this one out; does anyone know what happens in reality? In motor insurance there is a "knock for knock" approach does the same apply to aviation?
A curious MB.
Here it would appear that the flight deck crew did all they could to deal with the emergency and to mitigate the damage, the AFS got there as fast as might be reasonably expected but still the fire penetrated the fuselage and cause what is likely to be damage beyond economic repair.
I suspect that there will be claims (and counter claims) between BA and GE to sort this one out; does anyone know what happens in reality? In motor insurance there is a "knock for knock" approach does the same apply to aviation?
A curious MB.
Whatever they end up doing with that aircraft, even just the loss of use can be expensive. While talking to a loss adjuster some years ago I said this must be small beer compared to what you are used to. He mentioned a catering truck had driven into a nose leg at Heathrow. Ł7 million.
Gizmodo US just posted this article;
The FAA Warned Boeing About the Flaw That Caused a 777 to Explode in Las Vegas
Refering to this document;
https://www.documentcloud.org/docume...011-15-06.html
Detailing an AD published in 2011 reference HPCR 8-10 stage spool for cracks.
The FAA Warned Boeing About the Flaw That Caused a 777 to Explode in Las Vegas
Refering to this document;
https://www.documentcloud.org/docume...011-15-06.html
Detailing an AD published in 2011 reference HPCR 8-10 stage spool for cracks.
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@lomapaseo (#421), I am still curious, although indeed the matter which is the subject of that AD may or may not be related to this incident. I assume, in case of a positive result, it has to be fixed right away before returning it to service. Perhaps also some more extensive inspection is triggered? So in fact it would not (should not) be possible to learn how fast the cracks develop, from these inspections alone. And therefore, I do not see how to measure the effectiveness of this AD alone.
alexb757
Thank you for your excellent post, it is good to have some facts and expert opinion from someone who was there instead of endless speculation by so many non-professionals.
Thank you for your excellent post, it is good to have some facts and expert opinion from someone who was there instead of endless speculation by so many non-professionals.
PAX2908
In general (not necessarily this one) That is what they do. These material have lots of tolerance to damage if inspected often enough. Some damage is always assumed (escapes from manufacturing inspections) and even with those you ought to make to even the longest overhaul interval one can imagine. However if the damage occurs in service (lots of reasons) than one needs some updated assessments of where and how much to redo it's life expectancy between specialized inspections.
In the end the expectations as approved by the regulator may not be 100% but they historically have done a very good job at preventing loss of aircraft when taken into context with the ruggedness of the aircraft to an engine failure.
So standby by for updated actions in this regard and hopefully some other aircraft type or engine model will not repeat these lessons learned.
I assume, in case of a positive result, it has to be fixed right away before returning it to service. Perhaps also some more extensive inspection is triggered? So in fact it would not (should not) be possible to learn how fast the cracks develop, from these inspections alone.
In the end the expectations as approved by the regulator may not be 100% but they historically have done a very good job at preventing loss of aircraft when taken into context with the ruggedness of the aircraft to an engine failure.
So standby by for updated actions in this regard and hopefully some other aircraft type or engine model will not repeat these lessons learned.
It shouldn't have any affect - the GE90 shutdown rate remains impressively low at 1 or 2 per million hours (which is much better than what's required for even 330 minute ETOPS).
Uncontained engine failures are always considered to be potentially catastrophic independent of any ETOPS considerations (recall the close call from the uncontained turbine burst on the Qantas A380, and it still had 3 engines running).
So the focus will be on what caused the uncontained failure, and how to prevent a future occurrence.
Uncontained engine failures are always considered to be potentially catastrophic independent of any ETOPS considerations (recall the close call from the uncontained turbine burst on the Qantas A380, and it still had 3 engines running).
So the focus will be on what caused the uncontained failure, and how to prevent a future occurrence.
PPRuNe Person
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alexb747:
Not quite.
The evacuation checklist supercedes all others. If the crew are commencing, say, a Fire engine checklist and it becomes clear to the Capt that an evacuation is necessary, he will immediately ask for the Evacuation checklist, he will not wait for FO to finish the Fire engine checklist. The evacuation command stops all other checklists.
Cannot say for sure what the third pilot was saying/doing in the cabin prior to evacuation but in any event, one uses CRM (Crew Resource Management or whatever your airline calls it). An extra set of eyes and comms is always good.
The evacuation command would come at the end of the engine fire checklist, once it's established the fire is not out. That's why there's a "longish " gap.
The sequence of actions in any abnormal situation during the start of the takeoff roll is:
1. Stop aircraft.
2. Assess the situation.
3. Do the necessary drills per the checklist and verify all complete.
4. Make the evac decision - if required.
5. Make the PA call.
And get out using nearest exit........
The evacuation command would come at the end of the engine fire checklist, once it's established the fire is not out. That's why there's a "longish " gap.
The sequence of actions in any abnormal situation during the start of the takeoff roll is:
1. Stop aircraft.
2. Assess the situation.
3. Do the necessary drills per the checklist and verify all complete.
4. Make the evac decision - if required.
5. Make the PA call.
And get out using nearest exit........
The evacuation checklist supercedes all others. If the crew are commencing, say, a Fire engine checklist and it becomes clear to the Capt that an evacuation is necessary, he will immediately ask for the Evacuation checklist, he will not wait for FO to finish the Fire engine checklist. The evacuation command stops all other checklists.
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Having retired from looking after 77s and 74s it is refreshing to read such a factual reply from Alexb757 .I too agree with the comment about the time lag he speaks of,this crew were merely going through that check list.What comes over in this whole incident is how everybody just did their job without panicking and in an ordered way. Every person involved should be thanked on this one.Hopefully in years to come,the footage will be used in training videos.....textbook. I am not going to voice an opinion on the hand baggage,there are enough comments here already.
ETOPS
Doesn't count, failure before EEP.
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alexb747:
Not quite.
The evacuation checklist supercedes all others. If the crew are commencing, say, a Fire engine checklist and it becomes clear to the Capt that an evacuation is necessary, he will immediately ask for the Evacuation checklist, he will not wait for FO to finish the Fire engine checklist. The evacuation command stops all other checklists.
Not quite.
The evacuation checklist supercedes all others. If the crew are commencing, say, a Fire engine checklist and it becomes clear to the Capt that an evacuation is necessary, he will immediately ask for the Evacuation checklist, he will not wait for FO to finish the Fire engine checklist. The evacuation command stops all other checklists.
According to my old 757 Emergency Evacuation checklist, there are several conditional statements.
After the Parking Brake is set, it states IF evac MAY be necessary, when aircraft comes to a stop, announce "Remain seated, Flight Attendants prepare".
Then,
If evac IS Necessary:
All Fire Switches.......Override & Pull
All Fire Switches(if required).....Rotate
Rotate engine fire switches in opposite directions.
Announce: " EVACUATE"
Then goes in to supplementary info.
I was not in the cockpit, nor do I have intimate knowledge of BA procedures. So, I was only making an educated guess for those that have no idea about emergency checklists.
The question is, of course, at what stage did the crew realize they had a fire and that fire was NOT out and evacuation imminent. Only the CA/FOs can answer that.
I suspect now they may have started the Engine Fire Checklist and perhaps switched to the Emergency Evacuation one early on.
Perhaps a BA 777 pilot can offer further info on this.
I also notice that a lot of engine fire/severe damage/separation (but not all) checklists assume you are in flight and have the rider "land at nearest suitable airport".
Of course, this was on the ground, fire was initially there and likely for at least a minute, it was not confirmed it was out, therefore an evacuation was the right call.
Be interested in others, still flying, take. And/or check airmen/training captains.
I'm still learning and wish to know, although my wings are now hung up. Thanks.