BA 777 on fire in Las Vegas
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"What I do not know is how cabin crew monitors the Over-Wing exits in a similar event"
The 777-200 does not have over wing exits. Door 2 left is in front of the wing and door 3 L is behind the wing.
The 777-200 does not have over wing exits. Door 2 left is in front of the wing and door 3 L is behind the wing.
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I see no signs of shrapnel damage. As some said much earlier in this thread it doesn't look like an uncontained disk rotor. Nor do I see signs of extreme pressure release (some call this an explosion). Instead the pictures of the externals of the engine pod and wing go hand in hand with a persistent ground pool fire.
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As PAX sitting in the over wing exit seat over 100`s of flights - the only time i have ever been briefed to look for fire before opening the door was on Eastern Airways from LCY to IOM.
This should be a mandatory brief item.
This should be a mandatory brief item.
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https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/ntsb-detects-signs-of-uncontained-engine-failure-fro-416634/
Preliminary findings released by the US National Transportation Safety Board on 10 September indicated multiple breaches of the engine fan case in the region of the high-pressure compressor.
Several pieces of about 17.8-20.3cm (7-8in) in length from the high-pressure compressor spool were found on the runway, the NTSB says
Several pieces of about 17.8-20.3cm (7-8in) in length from the high-pressure compressor spool were found on the runway, the NTSB says
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Ka-2b pilot, you said, and I quote: ".....which caused a lot of fuel to leak out from somewhere, probably onto the ground where it then started to vaporise and subsequently ignited".
I was simply remarking that unlike petrol in that particular situation, kero would not ignite.
I was simply remarking that unlike petrol in that particular situation, kero would not ignite.
The photo I've seen (not published elsewhere and I wont post as its not mine) was taken on the aft inbd side and shows all the px relief doors open and C duct material blown outwards consistent with an explosion/high velocity exit of high energy matter for the non daily mail readers... Very reminiscent of that AA 767 that lost hpt1 on eng runs.
Outstanding job by all concerned.
Outstanding job by all concerned.
Regarding having important items about your person, a typical piece of non-joined-up aviation procedure is that if you present yourself at security with the relevant items (passport, wallet with CCs, etc) in your pockets, at a number of stations, although not all (so it's not legislation) they will insist you take these off your person, and put them in your laptop bag, which is of course going up in the rack. We know about keys and phones but some places want all this off you as well. Dublin is particularly zealous in requiring this, there are many others. Now often I transfer them all back afterwards, but also can find the first time I need them that they have done the journey up in the rack.
Given the media reports of the subsequent treatment of the passengers from the accident flight at the hotel they were taken to in Las Vegas, which was, simplistically, no credit card = no service, no refreshments, no phone calls, nothing (a typical USA reaction to someone without a credit card, and probably also a standard Las Vegas reaction to anyone who has the temerity to check in without tipping the desk clerk US$20), let alone how you might anticipate be treated at immigration the next day on arrival with no passport, and given the eternity it takes bureaucracy nowadays to reissue passports, you can understand more why people would want these items with them.
Given the media reports of the subsequent treatment of the passengers from the accident flight at the hotel they were taken to in Las Vegas, which was, simplistically, no credit card = no service, no refreshments, no phone calls, nothing (a typical USA reaction to someone without a credit card, and probably also a standard Las Vegas reaction to anyone who has the temerity to check in without tipping the desk clerk US$20), let alone how you might anticipate be treated at immigration the next day on arrival with no passport, and given the eternity it takes bureaucracy nowadays to reissue passports, you can understand more why people would want these items with them.
Last edited by WHBM; 12th Sep 2015 at 19:07.
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DevX, midday in the Nevada desert you suggest the surface temperature would not be 110ºF in the sun, which it would have been seconds before the aircraft cast its shadow. I think it is very possible. Surface temperature of runways in those conditions are often a lot higher than air temperature, often 50-60ºC, roughly 120-140ºF. At the time of the accident the air temperature was 39ºC, that is already 102ºF in the shade. The actual flash point of Jet-A fuel is 100ºF/38ºC.
Last edited by Ka-2b Pilot; 12th Sep 2015 at 20:04. Reason: To add temperature recorded around the time of the accident. Again to add the correct flash point for Jet-A type fuel.
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Story of a past crash - and guess what - the expensive laptop in the hand baggage left on the aircraft goes 'missing'
Well...now what a surprise... who'd have guessed it.
The Crash Landing of Southwest 345 | Nick Bradbury
Well...now what a surprise... who'd have guessed it.
The Crash Landing of Southwest 345 | Nick Bradbury
Mzguilty. Thank you for your reply. I am not arguing with anything you say, nor decrying the good job evidently done in this case. I am listening to what people say but I think others are not listening to me! Point I was trying to make is that it is all very well for us all to agree that the passengers acted selfishly in carrying their luggage, and acted clearly in contravention of instructions, nevertheless a hero went down the slide with a wheelie. Point is, should his action cause harm to another passenger, wouldn't that passenger have a complaint against the operator? Being incapacitated at the bottom of the slide could be a serious issue during a full evacuation.
If the instructions are clear but the staff member at the exit allowed contravention, then I reckon there is the risk of a claim.
So, yes, letting the guy go may well be for the greater good but you now have to argue in law against a passenger who was hurt in consequence of your actions.
Ultimate answer in my view is to shrink the overheads and restrict carry on but guess what, the safety is paramount mantra seems to stumble here against the convenience of passengers.
I hope they find the guy with the wheelie and make him eat it.
If the instructions are clear but the staff member at the exit allowed contravention, then I reckon there is the risk of a claim.
So, yes, letting the guy go may well be for the greater good but you now have to argue in law against a passenger who was hurt in consequence of your actions.
Ultimate answer in my view is to shrink the overheads and restrict carry on but guess what, the safety is paramount mantra seems to stumble here against the convenience of passengers.
I hope they find the guy with the wheelie and make him eat it.
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No_Fly_Zone wrote.
The pix of this event suggest that opening L2 likely would have caused far more serious problems. That much I'm sure about.
What I do not know is how cabin crew monitors the Over-Wing exits in a similar event. In this case, popping the first Left Over-Wing hatch would have been almost as bad as opening L2. They do not have sufficient staff to monitor the Over-Wing pop (in or out) hatches and I do not know how they control their use. Does anyone out there know?
I know at our Airline, the flight attendants come back and give the overwing exit row passengers a quick briefing on how to open this exit, and (sometimes ) advise them to check for fire first. Often it seems these passengers are just happy to find themselves with the extra leg room, and don't even listen to the briefing. Many seem to me to be incapable of opening/lifting the exit window, but F/As are reluctant to pull someone from one of these exit rows and find them another seat. .Some airlines even offer these rows to passengers for an upgrade price for more legroom.
In my opinion these rows should be offered to deadheading/retired crew first, who have trained in a smoke filled sim to pull the handle down, and throw the overwing exit out of the way. As I have, in mixed crew training with Flight Attendants. These are plug type doors, so you must pull the window exit in, which is counter intuitive.
Another safety issue that bothers me. I often find myself sitting far from the overwing exit rows, while untrained passengers sit there, possibly unable to open the over-wing exit in an emergency..
The pix of this event suggest that opening L2 likely would have caused far more serious problems. That much I'm sure about.
What I do not know is how cabin crew monitors the Over-Wing exits in a similar event. In this case, popping the first Left Over-Wing hatch would have been almost as bad as opening L2. They do not have sufficient staff to monitor the Over-Wing pop (in or out) hatches and I do not know how they control their use. Does anyone out there know?
I know at our Airline, the flight attendants come back and give the overwing exit row passengers a quick briefing on how to open this exit, and (sometimes ) advise them to check for fire first. Often it seems these passengers are just happy to find themselves with the extra leg room, and don't even listen to the briefing. Many seem to me to be incapable of opening/lifting the exit window, but F/As are reluctant to pull someone from one of these exit rows and find them another seat. .Some airlines even offer these rows to passengers for an upgrade price for more legroom.
In my opinion these rows should be offered to deadheading/retired crew first, who have trained in a smoke filled sim to pull the handle down, and throw the overwing exit out of the way. As I have, in mixed crew training with Flight Attendants. These are plug type doors, so you must pull the window exit in, which is counter intuitive.
Another safety issue that bothers me. I often find myself sitting far from the overwing exit rows, while untrained passengers sit there, possibly unable to open the over-wing exit in an emergency..
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HP Disk failures at power
Just an observation from this thread, as all the cited disk failures have been in GE manufactured engines. Do the other manufacturers have a similar failure rate? or is this a peculiarity of GE's design and manufacturing processes that make their engines vulnerable to these types of failures?
Just an observation from this thread, as all the cited disk failures have been in GE manufactured engines. Do the other manufacturers have a similar failure rate? or is this a peculiarity of GE's design and manufacturing processes that make their engines vulnerable to these types of failures?
Hopefully the problems are unique so all don't make the same mistakes.
I suspect the actual causal chain in this one relative to the fire will be unique.
N4790P
Another safety issue that bothers me. I often find myself sitting far from the overwing exit rows, while untrained passengers sit there, possibly unable to open the over-wing exit in an emergency..
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I'm well aware of the flash point of kero Ka-2b, but that's not to say that it's guaranteed to combust every time at that point. In my personal experience of engine failures conditions have to be ideal otherwise it's it's more likely that a flash over won't take place, therefore I still don't hold with your original theory.
I half expected someone to produce a camping gaz & wok for mid-flight meal.
Originally Posted by Retired DC9 driver
. . . overwing exit row passengers . . .
In my opinion these rows should be offered to deadheading/retired crew first
In my opinion these rows should be offered to deadheading/retired crew first
Originally Posted by Retired DC9 driver
. . . overwing exit row passengers . . .
In my opinion these rows should be offered to deadheading/retired crew first
. . . overwing exit row passengers . . .
In my opinion these rows should be offered to deadheading/retired crew first
The idea was for fit, regular, passengers from suitable backgrounds in industry to undergo a short course of airline ( e.g. B.A.) cabin training, including some "friend in the cabin" aspects for some situations, as well as being able to bodily assist in cabin evacuation.
Such individuals would be listed and identified on booking and discreetly seated by an exit, with the cabin crew being made aware of the fact during crew brief.
A poll of B.A. flight deck crew met with an enthusiastic response - provided said selected individuals abstained from alcohol during flight. Through my company into SBAC, there was a positive feedback with other companies expressing willingness to fund their participants through any such training.
Unfortunately B.A. , via a signed letter from Colin Marshall, thought such a scheme unnecessary since the airline had the fullest confidence in its current procedures - a near identical letter coming back from BALPA.
Funnily enough ,some time later on a B.A.TriStar flight back from New Delhi in rough weather, the cabin crew were very supportive of my volunteering to clamber around the cabin strapping in confused and frightened Indian passengers.
As a P.S. I do believe that it was then a policy, in some airlines at least, to preferentially seat passengers of a particular profile on certain flights, by escape exits in any event.
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Another safety issue that bothers me. I often find myself sitting far from the overwing exit rows, while untrained passengers sit there, possibly unable to open the over-wing exit in an emergency
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Some interesting posts and links here, some accurate, others not so much.
As one who was there, I'd like to share some aspects.
This was a low-speed/low-energy RTO, around 80kts IAS. Apparently, no prior warning or abnormal indication, just two "booms" followed by an immediate engine fire indication with both bottles fired, followed by the evac.
The aircraft was departing on RWY 7L from A8 intersection, which is standard for that airport configuration and for aircraft less than MGTOW, which this flight was (170 SOB).
When it came to a final stop, it was just west of A6, remaining on the RWY, left of center line and tire marks clearly visible as it decelerated. No tires blown; just one slightly deflated. No brake fire.
The main reason why the emergency services got there so quick and put out the fire in under two minutes was the location of the aircraft. It was immediately due south of the fire station crossing one, parallel taxiway, TWY B. Took about a minute to get there whereas the FAA-mandated response time is 3 minutes for the first fire truck to reach the mid-point of the emergency runway. It was less than half that time, so some luck also involved here.
Six out of a total of eight slides/doors were activated. The two NOT activated were L2 and L3 - for obvious reasons. The evacuation, when it was initiated was very quick, majority of injuries coming as a result of evacuating which seems to be common in incidents like this. The aircraft has NO over wing exits (windows).
ATC did not have to notify nor did the crew ask if there was fire or smoke - it was pretty obvious by everyone after a few moments and the fire trucks and other first responders were ALREADY on the way before any crash alarms sounded. Again, the fire station is in close proximity to that runway location, the visual impact unmistakeable, and the crew had fired both bottles with the engine fire handle still lit (hence the evacuation command).
Damage to the aircraft was concentrated to the #1 engine cowling, especially on the inboard side and underneath (Mainly smoke and fire damage), inboard leading edge of that wing, along the fuselage and some four to five windows scorched. Some of the fire went under and around and there is smoke/fire damage on the opposite side, although less intensive as you would expect from the source. Difficult to ascertain any evidence of penetration of the cowling. However, plenty of bent metal parts and pieces hanging down, still attached, again on the inboard part.
The debris field behind the aircraft depicted several engine parts including pieces of cowling, compressor or turbine blades or parts thereof, flanges, metal collars and small bolts.
Whatever the ultimate cause, the preliminary NTSB report, evidence at the scene and research of previous accidents with similar characteristics, all seem to point to a catastrophic failure of either compressor or turbine parts inside the #1 engine. As for the subsequent fire, my best guess is rupture of some fuel lines, a gearbox or the oil/fuel cooler. It is my understanding that no fuel tank was breached.
Investigation and engine tear down continuing with NTSB, AAIB, BA, GE, Boeing and FAA FSDO working in unison all week and likely in to next week also.
Lives were definitely saved, no question. Kudos to the crew, LAS ARFF and rescue units, ATCT and all the other agencies involved. It's not every day or even every year that you have an incident like this and everyone acted professionally and quickly, with the sole exception of a few passengers! Frankly, that part was not noticed in the immediate aftermath as there was a lot going on and the vast majority had already exited by then and well away from the aircraft.
As one who was there, I'd like to share some aspects.
This was a low-speed/low-energy RTO, around 80kts IAS. Apparently, no prior warning or abnormal indication, just two "booms" followed by an immediate engine fire indication with both bottles fired, followed by the evac.
The aircraft was departing on RWY 7L from A8 intersection, which is standard for that airport configuration and for aircraft less than MGTOW, which this flight was (170 SOB).
When it came to a final stop, it was just west of A6, remaining on the RWY, left of center line and tire marks clearly visible as it decelerated. No tires blown; just one slightly deflated. No brake fire.
The main reason why the emergency services got there so quick and put out the fire in under two minutes was the location of the aircraft. It was immediately due south of the fire station crossing one, parallel taxiway, TWY B. Took about a minute to get there whereas the FAA-mandated response time is 3 minutes for the first fire truck to reach the mid-point of the emergency runway. It was less than half that time, so some luck also involved here.
Six out of a total of eight slides/doors were activated. The two NOT activated were L2 and L3 - for obvious reasons. The evacuation, when it was initiated was very quick, majority of injuries coming as a result of evacuating which seems to be common in incidents like this. The aircraft has NO over wing exits (windows).
ATC did not have to notify nor did the crew ask if there was fire or smoke - it was pretty obvious by everyone after a few moments and the fire trucks and other first responders were ALREADY on the way before any crash alarms sounded. Again, the fire station is in close proximity to that runway location, the visual impact unmistakeable, and the crew had fired both bottles with the engine fire handle still lit (hence the evacuation command).
Damage to the aircraft was concentrated to the #1 engine cowling, especially on the inboard side and underneath (Mainly smoke and fire damage), inboard leading edge of that wing, along the fuselage and some four to five windows scorched. Some of the fire went under and around and there is smoke/fire damage on the opposite side, although less intensive as you would expect from the source. Difficult to ascertain any evidence of penetration of the cowling. However, plenty of bent metal parts and pieces hanging down, still attached, again on the inboard part.
The debris field behind the aircraft depicted several engine parts including pieces of cowling, compressor or turbine blades or parts thereof, flanges, metal collars and small bolts.
Whatever the ultimate cause, the preliminary NTSB report, evidence at the scene and research of previous accidents with similar characteristics, all seem to point to a catastrophic failure of either compressor or turbine parts inside the #1 engine. As for the subsequent fire, my best guess is rupture of some fuel lines, a gearbox or the oil/fuel cooler. It is my understanding that no fuel tank was breached.
Investigation and engine tear down continuing with NTSB, AAIB, BA, GE, Boeing and FAA FSDO working in unison all week and likely in to next week also.
Lives were definitely saved, no question. Kudos to the crew, LAS ARFF and rescue units, ATCT and all the other agencies involved. It's not every day or even every year that you have an incident like this and everyone acted professionally and quickly, with the sole exception of a few passengers! Frankly, that part was not noticed in the immediate aftermath as there was a lot going on and the vast majority had already exited by then and well away from the aircraft.