BA 777 on fire in Las Vegas
Strangly enough I was in the USA last week and the cabin crew on all 4 flights asked pax to close the blinds before landing in order to help keep the cabin cool during the turnaround.
I thought it was not the best of plans.
I would understand if they had requested this after landing before arrival at the gate.
Delta Airlines.
I thought it was not the best of plans.
I would understand if they had requested this after landing before arrival at the gate.
Delta Airlines.
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How many more seconds would have been taken if third pilot had not been present and able to do this?
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Third pilots may not always be aboard, but FAs are. Wouldn't it make sense to brief them to eyeball obvious problems? It doesn't take a lot of stick time to report smoke and flames engulfing a wing. It might even be faster than waiting for a third pilot's report, when a third pilot was available.
Evacuating an aircraft is a big deal. You expect serious injuries from an evacuation.
If you have a spare pilot, then it is wise to use him just to confirm it is really necessary.
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when people actually listen to the safety brief they will know not to try and get the trolley bags before evacuation.
Cabin crew will also go down the cabin to ensure that tables are stowed, seats are upright, belts are fastened, earplugs to iphones etc. are out, and blinds are open.
What people do after that is basically down to whether they respect the cabin crew and the advice they were given.
There are plenty of travellers who think they know better, and the cc cannot be expected to police them all, all of the time.
Cabin crew will also go down the cabin to ensure that tables are stowed, seats are upright, belts are fastened, earplugs to iphones etc. are out, and blinds are open.
What people do after that is basically down to whether they respect the cabin crew and the advice they were given.
There are plenty of travellers who think they know better, and the cc cannot be expected to police them all, all of the time.
Safety briefs need to be far more specific: E.g. "In an evacuation you must not take bags with you. Any important papers should be in your pockets"
Regarding the large number of people who took baggage down the slides: an experienced former CC member gave a credible, if politically incorrect, explanation on this evening's Today programme on BBC Radio 4.
www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b06950lr, drag the player forward to time 53:40.
www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b06950lr, drag the player forward to time 53:40.
Originally Posted by Ian W
BA has a cartoon video with a throw away line saying "take nothing with you" is that a legal order from a flight attendant?
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Ian Simpson's take on the Vegas incident...
Take a deep breath before you read this, but Ian Simpson, chemtrail expert extraordinaire, has diagnosed the incident at LAS, I guess the air crash investigators can all go home now...
look-up.org.uk/ba-la-fire/
It will make you wince, it may make you cry with laughter, it may make you wonder when the definition of the word 'truth' was changed.
look-up.org.uk/ba-la-fire/
It will make you wince, it may make you cry with laughter, it may make you wonder when the definition of the word 'truth' was changed.
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Had this gone on a few seconds longer, there might well have been hull loss. And massive loss of life.
Whether the cabin would have been penentrated without expedient evacuation and arrival of fire services is a moot point. However, I will agree with you that it was a close call in that most of those hospitalised were due to smoke inhalation. If you recall the BA disater from 30 years, it was indeed smoke inhalation that killed most of the souls on board.
In this respect, it was indeed a close call.
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Other reports suggest that the majority of injuries sustained were abrasions resulting, typically, from the slide evacuation.
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Mr Optimistic, I don't think you understand what people are trying to explain to you. As former cabin crew with three airlines (including BA), the commands we practice for an evacuation drill include "get out, leave everything behind", yelled at the top of our voice, as we "gently" push people in the small of the back, down the slide. In our annual recurrent drills, some crew (sitting as passengers) are asked to take baggage to the door during the emergency evacuation, and within seconds there is a line of people that can't get out as the crew try to make the passenger leave the case behind. Leave the case by the door, the exit is blocked, do we tell the passenger to return the case to the overhead locker ten rows back?!
Many passengers find it impossible to obey the fasten seat belt sign, listen to the demo yada yada, and perhaps it is these same people who choose to ignore the yelled commands "get out, leave everything behind"
But I have to say, who knows what we would do in a panic. We may not react the way we think we would. Tossing the cases over the side of the slide isn't an option, as there may well be passengers under there, or emergency services. But taking cases away causes a line of blocked passengers in seconds.
Personally I think the crew did an amazing job, and I am just glad I retired with nothing more serious than helping out with a few faints and panic attacks.
Many passengers find it impossible to obey the fasten seat belt sign, listen to the demo yada yada, and perhaps it is these same people who choose to ignore the yelled commands "get out, leave everything behind"
But I have to say, who knows what we would do in a panic. We may not react the way we think we would. Tossing the cases over the side of the slide isn't an option, as there may well be passengers under there, or emergency services. But taking cases away causes a line of blocked passengers in seconds.
Personally I think the crew did an amazing job, and I am just glad I retired with nothing more serious than helping out with a few faints and panic attacks.
Bags are important. If a highly experienced flight crew values them as highly as this video shows how are you going to get meer passengers to leave them behind?
http://youtu.be/lvqEXbMVANM
No bags were harmed in the filming of this video!
http://youtu.be/lvqEXbMVANM
No bags were harmed in the filming of this video!
Last edited by Sailvi767; 11th Sep 2015 at 21:52.
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Airbubba
To be clear, I didn't mention a figure at all. I was commenting on a certain operator to whom you referred, that recently aligned itself with both A&B manufacturers' operations.
For the avoidance of doubt, that operator currently shows the following memory items for a (non ECL) large Boeing:
1) Aborted Eng Start/Eng Autostart (same single item drill)
2) Cabin Altitude
3) Eng Lim/Surge/Stall
4) Multiple Eng Fail/Stall
5) Fire Eng/Sev Damage/Sep
6) IAS Disagree
Along with the following manoeuvres
1) RTO
2) Stall
3) GPWS
4) Windshear
5) TCAS
I'm intrigued to know which of those items are non memory in your outfit? I too have over 3 decades on A & B. (And others!) Perhaps we have more in common than we realise?
So whip, that doesn't include Fire APU, Tailpipe Fire, or Pax Evac. All done with reference to checklists, and for very good reason, I would suggest?
Does Boeing have 13 drills with memory items these days? I sure don't think so.
For the avoidance of doubt, that operator currently shows the following memory items for a (non ECL) large Boeing:
1) Aborted Eng Start/Eng Autostart (same single item drill)
2) Cabin Altitude
3) Eng Lim/Surge/Stall
4) Multiple Eng Fail/Stall
5) Fire Eng/Sev Damage/Sep
6) IAS Disagree
Along with the following manoeuvres
1) RTO
2) Stall
3) GPWS
4) Windshear
5) TCAS
I'm intrigued to know which of those items are non memory in your outfit? I too have over 3 decades on A & B. (And others!) Perhaps we have more in common than we realise?
So whip, that doesn't include Fire APU, Tailpipe Fire, or Pax Evac. All done with reference to checklists, and for very good reason, I would suggest?
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A similar incident, with similar results:
PWA Flight 501 was a regularly scheduled flight that flew between Calgary, Alberta and Edmonton, Alberta, Canada. The aircraft caught fire during takeoff on March 22, 1984.
The Boeing 737 pushed back from the gate at Calgary International Airport at 7:35 AM and proceeded to take off north on runway 34 (16/34), carrying five crew members and 114 passengers. At 7:42 AM, a loud popping sound was heard 20 seconds into takeoff. The aircraft began to vibrate and veer (back) to the left, and a fire broke out in the rear of the aircraft. The pilot, Stan Fleming, managed to abort the take-off.
An emergency evacuation was ordered as the fire continued to roar. Five people were seriously injured and 22 suffered minor injuries, but no-one was killed. Although the CFR crew attended to the fire in very short order, the aircraft was destroyed by the fire.
The fire was attributed to a faulty compressor disc that blew apart, rupturing the fuel tanks. This incident was similar to the cause of the British Airtours Flight 28M disaster that claimed 55 lives in 1985.
PWA Flight 501 was a regularly scheduled flight that flew between Calgary, Alberta and Edmonton, Alberta, Canada. The aircraft caught fire during takeoff on March 22, 1984.
The Boeing 737 pushed back from the gate at Calgary International Airport at 7:35 AM and proceeded to take off north on runway 34 (16/34), carrying five crew members and 114 passengers. At 7:42 AM, a loud popping sound was heard 20 seconds into takeoff. The aircraft began to vibrate and veer (back) to the left, and a fire broke out in the rear of the aircraft. The pilot, Stan Fleming, managed to abort the take-off.
An emergency evacuation was ordered as the fire continued to roar. Five people were seriously injured and 22 suffered minor injuries, but no-one was killed. Although the CFR crew attended to the fire in very short order, the aircraft was destroyed by the fire.
The fire was attributed to a faulty compressor disc that blew apart, rupturing the fuel tanks. This incident was similar to the cause of the British Airtours Flight 28M disaster that claimed 55 lives in 1985.
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2tY2HzWCvhw
China Airlines 738 fire in Okinawa. At least the Fire Services seem to have been quicker in Vegas.
And yes, people took their belongings then also.
China Airlines 738 fire in Okinawa. At least the Fire Services seem to have been quicker in Vegas.
And yes, people took their belongings then also.
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I have been reading the FAA AD designed to prevent the type of incident which occurred to the BA 777 at Las Vegas. I found the following parts of the document interesting:
Request
Two commenters, General Electric Company and The Boeing Company, requested that we remove the “UnsafeCondition” paragraph from the AD, and reword the Summary section to resemble the Summary section of AD 2002-04-11. The commenters stated that, by their analyses, cracks in the weld joint would not develop into an uncontained failure. The commenters stated that HPCR 8-10 stage spools, P/Ns 1844M90G01 and 1844M90G02, be inspected by an enhanced inspection, similar to those parts covered in AD 2002-04-11.
Answer
We do not agree. AD 2002-04-11 was issued because of additional focused inspection procedures that had been developed by the manufacturer. Because cracks were discovered on one HPCR 8-10 spool between the 9-10 stages in the weld joint, this unsafe condition is likely to exist or develop in other products of the same type design. The unsafe condition could result in failure of the HPCR 8-10 stage spool, uncontained engine failure, and damage to the airplane. We determined that this unsafe condition requires mandatory repetitive inspections for cracks. We did not change the AD.
Well done the FAA for 'sticking to its guns'.
Inspections of the HPCR 8-10 Stage Spool
(f)(1) At the next piece-part exposure of the HPCR 8-10 stage spool after the effective date of this AD, perform a fluorescent penetrant inspection (FPI) and eddy current inspection (ECI) of the weld joint between the 9-10 stages of the HPCR 8-10 stage spool for cracks.
(2) Thereafter, perform repetitive FPIs and ECIs of the weld joint between the 9-10 stages of the HPCR 8-10 stage spool for cracks at every piece-part exposure of the HPCR 8-10 stage spool.
Presumably, this type of inspection can be performed only during major engine overhaul, with the engine removed from the aircraft? If so, will the authorities now need to consider more frequent engine overhauls?
What seems to be missing is any move to find a permanent fix for the problem such as a redesign/manufacture of a HP turbofan which does not have an inherent weakness.
Request
Two commenters, General Electric Company and The Boeing Company, requested that we remove the “UnsafeCondition” paragraph from the AD, and reword the Summary section to resemble the Summary section of AD 2002-04-11. The commenters stated that, by their analyses, cracks in the weld joint would not develop into an uncontained failure. The commenters stated that HPCR 8-10 stage spools, P/Ns 1844M90G01 and 1844M90G02, be inspected by an enhanced inspection, similar to those parts covered in AD 2002-04-11.
Answer
We do not agree. AD 2002-04-11 was issued because of additional focused inspection procedures that had been developed by the manufacturer. Because cracks were discovered on one HPCR 8-10 spool between the 9-10 stages in the weld joint, this unsafe condition is likely to exist or develop in other products of the same type design. The unsafe condition could result in failure of the HPCR 8-10 stage spool, uncontained engine failure, and damage to the airplane. We determined that this unsafe condition requires mandatory repetitive inspections for cracks. We did not change the AD.
Well done the FAA for 'sticking to its guns'.
Inspections of the HPCR 8-10 Stage Spool
(f)(1) At the next piece-part exposure of the HPCR 8-10 stage spool after the effective date of this AD, perform a fluorescent penetrant inspection (FPI) and eddy current inspection (ECI) of the weld joint between the 9-10 stages of the HPCR 8-10 stage spool for cracks.
(2) Thereafter, perform repetitive FPIs and ECIs of the weld joint between the 9-10 stages of the HPCR 8-10 stage spool for cracks at every piece-part exposure of the HPCR 8-10 stage spool.
Presumably, this type of inspection can be performed only during major engine overhaul, with the engine removed from the aircraft? If so, will the authorities now need to consider more frequent engine overhauls?
What seems to be missing is any move to find a permanent fix for the problem such as a redesign/manufacture of a HP turbofan which does not have an inherent weakness.
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http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/5...ml#post9114090
Avionista,
Thank you for researching this and summarising key detail. You pose a critical question. I hope it will be answered.
Avionista,
Thank you for researching this and summarising key detail. You pose a critical question. I hope it will be answered.
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What seems to be missing is any move to find a permanent fix for the problem such as a redesign/manufacture of a HP turbofan which does not have an inherent weakness