Transavia (HV5068/TRA3K) emergency landing
Join Date: Jun 2000
Location: last time I looked I was still here.
Posts: 4,509
......resulted in a go-around because of a windshear warning. Firewalled the engines, and they ended up with a speed of 250 kts. With flaps extended. Don't know what flap setting. They retracted the flaps, but upon re-extension, everything refused to come out.
Not sure in which topic, perhaps crunched landing by SWA, but there was some discussion about the lack of practice with all engine G/A and the subsequent cock ups when it is done. Here is another example of that, with some critical consequences. (what if they had been at a rwy that was too short for flapless?) Firstly I would hope, especially on a day like this, that the G/A procedure was reviewed AGAIN just before G/S capture; even touch drilled. That plus a suitable routing was planned. W/S at 1000' might require full power initially, but could then be adjusted as necessary: if it had been anticipated. If it was a W/S G/A from reasonable height and ground contact not a factor would you go F15? Now, with full power and TOGA the pitch bar is in speed and it could have been high. Imagine what the attitude would be. Then with lowish MAA the ALT ACQ comes very quickly and the subsequent push-over would be stomach churning. With A/T's in manual and you forget to pull back the levers it's easy to see how this scenario could develop. Sometimes power can be your friend, other times not. A calm cockpit can avoid many problems. Oh for more sim time to practice such scenarios. I wish, I wish. It should be an annual sim event, surely: a menage of G/A's.
For the technical guys: I suspect the overspeed is more critical for the LED's. If they do overspeed, with no damage, do they behave like this and lock out? If not, then the the ALT system might have been available. However, it's nice to have RW27 underneath you in such a landing config. Let us learn please.
Not sure in which topic, perhaps crunched landing by SWA, but there was some discussion about the lack of practice with all engine G/A and the subsequent cock ups when it is done. Here is another example of that, with some critical consequences. (what if they had been at a rwy that was too short for flapless?) Firstly I would hope, especially on a day like this, that the G/A procedure was reviewed AGAIN just before G/S capture; even touch drilled. That plus a suitable routing was planned. W/S at 1000' might require full power initially, but could then be adjusted as necessary: if it had been anticipated. If it was a W/S G/A from reasonable height and ground contact not a factor would you go F15? Now, with full power and TOGA the pitch bar is in speed and it could have been high. Imagine what the attitude would be. Then with lowish MAA the ALT ACQ comes very quickly and the subsequent push-over would be stomach churning. With A/T's in manual and you forget to pull back the levers it's easy to see how this scenario could develop. Sometimes power can be your friend, other times not. A calm cockpit can avoid many problems. Oh for more sim time to practice such scenarios. I wish, I wish. It should be an annual sim event, surely: a menage of G/A's.
For the technical guys: I suspect the overspeed is more critical for the LED's. If they do overspeed, with no damage, do they behave like this and lock out? If not, then the the ALT system might have been available. However, it's nice to have RW27 underneath you in such a landing config. Let us learn please.
Join Date: Nov 2006
Location: in the mud
Posts: 48
Hmm can't really see how some folks say they did a great job....
Tunnel vision, no clear diversion plan, huge max flap speed exceedance, no clear view how to circumnavigate TSRA, so nervous that she transmitted on ATC instead of intercom, letting the FO land in this kind of wx and then the remark after landing that "she had never saw this kind of wx in 25 years of flying" ?? what has she been doing in those 25 years ? this is not exceptional wx in many places in europe year round...
do not forget there were dozens of other aircraft at the same time and same conditions and they all landed safely despite windshear and the occasional go around....
I would say that this captain was not in command of the situation
and there is more to this one than meets the eye and I sincerely hope that this will be thoroughly investigated by the Dutch
Tunnel vision, no clear diversion plan, huge max flap speed exceedance, no clear view how to circumnavigate TSRA, so nervous that she transmitted on ATC instead of intercom, letting the FO land in this kind of wx and then the remark after landing that "she had never saw this kind of wx in 25 years of flying" ?? what has she been doing in those 25 years ? this is not exceptional wx in many places in europe year round...
do not forget there were dozens of other aircraft at the same time and same conditions and they all landed safely despite windshear and the occasional go around....
I would say that this captain was not in command of the situation
and there is more to this one than meets the eye and I sincerely hope that this will be thoroughly investigated by the Dutch
Thread Starter
Join Date: May 2004
Location: Netherlands
Posts: 36
I've replayed the full comms recording of EHAM TWR on the afternoon of July 25. Between 11:20 UTC and 14:10 UTC, I counted 20 go-arounds on RWY27.
At around 12:15 UTC, the vast majority of approaching aircraft made a go-around because of windshear.
View EHAM traffic, starting at 11:30 UTC: http://www.flightradar24.com/2015-07...x/52.3,4.74/12
There were single-runway operations on RWY27. PIREPs from aircraft on approach to RWY27 reported windshear of 20 knots at 200 ft and moderate turbulence. There were no windshear reports from aircraft departing from RWY27. Some aircraft cancelled take-off from RWY27 because gusting exceeded 50 kn (from 290 - 310 deg).
At around 12:15 UTC, the vast majority of approaching aircraft made a go-around because of windshear.
View EHAM traffic, starting at 11:30 UTC: http://www.flightradar24.com/2015-07...x/52.3,4.74/12
There were single-runway operations on RWY27. PIREPs from aircraft on approach to RWY27 reported windshear of 20 knots at 200 ft and moderate turbulence. There were no windshear reports from aircraft departing from RWY27. Some aircraft cancelled take-off from RWY27 because gusting exceeded 50 kn (from 290 - 310 deg).
Last edited by Aireps; 28th Jul 2015 at 14:25. Reason: Changed FR24 link
Join Date: Jul 2004
Location: Cloud 9
Posts: 2,949
Hmm can't really see how some folks say they did a great job....
Tunnel vision, no clear diversion plan, huge max flap speed exceedance, no clear view how to circumnavigate TSRA, so nervous that she transmitted on ATC instead of intercom, letting the FO land in this kind of wx and then the remark after landing that "she had never saw this kind of wx in 25 years of flying" ?? what has she been doing in those 25 years ? this is not exceptional wx in many places in europe year round...
do not forget there were dozens of other aircraft at the same time and same conditions and they all landed safely despite windshear and the occasional go around....
I would say that this captain was not in command of the situation
and there is more to this one than meets the eye and I sincerely hope that this will be thoroughly investigated by the Dutch
Tunnel vision, no clear diversion plan, huge max flap speed exceedance, no clear view how to circumnavigate TSRA, so nervous that she transmitted on ATC instead of intercom, letting the FO land in this kind of wx and then the remark after landing that "she had never saw this kind of wx in 25 years of flying" ?? what has she been doing in those 25 years ? this is not exceptional wx in many places in europe year round...
do not forget there were dozens of other aircraft at the same time and same conditions and they all landed safely despite windshear and the occasional go around....
I would say that this captain was not in command of the situation
and there is more to this one than meets the eye and I sincerely hope that this will be thoroughly investigated by the Dutch
Join Date: Apr 2014
Location: Sky
Posts: 329
Never had a shit day in the office?
When I was instructing I have seen too many great crew totally **** up in the sim on the windshear exercise and have since a more humble approach to what you should have done.... With windshear you will [email protected] up some day, I will [email protected] up some day and let's make sure that we both appreciate that and do our best to avoid it. This flight had all the swiss cheese issues written all over it: confused diversion, low fuel, shaken about for a while in shitty weather...how sharp would you be? Not how sharp should you have been.... So I am with the crew on this one. Could they have done better? absolutely. Can I understand that they did what they did: yep, absolutely!
there were dozens of other aircraft at the same time and same conditions and they all landed safely despite windshear and the occasional go around....
If you want something to compare: this was the heaviest summer storm in the Netherlands since 1901....
As for the PTT buttons, I think it's beyond incredible, that Boeing still has these silly rocker switches on the yoke!
But let's face it Boeing got scr3w3d over by South West when they designing the NG and created the most outdated cockpit with the most outdated features to allow SW a common type rating. Even the 757 is more advanced imho... 
Join Date: Aug 2012
Location: FL390
Posts: 150
As for the PTT buttons, I think it's beyond incredible, that Boeing still has these silly rocker switches on the yoke! They are a recipe for totally unnecessary additional workload (as you unfortunately see in this case), additional confusion and a loss of situational awareness between pilots and ATC. No, I'm definitely NOT blaming the crew, but add weather, low fuel and wind shear to that, and the recipe for disaster is complete! Completely insane that aircraft can be certified like that, only to save $10 on some wires and a decent switch! The Airbus system (a toggle switch that can be firmly locked in intercom position) located on the central pedestal on the radio panel, whilst still having a PTT switch on the Side Stick, is a much better thought-out solution IMO.
Join Date: Apr 2008
Location: nowhere
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Originally Posted by LLuCCiFeR
Some 744s don't even have a PTT button on the glare shield, so you either have to reach down to the radio panel, and thus effectively not being able to use that arm for anything else and taking your eyes off the PFD and ND, or you have to use the PTT switch on the yoke with the possibility of interfering in the controls of the PF.
Join Date: Jun 2000
Location: Australia
Posts: 4,123
With A/T's in manual and you forget to pull back the levers
Also, it will be most interesting to see the reason why an all flaps up landing was conducted; especially with approach and landing speeds around the 185 knots. That is a serious speed indeed and rarely practiced in the simulator.
If, according to reports, the captain elected to direct the co-pilot to conduct the all flaps up landing under such critical circumstances, it would indeed be a courageous decision (as Sir Humphrey would surely attest), that speaks volumes of the touching faith in the co-pilot's competency. In any case, unless there was a technical problem that prevented flaps and leading edge devices from not operating, there should be no reason that a normal Flap 30/40 should not be used up to the maximum crosswind component - whether windshear/turbulence was present or not. .
Last edited by Centaurus; 29th Jul 2015 at 03:19.
Join Date: Jun 2000
Location: last time I looked I was still here.
Posts: 4,509
If, according to reports, the captain elected to direct the co-pilot to conduct ta he all flaps up landing under such critical circumstances, it would indeed be a courageous decision.
I apologise if I've missed it, but is this confirmed as true? There have been various criticisms of certain apparent command decisions, but this would be most serious one. The a/c had a handling problem = flapless; there was a landing distance problem = higher speed: On their own these should be a 'captain's landing' in any airline. Add the severe weather and it only enforces the fact the the 'accountable manger' = the 4 striper in LHS should take responsibility for completing the task. It's what we are trained & paid for. If it had not gone well, and the F/O was PF, I hate to think what the insurance company would make of it and the resultant court case brought by pax.
Is it true EIN refused them? Why? There, RW22, the X-wind would have been worse, unless the speed was much reduced. RTM & AMS were close to the storm. Weeze RW27 is the same distance as EIN and may have had less wind and a better direction. It is a well facilitated airport and HV have operated from there.
It was a day for lots of extra fuel in tanks on departure. I hope the F/O on the day learnt a powerful lesson before their own upgrade process. That's what the RHS apprenticeship is all about.
I apologise if I've missed it, but is this confirmed as true? There have been various criticisms of certain apparent command decisions, but this would be most serious one. The a/c had a handling problem = flapless; there was a landing distance problem = higher speed: On their own these should be a 'captain's landing' in any airline. Add the severe weather and it only enforces the fact the the 'accountable manger' = the 4 striper in LHS should take responsibility for completing the task. It's what we are trained & paid for. If it had not gone well, and the F/O was PF, I hate to think what the insurance company would make of it and the resultant court case brought by pax.
Is it true EIN refused them? Why? There, RW22, the X-wind would have been worse, unless the speed was much reduced. RTM & AMS were close to the storm. Weeze RW27 is the same distance as EIN and may have had less wind and a better direction. It is a well facilitated airport and HV have operated from there.
It was a day for lots of extra fuel in tanks on departure. I hope the F/O on the day learnt a powerful lesson before their own upgrade process. That's what the RHS apprenticeship is all about.
Join Date: Feb 2008
Location: in my country
Posts: 168
Rat5, FOs and captains have the exact same training in simulators and they both have equale practice on line (except in china
). If the FO Is not crap in handling an aircraft then why wouldn't the captain let him fly? After all the pilot in command has to make some crucial decision at any time and in some difficult situation like this it is probably better to let the FO fly so the commander has a general view and is not focused in just one thing (speed and glide path-speed and glide path-speed and glide path). The captain can also take control at any time and he/she was probably damn ready to do so.
). If the FO Is not crap in handling an aircraft then why wouldn't the captain let him fly? After all the pilot in command has to make some crucial decision at any time and in some difficult situation like this it is probably better to let the FO fly so the commander has a general view and is not focused in just one thing (speed and glide path-speed and glide path-speed and glide path). The captain can also take control at any time and he/she was probably damn ready to do so.
Thread Starter
Join Date: May 2004
Location: Netherlands
Posts: 36
Is it true EIN refused them? Why?
Later, it emerged that there is a NOTAM in force saying that EHEH is unavailable as alternate for civil traffic, except (medical) emergencies.
M0681/15 - EINDHOVEN AIRPORT (CIVIL) NOT AVBL AS ALTN, EXCEPT
(MEDICAL) EMERGENCIES. 08 APR 00:00 2015 UNTIL 31 DEC 23:00 2015.
CREATED: 07 APR 12:51 2015
(MEDICAL) EMERGENCIES. 08 APR 00:00 2015 UNTIL 31 DEC 23:00 2015.
CREATED: 07 APR 12:51 2015
The NOTAM was put in place for noise mitigation purposes in the Eindhoven area.
News item on this (Dutch): http://nos.nl/artikel/2049294-stormt...eindhoven.html
Last edited by Aireps; 29th Jul 2015 at 09:09. Reason: News item added
Join Date: Oct 2013
Location: Sweden
Age: 44
Posts: 443
1) The 777 in LHR was flewn by the FO while Capt was making the brave move to rise the flaps. Both did an excellent job
2) In the same accident, the Capt made an EVACUATE over ATC comms instead of PA*.
Shit happens. It's how you deal with it to get everyone down and alive that matters. This is true for many many occupations out there.
*Boeing design again? Never was in a 777.
2) In the same accident, the Capt made an EVACUATE over ATC comms instead of PA*.
Shit happens. It's how you deal with it to get everyone down and alive that matters. This is true for many many occupations out there.
*Boeing design again? Never was in a 777.
Pegase Driver
Join Date: May 1997
Location: Europe
Age: 70
Posts: 2,953
RAT 5 :
It seems to be true, the local EIN newspapers published an audio f the conversations between the Captain and ATC. ( 2nd video at the bottom of article .
here : Transavia-toestel dat zaterdag op Schiphol noodlanding maakte, werd geweigerd op Eindhoven Airport
Most of it is in Dutch unfortunately for some here, but from the audio, after go around in RTM it was ATC who suggested EIN, as wind there was "only" 260/ 19 Kts G 30 and vis > 10 Km , and there was holding in SPL , the controller then contacted EIN ( a military airbase) who for some unknown reason refused, the controller came back to the HV and said " this is becoming crazy, apparently EIN is refusing you " an then offers a better EAT for SPL then HV decided to divert to SPL . the whole audio gives a good indication of the situation from initial APP to RTM to final landing , and how she got trapped. I feel sorry for her, and seen the final landing/outcome , I think she did quite well and I am glad I was not in her shoes that day.
Now as usual the Capt Hindsinght(s) can enter the game .
Is it true EIN refused them? Why?
here : Transavia-toestel dat zaterdag op Schiphol noodlanding maakte, werd geweigerd op Eindhoven Airport
Most of it is in Dutch unfortunately for some here, but from the audio, after go around in RTM it was ATC who suggested EIN, as wind there was "only" 260/ 19 Kts G 30 and vis > 10 Km , and there was holding in SPL , the controller then contacted EIN ( a military airbase) who for some unknown reason refused, the controller came back to the HV and said " this is becoming crazy, apparently EIN is refusing you " an then offers a better EAT for SPL then HV decided to divert to SPL . the whole audio gives a good indication of the situation from initial APP to RTM to final landing , and how she got trapped. I feel sorry for her, and seen the final landing/outcome , I think she did quite well and I am glad I was not in her shoes that day.
Now as usual the Capt Hindsinght(s) can enter the game .
Ut Sementem Feeceris
Join Date: Jul 1999
Location: UK
Posts: 3,044
Sure, let the FO fly whilst you manage.....but when it comes to the landing in 99% of cases it should be the LHS that does it. You're in that seat through experience and are ultimately responsible. If it all went wrong on touchdown that's too late to intervene.
How would you justify your decision to let 2nd in Command carry out the most critical task? Could the Commander be sued personally under such circumstance through dereliction of duty?
@MrSnuggles - not really like for like. The BA 777 only presented its issue at about 400' on final - hardly a planned non normal landing. As situations go that's about as dynamic as it gets!
A4
PS Do we actually know for sure it was the FO who landed?
How would you justify your decision to let 2nd in Command carry out the most critical task? Could the Commander be sued personally under such circumstance through dereliction of duty?
@MrSnuggles - not really like for like. The BA 777 only presented its issue at about 400' on final - hardly a planned non normal landing. As situations go that's about as dynamic as it gets!
A4
PS Do we actually know for sure it was the FO who landed?
Join Date: Oct 2013
Location: Sweden
Age: 44
Posts: 443
A4
Not from any of my sources, no. Might just be a rumour.
Buuuuuut, we have some successful landings from FOs when manure hit the AC (like the aforementioned LHR 777) and we have some very unsuccessful landings from when Capt took over late in the landing sequence (Southwest noseplant comes to mind).
Hindsight is always the best thing, right?
PS Do we actually know for sure it was the FO who landed?
Buuuuuut, we have some successful landings from FOs when manure hit the AC (like the aforementioned LHR 777) and we have some very unsuccessful landings from when Capt took over late in the landing sequence (Southwest noseplant comes to mind).
Hindsight is always the best thing, right?
Ut Sementem Feeceris
Join Date: Jul 1999
Location: UK
Posts: 3,044
Of course - hindsight is 20/20! And I agree that there are a few instances of where the LHS has got it wrong. Looking at the TAF's and the Wx for the whole area, I would have carried 60 minutes extra - minimum. I don't say that with hindsight - that would have been my decision. I think occasionally people are a little simplistic in their planning. They assume they'll go-around and get vectored downwind for a second approach with 2 minutes......on a day like that?
SPL ATC are good (been there 100's of times over the last 20+ years) but they can't work miracles.
What about others on here? How much would you have carried.
A4
SPL ATC are good (been there 100's of times over the last 20+ years) but they can't work miracles.
What about others on here? How much would you have carried.
A4
Join Date: Nov 2007
Location: malta
Posts: 161
Originally Posted by A4
Sure, let the FO fly whilst you manage.....but when it comes to the landing in 99% of cases it should be the LHS that does it. You're in that seat through experience and are ultimately responsible.
Although at transavia it probably will not be the case, at airlines with multiple types of aircraft, it is very well possible that you might have more hours/overall experience, the FO might have a lot more hours on type.
It might be totally explainable to let a more experienced (on type) FO land in my opinion.
