Indonesian airliner skids off runway
Racism? Bigotry?
There are those who see racism and bigotry everywhere.
I brought up the DC-10 topic because I found it strange at the very least that 34 years after the fact I could find no reference to it having occurred.
I also mentioned the KLM pilot along with every other major feature of the incident that I could recall.
I mentioned it as a fact (or what I believe to be a fact, aging memory aside) that was relevant to the event.
At the time GA had very little exposure to wide-bodies and I believe that it was common to have Dutch pilots flying on secondment to GA.
I'm sorry if that fits your very broad measure of bigotry. It does not fit mine.
As for Indonesia's aviation safety record, it speaks for itself.
I know. I live here.
Your comments on that are well founded.
But that does not mean that any one event in Indonesia is any more or less damning than a similar event in any other country.
I average about 40 domestic flights per year. We don't get a lot of choice to use other than domestic carriers.
Oh yeah, there is the occasional Air Asia flight available.
The DC-10 topic was moved over here because it was definitely off-topic for the Montreal thread.
It has progressed to the point where it is probably off-topic here too.
I brought up the DC-10 topic because I found it strange at the very least that 34 years after the fact I could find no reference to it having occurred.
I also mentioned the KLM pilot along with every other major feature of the incident that I could recall.
I mentioned it as a fact (or what I believe to be a fact, aging memory aside) that was relevant to the event.
At the time GA had very little exposure to wide-bodies and I believe that it was common to have Dutch pilots flying on secondment to GA.
I'm sorry if that fits your very broad measure of bigotry. It does not fit mine.
As for Indonesia's aviation safety record, it speaks for itself.
I know. I live here.
Your comments on that are well founded.
But that does not mean that any one event in Indonesia is any more or less damning than a similar event in any other country.
I average about 40 domestic flights per year. We don't get a lot of choice to use other than domestic carriers.
Oh yeah, there is the occasional Air Asia flight available.
The DC-10 topic was moved over here because it was definitely off-topic for the Montreal thread.
It has progressed to the point where it is probably off-topic here too.
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Garuda regularly take on cadets, fresh out of school with only a single engine cpl, no if, to fly a 737.
I have witnessed an IR renewal, with a dgca inspector by flying one visual approach, the guy was at the controls from 1500ft (took over from another pilot) to touch down and ir renewed.
I have seen a "cpl" holder, not know how to put on an aircraft harness, not know what a power lever is, the cpl was brought by his brother.
Thank god this over run was not at Bandung when I flew there last, a school fair ground was happening less than 20 meters from the edge of the runway! Not even a barrier!
Have a look at the safety record of the guys that fly from sentani to wamena, probably once every few months a freighter written off.
The dgca, and country is completely incapable of flying safely.
Ps - to be fair to the crew, perhaps atc told them viz met the minima, I had a flight into Jakarta where the 5min old atis gave the viz to low to shoot approach,on initial contact their first comment to us was viz was the exact minima to shoot approach, as they knew we would hold otherwise...! But they totally neglected to tell us both the dme and gs where in op..
I have witnessed an IR renewal, with a dgca inspector by flying one visual approach, the guy was at the controls from 1500ft (took over from another pilot) to touch down and ir renewed.
I have seen a "cpl" holder, not know how to put on an aircraft harness, not know what a power lever is, the cpl was brought by his brother.
Thank god this over run was not at Bandung when I flew there last, a school fair ground was happening less than 20 meters from the edge of the runway! Not even a barrier!
Have a look at the safety record of the guys that fly from sentani to wamena, probably once every few months a freighter written off.
The dgca, and country is completely incapable of flying safely.
Ps - to be fair to the crew, perhaps atc told them viz met the minima, I had a flight into Jakarta where the 5min old atis gave the viz to low to shoot approach,on initial contact their first comment to us was viz was the exact minima to shoot approach, as they knew we would hold otherwise...! But they totally neglected to tell us both the dme and gs where in op..
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Indonesian airliner skids off runway
< I have witnessed an IR renewal, with a dgca inspector by flying one visual approach, the guy was at the controls from 1500ft (took over from another pilot) to touch down and ir renewed.>. But they have simulators for PPC, are you sure ?
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I've worked on and off with Indonesians for years
many of the comments re the cultural problems are true but I've also seen some amazing piloting skills in really dreadful conditions - especially in backwoods helicopters
many of the comments re the cultural problems are true but I've also seen some amazing piloting skills in really dreadful conditions - especially in backwoods helicopters
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Inadequate Training Key To Garuda Indonesia Excursions
WASHINGTON—Final reports by Indonesia’s National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC) on two 2015 Garuda Indonesia Airlines runway excursions point to inadequate training for pilots and, in one case, for air traffic controllers.
The first serious incident, in February 2015, involved an ATR72-600 landing at the Lombok Praya International Airport on the island of Lombok, Indonesia,after a short flight from Bali.
According to the final report, the pilot-in-command (PIC) most likely used improper flight control inputs to counter a crosswind after the aircraft bounced three times upon landing, causing the twin turboprop to exit the right side of the runway.
While no passengers or crew members were injured, damage to the aircraft included a collapsed nose gear and damage to the right propeller.
The aircraft had experienced a tailwind and crosswind from the right side during landing, which would normally require left rudder and right aileron input to maintain directional control. However during the bounces, the PIC applied right rudder and left aileron input, causing the aircraft’s nose to turn right about 15 deg.
Contributing to the incident was the PIC taking control from the second-in-command—a first officer in training who was on the controls initially—during the final stages of the landing without making “clear statements” on who was in control.
NTSC recommendations included two for Garuda, calling on the airline to emphasize crosswind handling in its training and to review its policy for transfer of control. After the incident, the airline independently issued an instruction to its pilots to “strictly follow” stabilized approach criteria, procedures that typically call for a go-around after a botched landing.
The second runway excursion involved a Garuda Boeing 737-800 landing at the Sultan Hasanuddin International Airport in Makassar, Indonesia, during a thunderstorm in June 2015.
The crew had prepared for a landing on Runway 3 at the airport, calculating a landing distance of 6,890 ft., which would use 84% of the 8,200-ft. runway. Controllers later routed the aircraft to Runway 13 due to a thunderstorm in the approach path to Runway 3.
On its final approach to Runway 13 the aircraft was in a stable condition with a 10-kt. tailwind and 10-kt. crosswind. However, an unanticipated wind change to a headwind—created by the mature thunderstorm ahead—resulted in the aircraft floating for 13 sec. before touching down 4,700 ft. down the runway. Upon landing, the aircraft entered a heavy downpour from the thunderstorm.
As the end of the runway appeared, the captain turned slightly left, which resulted in the nose gear and the left main landing gear becoming stuck in mud off the end of the pavement.
The pilots told investigators that they did not consider a go-around “as they were aware that the takeoff area of the Runway 13 was a mountainous area and might jeopardize the flight.”
Safety recommendations for Garuda include reviewing its pilot training with respect to cumulonimbus development stages and emphasizing go-arounds when a safe landing cannot be made.
For AirNav Indonesia, the air navigation service provider that staffs the tower, the NTSC called for providing all controllers with meteorology training that includes understanding of cumulonimbus clouds and wind shear, training which controllers had not previously received. “The controllers assumed that the cloud formations were cumulonimbus, however they did not understand what stage of the cumulonimbus,” the NTSC said in the final report. “The controllers also did not recognize any visual sign of wind shear as they had never been trained for wind shear.”
Immediately after the incident, Garuda independently revised its ground and simulator recurrent training for the 737 to include wind shear avoidance and recovery.
Inadequate Training Key To Garuda Indonesia Excursions | Commercial Aviation content from Aviation Week
WASHINGTON—Final reports by Indonesia’s National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC) on two 2015 Garuda Indonesia Airlines runway excursions point to inadequate training for pilots and, in one case, for air traffic controllers.
The first serious incident, in February 2015, involved an ATR72-600 landing at the Lombok Praya International Airport on the island of Lombok, Indonesia,after a short flight from Bali.
According to the final report, the pilot-in-command (PIC) most likely used improper flight control inputs to counter a crosswind after the aircraft bounced three times upon landing, causing the twin turboprop to exit the right side of the runway.
While no passengers or crew members were injured, damage to the aircraft included a collapsed nose gear and damage to the right propeller.
The aircraft had experienced a tailwind and crosswind from the right side during landing, which would normally require left rudder and right aileron input to maintain directional control. However during the bounces, the PIC applied right rudder and left aileron input, causing the aircraft’s nose to turn right about 15 deg.
Contributing to the incident was the PIC taking control from the second-in-command—a first officer in training who was on the controls initially—during the final stages of the landing without making “clear statements” on who was in control.
NTSC recommendations included two for Garuda, calling on the airline to emphasize crosswind handling in its training and to review its policy for transfer of control. After the incident, the airline independently issued an instruction to its pilots to “strictly follow” stabilized approach criteria, procedures that typically call for a go-around after a botched landing.
The second runway excursion involved a Garuda Boeing 737-800 landing at the Sultan Hasanuddin International Airport in Makassar, Indonesia, during a thunderstorm in June 2015.
The crew had prepared for a landing on Runway 3 at the airport, calculating a landing distance of 6,890 ft., which would use 84% of the 8,200-ft. runway. Controllers later routed the aircraft to Runway 13 due to a thunderstorm in the approach path to Runway 3.
On its final approach to Runway 13 the aircraft was in a stable condition with a 10-kt. tailwind and 10-kt. crosswind. However, an unanticipated wind change to a headwind—created by the mature thunderstorm ahead—resulted in the aircraft floating for 13 sec. before touching down 4,700 ft. down the runway. Upon landing, the aircraft entered a heavy downpour from the thunderstorm.
As the end of the runway appeared, the captain turned slightly left, which resulted in the nose gear and the left main landing gear becoming stuck in mud off the end of the pavement.
The pilots told investigators that they did not consider a go-around “as they were aware that the takeoff area of the Runway 13 was a mountainous area and might jeopardize the flight.”
Safety recommendations for Garuda include reviewing its pilot training with respect to cumulonimbus development stages and emphasizing go-arounds when a safe landing cannot be made.
For AirNav Indonesia, the air navigation service provider that staffs the tower, the NTSC called for providing all controllers with meteorology training that includes understanding of cumulonimbus clouds and wind shear, training which controllers had not previously received. “The controllers assumed that the cloud formations were cumulonimbus, however they did not understand what stage of the cumulonimbus,” the NTSC said in the final report. “The controllers also did not recognize any visual sign of wind shear as they had never been trained for wind shear.”
Immediately after the incident, Garuda independently revised its ground and simulator recurrent training for the 737 to include wind shear avoidance and recovery.
Inadequate Training Key To Garuda Indonesia Excursions | Commercial Aviation content from Aviation Week
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I'm just SLF (and haven't read the reports) but "The pilots told investigators that they did not consider a go-around “as they were aware that the takeoff area of the Runway 13 was a mountainous area and might jeopardize the flight.”" seems to imply a runway that cannot be gone around from.
Should landing on such a runway ever be permissible in any circumstances or part of the world or has something been lost in translation here? Is it perhaps the case that what the pilots really meant was that they hadn't briefed the GA from R/W 13, which they knew to be tricky, and thus would rather land at any cost than fly off into the (to them) unknown?
Should landing on such a runway ever be permissible in any circumstances or part of the world or has something been lost in translation here? Is it perhaps the case that what the pilots really meant was that they hadn't briefed the GA from R/W 13, which they knew to be tricky, and thus would rather land at any cost than fly off into the (to them) unknown?
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interesting JammedStab - that's exactly the sort of conditions I refered to on page 2 of this thread - Makassar has some very strange meteo conditions for sure
Another one is Ambon................................
Another one is Ambon................................
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For AirNav Indonesia, the air navigation service provider that staffs the tower, the NTSC called for providing all controllers with meteorology training that includes understanding of cumulonimbus clouds and wind shear, training which controllers had not previously received. “
But also be aware that almost all salaries in Indonesia are stated as NETT.
That is, after tax, pension fund (JAMSOSTEK), etc, and excluding what can be significant additional payments or incentives. Those additional payments frequently include a housing allowance or free housing, travelling allowance for daily travel to / from work, and government mandated meal while at work.
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The "culture" is a real problem
I have never read an aviation safety report citing rate-of-pay as a primary cause or contributing factor in an incident or crash.
There is poverty everywhere - catch the train in to Jakarta and for the last few miles the sides of the track are packed with the carboard and tin "houses" of people who can't afford to live anywhere else. So a permanent government job is like gold - so much so that the employees at the bottom of the ladder generally contribute some of their monthly pay to their supervisor to say "Thank you" for their continued employment.. The supervisor in his turn says "Thank you" to his boss, and so on up the pyramid.
This "culture" means that a lot of people worry about doing something that will lose them their job, and sometimes this consideration overrides safety considerations. So it's not really "rate of pay", but more worry about "no pay any more", and that's not conducive to good decision making.
I refused to fly domestic when I was there. Especially after a colleague (with a PPL) told me about his flight into Bandung on Merpati. They were in a old Fokker circling waiting for the fog to clear. On the third circuit the pilot saw the runway diagonally ahead through a hole in the fog, sideslipped all the way down, neatly straitened up and greased it on. Great flying, but not exactly a "stabilised approach". But getting there is more important than all those silly rules and regulations.
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evansb :
Of course not . That is not looked for. Reports are made by people employed by same organisation as the controllers . My point is that if you do not pay your training is going to reflect that. Because if you train high and pay low, people leave and use the training they got to move to a better paid job. So if you train high and want to return on investment and retain your staff , you pay accordingly . basic principle. World wide applicable , not only in Indonesia.
The remarks made here by rob_ginger and WingNut60 are very true for Indonesia. there people use the training received ( mostly English language ) to do another job on the side to make ends meet , and the ATC job becomes only a mean to cover for such things as housing , medical insurance and most importantly a pension. The problem we saw is that, for many controllers, ATC was not their priority the other job was. Having worked 8 hours on a job + spent another 2 of horrendous traffic to get to/from that job , to start another 7 h duty at the Tower or ACC is not what I call safe.
Most said if they received enough money to be able to sustain a family , they would quit the second job. That is the message we tried to pass to the (highest) authorities back then .
So yes salaries and working conditions of any professional in Aviation are part of, and affecting Safety .
I have never read an aviation safety report citing rate-of-pay as a primary cause or contributing factor in an incident or crash.
The remarks made here by rob_ginger and WingNut60 are very true for Indonesia. there people use the training received ( mostly English language ) to do another job on the side to make ends meet , and the ATC job becomes only a mean to cover for such things as housing , medical insurance and most importantly a pension. The problem we saw is that, for many controllers, ATC was not their priority the other job was. Having worked 8 hours on a job + spent another 2 of horrendous traffic to get to/from that job , to start another 7 h duty at the Tower or ACC is not what I call safe.
Most said if they received enough money to be able to sustain a family , they would quit the second job. That is the message we tried to pass to the (highest) authorities back then .
So yes salaries and working conditions of any professional in Aviation are part of, and affecting Safety .
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Well there is a sizeable middle-class these days and Jakarta has changed dramtically - all cars and shopping malls rather than tin huts
But the people are still the same - as I've said in other threads it can be frustrating, even dangerous, given some work practices - on the other hand I've also seen some really excellent local pilots operating in conditions that would have 99% of western pilots in real trouble
At the end of the day it's their country
But the people are still the same - as I've said in other threads it can be frustrating, even dangerous, given some work practices - on the other hand I've also seen some really excellent local pilots operating in conditions that would have 99% of western pilots in real trouble
At the end of the day it's their country
