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Air Canada A320 accident at Halifax

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Air Canada A320 accident at Halifax

Old 30th Apr 2015, 23:50
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JFZ90 - List price for an A320 is $94 Million.

I'd be surprised if an operator with a big fleet pays anywhere near that figure.

Press release | Airbus, a leading aircraft manufacturer
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Old 1st May 2015, 16:33
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By the way the blanket exemption in Canada allowing the use of MDA as DA (without adding 50ft) has been extended for five years -- until April 30, 2020.

Exemption from Paragraph 602.128(2)(b) of the Canadian Aviation Regulations - Transport Canada

This exemption authorizes pilots-in-command of IFR aircraft operated by holders of an air operator certificate or a private operator registration document to descend below the minimum descent altitude (MDA), when conducting a non-precision approach [...] following a stabilized constant descent angle (SCDA) non-precision approach.
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Old 1st May 2015, 18:09
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Thanks for the info!
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Old 1st May 2015, 18:22
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Overrun - Lack Thereof

I had a good look at both the DC-9 and the A340 that had come to rest in the ravine.

My suspicion remains that EMAS would reduce takeoff weight because of reduced runway length.

Just before AF overran I was watching Buffalo weather radar as a line of cells propagated down the Bruce Peninsula down to YYC and my office in Port Credit.

Traffic came to a stop on the expressway under a downburst.

AF might have gotten across its downburst, but I seriously doubt it would have made it through the tailwinds on the other side.
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Old 3rd May 2015, 10:35
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Slast, a few questions if I may : you said earlier that none of the AC 320s are GPS equipped, meaning they are not RNP/RNAV capable right ?
So the vertical nav on that APP as purely visual , right ?
Do the AC A320s have HUDs ?
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Old 3rd May 2015, 13:42
  #306 (permalink)  
 
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I think your message should be addressed to SCUD, not me - although I was A320 qualified, I am not current and not Air Canada. If SCUD answers I would also be interested to know what crew callouts would have been are required on this approach.
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Old 3rd May 2015, 14:03
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ATC watcher
That approach in YHZ would be flown as a "coupled/selected" approach. Coupled to, and tracking the LOC , descending to FAF altitude before the FAF. When in ALT *star*, capturing the FAF crossing altitude, the PF selects FPA of zero, and winds up the altitude selection to MA altitude.. Then at .3 before the FAF he selects the desired FPA or flight path angle and the aircraft will start descending as it passes the FAF.
Now the aircraft is descending at that FPA.
At MDA (no +50 feet required now?) the aircraft should be in a stable, landing configuration to continue the landing if visual..disconnect the autopilot and land

So I wouldn't call it a "visual" approach except below MDA. Don't really understand your question.
No HUD on the AC A-320s, just the 787 to my knowledge..but I am retired now

Last edited by Retired DC9 driver; 3rd May 2015 at 16:44.
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Old 3rd May 2015, 15:12
  #308 (permalink)  
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Slast and Scud

Ooops, Slast, sorry , indeed the questions were for Scud , your 2 posts ( 297 and 298) were clsoe to one another and I mixed up.

Retired DC9 : thanks, I am trying to understand how they were conducting that APP (as I suppose AC flying to Halifax and using that runway would be rather common )
HUDs: some old A320s were equipped with HUDs (an option, Air inter in France had them if I remember correctly ) I was asking if some of AC 320s have the option.
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Old 3rd May 2015, 15:39
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ATC watcher,,,
Re HUDs; I corrected my post..

Note for peekay4, just so all understand this exemption,
regarding the "descent below MDA" on a non precision approach. CARs says later in the document
"This exemption is required in order to accommodate the altitude loss below MDA that will likely occur during a missed approach, following a stabilized constant descent angle (SCDA) non-precision approach".

so you could descend below MDA still in IMC conditions under this exemption, but only during the execution of a Go Around..In the past, the 50 foot "buffer" would ensure, that even during a GA in IMC,the aircraft would never descend below MDA.

Last edited by Retired DC9 driver; 3rd May 2015 at 16:42.
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Old 3rd May 2015, 18:30
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Re “I wondered if anything changed in training after that’, #303 (also #297, #300)
It might be better to consider if we could have expected any change in training.
While investigators and regulators continue to spout a ‘need for more training to improve decision making, judgement, etc’, but fail to provide guidance as to what and how should be trained, the industry is left to its own ideas.
This should not be surprising as there are few accident/incident reports which identify specific aspects of decision making – to continue or discontinue an approach – that have weaknesses and might be addressed by training.

At the time of deciding all decisions are good (valid), as judged by the decision maker; only subsequent events might classify the decision – good, less-so, poor, ‘wrong’, but all of this is in hindsight, and based on the judgement of the reviewer.
A significant problem in low visibility approaches is determining what the decision maker actually sees – perceives, and then how this is used, which may depend on training and experience. This point identifies a weakness in safety thinking, such that even if the decision maker is a highly trained / experienced pilot, the perception of an ‘incorrect picture’ can result in choosing an inappropriate action. We cannot assume that training and experience will always provide adequate perception and thus accident avoidance.
Vice-versa an inexperience pilot, perceiving a ‘correct picture’, can equally choose an appropriate course of action based on minimum training and experience.

The industry should heed the thoughts of James Reason where improving human performance – training, etc, is difficult and cannot be assured to be used in every situation. Solutions offering greater safety benefit can come from improvements in working conditions – the wider working environment, and protecting humans from their own fragility.
In low visibility this could be improving what might be seen, to perceive the visual scene (approach accuracy, guidance and autos, approach lighting), and/or ensure that pilots are not exposed to conditions where a decision could be unacceptably wrong (revise the approach minima). The point about ‘acceptability’ considers that the decision process is continuous and that choices of action can be changed, and even poor decisions are not necessarily ‘unsafe’, because the risks are contained.

The industry should stop trying to improve the human. Instead look at the working environment and pressures of operation; reconsider the assumptions made about operations, how operations, infrastructure and equipment have changed since regulations were formulated and minima published.
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Old 7th May 2015, 17:39
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Retired DC9 knows the scoop. At AC on a NPA you still add 50 feet to MDA. Everything else he wrote is bang on.
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Old 16th Jun 2015, 20:30
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16 June 2015 - Aviation news release - Transportation Safety Board of Canada

News release


Ground contact prior to runway threshold of Air Canada Flight 624 during approach to Halifax Stanfield International Airport (A15H0002)

The occurrence

On 29 March 2015, an Air Canada Airbus A320-200 aircraft (registration C-FTJP, serial number 233), was being operated as Flight AC624 from Toronto, Ontario, to Halifax, Nova Scotia, with 133 passengers and 5 crew on board.

The aircraft was flying the localizer approach procedure to land on Runway 05 at the Halifax Stanfield International Airport. A localizer approach only provides pilots with lateral guidance to align the aircraft with the runway for landing. During the approach, the engines of the aircraft severed power transmission lines, and then the main landing gear and rear fuselage impacted the snow-covered ground about 225 metres before the runway threshold. The aircraft continued through a localizer antenna, then impacted the ground in a nose down attitude, about 70 metres before the threshold. It then bounced and slid along the runway, coming to rest on the left side of the runway about 570 metres beyond the threshold.

The passengers and crew evacuated the aircraft; 25 people sustained injuries and were taken to local hospitals. The aircraft was substantially damaged. There was no post-crash fire.

Investigation team work

The Investigator-in-charge, Doug McEwen, is assisted in this investigation by TSB investigators with backgrounds in flight operations, aircraft performance, aircraft systems, aircraft engines, human performance, and air traffic control. Representatives from Air Canada, Airbus, NAV CANADA, Transport Canada, France’s BEA (Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses pour la sécurité de l'aviation civile), the RCMP, Halifax International Airport Authority, and the Halifax Regional Police department are also providing assistance.

Work to date

A large number of technical and operational documents, weather reports, air traffic control communications, and incident reports have been gathered and are being reviewed by investigation team members. Numerous interviews have been conducted with passengers and individuals from various organizations.

The flight data recorder (FDR) and cockpit voice recorder (CVR) have been examined. With assistance from external specialists, the TSB has retrieved information from the aircraft's Digital Access Recorder, which records additional flight and aircraft parameters. Further analysis of this recorded data will be conducted.

What we know

Weather

Prior to landing, the crew received an updated weather report at 12:15 am Atlantic Time which included: windspeed 20 knots gusting to 26 knots from the north north west; 350° true; with a forward visibility of ½ statute mile in snow and blowing snow. The vertical visibility was 300 feet above the ground, temperature of minus 6°C, dewpoint minus 7°C, and altimeter setting of 29.63 inches of mercury.

The aircraft

Preliminary examination of the FDR indicates the aircraft was correctly configured for landing, the airspeed was consistent with a normal approach speed, and the altimeters were set to 29.63 inches of mercury. No mechanical deficiencies were identified with the aircraft's engines, flight controls, landing gear and navigation systems. During the review of the aircraft's maintenance records, no discrepancies were noted. Approximately 4900 litres of fuel was recovered from the aircraft.

Post-impact damage

The forward right and both rear exits were not used during the evacuation. No discrepancies were noted during the initial examination of these exits. Examination of the aircraft revealed that the right side cabin floor in seat rows 31 and 33, and the floor adjacent to the flight attendant fold-down seat near the rear of the cabin were punctured from below by aircraft structure. No pieces of the localizer antenna structure penetrated the cockpit.

Next steps

Work will include:
•Recreating the accident flight profile as closely as possible to add to the understanding of the challenges encountered by the pilots of AC624.
•Completing a detailed site survey illustration, examining relevant aircraft components and developing an animation of the aircraft's flight profile.
•Evaluating pilot training and experience, human performance aspects, crew resource management, industry standards and company operating procedures.
•Reviewing flight attendant training and experience as well as company procedures and regulatory requirements.
•Examining survivability issues such as cabin and cockpit crashworthiness, passenger evacuation, and airport emergency response.
•Reviewing non-precision localizer approaches utilizing a stabilized constant descent angle.
•Conducting additional interviews as required.
•Ongoing examination of aircraft structural damage.

Approach-and-landing accidents

The TSB Watchlist identifes approach-and-landing accidents as one issue which poses the greatest risk to Canada's transportation system. These accidents include runway overruns, runway excursions, landings short of the runway, and tail strikes. The TSB has called on operators, regulators, and air navigation service providers need to take more action to prevent approach-and-landing accidents, and to minimize the risks of adverse consequences if a runway overrun occurs.

Communication of safety deficiencies

Should the investigation team uncover a safety deficiency that represents an immediate risk to aviation, the Board will communicate without delay so it may be addressed quickly and the aviation system made safer.

The information posted is factual in nature and does not contain any analysis. Analysis of the accident and the Findings of the Board will be part of the final report. The investigation is ongoing.


The TSB is an independent agency that investigates marine, pipeline, railway and aviation transportation occurrences. Its sole aim is the advancement of transportation safety. It is not the function of the Board to assign fault or determine civil or criminal liability.

For more information, contact:
Transportation Safety Board of Canada
Media Relations
Telephone: 819-994-8053
Email: [email protected]
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Old 17th Jun 2015, 14:50
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If this happened in Taiwan

the FDR data would have been released by now
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Old 18th Jun 2015, 09:23
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approach ban?

Weather

Prior to landing, the crew received an updated weather report at 12:15 am Atlantic Time which included...a forward visibility of ½ statute mile in snow and blowing snow.
See as the visibility on the approach plate is 1 mile for all categories (loc dme rwy 05), and the pilots were given 1/2 mile, do airlines in Canada have any sort of approach ban based on visibility?
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Old 18th Jun 2015, 09:39
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"Rather be Flying," that must have been some system to cover from Calgary VOR to the Bruce penilsular!
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Old 18th Jun 2015, 11:49
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Hawk 31, See post #231

http://www.pprune.org/8933482-post231.html
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Old 30th Sep 2015, 15:34
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New TSB photos show AC 624 interior damage.

Article: CBC News | Nova Scotia





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Old 30th Sep 2015, 17:11
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About a month later was the Asiana A320 accident at Hiroshima.

Also touching down short.

Asiana A320 Skids After Landing at Hiroshima, Japan; 23 Hurt - NBC News

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Old 7th Oct 2015, 16:48
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Spot on! I'm sure Air Canada follows Airbus recommendations like most carriers do. Below MDH you have to be visual and on profile to continue the descent to land - otherwise a Go-Around is mandatory.
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Old 29th Mar 2016, 21:56
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One year ago today:

One year later: AC624 passengers still recovering from Halifax crash landing | Globalnews.ca

Still no TSB report on this "hard landing"...
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