Airbus A320 crashed in Southern France
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According to the official report, the same crew landed in Barcelona at 7 h 57. The takeoff from Barcelona took place at 9 h 00. Barely 1 hour for ground operation. Pretty tight.
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I can't believe what I'm reading here.
Some argue about the toilet leaving of the captain. Wake up guys, he is human being, reason or not, leaving for toilet is a personnal problem. What do you want ? that pilots have to be chained on their seat ?
Maybe some of you are uneducated and only get an atpl, but come on. It is nonsense to argue about it. Don't cut off the branch you're sitting on !
Some argue about the toilet leaving of the captain. Wake up guys, he is human being, reason or not, leaving for toilet is a personnal problem. What do you want ? that pilots have to be chained on their seat ?
Maybe some of you are uneducated and only get an atpl, but come on. It is nonsense to argue about it. Don't cut off the branch you're sitting on !
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According to the prelim and its' description of the GWI access system, the door could have been opened by the Captain using a 3-digit (+#) "emergency" code. It would seem that it would not be possible to attempt to do so after the initial 1-digit "access request" had been refused
as this would make the keypad inoperative until approx 9:39.31 (approx 90 seconds before impact).
In the BEA sequence of events, at no time is this "emergency unlock" procedure imlemented, only "buzzing" of the 1-digit access request, use of the cabin intercomm and shouting/knocking on the door (plus some banging that could have been attempts at physical acccess).
Whilst they don't address it specifically, the suggestion of the report is that (in the case of the system in use on GWI) such an attempt could have been blocked by the co-pilot anyway
but there is no mention of any such attempt being made - perhaps not surprisingly, given the circumstances and the events of the intervening 5 minutes.
Clearly there are good reasons for the systems that are in place, but, as they highlight, such procedures inevitably introduce an element of compromise and risk.
"Any interaction with the keypad is then disabled for 5 minutes".
In the BEA sequence of events, at no time is this "emergency unlock" procedure imlemented, only "buzzing" of the 1-digit access request, use of the cabin intercomm and shouting/knocking on the door (plus some banging that could have been attempts at physical acccess).
Whilst they don't address it specifically, the suggestion of the report is that (in the case of the system in use on GWI) such an attempt could have been blocked by the co-pilot anyway
"If the flight crew toggles the switch during those 15 seconds, the acoustic signal stops and the system reacts according to the command (UNLOCK/LOCK)."
Clearly there are good reasons for the systems that are in place, but, as they highlight, such procedures inevitably introduce an element of compromise and risk.
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NW
I think it pretty safe to assume that numerous attempts at Emergency Access were made, or not bothered with due indications in the cabin.
Agree, when you run through the scenario toe door was designed for - a well equipped determined team in the cabin seeking access to the Flt Deck. The Flt Crew are having to deal with the situation, divert, ATC / Security agencies are going bananas launching fighters - they need a simple drill to at least ensure Flt Deck access will not be achieved.
I am not as confident as some the scenario is now "dead in the water", and the Pax will solve the issue and "take out the terrorists". A low pax load and a well rehearsed team - and the baddies want the aircraft as a weapon, and are not worried about the pax numbers they take with them.
The BEA and authorities various will have to balance the security and political risks and decide if there will be changes. My personal guess is they will not - nobody will want to be the ones that allow the next 9/11 - but I could well be wrong. They took no notice of the suicide risk prior GW, despite it being clear... there will just be a supposed tightening up of medicals and hope it does not happen again
I think it pretty safe to assume that numerous attempts at Emergency Access were made, or not bothered with due indications in the cabin.
Clearly there are good reasons for the systems that are in place, but, as they highlight, such procedures inevitably introduce an element of compromise and risk.
I am not as confident as some the scenario is now "dead in the water", and the Pax will solve the issue and "take out the terrorists". A low pax load and a well rehearsed team - and the baddies want the aircraft as a weapon, and are not worried about the pax numbers they take with them.
The BEA and authorities various will have to balance the security and political risks and decide if there will be changes. My personal guess is they will not - nobody will want to be the ones that allow the next 9/11 - but I could well be wrong. They took no notice of the suicide risk prior GW, despite it being clear... there will just be a supposed tightening up of medicals and hope it does not happen again
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Anyone object to us having the door to the loo on f/d? CC will have to use the ones at the back.
Then we only need to leave the f/d to look at the engines and reset the breaker for the toilets! which will reduce the burden on CC time to sit in the jump seat.
Then we only need to leave the f/d to look at the engines and reset the breaker for the toilets! which will reduce the burden on CC time to sit in the jump seat.
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An observation from the BEA preliminary report pages 22-23
From the previous DUS-BCN flight, aircraft level at 37000ft, captain leaves cockpit, seconds later ATC cleared them firstly to 35000ft and then circa 40 seconds later to 21000ft.
Lots of manipulation of target altitude to to 100ft etc during the time the captain wasn't in the cockpit, but when the captain returned to the cockpit four minutes later the target altitude selected was 25000ft and not 21000ft
ATC expecting 21000ft within an unstated time frame, but in the absence of terrain clearance issues would there be any reason not to set the desired altitude at anything other than 21000?
No indication of if this setting issue was resolved by subsequent communications and actions by the flight crew and if it raised any queries.
From the previous DUS-BCN flight, aircraft level at 37000ft, captain leaves cockpit, seconds later ATC cleared them firstly to 35000ft and then circa 40 seconds later to 21000ft.
Lots of manipulation of target altitude to to 100ft etc during the time the captain wasn't in the cockpit, but when the captain returned to the cockpit four minutes later the target altitude selected was 25000ft and not 21000ft
ATC expecting 21000ft within an unstated time frame, but in the absence of terrain clearance issues would there be any reason not to set the desired altitude at anything other than 21000?
No indication of if this setting issue was resolved by subsequent communications and actions by the flight crew and if it raised any queries.
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Originally Posted by NigelOnDraft
(...) Nobody will want to be the ones that allow the next 9/11. (...) They took no notice of the suicide risk prior GW, despite it being clear... there will just be a supposed tightening up of medicals and hope it does not happen again.
Nobody wants to be the ones who allow the next GW either.
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Of course, nothing will ever be able to stop a determined, skilled individual that is trusted with the operation of an aircraft from crashing it, no matter who is in the cockpit at the time.
EgyptAir 990 proved that.
EgyptAir 990 proved that.
In this case even if a CC person were on the flight deck what are the chances of them realizing what was happening in time to prevent this. I understand that she/he could have possibly let the captain back on to the flight deck but based on what has been reported it would seem that the alarm was raised only after the captain could not regain entry.
As has already been pointed out its all pretty moot anyway considering that if either of the two people at the front decide to end it there is not a lot that the other pilot, CC or SLF can do. Like anybody in control of people carrying transport the public places trust in the individual/s at the pointy end.
It's the trust in the system (and fellow workers) that allowed this individual to be in his position that I suggest should be questioned.
And no I don't have the answers for that.
As has already been pointed out its all pretty moot anyway considering that if either of the two people at the front decide to end it there is not a lot that the other pilot, CC or SLF can do. Like anybody in control of people carrying transport the public places trust in the individual/s at the pointy end.
It's the trust in the system (and fellow workers) that allowed this individual to be in his position that I suggest should be questioned.
And no I don't have the answers for that.
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The remains of all 150 victims of the Germanwings plane crash in the French Alps will be turned over to their families for burial now that investigators have completed the process of identifying them.Marseille Prosecutor Brice Robin said Tuesday that death certificates for everyone aboard the doomed Airbus A320 jet have been signed and turned over to officials at German airline Lufthansa, parent company of the low-cost airline.
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EASA releases Task Force report
European Commission - PRESS RELEASES - Press release - European Aviation: Commission releases Task Force's report on Germanwings incident
The Task Force recommendations are:
- The principle of 'two persons in the cockpit at all time' should be maintained.
- Pilots should undergo a psychological evaluation before entering airline service.
- Airlines should run a random drugs and alcohol programme.
- Robust programme for oversight of aeromedical examiners should be established.
- A European aeromedical data repository should be created.
- Pilot support systems should be implemented within airlines.
Next steps:
The Commission will review the recommendations, taking into account advice received from other sources such as the independent accident investigation led by the French Civil Aviation Safety Investigation Authority (Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses (BEA)). Where legislative action is to be taken, EASA will be requested to develop concrete proposals, which will then be included in EU aviation safety regulations. EASA will also be asked to produce non-legislative deliverables such as guidance material and practical tools for information sharing, and to monitor actions taken by Member States and industry.
The Task Force recommendations are:
- The principle of 'two persons in the cockpit at all time' should be maintained.
- Pilots should undergo a psychological evaluation before entering airline service.
- Airlines should run a random drugs and alcohol programme.
- Robust programme for oversight of aeromedical examiners should be established.
- A European aeromedical data repository should be created.
- Pilot support systems should be implemented within airlines.
Next steps:
The Commission will review the recommendations, taking into account advice received from other sources such as the independent accident investigation led by the French Civil Aviation Safety Investigation Authority (Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses (BEA)). Where legislative action is to be taken, EASA will be requested to develop concrete proposals, which will then be included in EU aviation safety regulations. EASA will also be asked to produce non-legislative deliverables such as guidance material and practical tools for information sharing, and to monitor actions taken by Member States and industry.
Once again EASA task force ignoring the problem completely and making recommendations to satisfy the public ie: recommending the politicians solution.
How about a look at how pilots are treated, the ever reducing TC's and the struggle to survive under a mountain of debt, changing contracts and applying FTL's as targets rather than limits.
Physiological evaluations can be beaten/manipulated at first hire interviews and as people get fed up as their life circumstances change or work pressure builds up, the desire to do the undesirable may come at random times after the initial psych evaluation.
How about a look at how pilots are treated, the ever reducing TC's and the struggle to survive under a mountain of debt, changing contracts and applying FTL's as targets rather than limits.
Physiological evaluations can be beaten/manipulated at first hire interviews and as people get fed up as their life circumstances change or work pressure builds up, the desire to do the undesirable may come at random times after the initial psych evaluation.
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Totally agree,the E.C. is completely missing the point in this,was he drunk or on drugs…no,he probably knew the chop was coming and was having a breakdown as a result.His actions were abhorrent but let's not deflect the real issues with bull**** recommendations in the hope that it will all go away.
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The Task Force recommendations are:
- The principle of 'two persons in the cockpit at all time' should be maintained.
- Pilots should undergo a psychological evaluation before entering airline service.
- Airlines should run a random drugs and alcohol programme.
- Robust programme for oversight of aeromedical examiners should be established.
- A European aeromedical data repository should be created.
- Pilot support systems should be implemented within airlines.
- The principle of 'two persons in the cockpit at all time' should be maintained.
- Pilots should undergo a psychological evaluation before entering airline service.
- Airlines should run a random drugs and alcohol programme.
- Robust programme for oversight of aeromedical examiners should be established.
- A European aeromedical data repository should be created.
- Pilot support systems should be implemented within airlines.
The psych eval (remember the Drs. Janus and the rocking chair at Delta?) had gone away at many American carriers for a while but has returned in online form in recent hiring.
The head U.S. Department of Transportation doc has wanted yearly pscyh evals for pilots for some time now and he may get it after the Germanwings 'incident'.
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The big picture
Banks, multinationals, corrupt governments, big airlines are run by psychopaths on behalf of their shareholders.
A crew of an airliner flies a plane, these aforementioned individuals fly around with billions, thousands of employees, whole countries.
What about psychological screening for those that run these bodies?
Where is IFALPA?
What about non European airlines flying into Europe?
Is EASA going to do anything about them?
A crew of an airliner flies a plane, these aforementioned individuals fly around with billions, thousands of employees, whole countries.
What about psychological screening for those that run these bodies?
Where is IFALPA?
What about non European airlines flying into Europe?
Is EASA going to do anything about them?
Last edited by Pitch Up Authority; 18th Jul 2015 at 13:09. Reason: typo
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What about non European airlines flying into Europe?
Is EASA going to do anything about them?
True. With EU airlines able to sub-charter their flights to cheaper operatives, albeit for short term, EASA rules may not apply to all EU flights with EU nationals as pax. The same will be true for non-EU airlines operating in/out of EU. In the latter case EASA may put their head in the and and say the pax have a choice; in the former the pax may not even know until they board the a/c. Knee jerk reactions often cause many more problems than they solve. e.g. 100ml bottles of liquid in hand luggage. Totally BS useless.
Is EASA going to do anything about them?
True. With EU airlines able to sub-charter their flights to cheaper operatives, albeit for short term, EASA rules may not apply to all EU flights with EU nationals as pax. The same will be true for non-EU airlines operating in/out of EU. In the latter case EASA may put their head in the and and say the pax have a choice; in the former the pax may not even know until they board the a/c. Knee jerk reactions often cause many more problems than they solve. e.g. 100ml bottles of liquid in hand luggage. Totally BS useless.
