Airbus A320 crashed in Southern France

[mcloaked]

Sky news carrying the same story:

Black Box Data Confirms Crash Was Deliberate

Also indications of speed changes in the report at: http://www.thelocal.fr/20150403/seco...d-deliberately

With a few more pictures of the FDR at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...iberately.html

[NorthernKestrel]

Good read on the RAeS Insight blog on this incident. Particularly the part about the 'cultural prism' and previous murder-suicides.


Royal Aeronautical Society | Insight Blog | Germanwings - the final frontier of aviation safety

[sky9]

The solution is to move the cockpit door to the other side of the toilet to provide a FD exclusive washroom and bring back 3 crew on the FD, the current FTL'S require it.

[INeedTheFull90]

Gotta love the way we do things in Europe. In SE Asia we have lost an A320 and very little has been released. In Canada an A320 is ruined and many won't even admit to it being an accident. Open, honest and quick is always the best!

[timmermc]

It is poor translation into English, its 'the pilot changed the autopilot setting to increase the speed of the plane descending'

[toffeez]

Translation

You can be sure the BEA's official translation will be out soon, on their site. By the way I find their English versions to be very professionally done. They take the time to get it right (hint to everyone of the Twitter generation who thinks that instant hot air blabbing is more important than accuracy)

[somethingclever]

There is only one solution

Over 3000 posts and just a precious few scratching the surface for a real world solution. Instead we get same nonsense responses all over again. First, the revenge squad who take pride in their old testament-style craving for easy answers in their black and white world. The "this guy was a mass murdering psychopath, case closed"-brigade. It's a completely meaningless attitude to bring to the table and effectively what it means is that you are happy for the next incident which will be coming down the line. It will be a simple matter of time. All you are doing is scrubbing out the number on the "X days since last murdercide" sign and going off to lunch.

Then the technobabbling nerds who think the door mechanism has anything to do with it. It doesn't. At all. For one simple reason. You can not invent away lack of trust. You either trust your pilots or you do not.

After that come the home grown lawyers with more paragraphs in the works for us. Some more pages to read, documents to sign to somehow magically prevent or reveal mental problems. How is this ever going to work? Forcing people to feel good? Forcing people to admit being unfit to fly? You don't think a person with mental issues will be able to con his way over such hurdles? In a heartbeat buddy. Tougher checks during training, that will do the trick, right? Tougher checks during medicals, while at work, while at home. Force pilots to sign a paper every turn-around declaring their mental fitness. All these things simply ADD MORE PRESSURE. Once again, you either trust your pilots, or you do not. And so what if you have all these fine checks to keep the people with problems out. You can have problems at any point during your career, and in fact you probably will. Especially now that the industry has abandoned every pretence of safety over profit and is clamping down on everything from sick leave to fuel burn. It's an intentionally sick industry choosing money over stability and it works until it doesn't work anymore. Captain America with grey temples and 30000 hrs can snap. You may not like to think so, but he can. You can. Because, gasp, you are HUMAN. The industry specifically and society in general would do well to accept that reality. We are reverse engineering our lives. We decide what's best for the bottom line and work backwards to see how the people need to act and feel for that to come true. It's a bad idea in general and a down right lethal recipe in aviation.

The only way, period, is to have crew you can trust. To get that, you need crew that trust you, the company and the only way to get that is to have a non-punitive and inviting reporting system that is backed by an absolutely rock solid support system. A system that is designed with the expressed goal of getting you diagnosed, treated and returned to service. That is trust on a human level. You can always come to us and express your concerns and feelings. We will listen and we will help. Our team is standing by for your benefit whatever the problem may be. We will not turn our backs and we will not kick you out.

But today we don't have that. Today we have bean counters and lawyers on one side, and faceless employee numbers on the other. If you report mental problems they will say "ah, looks like 342323 is broken, let's go ahead and remove that one from the production line. Bring in 342324 please." Mental illness needs to be treated like any other problem, instead of this fearful stigmatisation that never seems to let up. Not a single LOL-insurance that I'm aware of is valid for mental problems. If you lose your medical due to depression, you get nothing. How can anyone in their right mind claim that aviation is safety-focused? Safety, money permitting maybe. Safety, time permitting maybe. Until the industry backs off again and implements a human-centric approach to operations, problems will keep getting worse. Until the industry encourages employees to come in and get effective treatment, we are simply waiting for the next incident.

[anengineer]

Sky9 said:

The solution is to move the cockpit door to the other side of the toilet to provide a FD exclusive washroom and bring back 3 crew on the FD, the current FTL'S require it.

Absolutely. Maybe not as far as 3 crew, but moving the door will finally separate pax from the flightdeck and stop the pilots being separated from each other.

[NigelOnDraft]

Hi Triskel

Would it be more reasonable to lock in the autopilot whenever one of the pilots leaves his seat? My lawn tractor has a pressure switch in the seat which turns off the engine when vacated - a similar switch in pilots' seats could lock into A/P (maintaining current settings) whenever either seat is vacated - of course pilots would have to choose when to leave i.e. no likely imminent change of course/altitude, but I guess most do anyway?

I'm afraid that solution is about as sensible as mandating that when one pilot leaves the cockpit, the other must do so also

Frequently when I leave the Flt Deck, my colleague is required to speak to ATC, alter heading, navigation and FL - and primarily of course, be ready and able to react to any abnormal situation appropriately. And this is a flaw in the "2 in cockpit rule" - prior GW their role could be seen as in case of incapacitation and/or door operative. Post GW, unless and until it is clearly stated, people (including Cabin Crew) will see the role to "monitor" the remaining pilot, and be consulted over such actions.

Hence whilst I am not necessarily against a "2 in cockpit" rule, with it's implementation the role of said person needs to be very clearly laid out. You only have to read the last X million posts on this thread to see that role has been given many different purposes.

Prior to a pilot under training being assessed as competent to handle the above tasks by themselves, a 3rd (Safety) pilot is carried. What some posters above seem to be advocating with the "2 in cockpit" rule is removing that ability from all pilots - if that is the case, then the rule needs to be "2 pilots in the cockpit at all time", which effectively equates to 3 Flt Crew aircraft. Fine by me

[GlueBall]

xollop . . .

Still don't understand the drip feed of data approach....

What's your solution to internet news portals in a world where news is everywhere instantly? Sit on the data for a week, for a month, before talking about it? Is the CVR audio in doubt? Is CVR audio less factual today than it would be a month from now? Is the FDR data in doubt? Is the FDR data inconclusive about altitude & speed changes initiated by someone in the cockpit?

[Good Business Sense]

Think everyone forgets the aircraft hijacked on 9/11 operated with locked cockpit doors.

[GlueBall]

xollob ...BEA (Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses pour la sécurité de l'aviation civile) has a secondary role to assist the prosecutor in technical matters, as it was established to be a criminal act. Thus, primary jurisdiction is with the French prosecutor's office, which is not subject to ICAO protocols.

[G-CPTN]

Andreas Lubitz modified the automatic pilot system several times to increase the speed of descent.
"the pilot in the cockpit used the automatic pilot to put the airplane on a descent towards an altitude of 100ft (30m)"
"Then several times the pilot modified the automatic pilot settings to increase the speed of the airplane as it descended," it added.

Germanwings also said it was unaware that Lubitz, 27, had experienced depression while he was training to be a pilot.
Lufthansa confirmed on Tuesday that it knew six years ago that the co-pilot had suffered from an episode of "severe depression'' before he finished his flight training.
"We didn't know this,'' said Vanessa Torres, a spokeswoman for Lufthansa subsidiary Germanwings, which hired Lubitz in September 2013.

From (and more at):- Germanwings crash: Co-pilot Lubitz 'accelerated descent' - BBC News

[Pace]

RexBanner

But neither was a completely insane FO under the personal invitation of the captain? a sane one yes and that is obviously what this poor captain thought he had. That is the worrying thing if he didn't doubt him how would anyone else?

[RexBanner]

The hijackers on 9/11 took advantage of a window of opportunity that was only available up until 09:37 on Tuesday September 11th 2001 (the moment the Pentagon was hit). From then on it was apparent to the passengers on United Flight 93 and the rest of the entire world that the classic hijack scenario had ended and the tactics had now radically changed.

No aircraft that has been hijacked since will have its passengers meekly sit subserviently as they fly to their doom. Likewise air forces on the ground will prevent any aircraft getting near built up areas.

It is also highly probable that had the US Government actually been paying attention to the threat posed (they had numerous warnings from Mossad and German intelligence amongst others) and the CIA and FBI had been sharing their information, they would have apprehended Atta and the others before they got anywhere near commercial aircraft that morning.

[G-CPTN]

No aircraft that has been hijacked since will have its passengers meekly sit subserviently as they fly to their doom.

But they are now unable to gain access to the Flight Deck - so they can do no more than the passengers on the Germanwings flight were able to do . . .

Likewise air forces on the ground will prevent any aircraft getting near built up areas.

Though eight minutes doesn't seem enough time to react and respond - was there any evidence that the Germanwings flight was being intercepted?

I agree that there was no built-up area near by, but if the FO had maintained altitude there would have been no trigger for ATC to decide on action.
Could the Captain have contacted 'base' from outside the FD?

[RexBanner]

G-CPTN Read between the lines. That is my EXACT point. The flaw is in the cockpit door to start with and our entire approach to security and counter terrorism.

[GXER]

@NoD, Pace and others who object to the "two in the cockpit" principle.

None of the stated objections have real substance or come close to outweighing the immediate and real benefit of ensuring that a single pilot cannot easily exclude the second pilot from the cockpit without overpowering that pilot or at least one other crew member. Dealing with those stated below -

Typically with 2 pilots on the Flt Deck, not one.

Are you saying there is a RULE that CC cannot enter the cockpit unless both FD crew are present?

Even if that was the case, which I doubt, the risk of a rogue CC overpowering the single pilot is hardly more significant than the risk that a CC will conspire to allow a hijacker or terrorist to enter the flight deck when delivering refreshments to the FD crew.

Exactly - the CC now knows they will get access to the Flt Deck, they know there will only be one pilot with them, strapped in, and they know they can override the Capt's command and controls to allow anyone access to the Flt Deck.

As above. If there is a rogue CC, the risk exists anyway and is hardly increased by the need for an occasional extra visit to the FD to guard the door.

And with a guarantee they can override anybody else in order to do so.

There is always a risk that CC will refuse to obey the captain's instructions. This risk is not increased.

Yes it is - a PR stunt, and if you actually read the EASA/CAA recommendation, you will see the "2 in the Flt Deck" recommendation was only after a review of the risk assessment, and as part of that risk assessment. Some airlines managed, and announced that review conveniently for TV deadlines rather than safety IMO.

Honestly I am dismayed by what I have been reading. Your profession is facing a crisis of confidence and all you seem to have to say is "the risk of rogue pilots is tiny, no need to worry or take additional precautions". Well hello. Lubitz (and some others before) proved that the risk is real and exists NOW. True it has done for years but that is NO reason not to take NOW, immediate, simple, and virtually zero cost steps to reduce the risk.

More may be needed, which may take more thought and time, but this CAN be done, SHOULD be done and I am pleased that some carriers and regulatory authorities have faced up to that and taken steps to make sure it is done.

Waiting for a better long-term solution, if there is one (which is far from certain), is foolish and reckless.

[Pace]

In my world of corporate jet flying we fly with the same pool of pilots who normally become friends. We even meet up for a night out
We spend longer periods away together than the quick turnaround low cost carriers and will tend to know each others problems and usually discuss those problems with each other and yes pilots have problems like anyone else.

You can keep things hidden for a short time to someone you don't know but you cannot do that with someone you know very well.

Maybe rostering crews not to always fly together but to fly more together might part help. The fact that you get crews who have never clapped eyes on each other before the flight might not be a positive thing.

Crews used to be a unit years ago, there were benefits to that as well as negatives

But if Lubitz was devoid of any external emotions so that no one would notice then he was a very dangerous and thankfully rare character

[NigelOnDraft]

I should think that CC are sufficiently qualified to open the door to let the other pilot back in

Please confirm that you would "empower" the CC in this scenario to override the specific verbal instructions of the Captain?

If that had been done on this flight, then the outcome may have been different

It almost certainly would have, but then it would not have been planned in this way. You cannot look at one accident in isolation - you need to design a "system" to provide the minimum overall risk.

"Mentally ill pilot crashes aircraft and kills all on board". How best to address? Prevent the situation in the 1st place, or accept it as fact, and devise solutions that not only allow the mentally ill pilot to still achieve their aims, but opens up a whole range of new hazards.

PS I assume you do know the rules (or lack of) re CC operating with depression / mental illness / associated drugs, their medical checks (nil) etc.?