Airbus A320 crashed in Southern France

[Vinnie Boombatz]

Two Person Rules

@IBMJunkman, 2 Apr 2015 at 09:17:

A good deal of what used to be human operations has been automated, but the two man and two officer rules did work for a number of years.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Two-man_rule

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Permissive_Action_Link

Like electronic countermeasures and electronic counter-countermeasures and their extensions, or cryptography and code-breaking, you never design an infallible system. You just keep working at it.

And as so many commenters have noted, knee-jerk reactions aren't the most productive method.

[peekay4]

no-hoper:

What the microphones are recording...

Post #2985 was nearly correct,but refering to the CAA rules.

Page 16 and 17 showing clearly the difference FAA/CAA;

ACARS ARCHITECTURE - Description and Operation - System Description_°Ù¶ÈÎÄ¿â

That looks to be an old document. Current FAA regs also require hot mics for the flight crew microphones.

[TheInquisitor]

The Inquisator/EPPO

I think fully automated aircraft are technically within our reach. I think they would face two major obstacles. One, development and implementation cost, and two public acceptance.

I must respectfully disagree with you on one point - and agree with you on another.

We are not even remotely close to technically replicating what a human pilot can bring to the game. There are those within my industry that would agree with you - but they, by and large, are the ones who work behind desks & computers and rely on numbers, theory, postulation and the 'art of the possible' - and almost to a man, have no actual operational experience of "Zero POB". Those of us who do know how it works in the real world, know the practical limitations of such things, as we have dealt with them in real life day-to-day.

Where we are in agreement is on cost. To design, build, test, certify and put into service just a remotely piloted airliner (not 'autonomous', which is technically well beyond our reach, and not even being discussed in regulatory circles) will be EXPONENTIALLY more costly than a traditional, manned, 2-pilot Flight Deck.

And that's before you even take into account the running costs of such things, which will require everything a manned airliner currently has, and IN ADDITON - reliable, assured, certified, broadband datalinks, and fully qualified and competent HUMAN pilots sitting in a GCS on the ground somewhere. The costs of the datalinks alone are eye-watering.

When a certain loudmouthed airline CEO gets around to doing his homework and sums (as the rest will eventually do) they will realise that the unmanned option for passenger transport simply isn't:

A) Technically possible at present, nor will it ever likely be; AND,

B) Exponentially more expensive, and therefore not commercially viable.

[nsmith]

Lufthansa states that only around 2% of those that pass the whole selection process fail during flight training and have to be let go. Those figures seem to be consistent for the last 30 or 40 years.

There is something about that statistic I really do not like. It might tell us how good the selection filter is, but it might also be telling us how doggedly they hold to their initial, possibly incorrect, assessments. That nothing has changed over the last 30-40 years I also find quite troubling.

[WingNut60]

Sound of breating

Gouli, I think the disbelief probably originates from people thinking that because they can not hear the breathing through the headphones that the mic is not picking it up.

Two very different concepts.

A little bit of filtering and amplification would surely give you the breathing.

[klintE]

Originally Posted by Pace

The cause of this crash was the inability of the Captain to enter the flight deck and to recover a situation caused by a very mentally sick FO its as simple as that!!

Disagree. Remember crash of EgytpAir flight 990? Cockpit door was unlocked, suicidal co-pilot started tragic dive and when captain get back to the flight deck wasn't able to stop his actions. Door is not the key. It was just a factor. The real cause was (most probably) deliberate action from FO. Planned and cold blood (should say steady breath) executed.

And mental condition is a separate case. I really doubt he could be as sick as some delusional, psychotic person who see things and hear things. These types of diseases are very easy recognizable, visible to environment.
More likely he was an APD. And depression fueled by personal and professional problems was a trigger.

[CodyBlade]

A little bit of filtering and amplification would surely give you the breathing.

Correct and when analyzing sound a spectrum analyzer give a 'visual picture' of frequencies of interest.

Example:

Cockpit background noise will have it's own frequency plot.
Aural alarms will have it's own frequency plot.
Electrical seat movement will have it's own frequency plot.
Someone banging cockpit will have own plot.
Breathing thru Full face mask will have it's own frequency plot.

A spectrum analyzer can differentiate all these.

[ExSp33db1rd]

That nothing has changed over the last 30-40 years I also find quite troubling.

Why, I can't recall us having the problem 40 years ago, If It Weren't Broke Then, Don't Fix It Now, leave what was working well alone ? One Swallow Does Not Make A Summer.

When was the first recorded incident of a pilot trying to commit suicide with a shed load of innocent passengers on board ? I have a vague recollection of a JAL DC-8 landing short, (or nearly landing short ?) at the old Haneda Airport?
( I know, I could Giggle it but Life's too short and I'm sure someone will do it !)

Maybe the first pilot who would have been accused of attempting suicide with an aeroplane as an accessory was Lindbergh ? I doubt that he would pass any of today's Risk Assessment modules now being forced upon the flying community.

I was once asked if the fact that I had responsibility for 300-400 lives weighed heavily on me ? I replied not, what weighed most heavily on my mind was my own survival, I flew the bit of the aeroplane that I could see in front of me, the rest just followed ! I flew the freighter aircraft with as much professionalism and responsibility as the passenger models. I guess that's where the term SLF comes from ?

[Denti]

IF you are hired by Germanwings, can you move to regular Lufthansa or not?

Yes. You can move to lufthansa mainline or lufthansa cargo if there are openings and the initial fleet freeze is over.

IF you just quit, is there still a requirement to repay the mortgage on the flight training?

Probably, but i have to say i don't know really, it is not a case that is usually considered.

There is something about that statistic I really do not like. It might tell us how good the selection filter is, but it might also be telling us how doggedly they hold to their initial, possibly incorrect, assessments

During my time there they had a formalized procedure how to deal with cadets that didn't show the required performance. Pretty similar to what most airlines do with normal pilots that flunk their simulator or line checks. Even for us non-Lufthansa cadets that paid for their own training it wasn't different and they had no problems at all to to let anyone go if his performance wasn't good enough, even if it meant a loss of revenue for them.

[Sawbones62]

FDR

flynerd:

Dont let the scorched appearance fool you - the FDR is tough, I got to see them being built at the L3 factory in Sarasota, the steel "pot" the memory chips live in is well insulated and built to be cooked - rated as "50,000 BTU/sq. ft./hr. for 60 min. at 1100° C; 10 hrs. at 260° C"...so I expect it will be okay.

[toffeez]

FDR

The Marseille prosecutor said yesterday that the condition of the FDR leaves open a "possibility" that the data is usable. It is now in the hands of the BEA for analysis.

[Wader2]

Flynerd the FDR, number of phones recovered, bodies of all individuals on identified, all discussed here hours ago.

[nsmith]

@ExSp33db1rd

Quote:
That nothing has changed over the last 30-40 years I also find quite troubling.
Why, I can't recall us having the problem 40 years ago, If It Weren't Broke Then, Don't Fix It Now, leave what was working well alone ? One Swallow Does Not Make A Summer.

When was the first recorded incident of a pilot trying to commit suicide with a shed load of innocent passengers on board ? I have a vague recollection of a JAL DC-8 landing short, (or nearly landing short ?) at the old Haneda Airport?
( I know, I could Giggle it but Life's too short and I'm sure someone will do it !)

Maybe the first pilot who would have been accused of attempting suicide with an aeroplane as an accessory was Lindbergh ? I doubt that he would pass any of today's Risk Assessment modules now being forced upon the flying community.

I was once asked if the fact that I had responsibility for 300-400 lives weighed heavily on me ? I replied not, what weighed most heavily on my mind was my own survival, I flew the bit of the aeroplane that I could see in front of me, the rest just followed ! I flew the freighter aircraft with as much professionalism and responsibility as the passenger models. I guess that's where the term SLF comes from ?

I feel that I must have missed something here, but nothing about my comment had anything to do with suicide. The only point I wanted to make was that when someone claims that they have an entry filter for flight training that is so good that it only results in a subsequent 2% drop out, the reason for this may not be as benign as it sounds. And when I hear that over 30-40 years this never varied, it only amplifies my suspicion that this statistic may be misleading.

[GXER]

@kcockayne

The decision to impose a "2 in the cockpit at all times" policy is, though understandable, a thoroughly "knee jerk" reaction by authorities etc. who "have to be seen doing something" - no matter that it only complicates the situation & does not, necessarily , do anything to increase cockpit security.
It is, for the reason that it does not guarantee anything effective to avoid or overcome the problem, & for the fact that it was hastily (& unthinkingly) set up," Kneejerk".
It is unthinking because 1) it introduces another person to the cockpit (who might, in fact, be the perpetrator of this kind of action), 2)that person may be physically unable to overcome the remaining pilot, 3) that person is totally unqualified to recognise a problem caused by the remaining pilot's actions 4) &, unable to take corrective action, 5) make matters worse, 6) far from your simple explanation of being able to open the door for the returning pilot- be totally incapable of doing even that.
Indeed, I should imagine that such a person's presence & influence would be limited to a very slight deterrent to a pilot with such intent.
What do you really expect a lady stewardess, or a weakly built steward, or a lady pilot to physically be able to do to stop a more powerful (& technically capable) pilot from doing what he is suicidally bent on doing !?
The only way a third person in the cockpit would be reliably capable of stopping such actions would be if HE was a type rated, physically superior, pilot ( & then preferably if there were 2 of them - one to overcome the "suicidal pilot" & the other to correct his actions & fly the a/c).
Otherwise, forget it !
These sort of problems need calm, careful, reflective & exhaustive examination & problem solving to overcome. The whole history of the reaction to this terrible disaster & the piecemeal release of information by the investigators have complicated the very investigation that is taking place. It may even have jeopardised an eventual objective outcome ! (By releasing facts & info. ehich should not be in the public domain.
Certainly, I prefer the DLH Chief Executive's more measured approach & reaction - even if he may have appeared a little insensitive at times !

I appreciate the time you have taken to respond but I disagree with nearly all your objections. The central fact is that implementation of the "two persons" principle makes it far more difficult, by orders of magnitude, for a Lubitz inclined pilot to repeat that specific method of self-destruction. Dealing with your specific objections:

1. CC are given access to the FD anyway to deliver refreshments so the risk of one with evil intent is not much changed whether there to act as door opener or to deliver a cup of coffee.

2. Physically limited possibly but that also applies to captain v FO or vice versa, so no change there.

3. In any event, as I understand the sole pilot is supposed to be always at the controls and strapped in when the other has left FD. The CC only needs to be standing at the door ready to allow access and can call for assistance immediately if the remaining pilot makes any move to leave the controls.

4. I would agree that CC will often not be qualified to judge the remaining pilot's actions but that's not part of the requirement. The job is simply to guard the door and re-open it to the absent pilot.

5. How can CC standing at the door make matters worse?

6. As I understand, turning the handle from the inside over-rides any other lock so the CC at the door will ALWAYS be able to open the door.

Not one of your objection stands up to scrutiny. Moreover, if it is not an improvement, why was the "two persons" rule implemented by some regulators and some carriers even before last week. The answer is simple - it provides another layer of protection; one that quite probably would have prevented Lubitz from doing what he did, or at least not as easily.

[Pace]

1. CC are given access to the FD anyway to deliver refreshments so the risk of one with evil intent is not much changed whether there to act as door opener or to deliver a cup of coffee.

And 1000s of FOs have access to the cockpit too every day and that risk had not changed till it happened

The risk of a rogue CC because of the ease of becoming CC compared to going through all the training to gain an ATPL surely has to be greater?

Like with the FO because it hasn't happened does not mean it won't happen
You are replacing one risk factor with another greater risk to remove a tiny risk factor of another FO doing the same awful deed. That stinks of knee jerk reaction public perception reaction with no statistical in crease in safety

Infact by placing CC in the flight deck with only one pilot there alone you have probably increase the chance of a terrorist crash slightly higher than the chance of another FO doing the same

it provides another layer of protection; one that quite probably would have prevented Lubitz from doing what he did, or at least not as easily.

What would have prevented Lubitz doing what he did would have been the Captain being able to access the cockpit and the rogue FO not having the ability to lock him out! A terrorist within using a system designed to stop a terrorist without. The police discovered that he had been refreshing his knowledge of the locking over ride systems on his computer at home in what was a planned suicide mass murder

[captainsmiffy]

Lets face it, if I wanted to take the aircraft and 'do a lubitz' then all I have to do is to put the aircraft in an unusual position, roll it inverted etc. nobody but nobody will get through that door under the loads imposed on the aircraft.....whether the door is guarded or not. We have to face facts, the aircraft can always be taken by one of its pilots. This two in the cockpit thing is a complete waste of time. Have always wondered why pilots are parted from their sharp items through security, dont need them to cause a catastrophe.

[Tokyo Geoff]

I appreciate the time you have taken to respond but I disagree with nearly all your objections. The central fact is that implementation of the "two persons" principle makes it far more difficult, by orders of magnitude, for a Lubitz inclined pilot to repeat that specific method of self-destruction.

The recent disclosures that Lubitz had been researching suicide and the door lock mechanism means he planned this in advance. If you make this *specific* method of murder-suicide harder the next Lubitz will simply choose another method. As plenty of pilots have said, there are many options to bring down an airliner as PF.

So changing the rule to "two in cockpit" doesn't prevent the next Lubitz but does open up the possibility of a rogue CC having only one pilot to take out, instead of two. It doesn't seem to be a well considered change.

[NigelOnDraft]

1. CC are given access to the FD anyway to deliver refreshments so the risk of one with evil intent is not much changed whether there to act as door opener or to deliver a cup of coffee

Typically with 2 pilots on the Flt Deck, not one.

3. In any event, as I understand the sole pilot is supposed to be always at the controls and strapped in when the other has left FD. The CC only needs to be standing at the door ready to allow access and can call for assistance immediately if the remaining pilot makes any move to leave the controls.

Exactly - the CC now knows they will get access to the Flt Deck, they know there will only be one pilot with them, strapped in, and they know they can override the Capt's command and controls to allow anyone access to the Flt Deck.

4. I would agree that CC will often not be qualified to judge the remaining pilot's actions but that's not part of the requirement. The job is simply to guard the door and re-open it to the anyone

And with a guarantee they can override anybody else in order to do so.

Moreover, if it is not an improvement, why was the "two persons" rule implemented by some regulators and some carriers even before last week. The answer is simple -

Yes it is - a PR stunt, and if you actually read the EASA/CAA recommendation, you will see the "2 in the Flt Deck" recommendation was only after a review of the risk assessment, and as part of that risk assessment. Some airlines managed, and announced that review conveniently for TV deadlines rather than safety IMO.

[PAXfips]

Ticker on german newschannel N24 just reads:
"FDR data verifies copilot acted deliberatly"
no details given yet.

Isnt that a bit quick for data read out and analysis?

[toffeez]

FDR

The BEA has said the FDR is readable and confirms the (up to now supposed) actions of the FO